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Abnormals > AB.CC-0001 — Loss of Component Cooling Water

AB.CC-0001 — Loss of Component Cooling Water

⚠️ DRAFT

AB.CC-0001 — Loss of Component Cooling Water

Purpose

Provides operator actions for responding to a loss of Component Cooling Water, including identification of thermal barrier rupture and RCP protection.

Key Actions / Information

Exam — 2023 Q4
Thermal barrier rupture indications: R17 A/B CCW radiation monitors in warning, CCW surge tank level rising, CC131 thermal barrier valve closes on high CCW flow.
Exam — 2022 Q5
1CC190 is on the COMMON CCW return line — isolates ALL RCP thermal barriers. Individual RCP isolation is via CC130 valves, not 1CC190. RCPs may continue running if charging flow is maintained.
Exam — 2022 Q8
Attachment 1 — RCP motor bearing temperature limit 175°F for reactor trip and stopping affected RCP. AB.RCP-0001 Attachment 1 also uses motor bearing temp > 175°F.
Exam — 2023 Q59
Per S1.OP-AB.CC-0001, components supplied by CCW with pressure less than CCW header pressure are sources for system-to-system out leakage (e.g., Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger). A tube rupture in the SFP HX results in CCW leaking OUT into the SFP system, causing CCW Surge Tank level to lower and SFP level to rise. The non-borated CCW water will reduce SFP boron concentration, requiring addition of borated water.
Exam — 2022 Q35
Attachment 1: CCW surge tank level at 5% requires reactor trip, tripping ALL RCPs, isolating letdown, and swapping charging suction to RWST.
Exam — 2020 Q34
Thermal barrier HX leak alarm pattern: CC HDR ACTIVITY HI + SURGE TANK LEVEL HI-LO + DISCHARGE FLOW LO = unique signature of 2CC131 automatic closure. The DISCHARGE FLOW HI alarm fires first (RCS in-leakage increases CCW flow), auto-closes 2CC131, then DISCHARGE FLOW LO follows. The Hi alarm was acknowledged and is presently clear. Letdown HX leak would show activity and level alarms but NOT the Discharge Flow Lo pattern — no auto-isolation valve on the letdown HX CCW line.
Exam — 2020 Q78
Per Attachment 1, three RCP protection time limits on loss of CCW:
1. Motor bearing temperature reaches 175°F → stop RCPs (calculate from initial temp + rate of rise)
2. CCW Surge Tank Level cannot be maintained > 38% → immediately stop RCPs
3. 5 minutes after "RCP BRG CLG WTR FLO LO" alarms (OHAs D-20 through D-23) → stop RCPs
Trap: the 175°F limit is the EARLIEST action if bearing temp is rising fast. In the exam scenario: 140°F at T+0 rising at 5°F/min → 175°F at T+7 min. The low flow alarms at T+5 add another 5 min = T+10 min. The surge tank criterion (38%) was already recovered. So 175°F limit (1007) is the controlling action.
Exam — 2018 Q7
Per Step 3.8 NOTE: "Allowing CCW Surge Tank to overflow will contaminate the in-service Waste Holdup Tank and the 22 ABV Exhaust Filter Unit." 2CC149 (Surge Tank Vent Valve) automatically closes on 2R17A/B high radiation alarm. 2CC149 is normally OPEN. CCW Surge Tank overflow contaminates two components — the Waste Holdup Tank AND the 22 ABV Exhaust Filter Unit. Missing the exhaust filter unit is a common error.
Exam — 2019 Q8
Confirms 2018 Q7: 2CC149 auto-closes on 2R17A/B high radiation alarm. Surge Tank overflow contaminates both the Waste Holdup Tank and the 22 ABV Exhaust Filter Unit.
Exam — 2019 Q87
CCW pump trips in MODE 5 (RCS at Water Elevation 103.5 feet): when 22 and 23 CCW Pumps trip causing CC Header Low Pressure alarms, the abnormal procedures network requires concurrent performance of AB.CC-0001 AND AB.RHR-0001 (not AB.RHR-0002). Trap: AB.RHR-0002 (Loss of RHR at Reduced Inventory) would apply only if RCS Water Elevation is 101 feet or less. At 103.5 feet the plant is NOT at reduced inventory, so AB.RHR-0001 applies.
JPM — 2019 Sim-h
Alternate path JPM: CCW leak inside containment progresses beyond makeup capability. Operator enters AB.CC-0001, opens 2DR107 for CCW Surge Tank makeup, progresses through leak isolation steps (close 2CC113 Exc LHX Outlet). At step 3.24, when CCW Surge Tank level cannot be maintained >5%: transition to Attachment 2 — Stop RCPs and Isolate CCW to CNTMT. Attachment 2 actions: trip reactor, stop ALL RCPs, close 2CC131 (RCP Therm Bar), 2CC136 (RCP CLG OIL CLR Outlet), 2CC190 containment isolation valves, then GO TO EOP-TRIP-1.
Exam — 2018 Q54
CCW leak location diagnosis using chemistry: per AB.CC-0001, "Any inleakage will dilute CC System Chromates and SW inleakage will increase Chloride concentration." Key discriminator: rising chloride = Service Water inleakage → leak is in the CC Heat Exchanger (where SW and CCW interface). All CCW inleakage sources cause surge tank level to rise and chromate to lower, but only the CC HX is cooled by SW. Trap: Seal Water HX, Letdown HX, and Charging Pump also interface with CCW, but none use SW — they would cause chromate dilution without chloride increase.
Exam — 2018 Q95
Per S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 CAS items, the 5-minute timer applies to the RCP BRG CLG WTR FLO LO alarm: if the alarm is still valid after 5 minutes, perform Attachment 2 (Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps). Trap: the 2-minute CAS timer applies only when RCP Seal Injection Flow AND RCP Thermal Barrier Component Cooling flow are lost concurrently — not for the BRG CLG WTR FLO LO alarm alone. Per Attachment 2: if Reactor Trip Breakers are CLOSED, the crew MUST manually TRIP the Reactor prior to stopping the affected RCPs — even if the plant is in MODE 3 with all rods fully inserted. Trap: candidates may think a manual trip is unnecessary because rods are already in, but the procedure requires it whenever RTBs are closed.

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