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Exams > 2018 NRC Operating Exam

2018 NRC Operating Exam

⚠️ DRAFT

2018 NRC Operating Exam

Overview

  • Exam: SALEM 2018 NRC Exam — 16-01 ILOT (Op-Test 16-01)
  • Admin JPMs (RO): 4
  • Admin JPMs (SRO): 5
  • Simulator JPMs: 8
  • In-Plant JPMs: 3
  • Simulator Scenarios: 2

View Operating Test PDF

JPMs

Simulator Scenarios

JPM RO-A1 — Perform a Manual AFD Calculation Admin | RO/SRO | G2.1.25 (3.9)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 completed a down power to 73% power today at 0830 IAW TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d due to a single control rod being declared inoperable.
- The AFD Monitor Alarm for the Auxiliary Annunciator was determined to be inoperable at 0840.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to perform a manual AFD calculation IAW Section 5.3 of S2.OP-ST.NIS-0001 (Q), Power Distribution — Axial Flux Difference.
- Current AFD Channel Console Readings are:
  Channel I: -9.8
  Channel II: -9.7
  Channel III: -10.3
  Channel IV: -10.5
- All prerequisites are completed SAT.
- NOTIFY the CRS of the results of the surveillance after completing Step 5.3.1.F.
Task Standard:
1. Completes applicable portion of Attachment 3 of S2.OP-ST.NIS-0001, and determines Channel III and IV are operating outside the AFD Target Band.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.3.1 IF AFD Monitor (XA-8740) OR Monitor Alarm (Auxiliary Annunciator) is inoperable, THEN COMPLETE Attachment 3 Operator uses Attachment 3 to determine AFD.
5.3.1.A ENTER present Reactor Power Operator enters 73% power.
5.3.1.B ENTER AFD Target from S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Tables, Table 3 Operator enters (-1.5) for AFD Target using the Salem 2 Cycle 23 REM, Table 3.
5.3.1.C * CALCULATE the AFD Target value IAW (Present Power / 100) x (AFD Target) Calculates AFD Target for present power level: (73/100) x (-1.5) = -1.095. IAW P&L 3.2, round to first decimal place = -1.1.
5.3.1.D * DETERMINE Upper and Lower Limits using Target Band values from REM Table 3 Upper Limit: +6.0 + (-1.1) = +4.9. Lower Limit: -9.0 + (-1.1) = -10.1.
5.3.1.E ENTER AFD Channel Readings Enters AFD values from initial conditions on Attachment 3: Ch I: -9.8, Ch II: -9.7, Ch III: -10.3, Ch IV: -10.5.
5.3.1.F * DETERMINE channels within/outside AFD Target Band and notify CRS Determines Channels III (-10.3) and IV (-10.5) are operating outside the Lower Target Band limit of -10.1. Notifies CRS of results.
Key Decision Point:
Step 5.3.1.F is the discriminating step. After calculating the AFD Target (-1.1) and determining the Lower Limit (-10.1), the applicant must compare each channel reading against the limits. Channels I (-9.8) and II (-9.7) are within the band. Channels III (-10.3) and IV (-10.5) are MORE NEGATIVE than the Lower Limit of -10.1, placing them outside the target band. With two AFD channels outside the target band, TS action is required to reduce reactor power.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.NIS-0001 (Rev 13), Salem 2 Cycle 23 REM (Rev 17), Salem Unit 2 COLR Cycle 23 (Rev 7) | Task: N0150010201 | K/A: G2.1.25 — Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A2 — Channel Check of Reactor Coolant Temperatures Admin | RO/SRO | G2.1.18 (3.6)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 5 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 is at 100% reactor power.
- Control room log readings IAW S2.OP-DL.ZZ-0003, Control Room Log (Modes 1-4), is in progress.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- PERFORM the 1830 log readings using the control room log sheet provided.
- 2CC1 Console Readings for OTDT Setpoint are:
RC LoopOTDT (deg F)
21 (TI411C)74
22 (TI421C)78
23 (TI431C)75
24 (TI441C)72

- NOTIFY the CRS when log readings are complete.
Task Standard:
1. Completes the 1830 log readings for 21 thru 24 OTDT Setpoints and Tavg Channel Checks.
2. Determines 24 Loop OTDT Setpoint is UNSAT.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
CUE RC Loop Average Temperature Channel Check Tavg temps provided on log sheet: Loop 21 = 573.2 F, Loop 22 = 575.2 F, Loop 23 = 574.5 F, Loop 24 = 574.8 F.
Tavg * 21-24 AVE TEMP CHANNEL CHECK — IF all 4 loop average temperatures are within 3 degrees F, THEN RECORD "SAT" Operator determines all Tavg temps within 3 degrees F (max spread: 575.2 - 573.2 = 2.0 F) and records "SAT". S/R 4.3.2.1.1 applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3.
OTDT 21 * RECORD console OTDT indication for Loop 21. Must be within REM OTDT Setpoint Band. Records OTDT setpoint on log sheet. Evaluates using REM FIGURE 5A and determines 21 Loop OTDT setpoint is within the OTDT setpoint band.
OTDT 22 * RECORD console OTDT indication for Loop 22. Must be within REM OTDT Setpoint Band. Records OTDT setpoint on log sheet. Evaluates using REM FIGURE 5B and determines 22 Loop OTDT setpoint is within the OTDT setpoint band.
OTDT 23 * RECORD console OTDT indication for Loop 23. Must be within REM OTDT Setpoint Band. Records OTDT setpoint on log sheet. Evaluates using REM FIGURE 5C and determines 23 Loop OTDT setpoint is within the OTDT setpoint band.
OTDT 24 * RECORD console OTDT indication for Loop 24. Must be within REM OTDT Setpoint Band. Records OTDT setpoint on log sheet. Evaluates using REM FIGURE 5D and determines 24 Loop OTDT setpoint is NOT within the OTDT setpoint band. Informs CRS that Loop 24 OTDT setpoint is outside the REM setpoint band.
Key Decision Point:
The OTDT 24 step is the discriminating step. All four loops' OTDT console readings must be compared against the REM Reactor Engineering Manual FIGURE 5 (A-D) setpoint bands. Loops 21, 22, and 23 are within their respective bands. Loop 24 OTDT setpoint of 72 deg F is outside the REM FIGURE 5D setpoint band — the applicant must recognize this, record it as UNSAT (or red-circle it), and notify the CRS. The Tavg Channel Check is SAT (all within 3 deg F), but the OTDT check fails on Loop 24.
Ref: S2.OP-DL.ZZ-0003 (Rev 109), Salem 2 Cycle 23 REM (Rev 17) | Task: S302000115 | K/A: G2.1.18 — Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A3 — Perform a Manual QPTR Calculation Admin | RO/SRO | G2.1.43 (4.1) | Alternate Path
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 20 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when rod 204 dropped fully into the core.
- OHAs E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR, and E-38 UPPER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR, are both illuminated.
- The crew has entered S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002, Dropped Rod, and is making preparations to perform a load reduction to < 75% Rated Thermal Power to comply with Tech Spec 3.1.3.1, Action c.3.d.

Initiating Cue:
- The CRS has directed you to PERFORM a Manual QPTR Calculation IAW S2.OP-ST.NIS-0002, Power Distribution — Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio.
- The Lower and Upper NI Detector current readings are:
Upper DetectorsLower Detectors
N41184181
N42192198
N43182174
N44139142

- NOTIFY the CRS with the results of the surveillance.
Task Standard:
1. Perform the QPTR and calculates the highest QPTR as UNSAT (highest N42T AND N42B) with a value of 1.025 and 1.023 respectively (acceptable range +/- 0.002).
2. Identifies Maximum Power Tilt exceeds 1.02 and enters T/S 3.2.4.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
3.0 Read Precautions and Limitations 3.1-3.5 Operator reads and initials Precautions and Limitations.
5.1.1 IF one PR channel is inoperable, AND RTP is > 75%, THEN ... Determines all PR channels are operable; step is N/A.
5.1.2 RECORD date, time, reactor power, and reason for performing QPTR on Attachment 2 Records current date, time, 100% reactor power, and checks OHA E-46 as reason for performance in Attachment 2.
5.1.3 RECORD NI Channels N-41 through N-44 Upper and Lower Detector currents and 100% NI Current Values from S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0011, Table 2 Records N41-44 upper and lower detector currents from initial conditions and 100% NI current values from REM Table 2 on Attachment 1.
5.1.4 * Complete Attachment 1 QPTR calculations Calculates Detector Ratio for each top and bottom detector. Adds detector ratios to get Sum. Divides Sum by number of operable detectors (4) to get Average Detector Ratios. Divides each detector ratio by average to get Power Tilt for each detector.
5.1.5 * RECORD Power Tilt on Attachment 2 for each detector. Maximum Power Tilt and applicable detector identification. Test Results SAT or UNSAT. Maximum Power Tilt for N42T = 1.025 and N42B = 1.023 (+/- 0.002). Marks UNSAT.
5.1.6 DIRECT a second Operator to perform Independent Verification of calculations in Attachment 1 CUE: IV is complete SAT.
5.1.7 * IF Maximum Power Tilt for any detector exceeds 1.02, THEN REFER to T/S 3.2.4 for corrective actions Determines maximum power tilt exceeds 1.02 and determines entry into Tech Spec 3.2.4 IS required.
5.3.1-5.3.2 * Surveillance is UNSAT. RECORD NOTF number(s) AND the reason for unsatisfactory completion. Determines surveillance is UNSAT. CRS will initiate the NOTF and notify Reactor Engineering.
Key Decision Point:
Steps 5.1.5 and 5.1.7 are the discriminating steps. After performing the multi-step calculation, the applicant must determine that the Maximum Power Tilt (N42T = 1.025, N42B = 1.023) exceeds the TS 3.2.4 limit of 1.02. The dropped rod (204) causes asymmetric flux distribution in the N42 quadrant. The applicant must mark the surveillance UNSAT and identify entry into TS 3.2.4 for corrective actions. This is an alternate path JPM because the expectation is a SAT surveillance, but the plant data drives an UNSAT result.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.NIS-0002 (Rev 14), S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0011 Salem 2 Cycle 23 REM (Rev 17), Tech Spec 3.2.4 (QPTR) | Task: N0150020201 | K/A: G2.1.43 — Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A4 — Activate ERDS IAW EP-SA-111-F8 Admin | RO/SRO | G2.4.43 (3.2)
Location: Simulator / Perform
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 5 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 was manually tripped from 100% power due to an RCS leak.
- Safety Injection was manually initiated and all ECCS pumps are running.
- The Shift Manager has declared an ALERT.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Work Control NCO and designated Secondary Communicator.
- ACTIVATE ERDS IAW Step 1.2.b of EP-SA-111-F8, Secondary Communicator Log.
- Notify the Shift Manager when ERDS is activated.
Task Standard:
Activates ERDS IAW EP-SA-111-F8.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.2.b Within 60 minutes, ACTIVATE ERDS from a LAN computer Operator proceeds to ERDS XXX computer located inside Salem Simulator horseshoe area.
1.2.b.1 * PROCEED to a computer labeled "ERDS XXX" and START the program by SELECTING the ERDS_Salem desktop icon Operator selects the ERDS_Salem desktop icon.
1.2.b.2 * On the "Login For ERDS Display" popup window ENTER the PASSWORD and SELECT "Login" to proceed Operator enters the PASSWORD and selects "Login" to proceed.
1.2.b.3 * SELECT the Action button labeled <CONNECT> for Salem 2 "ERDS Link Control and Status Display Screen" Operator selects the button labeled <CONNECT> for Salem 2 "ERDS Link Control and Status Display Screen".
1.2.b.4 * SELECT the <YES> button in the "Current Link Control State is Disconnect. Do You Want To Connect?" box Operator selects <YES> button in the confirmation dialog.
1.2.b.5 * OBSERVE that Status changes to "Transmitting Data" Operator checks that the Status changes to "Transmitting Data".
1.2.b.6 * VERIFY successful communications status by observing that the "Messages Sent" value is increasing from zero "0" to some positive integer > "0" Operator verifies that the "Messages Sent" value is increasing from zero "0" to some positive integer > "0".
1.2.b.7 INFORM the CRS of successful ERDS activation status Notifies CRS/SM that ERDS is activated.
Key Decision Point:
Step 1.2.b.3 is the discriminating step — the applicant must select the correct unit (Salem 2) ERDS Link Control and Status Display Screen, since the initial conditions state Unit 2 experienced the manual trip and RCS leak. Selecting Salem 1 would be an incorrect action. This same discriminating step appears in the 2020 and 2023 ERDS activation JPMs.
Ref: EP-SA-111-F8 (Rev 6) | Task: N1240110501 | K/A: G2.4.43 — Knowledge of emergency communications systems and techniques | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A1 — Isolate Non-Essential Chilled Water Loads Admin | SRO | G2.1.25 (4.2)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- It is July 15th time 1800 and you have just assumed the watch as the Unit 2 CRS. It was turned over that both 21 and 22 Chillers tripped at 1600 and you are currently in T/S 3.7.10 action 'b', entered at 1600.
- To comply with the T/S action, the crew is implementing S2.OP-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation, Section 4.6, Isolation of Non-Essential Heat Loads.
- During preparations to align #2 ECAC cooling to Service Water IAW S2.OP-SO.CA-0001, Control Air System Operation, it was reported that the spool pieces required to align to service water cannot be located.
- Unit 2 CREACS has been removed from service IAW step 4.6.2 of S2.OP-SO.CH-0001.
- CW Inlet Water Temperature Readings from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(Q), Circulating / Service Water Log are:
  2TL3756 = 83.4°F
  2TL3757 = 83.6°F

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Unit 2 CRS.
- The Shift Manager directs you to NOT isolate the #2 ECAC and to re-perform the Non-Essential heat load determination IAW Attachment 2.
- DETERMINE the total Non-Essential heat load and SELECT the required components for isolation IAW S2.OP-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation, Attachment 2 to comply with Tech Specs.
Task Standard:
1. Determines the Total Heat Load Isolation value required is 902.8 kBTU/HR.
2. Selects the required components on Table B for isolation and ensures that the total value is greater than 902.8 kBTU/HR.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
Att 2 1.A RECORD inlet water temperature data for Table A from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(Q) Enters temperatures from cue sheet (2TL3756 = 83.4°F, 2TL3757 = 83.6°F). Records highest temperature (83.6°F) and adds 1.5°F for instrument uncertainty = 85.1°F.
Att 2 1.B RECORD number of inoperable Chiller Units Lists 2 Chillers Inoperable.
1.C * RECORD the TOTAL HEAT LOAD ISOLATION from Table A From Table A, determines 902.8 kBTU/HR based on inlet water temp of 85.1°F, 2 chillers inoperable, in Maintenance Mode with Unit 2 EACS Out of Service.
1.D IDENTIFY the components to be isolated in Table B Selects non-essential loads for isolation.
1.E * RECORD heat load values from Table B into Isolation column for selected components Selects values from Table B: 21 PACU = 145.7, 22 PACU = 145.7, 23 PACU = 145.7, Secondary Lab = 192.1, Primary Lab = 165.9, Counting Room = 73.0, PASS = 38.5. Selects N/A for ECAC per SM direction.
1.F * ADD values recorded in Isolation column and RECORD Total Isolation value Determines Total Heat Load Isolation per Table B is 906.6 kBTU/HR.
1.G * ENSURE Total Isolation value (Table B) is greater than or equal to Total Heat Load Isolation (Step 1.C) Determines 906.6 kBTU/HR > 902.8 kBTU/HR — isolation is adequate.
1.1 ISOLATE the selected components IAW Section 4.6 of this procedure CUE: The NCO will isolate the selected components IAW Section 4.6.
Key Decision Point:
Step 1.C is the first discriminating element — the applicant must correctly enter Table A using 85.1°F (highest CW temp 83.6°F + 1.5°F instrument uncertainty), 2 chillers inoperable, and Maintenance Mode with EACS out of service to determine 902.8 kBTU/HR. Step 1.E is the second key decision — the applicant must select enough non-essential loads to exceed 902.8 kBTU/HR while keeping the ECAC available per SM direction. The specific combination totaling 906.6 kBTU/HR excludes the ECAC. This is the same JPM concept as the 2022 SRO-A1 (identical initial conditions, values, and procedure).
Ref: S2.OP-SO.CH-0001 (Rev 34), S2.OP-SO.CA-0001, SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(Q) | Task: 0980020202 | K/A: G2.1.25 — Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A2 — Determine Heat Stress Requirements Admin | SRO | G2.1.26 (3.6)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power
- 2PS3, PZR Spray Valve, is operating erratically and a decision has been made to enter containment to isolate the 2PS3 by closing the manual isolation valve (2PS28)
- The 2PS28 is located inside the PZR housing (dog house), upper elevation, and is known to be very physically demanding on the operators to operate. Two operators will be required to simultaneously operate the valve using a valve wrench during the entire valve operation. Operators will also have to climb ladders to access the 2PS28 in the dog house
- The Shift Manager needs to determine the amount of resources needed to close this valve given the Heat Stress conditions
- Rad Pro has provided a Wet Bulb Globe Thermometer (WBGT) temperature of 89 F for the work area
- Rad Pro has determined that operators will need to wear double PCs
- Cooling Garments will not be used

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor
- DETERMINE the following using SA-AA-111, Heat Stress Control:
  1. What is the Stay Time?
  2. Assume the task will need more time and Check Times will be used. What is the Maximum Extended Stay Time?
  3. Assume the task required the use of the maximum extended stay time. What is the Recovery Time?
- Provide your answers on the Initiating Cue sheet
Task Standard:
Determines: Stay Time = 20 mins, Maximum Extended Stay Time = 30 mins, and Recovery Time = 90 mins.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
4.1.1 OBTAIN the WBGT temperature for the work location and RECORD on Attachment 4 CRS records WBGT of 89 F from initial conditions on Attachment 4
4.1 * CLASSIFY the work environment as High Temperature, Very High Temperature, or Extremely High Temperature. RECORD in line 3 of Attachment 4 Classifies environment as High Temperature based on work area temperature of 89 F
4.2 * DETERMINE Work Rate using Attachment 2, Work Rate Metabolism Guideline. RECORD results in line 4 of Attachment 4 Determines Work Rate = HIGH based on: sustained heavy physical work (valve wrench operation, climbing ladders, two operators required) for >50% of work time inside PZR dog house
4.3 DETERMINE clothing ensemble and adjustment factor Determines clothing = Double Cloth Coveralls (double PCs) with adjustment factor of +9 F to WBGT
4.4 * DETERMINE the Stay Time using WBGT/Dry Bulb value from 4.1, work rate from 4.2, and clothing ensemble from 4.3. RECORD in line 6 of Attachment 4 Effective WBGT = 89 F + 9 F = 98 F. Using Attachment 3 with WBGT 98 F and High work demand: Stay Time = 20 min
4.6 * DETERMINE the Maximum Extended Stay Time (1.5 x ST) Maximum Extended Stay Time = 1.5 x 20 mins = 30 mins
4.8 * DETERMINE the Recovery Time. RECORD in line 12 of Attachment 4 Recovery Time = (Actual Work Time / Stay Time) x 60 = (30 / 20) x 60 = 90 mins
Key Decision Point:
Step 4.2 is the discriminating step. The applicant must classify the work rate as HIGH (not Moderate) based on the initial conditions describing sustained heavy physical work — operating a valve wrench, climbing ladders, two operators required simultaneously, in the physically demanding PZR dog house environment. High Work Rate is defined as sustained heavy physical exertion for >50% of work time. Moderate activities involving negative pressure air-purifying respirators also classify as High, but that is not the basis here. The entire calculation chain depends on correctly identifying HIGH work rate, which then drives the Stay Time of 20 minutes (vs. a longer time for Moderate), the Extended Stay Time of 30 minutes, and the Recovery Time of 90 minutes.
Ref: SA-AA-111 (Rev. 12) | Task: N1220400302 | K/A: G2.1.26 — Knowledge of industrial safety procedures | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A3 — Determine Technical Specification Action Admin | SRO | G2.2.13 (4.3)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 1 is at 100% power
- No Tech Specs are currently active
- 11 Charging pump 405p surveillance was just completed
- Following the surveillance, excessive leakage from the pump seal was noted by the field operator
- The Work Control NCO is preparing a Tagout package as part of the TAGOUT INITIATION section of OP-AA-109-115 and has requested you to review the marked up drawing for adequate blocking points
- The charging pump will be removed from service IAW S1.OP-SO.CVC-0002, CHARGING PUMP OPERATION

Initiating Cue:
- You are the extra SRO
- REVIEW the blocking points on the supplied drawing AND DETERMINE the following using ONLY the provided drawing and procedures:
  1. Are the blocking points on the supplied drawing adequate to isolate the equipment to be worked?
  2. Justify your answer
  3. What are the applicable Tech Specs for the removal of the component?
Task Standard:
1. Identifies the following discrepancies from DWG 205228:
  a. 1CV81 is not a selected Blocking Point
  b. 1CV136 is not a selected Blocking Point
  c. 1CV356 is not a selected Blocking Point (2nd vent path)
2. Identifies T/S 3.5.2 as applicable LCO.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 * Review provided drawing for adequate Blocking Points — identify 1CV81 missing 1CV81, 11 CHG PUMP DISCH VALVE, is NOT listed as a Blocking Point and position should be CLOSED (see S1.OP-SO.CVC-0002 step 4.9.4.2). Both 1CV48 and 1CV81 are required to be closed to isolate the discharge of 11 Charging pump.
2 * Identify 1CV136 missing from Blocking Points 1CV136, 11 CHG PUMP RECIRC STOP VALVE, is NOT listed as a Blocking Point and position should be CLOSED (see S1.OP-SO.CVC-0002 step 4.9.4.4). 1CV135 is a check valve and incorrectly used as a Blocking Point on the recirc flow line.
3 * Identify 1CV356 missing from Blocking Points 1CV356, CHG PUMP SUCT VENT, is NOT listed as a Blocking Point and position should be OPEN (see S1.OP-SO.CVC-0002 step 4.9.4.7). Both 1CV356 and 1CV45 need to be OPEN to properly vent and drain. OP-AA-109-115, Attachment 2, page 71: liquid systems shall have a minimum of one vent and drain tagged.
4 * Evaluate applicable Tech Specs for removal of component Identifies T/S 3.5.2, action 'a', is applicable for removal of a charging pump (ECCS subsystem)
5 RECORD discrepancies and applicable Tech Specs on Initiating Cue Sheet Operator records all discrepancies and TS 3.5.2 on the answer sheet
Key Decision Point:
Steps 1-3 are the discriminating steps. The applicant must systematically review DWG 205228 Sheet 2 against the procedure S1.OP-SO.CVC-0002 to identify three missing blocking points. Key traps: (1) 1CV135 is a check valve — it is already listed as a blocking point on the drawing but is insufficient because check valves do not provide positive isolation; 1CV136 (the motor-operated stop valve) is the required blocking point. (2) 1CV356 is the second vent path — OP-AA-109-115 requires liquid systems to have at least one vent and drain tagged, and 1CV45 alone is insufficient without 1CV356. The applicant must also recognize that the charging pump is part of ECCS and TS 3.5.2 applies (not TS 3.1.2 for boration).
Ref: OP-AA-109-115 (Rev. 12), S1.OP-SO.CVC-0002 (Rev. 41), DWG 205228 Sheet 2 (Rev. 85) | Task: N1220050302 | K/A: G2.2.13 — Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A4 — Authorize a Radioactive Gas Release Form Admin | SRO | G2.3.6 (3.8)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- 13 WGDT is in holdup in preparation for performing a gas release via the Plant Vent
- Chemistry has performed all required sampling and authorized the gas release
- The release procedure, S1.OP-SO.WG-0010, Discharge of 13 Gas Decay Tank to Plant Vent, has just been handed to you by the Unit 1 Plant Operator, who informs you the release is ready for CRS approval
- All procedure sections are complete up to Step 5.2.9

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Unit 1 Control Room Supervisor (CRS)
- REVIEW all completed sections of the procedure for accuracy and completeness
- DETERMINE the following:
  a. Can you authorize the gas release?
  b. If No release is authorized; identify ALL issues to be corrected
Task Standard:
1. Review Gas Release and identify that:
  a. Pre-Release verification has not been performed in Attachment 1, Section 1.0
  b. Calculated Maximum Allowable Release Rate is not > 32 SCFM
  c. CRS does not authorize the gas release
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 Review marked up S1.OP-SO.WG-0010 procedure Operator reviews the completed procedure sections for accuracy and completeness
2 * Identify that PRE RELEASE VERIFICATION in Attachment 1, Section 1.0 has NOT been performed prior to step 5.2.8 The first error: Pre-Release verification has not been performed in Attachment 1, Section 1.0, prior to the procedure being given to the CRS for release approval
3 * Identify that Maximum Allowable Release Rate of 32 SCFM recorded in Step 3.4 and 4.1 is not > 32 SCFM The second error: per NOTE in Step 3.4, tanks with a calculated maximum allowable release rate of <= 32 SCFM cannot be released. The recorded value of 32 SCFM is NOT > 32 SCFM.
4 * Determine CRS does NOT authorize the gas release Operator determines the release cannot be authorized due to both identified discrepancies and records findings
Key Decision Point:
Steps 2 and 3 are the discriminating steps. The applicant must catch two errors in the completed procedure: (1) The Pre-Release Verification in Attachment 1, Section 1.0 was skipped — this step must be completed before the CRS reviews for release authorization. (2) The Maximum Allowable Release Rate recorded as 32 SCFM is insufficient — per the NOTE in Step 3.4, the rate must be GREATER THAN 32 SCFM (not equal to) for the release to proceed. A common trap is that the applicant finds the first error and stops reviewing, assuming one deficiency is sufficient to deny authorization. The examiner cue specifically directs continued review of the entire procedure.
Ref: S1.OP-SO.WG-0010 (Rev. 31) | Task: N1120650302 | K/A: G2.3.6 — Ability to approve release permits | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A5 — Classify an Event and Complete ICMF Admin | SRO | G2.4.41 (4.6)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: Yes (15 minutes)
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem 2 was manually tripped and Safety Injection Auto actuated due to a RCS leak inside containment
- The crew is implementing 2-EOP-TRIP-1
- RCS pressure < 60 psig
- RCS Subcooling is 0 degrees F
- All ECCS pumps are running
- Containment pressure is 35 psi and 21 Containment Spray pump failed to start. Attempts to start 21 CS pump from the control room are unsuccessful
- 21 CFCU is C/T for cooler leak and 22 and 23 CFCUs failed to start in LOW SPEED. Attempts to start 22 and 23 CFCUs from the control room are unsuccessful
- Meteorological data is as follows: Wind Direction: 180 degrees, Wind Speed: 5 mph
- 2R41D, Plant Vent Release Rate, radiation monitor is NOT indicating elevated readings

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor (CRS)
- CLASSIFY the event AND COMPLETE the ICMF IAW EP-SA-111-101 and appropriate EAL category flowcharts
- THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM
Task Standard:
1. Classifies the event as Site Area Emergency (SAE) based on RB2.L and CB8.P.
2. Properly completes ICMF for the classified event.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 Review initial conditions and gather materials (EP-SA-111-101, Salem 2 ECG books) Operator reviews initial conditions, acknowledges time-critical nature of JPM
2 * Classify the event using the Fission Product Barrier Table Classifies event as Site Area Emergency (SAE) based on:
- RB2.L (5 pts) — RCS barrier loss: Subcooling <= 0 F as a result of RCS leakage
- CB8.P (2 pts) — Containment barrier potential loss: Containment pressure > 15 psig AND one containment spray train in service AND < 3 CFCUs running in low speed
- Total: 7 points = Site Area Emergency
3 * Select correct ICMF Attachment (Attachment 3 — SAE) Requests Attachment 3 (SAE) ICMF form EP-SA-111-F3. Attachments 2 (Alert) and 4 (GE) are incorrect.
4 * Accurately and completely fill out the ICMF Completes ICMF for Site Area Emergency including: plant identification, declaration time, event description (RCS leak with loss of containment cooling), release status (no release — 2R41D not elevated), meteorological data (180 degrees / 5 mph), protective action recommendations
Key Decision Point:
Step 2 is the discriminating step. The applicant must correctly assess each fission product barrier using the ECG flowcharts:

RCS Barrier (RB2.L = 5 pts): RCS subcooling is 0 F with RCS pressure < 60 psig — this indicates a loss of the RCS barrier due to the leak inside containment. Subcooling <= 0 degrees as a result of RCS leakage = RCS barrier LOST.

Containment Barrier (CB8.P = 2 pts): Containment pressure is 35 psi (well above 15 psig threshold). One CS pump is running (22 CS), but 21 CS failed to start. Only 24 CFCU is running in low speed (21 is C/T, 22 and 23 failed to start). This meets CB8.P: containment pressure > 15 psig AND either (a) one CS train in service AND < 3 CFCUs running in low speed, OR (b) no CS trains. This is a POTENTIAL loss (2 pts).

Total = 7 points → Site Area Emergency (SAE). A common trap is classifying as General Emergency (requires containment barrier LOST, not potentially lost) or as Alert (insufficient points). The 2R41D showing no elevated readings confirms no release is in progress — this is important for the ICMF but does NOT affect the classification.
Ref: EP-SA-111-101 (Rev. 23), EP-SA-111-121 (Rev. 00), EP-SA-111-F3 (Rev. 03) | Task: 1240020502 | K/A: G2.4.41 — Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-i — Shed Non-Essential DC Loads IAW EOP-LOPA-1 In-Plant | RO/SRO | EPE 055 EA1.04 (3.5/3.9)
Location: In-Plant (NOT inside RCA)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 has experienced a total Loss of All AC Power.
- The control room is performing actions in 2-EOP-LOPA-1, Loss of All AC Power.

Initiating Cue:
- You are directed to shed non-essential DC loads using 2-EOP-LOPA-1, Checkoff Sheet 3, 125VDC LOAD SHED LIST pages 1-3 (COS 3-1 thru 3-3).
Task Standard:
Locate DC panels and simulate opening only associated DC breakers listed on Checkoff Sheet 3.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
COS 3 * Locate distribution panels and open DC breakers IAW Checkoff Sheet 3 — 64 ft elevation Locates the following distribution panels: 2A 125VDC bus, 2ADC 125VDC Distribution Panel, 2B 125VDC Bus, 2DDC 125VDC Distribution Panel, 2CDC 125VDC Distribution Panel. Simulates opening only the breakers listed on Checkoff Sheet 3 (not all breakers in each panel).
COS 3 * Locate distribution panels and open DC breakers IAW Checkoff Sheet 3 — 100 ft elevation switchgear room Locates the following distribution panels in 100 ft elevation switchgear room: 2AADC 125VDC Distribution Panel, 2BBDC 125VDC Distribution Panel, 2CCDC 125VDC Distribution Panel. Simulates opening only the breakers listed on Checkoff Sheet 3.
Key Decision Point:
This JPM tests the applicant's ability to navigate the plant and locate multiple 125VDC distribution panels across two elevations (64 ft and 100 ft) during a station blackout. The key discrimination is that the operator must open ONLY the specific breakers designated on Checkoff Sheet 3 — not every breaker in each panel. The Checkoff Sheet sections may be performed in any order. Labeling discrepancies exist in the field: 2ADC3AX29 is labeled as "Source #1 125 VDC to AVR Excitation Cab" rather than "2 Generator Exciter Voltage Regulator," and 2DDC2AX28 "Safety Injection Test Line Valves" is labeled as "21SJ162, 2SJ166, 22SJ162, 22SJ166, 2SJ158." The operator must correctly identify the breakers despite these labeling differences.
Ref: 2-EOP-LOPA-1 (R31) | Task: N1150140501 | K/A: EPE 055 EA1.04 — Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Station Blackout: emergency generators | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-j — Locally Open Reactor Trip Breakers and Control Charging Flow In-Plant | RO/SRO | 012 A4.06 (4.3/4.3)
Location: In-Plant (RCA) — 84 ft Elevation Switchgear Room, Aux Bldg Charging Valve Alley
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 25 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- The Unit 1 Control Room has been evacuated in accordance with S1.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation.
- A reactor trip from 100% was initiated prior to evacuating the Control Room, but the reactor failed to trip from the control room.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to locally trip open the Reactor Trip Breakers and take local control of charging flow by PERFORMING Steps 1 thru 9 IAW Attachment 5 of S1.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation.
Task Standard:
1. Locally OPEN Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers.
2. Locally controls 1CV55 to maintain charging flow.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 OBTAIN required equipment (procedure copy, radio, key ring set, tools, Security Master Key) Operator reviews S1.OP-AB.CR-0001, Att. 5 and proceeds to El. 84 switchgear room (outside RCA). Obtains all required items (provided via cue).
2.0 * PROCEED to Rod Drive MG Set Control Panel (460V Vital Bus Room, El 84) and OPEN Reactor Trip Breaker A and Reactor Trip Breaker B Simulates opening each breaker by removing cover and depressing the TRIP pushbutton until the breaker flag indicates OPEN. Note: Operator only opens Reactor Trip Breakers that are currently racked in and closed. Bypass Trip Breakers are typically Open and racked out (N/A).
3.0 CONFIRM with Hot Shutdown Panel Operator that 11 or 12 Charging Pump is operating Contacts PO and confirms 11 charging pump is operating.
4.0 * PROCEED to 1AX1AX7X, #13 Charging Pump breaker AND OPEN the breaker Locates 1AX1AX7X, #13 Charging Pump breaker at 84 ft El. SGWR Room, 1A 460V MCC. Depresses the trip PB to open the breaker.
5.0 * PROCEED to 1C West Valve & Misc 230V Control Center El 84 and OPEN Breaker 1CY2AX41, 1CV175 Rapid Borate Stop Valve Locates 1C West Valve & Misc 230V Control Center at 84 ft El. Inside RCA, Aux Bldg across from AFW pumps. Opens Breaker 1CY2AX41 (1CV175 Rapid Borate Stop Valve) by rotating switch to OFF position.
6.0 NOTIFY the CRS: Reactor Trip and Bypass breakers are OPEN; #13 Charging Pump Breaker is OPEN Reports to CRS that breakers are open.
7.0 CONFIRM with NEO #1 that 1CV71 (Chr Hdr PCV) is isolated (1CV70) and bypassed (1CV73) with RCP seal flow at 6 to 10 gpm per seal Contacts NEO #1 and confirms 1CV71 is isolated and bypassed, flow maintained at 8 gpm per seal.
8.1 * RECORD charging flow from 1FI-128A at Panel 216-1 Proceeds to Unit 1 Panel 216-1 (Chg Pmps FL & PR Inst Pnl) at 84 ft El. Aux Bldg, Charging Valve Alley. Records charging flow from 1FI-128A (typical ~87-89 gpm). Note: panel door alarm requires control room notification before opening.
8.2 * PLACE local E/P Bypass Line Selector Valve in Manual Locates local E/P Bypass Line Selector Valve and simulates rotating valve clockwise to Manual position.
8.3 * Using the MANUAL hand air operator, ENSURE flow rate from Step 8.1 is being maintained with 1CV55 Reads 1FI-128A; flow has LOWERED 10 gpm from recorded value. Adjusts Manual Hand Operator counter-clockwise to LOWER air pressure and OPEN 1CV55, raising charging flow back to recorded value. 1CV55 is a fail-open (air-to-close) valve: lowering air pressure opens the valve and raises flow.
8.4 OBSERVE local air pressure indicator to verify local control Observes local air pressure indicator reads 8 psig.
9.0 NOTIFY CRS and STA that Steps 1 through 8 of Attachment 5 are completed Notifies CRS and STA that all steps are complete.
Key Decision Point:
Step 8.3 is the discriminating step. After taking local control of 1CV55 (Cent Chg Pmp Flow Cont Valve), charging flow drops 10 gpm below the recorded baseline. The applicant must understand that 1CV55 is a fail-open, air-to-close valve: to raise flow, the operator must LOWER air pressure by turning the manual hand air operator counter-clockwise. Turning clockwise (raising air pressure) would further close the valve and reduce flow. This tests the applicant's understanding of valve fail-safe directions during a control room evacuation scenario. The broader JPM also tests knowledge of physical plant layout across multiple locations: Rod Drive MG Set room (El. 84), 1A 460V MCC (SGWR Room, El. 84), 1C West 230V Control Center (inside RCA, across from AFW pumps), and Panel 216-1 in the Charging Valve Alley.
Ref: S1.OP-AB.CR-0001 (R18), Attachment 5 | Task: 1130070501 | K/A: 012 A4.06 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Reactor trip breakers (manual) | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-k — Perform a Radioactive Liquid Release In-Plant | RO/SRO | 068 A2.04 (3.3/3.3)
Location: In-Plant (RCA) — 64 ft Elevation Aux Bldg, Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room, CVCS MT Room, 104 Panel area
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 20 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Preparations for a release of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank via Unit 2 SW system to Unit 1 CW system is in progress IAW S2.OP-SO.WL-0001, RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE FROM 21 CVCS MONITOR TANK.
- Chemistry has granted permission to release 21 CVCS MT at a Maximum Release Rate of 45 gpm due to the high curie content of the tank.
- 2R18 and 2FR1064 Flow Recorder are both OPERABLE.
- All Unit 1 CW pumps are in service.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the extra NCO.
- The CRS directs you to release 21 CVCS MT IAW Section 5.5 of S2.OP-SO.WL-0001.
Task Standard:
Controls the discharge of 21 CVCS MT to less than the Maximum Release rate.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.5.1 IF 2FR1064, RADWASTE OVERBOARD DISCH FLOW RECORDER is INOPERABLE, THEN INITIATE Attachment 4, Section 4.0 Marks step N/A; 2FR1064 is OPERABLE.
5.5.2 * DIRECT Unit 2 NCO to OPEN 2WL51, LIQUID RELEASE STOP VALVE Operator simulates calling control room and DIRECTS Unit 2 NCO to OPEN 2WL51.
5.5.3 DIRECT second Operator to PERFORM Independent Verification of 2WL51 position in Attachment 2 IV has been performed.
5.5.4 * OPEN 2WR59, MT PMPS OB STOP VALVE Locates 2WR59 and simulates opening valve by turning hand wheel counterclockwise. Location: Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room, 64 ft El. Aux Bldg.
5.5.5 DIRECT second Operator to PERFORM Independent Verification of 2WR59 position IV has been performed.
5.5.6 * THROTTLE 21WR53, MT RECIRC STOP VALVE, to obtain Maximum Release Rate With 2WR59 fully open, 2FR1064 reads 5 gpm (below 45 gpm max). Throttles 21WR53 CLOSED (clockwise) to raise flow. 2FR1064 reads 50 gpm (exceeds 45 gpm limit). Adjusts 21WR53 OPEN (counterclockwise) to lower flow to 40 gpm (below 45 gpm max). Location: CVCS MT Room, 64 ft El. Aux Bldg. Note: 21WR53 is approximately 7 feet above floor level.
5.5.7 RECORD time, date, and tank identification on 2FR1064 recorder Simulates annotating recorder with time, date, and tank.
5.5.8 * COMPLETE Attachment 2, Section 5.1 — Initial Release Data Records: 21 CVCS MT Level (2LIS-180) = 90%. Volume from S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 = 19500 gallons (acceptable: 19200-19800). Dilution Flow Rate = 200000 gpm (all Unit 1 CW pumps in service: 2 circulators x 100000). Discharge Flow Rate (2FR1064) = 40 gpm. 2R18 reads 105 cpm with High Radiation light illuminated.
5.5.9 * 2R18 Monitor ALARMS — DIRECT NCO to CLOSE 2WL51 2R18 High Radiation light illuminated (105 cpm). Operator identifies alarm condition from Step 5.5.9 criteria ("2R18 Monitor ALARMS"). Simulates calling control room to report 2R18 is in ALARM and DIRECTS NCO to CLOSE 2WL51, LIQUID RELEASE STOP VALVE. JPM terminates when NCO reports 2WL51 is CLOSED.
Key Decision Point:
Two key discriminating elements in this JPM. First, at Step 5.5.6, the operator must correctly control the discharge flow rate below the 45 gpm maximum by throttling 21WR53. With 2WR59 fully open, initial flow is only 5 gpm. Closing 21WR53 diverts more flow to the overboard path, raising discharge flow. The operator must check 2FR1064 and adjust until flow is below 45 gpm. The Caution before Step 5.5.6 warns that completely closing 21WR53 will NOT provide sufficient recirculation to protect the pump if 2WL51 isolates on high radiation alarm. Second, at Step 5.5.8/5.5.9, the 2R18 radiation monitor reads 105 cpm with the High Radiation light illuminated. The operator must recognize this is an alarm condition requiring immediate termination of the release by directing the NCO to close 2WL51.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.WL-0001 (R28), S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 (R8) | Task: N0685140104 | K/A: 068 A2.04 — Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Liquid Radwaste System malfunctions and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-a — Respond to Loss of All Control Rod Drive Vent Fans Simulator | RO/SRO | 001A2.01 (3.1/3.7)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: N/A

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 at 100% power
- No equipment is out of service and no active Tech Specs are in effect

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator
- Respond to all alarms and indications
Task Standard:
1. STARTS Standby CRDM Vent Fan IAW ARP based on abnormal console indications.
2. TRIPs the Reactor IAW ARP based on NO CRDM Vent Fans running.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 Recognize 21 CRD Vent Fan AIR FLOW LO alarm and SEQUENCE COMPLETE bezel extinguished on 2CC1 Operator reports receipt of unexpected console alarm on 21 CRD Vent Fan for AIR FLOW LO and SEQUENCE COMPLETE bezel extinguished. Refers to 2CC1 ARP S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011
2 Read CAUSE, AUTOMATIC ACTIONS, NOTE, and CAUTION from ARP page 13 Cause: Fan discharge pressure < 2.0 INWC. No automatic actions. Note: Low flow alarm may result from erratic flow during fan start; SEQUENCE COMPLETE light indicates flow through fan outlet damper. Caution: Operating with less than two Rod Drive Vent Fans could degrade Rod Drive Coils — Operability Determination should be performed
3.1 IF Rod Drive Vent Fan has just been started AND SEQUENCE COMPLETE illuminated, THEN MONITOR Rod Drive Hdr Outlet temperatures Operator reads step and determines N/A — a fan has NOT just been started
3.2 * IF SEQUENCE COMPLETE indication for affected fan is extinguished, THEN immediately SWAP to the standby Rod Drive Vent Fan Operator determines applicable based on extinguished SEQUENCE COMPLETE. Depresses STOP PB for 21 Fan, verifies STOP bezel illuminates green. Depresses START PB for standby vent fan, verifies START bezel illuminates red. Reports SEQUENCE COMPLETE bezel illuminated and AIR FLOW LO cleared
3.2.D * ALTERNATE PATH: IF no Rod Drive Vent Fans are in operation, THEN TRIP the Reactor After starting the standby fan, the two running vent fans trip shortly after. Operator initially marked 3.2.C (IF standby cannot start) as N/A because standby fan started. This step becomes applicable when both remaining fans trip — NO CRDM Vent Fans are running. Operator TRIPs the Reactor.
Key Decision Point:
Step 3.2.D is the discriminating step (alternate path). The initial alarm on 21 CRD Vent Fan is straightforward — the ARP directs swapping to standby. The key test is what happens AFTER the standby fan starts: both remaining running fans (22 and 23) trip within seconds. The applicant must recognize that with NO CRDM Vent Fans running, the ARP (step 3.2.D) directs an immediate reactor trip. Operating with no vent fans would cause CRD mechanism coil overheating and potential damage. The applicant may have already marked step 3.2.C as N/A (standby fan started successfully), but must reassess when the additional fans trip. CRD Vent Fan Outlet Temperature alarms: 21 at T2602A/160F, 22 at T2603A/160F, 23 at T2604A/160F (P250 computer points). Performing EOP-TRIP-1 immediate actions is NOT required to complete this JPM.
Ref: S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 (Rev. 60), S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001 (Rev. 33) | Task: 0220040101 | K/A: 001A2.01 — Ability to predict the impacts of CRDS malfunctions on system components | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-b — Perform Manual Makeup of the VCT Sim | RO/SRO | 004 A4.04 (3.2/3.6)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- 100% power, MOL. RCS boron concentration is 900 ppm.
- The crew has entered S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, due to VCT level channel 2LT112 failing high.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to PERFORM a manual makeup of the VCT to RESTORE VCT level to 53% IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006, Boron Concentration Control, Section 5.2, Manual Makeup Mode.
- All prerequisites are complete with no issues.
- P&Ls have NOT been reviewed.
- Boric Acid Storage Tank boron concentration is 6700 ppm.
Task Standard:
Initiates manual makeup to VCT and stops the makeup when directed.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
P&Ls Review Precautions and Limitations 3.1 thru 3.22 Operator reviews and initials all P&Ls.
5.2.1 Determine Boric Acid flow setpoint from Figure 100A Using Figure 100A from S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012 for 62 gpm Primary Water flow with BAST at 6700 ppm, determines setpoint between 9-11 gpm. If calculated: 9.62 gpm (900 ppm RCS / 6700 ppm BAST).
5.2.3 * Place Makeup Control in STOP, place 2CV179 and 2CV172 in MANUAL/CLOSE Presses Makeup Control Mode Select STOP pushbutton and verifies bezel illuminates. Depresses 2CV179 MANUAL PB until bezel illuminates, then CLOSE PB. Note: when selected to MANUAL, 2CV179 will initially go full open — this is expected. Depresses 2CV172 MANUAL PB until bezel illuminates, then CLOSE PB.
5.2.5 Align blender outlet flowpath (2CV185 or 2CV181) Selects one flowpath by depressing MANUAL PB then OPEN PB for 2CV185 (preferred — charging pump suction) or 2CV181.
5.2.7 Start Primary Water pump and Boric Acid pump Depresses MANUAL PB for selected PW pump, then START PB. Depresses MANUAL PB for selected BAT pump, then FAST START PB.
5.2.8 Adjust Boric Acid flow on FI110A to value from Step 5.2.1 Adjusts Boric Acid flow using 2CV172 OPEN/CLOSE PBs to match setpoint (9-11 gpm).
5.2.10 * Manually ADJUST 2CV179 setpoint to 62 gpm (or as calculated) to maintain required flow Adjusts Primary Water flow on FI111A to 62 gpm (acceptable range 60-64 gpm) by depressing 2CV179 OPEN PB to raise or CLOSE PB to lower setpoint.
5.2.12 Secure makeup — close 2CV179, 2CV172, and blender outlet valve Depresses CLOSE PBs for 2CV179, 2CV172, and whichever of 2CV185 or 2CV181 was opened. Stops Primary Water pump.
5.2.13 * Place selected Boric Acid pump in SLOW speed and place system to automatic makeup mode Places selected Boric Acid pump in SLOW speed and verifies.
Key Decision Point:
The discriminating element is the boric acid flow setpoint determination (Step 5.2.1). The applicant must use the correct figure (Figure 100A for 62 gpm PW flow at normal BAST concentration) — NOT Figure 100C (wrong boron concentration of 9000 ppm) or Figure 105 (temperature correction, N/A at 100% power). Additionally, the applicant must recognize that 2CV179 will initially go full open when placed in MANUAL and must then close it before proceeding.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 (Rev 25) | Task: 0040130101 | K/A: 004 A4.04 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CVCS (3.2/3.6) | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-c — Isolate ECCS Accumulators IAW EOP-TRIP-6 Sim | RO/SRO | 006 A1.13 (3.5/3.7)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- A reactor trip occurred when a 500 KV grid perturbation occurred, which also caused all RCPs to trip.
- The operating crew has progressed through the EOPs and is now in 2-EOP-TRIP-6, NATURAL CIRCULATION RAPID COOLDOWN WITH RVLIS.
- The RCPs will NOT be restarted.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to isolate the SI Accumulators IAW Step 12 of 2-EOP-TRIP-6, NATURAL CIRCULATION RAPID COOLDOWN WITH RVLIS.
- Notify the CRS when Step 12 is completed.
- Your evaluator will take care of all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
1. Closes 21, 22, and 23 SJ54s. 2. Vents 24 SI Accumulator to atmospheric pressure. 3. Closes vent valves to 24 SI Accumulator when venting is complete.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
12 Verify RCS Pressure <1000 psig Operator verifies RCS pressure is <1000 psig — YES.
12 * Remove lockout from 21-24 SJ54 Accumulator Outlet Valves At 2RP4, selects VALVE OPERABLE on 21-24 SJ54 Accumulator Outlet Valves lockout switch.
12 * Close 21 thru 24 SJ54 Accumulator Outlet Valves Depresses CLOSE pushbuttons for 21-24 SJ54 and verifies each CLOSE bezel illuminates.
12.1 * Determine 24SJ54 is NOT closed (stuck at intermediate position) ALTERNATE PATH: Operator determines that 24SJ54, Accumulator Outlet Valve, is OPEN (observes valve stroking then stopping at intermediate position). 21, 22, and 23 SJ54s are closed.
12.2 Consult TSC for contingency actions CRS will consult with TSC if needed.
12.3 * Verify RCS Pressure greater than Accumulator nitrogen pressure Operator verifies RCS pressure is greater than accumulator pressure.
12.3 * Open 2NT35 (N2 HDR VALVE) and 24SJ93 (N2 SUPPLY VALVE) to vent 24 Accumulator Depresses OPEN PB for 2NT35 (N2 HDR VALVE) until OPEN bezel illuminates. Depresses OPEN PB for 24SJ93 (N2 SUPPLY VALVE) until OPEN bezel illuminates. Observes 24 Accumulator pressure lowering.
12.3 * Close vent valves when accumulator pressure reaches zero When 24 Accumulator pressure reads ZERO: closes 2NT35 N2 HDR VALVE and 24SJ93 N2 SUPPLY VALVE (CLOSE PBs, bezels illuminated).
Key Decision Point:
The discriminating step is 12.1 — the applicant must recognize that 24SJ54 has failed at an intermediate position (valve strokes then stops) and cannot be isolated. The alternate path requires the applicant to transition to the venting steps: verify RCS pressure exceeds accumulator nitrogen pressure, then open 2NT35 (N2 header valve) and 24SJ93 (N2 supply valve) to vent the 24 Accumulator to atmospheric pressure, and close vent valves when venting is complete.
Ref: 2-EOP-TRIP-6 (Rev 30) | Task: 1150070501 | K/A: 006 A1.13 — Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the ECCS controls (3.5/3.7) | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-d — Initiate Bleed and Feed Using Reactor Head Vents Sim | RO/SRO | 002 A2.04 (4.3/4.6)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 was manually tripped at 90% power due to elevated main turbine vibrations IAW S2.OP-AB.TL-0001.
- An inadvertent feedwater isolation actuation occurred resulting in the loss of all main feedwater.
- Loss of all AFW flow occurred when all AFW pumps tripped.
- The crew has entered 2-EOP-FRHS-1 due to valid RED Path on Heat Sink CFST based on all SG NR levels < 9% and AFW flow < 22E4 lbm/hr.
- Plant conditions have continued to deteriorate and three (3) steam generator Wide Range levels are now less than 32%.
- The CRS is implementing the CAS action to Initiate Bleed and Feed.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to Initiate Bleed and Feed starting at Step 21 IAW 2-EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
OPENS 2RC40 thru 2RC43 Reactor Head Vents IAW 2-EOP-FRHS-1.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
21 Read CAUTION: Steps 24 thru 29 must be performed quickly and without interruption Operator reads the Caution and continues.
21 STOP ALL RCPs Verifies all RCPs are already stopped (per Step 7 of FRHS-1).
22 * Initiate SI on both trains Inserts key and turns switch clockwise until SI Operate bezel illuminates and SI Reset bezel extinguishes. Only needs to initiate SI on one train.
23 Verify SI valves in Safeguards Position YES — checks all SI valve bezels on 2RP4 are illuminated.
23.1 Verify charging pumps running and BIT flow established Both charging pumps running (START bezels illuminated red). BIT flow established (~150-160 gpm on charging flowmeter).
23.2 Verify SI pumps running and Table C valves open Both SI pumps running (START PBs illuminated red). All Table C valves OPEN for both running SI pumps.
24 * Open both PZR PORV stop valves (2PR6 and 2PR7) Verifies both PZR PORV stop valves are OPEN (2PR6 and 2PR7 OPEN bezels illuminated).
24 * Open both PZR PORVs — 2PR2 fails to open (alternate path) ALTERNATE PATH: Places both PZR PORVs in Manual and depresses OPEN PBs for 2PR1 and 2PR2. Reports that 2PR2 will NOT OPEN. PORVs may be cycling — applicant must determine both PORVs are required fully open in Manual and not credit auto operation.
24.1 Verify both PZR PORV stop valves still open YES — 2PR6 and 2PR7 OPEN bezels still illuminated.
25 * Open Reactor Head Vent valves 2RC40 thru 2RC43 using keys at 2RP2 backpanel At 2RP2 backpanel, obtains four keys, inserts key into each keyswitch one at a time, and turns clockwise until OPEN bezel illuminates for 2RC40 through 2RC43.
Key Decision Point:
The discriminating step is Step 24 — the applicant must recognize that 2PR2 PORV fails to open in Manual and then transition to the alternate bleed path: opening the Reactor Head Vent valves 2RC40 through 2RC43 using key-locked switches on the 2RP2 backpanel. This is the same alternate path tested in the 2019 and 2023 Sim-d JPMs. The applicant must also correctly perform the rapid bleed and feed sequence without interruption (Steps 24-29), including manually initiating SI, verifying ECCS flow, and opening PORVs before identifying the need for reactor head vents.
Ref: 2-EOP-FRHS-1 (Rev 33) | Task: N1150290501 | K/A: 002 A2.04 — Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences (4.3/4.6) | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-e — Synchronize the Main Generator Sim | RO/SRO | 045 A4.02 (2.7/2.6)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 18 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 16% power starting up from a maintenance outage.
- The crew is performing power ascension activities IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load.
- The main turbine is at 1800 rpm with generator excitation applied.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Plant Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to synchronize the Generator IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001, Turbine-Generator Startup Operations, Section 4.5, Synchronizing the Generator.
- All Prerequisites are completed SAT.
- Step 4.5.1 IVs are completed SAT.
- Synchronize the Generator starting at Step 4.5.2. The 500 KV 1-9 breaker will be closed first followed by the 500 KV 9-10 breaker.
Task Standard:
Synchronizes the Generator to the electrical grid IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
4.5.2 Ensure 500 KV BUS SECT 9-10 (30X) Breaker selected to 9-10 LOCAL Verifies 9-10 Breaker is selected to 9-10 LOCAL.
4.5.3 Select No. 2 Unit Scope Transfer Switch to REGULAR or SPARE SCOPE Verifies REGULAR SCOPE is illuminated on 2RP6.
4.5.4 Scope test — verify synchroscope and voltmeters respond Presses SCOPE TEST pushbutton on 500KV Breaker Sections 1-9 (32X). Verifies synchroscope hand at 12 o'clock. Verifies INCOM KV and RUN KV voltmeters move upscale. Releases SCOPE TEST PB.
4.5.5 Verify MAIN GEN SYNC PERM BYPASS keylock switch in NORMAL Verifies MAIN GEN SYNC PERM BYPASS keylock switch is in NORMAL position.
4.5.6 * Select 1-9 Mimic Bus and 1-9 SYNCH POT ON Depresses 1-9 Mimic Bus PB and verifies yellow backlight AND console bezel for MIMIC BUS 1-9 INTERLOCK CLOSE SELECTION is illuminated. Depresses 1-9 SYNCH POT ON and verifies bezel illuminates.
4.5.8 * Adjust INCOM KV to 3-5 KV greater than RUN KV using Voltage Regulator Determines INCOM KV is NOT 3-5 KV greater than RUN KV (as-found: INCOM KV ~499, RUN KV ~498). At EXCITATION, VOLTAGE REGULATOR, VREG CNTRL SETPT ADJ, depresses RAISE SETPT until INCOM KV is 3-5 KV greater than RUN KV (at least 501 KV to meet Synch Permissive).
4.5.12.1 * Adjust turbine speed until synchroscope rotates SLOWLY in FAST direction (~1 revolution every 25-30 seconds) Determines turbine speed adjustment required. Adjusts SETTER 1-2 rpm above reference (as-found: SETTER = 1801, raise to 1802-1803). Selects SETTER GO (illuminates green). Verifies ACTUAL and REFERENCE speed adjust to SETTER speed. Synchroscope rotates slowly in FAST direction.
4.5.12.3 * Close 500KV 1-9 (32X) breaker when synchroscope is 1-2 minutes before 12 o'clock Depresses CLOSE PB for 500 KV GROUP BUS BREAKER Section 1-9 (32X) when synchroscope is 1-2 minutes before 12 o'clock. Verifies 1-9 CLOSE PB is illuminated. Verifies load is rising (MW indicator on 2RP3, MW Recorder on 2RP5, or HMI panel).
4.5.12.4 Verify generator load rises to 40-60 MW within 15 seconds Verifies generator load rises to 40-60 MW within 15 seconds. If not, raises SETTER <= 4% above REFERENCE and selects GO.
4.5.12.5 Select SYNCH POT OFF for 1-9 breaker Depresses SYNCH POT OFF PB and verifies bezel illuminates.
Key Decision Point:
Two discriminating elements in this JPM. First (Step 4.5.8): the applicant must recognize that INCOMING voltage is NOT 3-5 KV above RUNNING voltage (as-found both ~498-499 KV) and use the Voltage Regulator RAISE SETPT to increase INCOM KV to at least 501 KV — this satisfies one of the Synch Permissive requirements. Second (Step 4.5.12.1): the turbine is initially rotating too slowly (SETTER = 1801 rpm, producing slow FAST rotation). The applicant must increase the SETTER by 1-2 rpm increments and select SETTER GO to achieve a synchroscope rotation of approximately one revolution every 25-30 seconds in the FAST direction. Failing to satisfy either condition will prevent the MAIN GEN SYNC PERMISSIVE light from illuminating.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001 (Rev 47) | Task: N0450040101 | K/A: 045 A4.02 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Main Turbine Generator (2.7/2.6) | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-f — Perform 22 CFCU Surveillance Test Sim | RO/SRO | 022 A1.04 (3.2/3.3)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 16 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- No major equipment out of service and no active Tech Specs are in effect.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to PERFORM a scheduled surveillance test on 22 CFCU IAW S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Systems - Cooling Systems.
- All Prerequisites are completed SAT and all required M&TE are installed in the field.
- A field NEO is standing by to provide SW header differential pressure when directed.
Task Standard:
PERFORMS surveillance test IAW S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003 and determines 22 CFCU Test Results is UNSAT.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
P&Ls Review Precautions and Limitations including P&L 3.4 Reads and initials all P&Ls. P&L 3.4: if measured DP is between DP values in Exhibit 1, select minimum flow for next HIGHER DP value.
5.1.1.A * Ensure CFCU being tested is in LOW SPEED IAW S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001 Goes to S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001 to shift 22 CFCU from High Speed to Low Speed.
5.1.2.A * Press HIGH SPEED STOP bezel for 22 CFCU Depresses HIGH SPEED STOP bezel for 22 CFCU and verifies STOP bezel illuminates.
5.1.2.B Ensure FAN STOP bezel is illuminated Verifies HIGH SPEED STOP bezel is illuminated.
5.1.2.C * Wait 25 seconds then press FAN LOW SPEED START bezel Waits 25 seconds from when HIGH SPEED STOP was depressed. Depresses LOW SPEED START bezel for 22 CFCU and verifies START bezel illuminates.
5.1.2.D Verify damper positions for 22 CFCU Verifies: ROUGH FLT DAMPER CLOSED bezel extinguished, HEPA INLET DAMPER OPEN bezel illuminated, HEPA OUTLET DAMPER OPEN bezel illuminated.
5.1.2.F Ensure Service Water flow >= 1465 gpm Verifies SW flow > 1465 gpm.
5.1.1.B Record Start Time Records START time in Attachment 2, Section 3.0.
5.1.1.C Wait 15 minutes, record Stop Time, SW flow, and SW header DP After 15 minutes elapsed, records stop time. Records Cooling Water Flow Rate (~1786 gpm). Contacts field NEO and records 21 SW Header DP of 106 psi.
5.1.1.D * Record Test Results — determine UNSAT based on P&L 3.4 and Exhibit 1 Per P&L 3.4, measured DP of 106 psi is between 105 and 110 psi in Exhibit 1, so must use the next HIGHER DP value of 110 psi. At 110 psi, Minimum Flow Rate from Exhibit 1 = 1811 gpm. Actual flow ~1786 gpm is LESS than 1811 gpm minimum required. P&L 3.3: CFCU operable requires SW flow >= 1465 gpm AND >= Min Flow Rate from Exhibit 1. Flow meets 1465 gpm but does NOT meet 1811 gpm → Test Result is UNSAT, 22 CFCU is inoperable.
Key Decision Point:
The discriminating step is 5.1.1.D — the applicant must correctly apply P&L 3.4 to determine which minimum flow rate to compare against. With a measured SW header DP of 106 psi (between 105 and 110 psi in Exhibit 1), P&L 3.4 requires using the next HIGHER DP value (110 psi = 1811 gpm minimum). The actual flow of ~1786 gpm is LESS than 1811 gpm, making the result UNSAT. The trap is that 1786 gpm easily exceeds the 1465 gpm minimum (P&L 3.3) and also exceeds the 105 psi minimum flow (1769 gpm) — but the correct comparison is against the 110 psi value per P&L 3.4. This is the same discriminating concept tested in 2019 and 2023 CFCU surveillance JPMs.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003 (Rev 19), S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001 | Task: N0220130201 | K/A: 022 A1.04 — Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the CCS controls (3.2/3.3) | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-g — Transfer 4KV Group Buses SPT to APT Sim | RO/SRO | 062 A2.04 (3.1/3.4)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- 18% power, 160 MWe, SOL.
- The Main Generator was synchronized 10 minutes ago.
- Steam Dumps are in MS Pressure Mode-Auto set at 970 psig.
- Rod Control is in Manual (D-147) until Group Buses are transferred.
- Group Buses are currently powered from the Station Power Transformers (SPT).

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Plant Operator.
- The CRS directs you to TRANSFER all 4KV Group Buses from their respective Station Power Transformers (SPT) to the Aux Power Transformers (APT) IAW S2.OP-SO.4KV-0008, 4KV Group Buses Power Supply Transfer in the following order:
  1. 2F IAW section 5.2
  2. 2G IAW section 5.3
  3. 2H IAW section 5.4
  4. 2E IAW section 5.1
- All pre-requisites are completed SAT.
Task Standard:
1. Transfers 2F 4KV Group bus from SPT to APT.
2. Trips Reactor IAW ARP following de-energizing of 2G 4KV Group Bus.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
P&L Review Precautions and Limitations Reviews P&Ls. Notes P&L 3.3: OHA J-39, GROUP BUS XFER FAIL, will illuminate then clear on bus transfer (expected response). OHA J-39 annunciator response is applicable when the alarm does NOT clear following bus transfer.
5.2.1 ENSURE all OHA for 2 APT are clear Checks OHA windows; determines all OHA for 2 APT are clear.
5.2.2 ENSURE 2A APT voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV Checks 2A APT reading on 2CC3; ensures voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV.
5.2.4 * PRESS Mimic Bus 2F GROUP BUS INFEED 2BFGD BREAKER pushbutton Depresses Mimic Bus 2F GROUP BUS INFEED 2BFGD BREAKER pushbutton; verifies console bezel 2BFGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is illuminated.
5.2.5 * PRESS 2BFGD CLOSE pushbutton and verify transfer Depresses 2BFGD CLOSE pushbutton. Verifies: A. 22FSD is OPEN. B. 2BFGD is CLOSED. C. 2F 4KV Group Bus voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV. D. Console bezel 2BFGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is extinguished.
5.3.1 ENSURE all OHA for 2 APT are clear Checks OHA windows; determines all OHA for 2 APT are clear.
5.3.2 ENSURE 2A APT voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV Checks 2A APT reading on 2CC3; ensures voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV.
5.3.4 * PRESS Mimic Bus 2G GROUP BUS INFEED 2BGGD BREAKER pushbutton Depresses Mimic Bus 2G GROUP BUS INFEED 2BGGD BREAKER pushbutton; verifies console bezel 2BGGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is illuminated.
5.3.5 * PRESS 2BGGD CLOSE pushbutton — 2G 4KV Group Bus fails to transfer Operator determines 2G 4KV Group Bus did not transfer. Multiple OHAs annunciate: J-8 (2G 4KV GRP BUS DIFF/OVRLD), J-38 (4KV GRP BUS UNDRVOLT), J-39 (4KV GRP BUS XFER FAIL), D-31 (24 RCP BKR OPEN/FLO LO). 24 RCP trips due to loss of 2G bus.
ARP * Respond to OHA ARPs — Trip the Reactor Identifies from OHA J-39 ARP: GO TO OHA J-38 response. From J-38 (4KV GRP BUS UNDRVOLT) Step 3.5: IF ANY RCP Trips, THEN TRIP Reactor, GO TO EOP-TRIP-1. Alternatively from D-31 (24 RCP BKR OPEN/FLO LO): IF ANY RCP Trips, THEN TRIP Reactor, GO TO EOP-TRIP-1. Operator manually TRIPs the Reactor.
Key Decision Point:
Step 5.3.5 is the alternate path / discriminating step. The 2F Group Bus transfers successfully, but when attempting to transfer the 2G Group Bus from SPT to APT, the bus fails to transfer and de-energizes. This causes the loss of 24 RCP (powered from 2G bus). Multiple OHA alarms annunciate simultaneously. The applicant must recognize the significance of losing an RCP and use the Alarm Response Procedures (J-39 directs to J-38; J-38 Step 3.5 and D-31 both direct: IF ANY RCP Trips, THEN TRIP Reactor and GO TO EOP-TRIP-1) to determine that a manual reactor trip is required. Key P&L knowledge: P&L 3.3 warned that J-39 alarm illuminating then clearing is the expected response during transfer. If OHA J-39 does NOT clear following bus transfer, the ARP response applies. The applicant must recognize the difference between the expected transient alarm and the actual failure.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.4KV-0008 (R13), S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0009 (R27) | Task: N0620110101 | K/A: 062 A2.04 — Ability to (a) predict the impacts of AC distribution bus failure on the AC Electrical Distribution and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-h — Start a CCW Pump IAW EOP-APPX-1 Sim | RO/SRO | 008 A2.01 (3.3/3.6)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- The Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped and a SI initiated based on indications of a large break LOCA.
- A loss of off-site power occurred when the Main Generator breakers opened.
- 2B 4KV Vital Bus is de-energized due to Bus Differential with its Diesel running.
- 2-EOP-TRIP-1 is in progress.
- NO CCW pumps are running (SEC Mode 3).
- 21 and 22 CCW pumps were in service prior to the trip and 23 CCW pump was in Auto.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to START ONE CCW pump IAW 2-EOP-APPX-1.
- Notify the CRS when one CCW pump is running.
Task Standard:
STARTS 23 CCW pump IAW EOP-APPX-1.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 CHECK 4KV vital bus status: CHECK AT LEAST ONE vital bus ENERGIZED by station power transformers Determines that NONE of the 4KV vital buses are energized from the station power transformers. 2A and 2C are energized from EDGs, and 2B is de-energized. RNO: GOES TO Step 2.
2a CHECK all ECCS pumps AND motor-driven AFW pumps running on energized vital buses Checks running pumps; determines all ECCS pumps AND motor-driven AFW pumps running on energized vital buses (A and C).
2b CHECK one CCW pump running Checks CCW pump status; determines NO CCW pumps are running. RNO: GOES TO Step 3.
3 * SELECT CCW pump start strategy (choose a, b, c, or d) Selects strategy 'C' based on: de-energized 4KV Vital Bus = B; CCW Pumps available = 21 or 23. GO TO Step 6.
6e * Attempt to start 21 CCW pump (first available) Determines 21 CCW pump was in service prior to Rx trip. Rotates 2A SEC Block Switch to BLOCK and releases. Depresses Emergency Loading Reset for 2A SEC on 2CC3. Stops 21 CS pump. Depresses 21 CCW START PB — 21 CCW pump does NOT start.
6e RNO * 21 CCW fails to start — RESET CS, restart 21 CS pump, GO TO Step 6h Recognizes 21 CCW did not start. Per RNO: RESET Containment Spray, START 21 CS pump as necessary, GO TO Step 6h to attempt 23 CCW.
6h * Start 23 CCW pump Rotates 2C SEC Block Switch to BLOCK and releases. Depresses Emergency Loading Reset PBs for 2A and 2C SEC on 2CC3. Stops 22 CS pump. Depresses 23 CCW START PB; verifies START bezel illuminates. Resets Spray Actuation (Train A and B). Closes 22CS2. GOES TO Step 8.
Key Decision Point:
Step 3 is the discriminating step. The applicant must correctly determine which CCW pump start strategy to use from the four options (a, b, c, d) in EOP-APPX-1. With 2B 4KV Vital Bus de-energized and both 21 and 23 CCW pumps available, the correct selection is strategy 'C'. The alternate path element occurs at Step 6e: the first CCW pump attempted (21 CCW on the 2A bus) fails to start due to an override (21 CC PUMP-START is overridden OFF). The applicant must recognize the failure, take the RNO path (reset CS, restart 21 CS pump), and proceed to Step 6h to successfully start 23 CCW pump on the 2C bus. The sequence requires stopping a Containment Spray pump to make room for the CCW pump on the SEC-loaded bus, and the applicant must remember to restart CS and reset spray actuation after loading the CCW pump.
Ref: 2-EOP-APPX-1 (R25) | Task: N1150420501 | K/A: 008 A2.01 — Ability to (a) predict the impacts of CCW system malfunctions and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

Scenario 1 — Startup / PZR Pressure Channel Failure / SW Bay Leak / RCP Seal Failure / SGTR Simulator | 5 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: Salem Unit 2 is at 3% reactor power (Mode 2) during a plant startup, BOL. Control Bank D at 130 steps. Core burnup 500 EFPH. 21 SGFP is in service; 22 SGFP is O/S in standby. Steam dumps are in MS Pressure Control, Automatic, set at 1000 psig. 23 Charging pump is C/T to troubleshoot flow oscillations with the fluid drive. 21 Charging pump in service. Rod control in manual. S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load, complete up to step 4.3.18. S2.OP-SO.MS-0002, Steam Dump System Operation (5.4.1). Monitoring Tavg > 541 F once per 30 minutes due to RC Loop Tavg - Tref Deviation console alarm. Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. RCS Boron: 1648 ppm.

Turnover: The crew is directed to raise power to 10% and enter Mode 1 using control rods and steam dumps. Reactor Engineering directs use of control rods and steam dumps. No Fuel Conditioning Limits are imposed until 50%. No limiting LCOs in effect.
Major Events:
  1. Power ascension to 10% and enter Mode 1
  2. Controlling PZR Pressure Channel fails high (spray valves open, heaters de-energize)
  3. #2 SW Bay leak (split headers, isolate bay)
  4. 22 RCP #1 Seal degradation and failure (trip reactor, stop RCP, close 22CV104)
  5. 24 SG Tube Rupture (manual SI, EOP-SGTR-1 transition, cooldown)
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Power Ascension to 10% CRS directs power ascension using Main Steam Dumps in MS Pressure Control and control rods. PO raises steam dump demand IAW S2.OP-SO.MS-0002 Section 5.4 using Attachments 3 or 4. RO withdraws control rods at specified increments to maintain Tavg on program. RO announces when NIS indicates 5% reactor power and records time of Mode 1 entry in Control Room Narrative Log.
2 Controlling PZR Pressure Channel fails high RO announces OHA D-8 RC PRESS HI and E-42 2PR1 1/2 Trip. RO determines actual pressure is not high, reports spray valves open, recommends placing Master Pressure Controller (MPC) in manual. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001. RO takes manual control of MPC, lowers demand to close spray valves. RO identifies PZR Pressure Channel I failed high. RO selects Channel III for control, matches MPC demand to current pressure, returns MPC to AUTO. RO closes 2PR6 and places 2PR1 in Manual. CRS directs WCC to remove control power from 2PR6. CRS directs PO to remove failed channel from service IAW S2.OP-SO.RPS-0003. PO verifies tripping bistables will NOT cause ESF/RPS actuation, verifies Channel III selected for Master Pressure Control. CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 Action 6 (6 hr LCO), 3.3.2.1.b Action 19 (6 hr LCO), 3.4.5 Action b (1 hr LCO), and 3.2.5 DNB (2 hr LCO).
3 #2 SW Bay leak RO announces OHA B-29 (22-23 SW PMP SUMP AREA LVL HI), followed by OHA B-13 (21 SW HDR PRESS LO) and B-14. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay Leak. PO initiates CAS. Crew dispatches NEO to investigate. RO reports 25 SW pump auto start on low header pressure. Crew splits SW headers by opening nuclear header crossover MOVs 21SW23 and 22SW23, and closing cross-connect valves 21SW17 and 22SW17. Crew determines leak is in #2 Bay. RO/PO starts all available Bay 4 pumps (24, 25, 26). Crew stops #2 Bay pumps. Crew isolates #2 SW Bay by closing 21SW22 and 21SW20. PO reports SW available to DGs through 22SW21 and to Turbine Area through 23SW20. CRS enters TS 3.7.4 (72 hr LCO) for only one operable SW loop. PO removes one CCHX from service per CAS item 4.0. CRS contacts maintenance for leak repair.
4 22 RCP #1 Seal degradation and failure RO identifies rising 22 RCP seal leakoff flow, reports flow stable at ~5.2 gpm. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001. RO uses P-250 computer to check 22 RCP conditions. CRS determines CCW is not cause, winding temps normal, seal injection >6 gpm. CRS determines orderly unit shutdown required and must stop 22 RCP within 8 hours. Crew commences shutdown — RO manually inserts control rods (enters Mode 2). Seal leakoff flow then rises above 6 gpm — CRS initiates Att 1 CAS and Att 2 (Stopping RCPs). CRS briefs reactor trip actions and assigns 22CV104 closure to RO. RO trips reactor, confirms trip, stops 22 RCP, starts timer. RO closes 22CV104 within 3-5 minutes after stopping 22 RCP. (CT#1)
5 24 SG Tube Rupture RO performs EOP-TRIP-1 immediate actions. CRS and crew transition to EOP-TRIP-2 (no SI required). Shortly after, RO reports OHA A-6 RMS TRBL — 2R53D and 2R15 in alarm, followed by 2R41 and 2R19D. RO reports rapidly lowering RCS pressure/level. CRS directs manual SI and re-enters EOP-TRIP-1. RO reports 24BF13 (FW isolation valve) failed to close on SI/Phase A — PO manually closes 24BF13 from console. RO reports 24 SG NR level rising uncontrolled. CRS transitions to EOP-SGTR-1. PO isolates 24 SG — closes 24MS10 (set at 1045 psig), 24MS167, 24MS18, 24MS7, 24GB4. PO closes 24AF21 and 24AF11. CRS determines RCS cooldown target from Table B: SG press >1000 psig = 503 F CETs. PO initiates RCS cooldown using steam dumps at 25% demand or intact MS10s. (CT#2 Part 1) Crew waits until hottest CETs are less than target cooldown temp, then stops cooldown. (CT#2 Part 2)
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (Site Specific): Stop 22 RCP and close 22CV104 within 3-5 minutes after stopping 22 RCP in EOP-TRIP-1. Safety significance: failure to close the seal leakoff flow valve (CV104) when required could result in damage to the backup #2 seal and loss of RCS inventory. When seal leakoff is greater than 6 gpm the operator must close the associated CV104 within 3-5 minutes. The 3 minutes allows for the RCP to coastdown and enable static conditions for the #2 seal to perform its backup function. The 5 minutes minimizes RCS leakage from the damaged seal to maintain RCS inventory. Measurable performance standard: seal leakoff valve (CV104) position indicates closed; RCP breaker position indicates open.

CT#2 (CT-19): Control initial RCS cooldown so that transition from EOP-SGTR-1 does not occur. This CT is broken into two parts: (1) Initiate RCS cooldown — PO places steam dumps in manual, adjusts demand to 0%, then places in MS Pressure Control and adjusts to 25% to open dumps OR dumps steam at maximum rate using intact MS10s; (2) Maintain RCS temperature — crew monitors hottest CETs until less than RCS cooldown target temperature (503 F per Table B for SG pressure >1000 psig), then stops cooldown by closing steam dumps and placing MS Pressure Control in Auto or closing intact MS10s and placing in Auto.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 (PZR pressure channel fail high) → S2.OP-AB.SW-0003 (SW bay leak) → S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 (RCP seal degradation/failure) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip after RCP seal failure, no SI required) → EOP-TRIP-2 (reactor trip response) → 24 SG tube rupture occurs, manual SI initiated → EOP-TRIP-1 (re-entry with SI) → 24 SG NR level rising uncontrolled → EOP-SGTR-1 (isolate ruptured SG, cooldown to target temp) → Scenario terminated after RCS cooldown stopped
Source: 16-01 ESG-1 | View Scenario PDF

Connections

Scenario 2 — MS167 Drift / Tavg Channel Failure / RCS Leak / LBLOCA Simulator | 7 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: Salem Unit 2 is at 40% power, BOL. Mode 1. RCS Boron: 1348 ppm. MWe: 410. 22 SW Pump C/T for pump packing replacement. 23B CW Pump C/T for traveling screen repair. 2A EDG C/T for governor inspection and output breaker swap. 23 condensate pump and all heater drain pumps out of service due to plant power level. Polisher in service. Blowdown at 35K per loop aligned to flash tank/23 condenser. Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power. Power ascension on hold due to Main Turbine Valve Testing issues.

Turnover: Most limiting LCO: TS 3.8.1.1.b Action b for 2A EDG, expires in 60 hours. No other evolutions in progress beyond holding at 40% power.
Major Events:
  1. 21MS167 drifts from full open position
  2. 22 RC Loop Tavg Channel fails high (rods step in, continuous rod motion)
  3. RCS leak inside containment (35 gpm)
  4. Orderly unit shutdown due to RCS leak exceeding Tech Spec limits
  5. Large Break LOCA
  6. Both trains of SI fail to auto actuate; one keyswitch fails to operate
  7. 2B SEC fails to actuate on SI signal
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 21MS167 drifts from full open position PO announces OHA G-34 (21-24 MS167 VALVES NOT FULL OPEN) and refers to ARP. PO reports CRT and board indication of 21MS167 not full open. CRS directs PO to open 21MS167 per OHA ARP S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0007. PO depresses open pushbutton and reports 21MS167 has fully opened. CRS directs notification to maintenance.
2 22 RC Loop Tavg Channel fails high RO reports Tavg/Tref deviation and rods stepping in unexpectedly. RO reports no turbine runback in progress and places rod control in Manual. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. RO reports OHA E-8 and E-16 (Rod Insertion Lo and Lo-Lo) and various 2CC2 console alarms (RC Loop Tavg Deviation, Tavg-Tref Deviation, RC Tavg Hi or Lo-Lo). CRS confirms rods in manual and motion stopped. CRS directs RO to adjust rods to maintain Tavg within 1.5 deg of program. RO identifies 22 RC Loop Tavg channel failed high. CRS directs PZR level return to program. RO places Charging System Master Flow Controller in manual, adjusts charging flow, defeats 22 loop dT and Tavg on 2CC2, selects alternate channel. When PZR level restored, returns MFC to Auto. RO restores rods to ARO, places rod control in Auto. CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 Action 6 (6 hr LCO) and 3.3.2.1.b Action 19 (6 hr LCO). CRS initiates S2.OP-SO.RPS-0002 to place 22 RC Loop Tavg in tripped condition.
3 RCS leak inside containment (35 gpm) RO reports charging flow rising and PZR level lowering slowly. Crew reports 2R11A containment radiation monitor rising/alarm. RO reports OHA C-2 CNTMT SUMP PMP START. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.RC-0001, RCS Leak, and directs Att 1 CAS. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001 after OHA A-6. RO transfers to centrifugal charging pump IAW step 3.14, raises charging flow to stabilize PZR level. PO reduces letdown to minimum (opens 2CV3, maintains letdown pressure ~300 psig with 2CV18 in manual, closes 75 gpm orifice, returns 2CV18 to auto). RO stabilizes PZR level and estimates leak rate. CRS initiates S2.OP-ST.RC-0008, RCS Water Inventory Balance. CRS contacts Rad Pro — PO places 2 CFCUs in Low Speed and 2 in High Speed. CRS initiates Att 2 actions to locate/isolate leak. CRS enters TSAS 3.4.7.2.b Action b (4 hr LCO) for RCS leakage and 3.6.1.4 (1 hr LCO) for containment pressure if it reaches 0.3 psig.
4 Orderly unit shutdown due to RCS leak exceeding TS limits CRS determines orderly unit shutdown required based on RCS leak exceeding TS limits. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001. RO develops reactivity plan for shutdown and initiates boration. PO initiates turbine load reduction to 20% at specified rate.
5 Large Break LOCA RCS leak worsens to LBLOCA. Reactor trips. RO performs EOP-TRIP-1 immediate actions. RO reports demand for SI but SI did NOT auto-actuate.
6 SI fails to auto-actuate; one keyswitch fails to manually actuate RO reports SI failed to auto-actuate. RO manually initiates SI using keyswitch — one train fails to manually initiate. RO goes to other train keyswitch and initiates SI on both trains. (CT#1) RO continues EOP-TRIP-1 immediate actions: trips Main Turbine, reports at least one 4KV vital bus energized, reports SI initiated. CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1 and directs CAS implementation.
7 2B SEC fails to actuate on SI signal RO reports SEC loading NOT complete for energized vital buses; available equipment on 2B bus failed to start. RO blocks 2B SEC, resets 2B SEC. CRS directs starting safeguards loads for 2B bus using Table A. PO reports 21 and 22 AFW pumps running. RO reports NOT all valve groups in Table B in safeguards positions — 2SW26 NOT closed. PO manually closes 2SW26. RO reports containment pressure >15 psig — CRS directs Phase B and Spray actuation. RO initiates MSLI. RO stops all RCPs. CRS reads CAS to notify when RWST level lo alarm at 15.2 feet. RO reports SI flow >100 gpm. RO reports RCS pressure dropping through 1540, 300 psig. RO reports RHR flow at least 300 gpm. STA reports RED path for Thermal Shock — CRS transitions to EOP-FRTS-1 (enter/exit: RCS pressure <300 psig and RHR flow >300 gpm, return to EOP-LOCA-1). CRS transitions to EOP-LOCA-1. Crew resets SI, Phase A, Phase B. Resets SECs. At RWST level lo alarm, CRS transitions to EOP-LOCA-3 for cold leg recirculation transfer. (CT#2)
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-2): Manually actuate SI before transition to EOP-LOCA-1, EOP-FRTS-1, or EOP-TRIP-2. Safety significance: with both trains of auto SI failed, the operator must recognize the failure and manually actuate SI to ensure emergency core cooling. One keyswitch will fail, requiring the operator to use the other train keyswitch to initiate SI on both trains.

CT#2 (CT-36): Transfer to cold leg recirculation before RWST level drops below 1.2 feet. This CT is broken into three time-critical parts from RWST low level alarm (15.2 feet): (1) Initiate close on 2SJ69 within ~3.7 minutes, (2) Stop one containment spray pump (22 CS pump) within ~5.5 minutes, (3) Complete transfer to cold leg recirculation (EOP-LOCA-3 Step 15 complete — close 2SJ67 and 2SJ68, open 21SJ45 and 22SJ45, close 2SJ30/2SJ1/2SJ2, place 21RH29 and 22RH29 in manual and ensure closed) within ~11.2 minutes. Safety significance: failure to transfer before RWST empties results in loss of all pumped safety injection and containment spray — core damage.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 (continuous rod motion) → S2.OP-AB.RC-0001 (RCS leak) → S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001 (orderly shutdown) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip/SI after LBLOCA) → EOP-LOCA-1 (loss of reactor coolant — SI flow >100 gpm, RHR flow >300 gpm) → EOP-FRTS-1 (RED path Thermal Shock — enter/exit, RCS pressure <300 psig and RHR flow >300 gpm) → return to EOP-LOCA-1 → RWST level lo alarm at 15.2 feet → EOP-LOCA-3 (transfer to cold leg recirculation) → Scenario terminated after cold leg recirc transfer complete
Source: 16-01 ESG-2 | View Scenario PDF

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