✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, when the 13 RCP shaft shears at 17:00:00, the RCS low flow reactor trip setpoint will be met for only 13 Loop. Since the reactor is below P-8 (36% power), the reactor will not trip. For Part 2, PZR spray is produced from the 11 and 13 loop D/Ps (created by the 13 and 11 RCPs). However, 13 RCP actually produces most of the spray flow. Consequently, when 13 RCP trips, full PZR spray flow is not available.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, a reactor trip on RCS low flow has different coincidences based on reactor power level. Since the reactor is above P-7 (10% power) and there is a reactor trip based on RCS low flow when the reactor is > P-7, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that at 17:00:30, the reactor is tripped. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, same reasoning as A — candidate could incorrectly conclude the reactor is tripped. For Part 2, since many other systems only require 1 pump to provide 100% flow (e.g. CCW, SW, SI, CS, CVCS and RHR), the candidate could incorrectly conclude full PZR spray is available with only one RCP.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since many other systems only require 1 pump to provide 100% flow (e.g. CCW, SW, SI, CS, CVCS and RHR), the candidate could incorrectly conclude full PZR spray is available with only one RCP.

Ref: 2-EOP-FRCE-3 (Licensed Operator Fluency List) | LO: NOS05FLUNCY-09 | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, when in service, the mixed bed demineralizer is used to remove chemical impurities from the RCS. For Part 2, boron removal is more efficient at lower temperatures. Consequently, the demineralizer will release boron as temperature rises resulting in an unplanned reactivity change. With more boron in the RCS, TAVG will lower to offset the negative reactivity inserted into the core when the demineralizer heated up and released boron.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the Cation Demineralizer is used to remove Lithium from the RCS and to maintain RCS pH. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that mixed bed demineralizer is used to help maintain RCS pH. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the demineralizer will actually absorb more boron as it heats up which would cause TAVG to rise.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the Cation Demineralizer is used to remove Lithium from the RCS and to maintain RCS pH. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that mixed bed demineralizer is used to help maintain RCS pH. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the demineralizer will actually absorb more boron as it heats up which would cause TAVG to rise.

Ref: NOS05CVCS00-17 (Chemical and Volume Control System) | LO: NOS05CVCS00-17 — Describe demineralizer function and abnormal operations | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. The Residual Heat Removal System Pumps take suction from the 21 Hot Leg and can be aligned to discharge into the 23 and 24 Hot Legs.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Since the RHR Pumps take suction from an RCS hot leg and can be aligned to discharge into two RCS hot legs, selection of any combination of the 4 RCS loops is plausible.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Since the RHR Pumps take suction from an RCS hot leg and can be aligned to discharge into two RCS hot legs, selection of any combination of the 4 RCS loops is plausible.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Since the RHR Pumps take suction from an RCS hot leg and can be aligned to discharge into two RCS hot legs, selection of any combination of the 4 RCS loops is plausible.

Ref: NOS05RHR000-16 (Residual Heat Removal System) | LO: NOS05RHR000-16 — Draw a one-line diagram of the RHR System | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1, IAW EOP-LOCA-1, the crew is required to realign ECCS valves for cold leg recirculation as soon as the RWST Level LO alarm was FIRST validated. For Part 2, with 21SJ44 closed only 22 RHR pump will be able to draw suction from the Containment Sump and discharge ECCS flow into the RCS cold legs and to the suctions of the SI Pumps and CCPs.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the valve arrangements for the ECCS pumps to take suction from a water source are not standardized. For example, if SJ1 (RWST Suction Valve to CCP) had failed to open, BOTH CCPs could take suction from the RWST. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude the containment suction valves to the RHR pumps are arranged similarly to the SJ1 and SJ2. This would cause the candidate to further incorrectly deduce that with 21SJ44 closed, BOTH RHR Pumps will be able to draw suction from the Containment Sump.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, there is a RWST Level LO-LO alarm. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that RWST Level LO alarm only warns the crew to prepare for transferring ECCS flow to cold leg recirculation and the transfer will actually occur when the RWST Level LO-LO alarm is validated. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, there is a RWST Level LO-LO alarm. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that RWST Level LO alarm only warns the crew to prepare for transferring ECCS flow and the transfer will actually occur when the RWST Level LO-LO alarm is validated. For Part 2, the valve arrangements for the ECCS pumps to take suction from a water source are not standardized, leading the candidate to conclude BOTH RHR pumps could take suction with 21SJ44 closed.

Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-3 (Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation), NOS05ECCS00-09 (Emergency Core Cooling System) | LO: NOS05ECCS00-09 — Draw one-line diagram of ECCS major components and flowpaths | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1, an automatic Safety Injection occurs when PZR Pressure is < 1765 psig or Containment Pressure is > 4 psig. Consequently, 11:00 is the earliest time that an automatic Safety Injection occurred. For Part 2, the PZR heaters will de-energize based on PZR low level (at 17%).

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since the SI signal causes several automatic actions, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the PZR Heaters de-energize when SI is actuated.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate may recognize that at 11:08, the automatic Safety Injection setpoint for low RCS pressure has been reached and incorrectly determine that 11:08 is the earliest time that an automatic Safety Injection setpoint was reached. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate may recognize that at 11:08, the automatic Safety Injection setpoint for low RCS pressure has been reached and incorrectly determine that 11:08 is the earliest time. For Part 2, since the SI signal causes several automatic actions, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the PZR Heaters de-energize when SI is actuated.

Ref: NOS05FLUNCY-09 (Licensed Operator Fluency List), NOS05ECCS00-09 (Emergency Core Cooling System), NOS05PZRP&L-10 (Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control) | LO: NOS05PZRP&L-10 — Outline interlocks associated with PZR P&L components | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, PRT cooling is accomplished by a feed (via 2WR82) and bleed (via 2PR14) of the tank. Operation of WR82 and PR14 can only be performed manually. For Part 2, during PRT Cooling, the PRT is drained directly to the RCDT pump suction header.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since there are many other processes that have automatic functions, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that PRT Cooling can be performed manually and automatically. For Part 2, since the draining of the PRT is ultimately pumped from the RCDTs, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that when the PRT is drained via PR14 directly into the RCDT (like so many other water sources).

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since there are many other processes that have automatic functions, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that PRT Cooling can be performed manually and automatically. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since the draining of the PRT is ultimately pumped from the RCDTs, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that when the PRT is drained via PR14 directly into the RCDT (like so many other water sources).

Ref: NOS05PZRPRT-06 (Pressurizer and Pressurizer Relief Tank) | LO: NOS05PZRPRT-06 — Identify CR controls, indications, and alarms for PZR and PRT | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Lower

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, 2CC149 automatically closes on high radiation alarm on 2R17A/B. For Part 2, IAW S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 Step 3.8 NOTE, "Allowing CCW Surge Tank to overflow will contaminate the in-service Waste Holdup Tank and the 22 ABV Exhaust Filter Unit".

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, 2CC149 is normally open and the candidate could not recall that 2CC149 closes when 2R17A/B being in alarm. Consequently at 15:00:30, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2CC149 is open. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, 2CC149 is normally open and the candidate could not recall that 2CC149 closes when 2R17A/B being in alarm. Consequently at 15:00:30, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2CC149 is open. For Part 2, the candidate could fail to recognize the 22 ABV Exhaust Filter Unit will also become contaminated when the CCW Surge Tank overflows.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could fail to recognize the 22 ABV Exhaust Filter Unit will also become contaminated when the CCW Surge Tank overflows.

Ref: NOS05CCW000-11 (Component Cooling Water) | LO: NOS05CCW000-11 — Describe how CC-149 Surge Tank Vent Valve impacts CCW during normal and abnormal conditions | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, with PZR Pressure at 2005 psig (2020 psia), saturation temperature is 637 °F. Consequently, with PZR liquid temperature at 635 °F, the PZR is NOT water saturated. For Part 2, IAW 1-EOP-TRIP-6, "To limit the pressure decrease upon RCP restart, saturated conditions should first be established in the PZR."

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, there are concerns for pressure to rise when an RCP is started when the plant is water solid. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the reason for establishing and maintaining saturation conditions in the PZR is to limit the PZR pressure increase upon RCP restart IAW 1-EOP-TRIP-6.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since the steam tables are listed in psia (not psig), the candidate could enter the steam tables at 1990 psia and incorrectly interpolate to determine that the PZR is water saturated. For Part 2, same reasoning as A regarding pressure increase concerns.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since the steam tables are listed in psia (not psig), the candidate could enter the steam tables at 1990 psia and incorrectly interpolate to determine that the PZR is water saturated. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: Steam Tables, 1-EOP-TRIP-6 (Natural Circulation Rapid Cooldown Without RVLIS) | LO: NOS05TRP004-06 — Determine the basis for each step in a Natural Circulation Cooldown | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, with PZR Pressure at 2312, the PZR Spray Valves are fully open. For Part 2, with PZR Pressure at 2340, the PZR PORVs are open.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, 2315 psig is the PZR Pressure setpoint at which the PORVs would fully close. Consequently, the candidate could mistake the 2315 psig setpoint for when the PZR Spray valves go fully open. Consequently, the candidate would incorrectly conclude that at 12:00:00, the PZR Spray valves are throttled (and not fully open). Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, same reasoning as A. For Part 2, the PZR master controller setpoint is at 100% when PZR pressure is 2355 psig. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the PZR PORVs open when the PZR master controller is at 100% (or 2355 psig). This would then cause the candidate to incorrectly conclude that at 12:00:30, the PZR PORVs are closed.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the PZR master controller setpoint is at 100% when PZR pressure is 2355 psig. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the PZR PORVs open when the PZR master controller is at 100% (or 2355 psig). This would then cause the candidate to incorrectly conclude that at 12:00:30, the PZR PORVs are closed.

Ref: NOS05PZRP&L-10 (Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control) | LO: NOS05PZRP&L-10 — Describe how Spray Valves, PORVs, and MPC impact PZR P&L during normal and abnormal conditions | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. PT-455/456/457/474 are the pressure transmitters that feed into the PZR Pressure LOW Reactor Trip coincidence (2 out of 4 below low pressure trip setpoint). With 2PT-456 failed low, the coincidence for the PZR Pressure LOW Reactor Trip (based on the remaining functional PZR Pressure Channels) is now 1 out of 3.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that PT-1648 also feeds into the PZR Pressure LOW Reactor Trip coincidence and when 2PT-456 fails, this causes the 2PT-456 bistable to be bypassed from the PZR Pressure LOW Reactor Trip. Consequently, with 2PT-456 failed low, the candidate would then incorrectly determine that the coincidence is now 2 out of 4.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that PT-1648 also feeds into the PZR Pressure LOW Reactor Trip coincidence. PT-1648 is only used for indication at the RSP. Consequently, with 2PT-456 failed low, the candidate would then incorrectly determine that the coincidence is now 1 out of 4.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that when 2PT-456 fails, this causes the 2PT-456 bistable to be bypassed from the PZR Pressure LOW Reactor Trip. Consequently, coincidence for the PZR Pressure LOW Reactor Trip would be 2 out of 3.

Ref: NOS05RXPROT-12 (Reactor Protection System) | LO: NOS05RXPROT-12 — Describe the design bases of the RPS including redundancy, independence, fail safe, testability | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. If the associated Permissive Interlock is satisfied, a Reactor Trip Signal will be generated when 4KV Group Busses H and G are less than a maximum of 70% of normal bus voltage.

✗ B. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, 90% is setpoint for the RCP Low Flow Reactor Trip. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 90% normal bus voltage is the setpoint for the RCP Undervoltage Reactor Trip.

✗ C. The RCP Undervoltage Reactor Trip is based on two selected 4KV Group Busses in an undervoltage condition. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the 2 selected 4KV Group Busses are H and E. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the 2 selected 4KV Group Busses are H and E. For Part 2, 90% is setpoint for the RCP Low Flow Reactor Trip. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 90% normal bus voltage is the setpoint for the RCP Undervoltage Reactor Trip.

Ref: NOS05FLUNCY-09 (Licensed Operator Fluency List) | LO: NOS05FLUNCY-09 — State those items in the Licensed Operator Fluency List: Permissives and Control Grade Interlocks, Reactor Trips | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Lower (Memory)

✓ C. Correct. The following Containment Cooling configurations will maintain Containment Pressure, Temperature and Humidity within design limits with a DBA occurring inside containment: 2 CS Pumps (not given in question stem), 1 CS Pump + 3 CFCUs, and 5 CFCUs.

✗ A. Since all of the given Containment Cooling configurations are possible containment cooling configurations, then all of the distractors are plausible.

✗ B. Since all of the given Containment Cooling configurations are possible containment cooling configurations, then all of the distractors are plausible.

✗ D. Since all of the given Containment Cooling configurations are possible containment cooling configurations, then all of the distractors are plausible.

Ref: NOS05CONTMT-15 (Containment and Containment Support Systems) | LO: NOS05CONTMT-15 — Describe how CFCUs impact the Containment and Containment Support Systems during normal and abnormal conditions | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower (Memory)

✓ B. Correct. NaOH is added to Containment Spray flow to remove elemental iodine from the containment atmosphere and to prevent corrosion of containment components.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate may fail to recall that NaOH is also used to prevent corrosion of containment components.

✗ C. Hydrazine is a familiar chemical added to the RCS to scavenge oxygen. The candidate may incorrectly conclude Hydrazine is added to Containment Spray flow. For Part 2, the candidate may fail to recall that NaOH is also used to prevent corrosion of containment components.

✗ D. Hydrazine is a familiar chemical added to the RCS to scavenge oxygen. The candidate may incorrectly conclude Hydrazine is added to Containment Spray flow.

Ref: NOS05CSPRAY-06 (Containment Spray System) | LO: NOS05CSPRAY-06 — Describe the purpose and design bases of the Containment Spray System | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Lower (Memory)

✓ C. Correct. 21 CS Pump is powered from 2A 4KV Vital Bus and 22 CS Pump is powered from 2C 4KV Vital Bus. Additionally, a Containment Spray actuation occurs at 15 psig Containment pressure. At 16:30:00, a containment spray actuation signal exists and 2C 4KV Vital Bus is de-energized. Consequently, ONLY 21 CS Pump is running.

✗ A. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that at 16:30:00, the Containment Spray setpoint has not been reached or that the electrical transient has affected both CS pumps. In either case, the candidate would then incorrectly deduce that no CS pumps are running.

✗ B. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that both CS pumps are not powered from the 2C 4KV Vital Bus. Consequently, with a valid Containment Spray signal present, the candidate would incorrectly deduce that both CS pumps are running.

✗ D. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that only the 21 CS Pump is powered from 2C 4KV Vital Bus. Consequently, with a valid Containment Spray signal present, the candidate would incorrectly deduce that only 22 CS pump is running.

Ref: NOS05FLUNCY-09 (Licensed Operator Fluency List), NOS05CSPRAY-06 (Containment Spray System) | LO: NOS05CSPRAY-06 — State the power supply to the Containment Spray Pumps | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher (Analysis)

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1, IAW S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 Step 3.31, the 21MS10 setpoint will be set to 1045 psig. For Part 2, button A will be depressed on the 21MS10 controller to raise the setpoint.

✗ B. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, button B on the 21MS10 is used to raise the manual output to the valve so it opens more. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that button B actually raises the controller's setpoint.

✗ C. For Part 1, 1070 psig is a familiar pressure (setpoint for MS15 Main Steam Safety Valve). The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the MS10 controller will be adjusted to 1070 psig. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. For Part 1, 1070 psig is a familiar pressure (setpoint for MS15 Main Steam Safety Valve). The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the MS10 controller will be adjusted to 1070 psig. For Part 2, button B on the 21MS10 is used to raise the manual output to the valve so it opens more. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that button B actually raises the controller's setpoint.

Ref: NOS05ABSGTL-05 (Steam Generator Tube Leak) | LO: NOS05ABSGTL-05 — Describe the actions taken in S1/S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 and the bases for the actions | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher (Analysis)

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, the reason that 21-24MS7 (Main Steam Loop Drain Valves) are opened before 21-24MS167 is to prevent pressurized steam from forcing residual water in the piping to cause water hammer on downstream components. For Part 2, The crew will open 21-24MS167 when there is less than a maximum of 50 psid across each valve.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, there are multiple steps in S2.OP-SO.MS-0001 that require actions to be performed when MS Header pressure is ~15 psig. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that 21-24MS167 will be opened when there is less than a maximum of 15 psid across each valve.

✗ C. For Part 1, preventing damage to the Turbine is a general concern and the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 21-24MS7 are opened to remove corrosion products or impurities to ensure Main Turbine blading is not impinged. For Part 2, there are multiple steps in S2.OP-SO.MS-0001 that require actions when MS Header pressure is ~15 psig. The candidate could incorrectly conclude 15 psid is the maximum delta-P for opening MS167s.

✗ D. For Part 1, preventing damage to the Turbine is a general concern and the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 21-24MS7 are opened to remove corrosion products or impurities. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: S2.OP-SO.MS-0001 | LO: NOS05MSTEAM-11 — Given industry operating experience, review the OE and outline a course of action to prevent recurrence | Source: Modified Bank (ILOT 0901) | Cognitive: Lower (Memory)

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, the SGFP will trip when suction pressure is less than 215 psig for 10 seconds. Consequently, given the question stem, 09:00:10 is the LATEST time that the 22 SGFP TRIPS. For Part 2, once 22 SGFP trips, a turbine runback to 66% will be generated. Since Reactor Power follows steam demand, Reactor Power will stabilize at approximately 66%.

✗ A. For Part 1, there is an instantaneous SGFP trip on low suction pressure (< 190 psig). The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the SGFP will trip instantaneously at 09:00:00. For Part 2, there are only two SGFPs. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that each SGFP provides 50% total flow and that a turbine runback will occur to 50%.

✗ B. For Part 1, there is an instantaneous SGFP trip on low suction pressure (< 190 psig). The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the SGFP will trip instantaneously at 09:00:00. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, there are only two SGFPs. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that each SGFP provides 50% total flow and that a turbine runback will occur to 50%.

Ref: NOS05CN&FDW-15 (Condensate and Feedwater System) | LO: NOS05CN&FDW-15 — Identify and describe the Control Room controls, indications, and alarms associated with the Condensate and Feedwater System | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher (Analysis)

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, IAW S2.OP-PT.AF-0002 P&L 3.1, "This procedure shall be performed 30 to 60 minutes after an Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is shutdown in Modes 1-3". For Part 2, IAW SOER 84-3 (and the AFW Lesson Plan), "backleakage of hot feedwater has disabled auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps due to steam binding."

✗ A. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-PT.AF-0002 is required to be performed immediately after an AFW Pump is shutdown in Modes 1-3. For Part 2, when a pump rotates backward and the pump is started, the duration of the starting current is extended because it takes longer to get up to speed. In some cases, this extended starting current can cause the breaker for the motor to open. RCPs are specifically designed with Anti-Reverse-Rotation Devices. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that backleakage of feedwater into the AFW System can DISABLE the motor-driven AFW Pumps by causing them to rotate backwards.

✗ B. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-PT.AF-0002 is required to be performed immediately after an AFW Pump is shutdown in Modes 1-3. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, when a pump rotates backward and the pump is started, the duration of the starting current is extended. RCPs are specifically designed with Anti-Reverse-Rotation Devices. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that backleakage causes the AFW pumps to rotate backwards.

Ref: NOS05AFW000-15 (Auxiliary Feedwater System) | LO: NOS05AFW000-15 — Discuss the procedural requirements associated with the AFW System, including major precaution and limitations; Given industry OE, review and outline a course of action to prevent recurrence | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher (Analysis)

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, the 23 SPT Supply Breaker to 2A 4KV Vital Bus will FIRST open when 23 SPT Voltage lowers to less than a MAXIMUM of 70% of normal voltage. For Part 2, after the electrical transient is complete, 2A 4KV Vital Bus will be powered by 24 SPT.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, EDG 2A can power the 2A 4KV Vital bus. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that when 23ASD breaker opens, EDG 2A will power the 2A 4KV Bus.

✗ B. For Part 1, 35% of bus normal voltage is permissive setpoint which allows breaker 24ASD to close to power the 2A 4KV Vital Bus. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the 23 SPT Supply Breaker will FIRST open when voltage lowers to less than 35% of normal. For Part 2, EDG 2A can power the 2A 4KV Vital bus. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that EDG 2A will power the bus.

✗ D. For Part 1, 35% of bus normal voltage is permissive setpoint which allows breaker 24ASD to close to power the 2A 4KV Vital Bus. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the 23 SPT Supply Breaker will FIRST open at 35%. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: NOS054KVAC0-08 (4160 Electrical System) | LO: NOS054KVAC0-08 — State the setpoints, coincidence, blocks and permissives for automatic actuations associated with the 4160 Electrical System | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Higher (Analysis)

✓ B. Correct. The Unit 1 Main Turbine Emergency Oil Pump is powered from the Unit 1 250 VDC Battery and Charger System.

✗ A. All of the distractors are powered from the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery and Charger System. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the Field Excitation Circuitry for the EDGs is powered from the 250 VDC system.

✗ C. All of the distractors are powered from the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery and Charger System. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the Vital Instrument Bus Inverters are powered from the 250 VDC system.

✗ D. All of the distractors are powered from the Unit 1 125 VDC Battery and Charger System. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the Emergency Lighting Inverters are powered from the 250 VDC system.

Ref: NOS05DCELEC-09 (DC Electrical Systems) | LO: NOS05DCELEC-09 — Identify and describe the local controls and indications associated with the DC Electrical System | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Lower (Memory)

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1, LCO 3.8.1.2 requires a minimum of two separate and independent diesel generators to be OPERABLE. For Part 2, If ALL REQUIRED EDGs are inoperable, the crew is required to IMMEDIATELY suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, LCO 3.8.1.2 REQUIRED ACTION A has an option to ONLY declare the affected required features inoperable in lieu of suspending all operations involving positive reactivity changes. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LCO 3.8.1.2 REQUIRED ACTION B does not require suspending all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, LCO 3.8.1.1 (ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS - OPERATING) requires a minimum of three separate and independent diesel generators to be OPERABLE. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LCO 3.8.1.2 also requires a minimum of three separate and independent diesel generators to be OPERABLE. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, LCO 3.8.1.1 (ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS - OPERATING) requires a minimum of three separate and independent diesel generators to be OPERABLE. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LCO 3.8.1.2 also requires a minimum of three separate and independent diesel generators to be OPERABLE. For Part 2, LCO 3.8.1.2 REQUIRED ACTION A has an option to ONLY declare the affected required features inoperable in lieu of suspending all operations involving positive reactivity changes. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LCO 3.8.1.2 REQUIRED ACTION B does not require suspending all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

Ref: NOS05EDG000-12 (EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS) | LO: 10 — Given a situation dealing with Emergency Diesel Generator operability, examine the situation and apply the appropriate Technical Specification action | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ A. Correct. 22 RHR pump is powered from 2B 4KV Vital Bus and 22 SI Pump is powered from 2C 4KV Vital Bus. Additionally, 2B EDG can not be started after the LOOP occurs. Consequently, 15 minutes after a reactor trip and safeguards have occurred (coincident with the loop), 2A and 2C Vital Busses are being powered from EDG 2A and EDG 2C and all of the appropriate ECCS loads have been loaded onto the running EDGs. Therefore, at 10:15:00, 22 RHR Pump is stopped and 22 SI Pump is running.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 22 SI pump is powered from 2B 4KV Vital Bus. This would result in the candidate incorrectly deducing that at 10:15:00, the 22 SI Pump is stopped.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 22 RHR pump is powered from 2C 4KV Vital Bus. This would result in the candidate incorrectly deducing that at 10:15:00, the 22 RHR Pump is running. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 22 RHR pump is powered from 2C 4KV Vital Bus. This would result in the candidate incorrectly deducing that at 10:15:00, the 22 RHR Pump is running. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 22 SI pump is powered from 2B 4KV Vital Bus. This would result in the candidate incorrectly deducing that at 10:15:00, the 22 SI Pump is stopped.

Ref: NOS054KVAC0-08 (4160 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM) | LO: 9 — State the setpoints, coincidence, blocks and permissives for automatic actuations associated with the 4160 Electrical System | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, Unit 1 has no automatic functions when a R19 goes in to warning. Automatic functions only occur when the monitor goes into alarm. Consequently, with 1R19A in warning (at 17:01:00), 11GB185 (Blowdown Discharge to Condenser) is open. For Part 2, Unit 2 has automatic functions that occur when a R19 goes in to warning. Consequently, with 2R19C in warning (at 19:46:00), 23GB185 (Blowdown Discharge to Condenser) is closed.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate may incorrectly conclude that for Unit 1, there are automatic functions when a R19 goes in to warning. Consequently, the candidate would then incorrectly deduce that at 17:01:00, 11GB185 (Blowdown Discharge to Condenser) is closed. For Part 2, the candidate may incorrectly conclude that for Unit 2, there are no automatic functions when a R19 goes in to warning. Consequently, the candidate would then incorrectly deduce that at 19:46:00, 23GB185 (Blowdown Discharge to Condenser) is open.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate may incorrectly conclude that for Unit 1, there are automatic functions when a R19 goes in to warning. Consequently, the candidate would then incorrectly deduce that at 17:01:00, 11GB185 (Blowdown Discharge to Condenser) is closed. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate may incorrectly conclude that for Unit 2, there are no automatic functions when a R19 goes in to warning. Consequently, the candidate would then incorrectly deduce that at 19:46:00, 23GB185 (Blowdown Discharge to Condenser) is open.

Ref: NOS05RMS000-17 (RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM) | LO: 5 NCT — Outline the interlocks associated with the R19A, B, C, & D Steam Generator Blowdown Liquid Monitors | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1 and in accordance with S2.OP-AB.SW-0001 Attachment 4 Step 2.0, the crew will CLOSE 21SW22 and ENSURE CLOSE 21SW23 and 22SW23 (TIE VALVES). For Part 2, after the valve manipulations have been completed, SW cooling is NOT available to 21CFCU and 22CFCU.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could not recall the proper cooling arrangement between 21 and 22 SW headers. Additionally, 23 CFCU is the only CFCU that can be cooled by both SW headers. Either way, the candidate could then incorrectly determine that 21 and 22 CFCUs will still have SW cooling.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1 and in accordance with S2.OP-AB.SW-0001 Attachment 4 Step 3.0, if the 21 SW header was leaking upstream of 21SW22, the crew would CLOSE 21SW22 and ENSURE OPEN 21SW23 and 22SW23 (TIE VALVES). Consequently, given the question stem, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that opening 21SW23 and 22SW23 is required.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1 and in accordance with S2.OP-AB.SW-0001 Attachment 4 Step 3.0, if the 21 SW header was leaking upstream of 21SW22, the crew would CLOSE 21SW22 and ENSURE OPEN 21SW23 and 22SW23 (TIE VALVES). Consequently, given the question stem, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that opening 21SW23 and 22SW23 is required. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: NOS05ABSW01-03 (LOSS OF SERVICE WATER HEADER PRESSURE) | LO: 1 — Describe the operation of the SW system as applied to S1/S2.OP-AB.SW-0001; 4 — Given initial conditions, determine the appropriate AOP and describe plant response | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1, the CA330s fail closed on a loss of control air. For Part 2, each PORV has 2 accumulators and the accumulators are sized for 100 opening/closing cycles (50/accumulator). Consequently, with BOTH 11CA330 and 12CA330 CLOSED, each PZR PORV can be operated if needed.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could fail to recall that each PORV have accumulators. Consequently, with BOTH 11CA330 and 12CA330 CLOSED, the candidate would then incorrectly conclude that the PORVs can not be operated if needed.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since the CA330s are Containment Isolation Valves, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the CA330s fail closed on a loss of 125 VDC or 28 VDC Power. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since the CA330s are Containment Isolation Valves, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the CA330s fail closed on a loss of 125 VDC or 28 VDC Power. For Part 2, the candidate could fail to recall that each PORV have accumulators. Consequently, with BOTH 11CA330 and 12CA330 CLOSED, the candidate would then incorrectly conclude that the PORVs can not be operated if needed.

Ref: NOS05CONAIR-12 (CONTROL AIR SYSTEM) | LO: 1 — Describe how each impact the Control Air System during normal and abnormal conditions: CA Containment Isolation Valves | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, the 2 ECAC will automatically start when control air pressure is less than 85 psig. Consequently, since the lowest control air pressure is 86 psig, the 2 Emergency Air Compressor has NOT reached its AUTOMATIC start setpoint. For Part 2, depressing BEZEL button(s) A then B are the MINIMUM pushbutton manipulation(s) required to start the emergency air compressor.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 (Loss of Control Air) requires the crew to manually start ECAC when control air pressure reaches 88 psig. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly deduce that the automatic start setpoint for the ECAC is 88 psig. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 (Loss of Control Air) requires the crew to manually start ECAC when control air pressure reaches 88 psig. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly deduce that the automatic start setpoint for the ECAC is 88 psig. For Part 2, since the crew is attempting to manually start the emergency air compressor (ECAC), the candidate could incorrectly deduce the controller is designed to start the ECAC with only one button.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since the crew is attempting to manually start the emergency air compressor (ECAC), the candidate could incorrectly deduce the controller is designed to start the ECAC with only one button.

Ref: NOS05CONAIR-12 (CONTROL AIR SYSTEM) | LO: 8 — Identify and describe the Control Room controls, indications, and alarms associated with the Control Air System | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. At 14:00:00 the SECs will be in MODE 1. This will cause the running CFCUs to stop and then all of the CFCUs will be started in low speed. Consequently, at 14:00:00, 21-24 CFCUs are running in low speed and 25 CFCU is running in low speed.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that with the SECs in Mode 1, this will cause only the previously running CFCUs to shift to high speed.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that with the SECs in Mode 1, this will cause all of the CFCUs to shift to high speed.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that with the SECs in Mode 1, this will cause only the previously running CFCUs to shift to low speed.

Ref: NOS05ESF000-02 (INTRODUCTION TO ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES AND DESIGN CRITERIA) | LO: 4 — Describe the function and operating characteristics for the Engineered Safety Features Standby Power System components: The Safeguards Equipment Cabinets | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, 1CV284 & 1CV116 (RCP SW RET HOR STOP VALVES) will close. This causes seal return flow to be redirected from the VCT to the PRT via Relief Valve 1CV15. For Part 2, letdown will be isolated during a Phase A isolation. This is accomplished by closing 1CV5 and 1CV7.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, 1CV2 and 1CV277 will automatically close on low PZR level. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1CV2 and 1CV277 also automatically close on a Phase A Containment Isolation.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, seal injection flow is normally directed to the VCT. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that redirecting seal injection to the PRT is not desirable since this will cause a loss of RCS inventory. For Part 2, 1CV2 and 1CV277 will automatically close on low PZR level. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1CV2 and 1CV277 also automatically close on a Phase A Containment Isolation.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, seal injection flow is normally directed to the VCT. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that redirecting seal injection to the PRT is not desirable since this will cause a loss of RCS inventory. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: NOS05CVCS00-17 (CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM) | LO: 9 — State the setpoints for automatic actuations associated with the Chemical and Volume Control System | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. 21 Centrifugal Charging Pump is powered from the 2B 4KV Vital Bus. 22 Centrifugal Charging Pump is powered from the 2C 4KV Vital Bus.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Since there are three 4KV Vital Busses that power two trains of each type of ECCS pumps, selecting any combination of two separate 4KV Vital busses is plausible.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Since there are three 4KV Vital Busses that power two trains of each ECCS pumps, selecting any combination of two separate 4KV Vital busses is plausible.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Since there are three 4KV Vital Busses that power two trains of each ECCS pumps, selecting any combination of two separate 4KV Vital busses is plausible.

Ref: NOS05CVCS00-17 (CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM) | LO: 9 — State the power supply to the following Chemical and Volume Control System components: Charging Pumps, Boric Acid Transfer Pumps, Primary Water Pumps | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ C. Correct. With the ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in CBA, the dropped rod will be withdrawn at 48 steps per minute.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. 72 steps per minute is maximum speed for withdrawing rods when the ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH is in AUTO. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that with ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in CBA, the dropped rod will be withdrawn at 72 steps per minute.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. 64 steps per minute is the speed for withdrawing rods when the ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH is in SBA, SBB, SBC or SBD. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that with ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in CBA, the dropped rod will be withdrawn at 64 steps per minute.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. 8 steps per minute is minimum speed for withdrawing rods when the ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH is in AUTO. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that with ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in CBA, the dropped rod will be withdrawn at 8 steps per minute.

Ref: NOS05RODS00-12 (ROD CONTROL AND POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS) | LO: 11 — Identify and describe the Control Room controls, indications, and alarms associated with the Rod Control and Position Indication Systems | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0012, the Primary Water Flow Deviation Alarm actuates when primary water flow is greater than a MINIMUM of ±5.0 gpm above the setpoint. For Part 2, 2CV179 fails closed. Consequently, actual boron flow into the boric acid blender will be higher than the predetermined setpoint for the auto makeup (based on current RCS Boron concentration). This will cause actual RCS boron concentration to rise since the boron concentration of auto makeup flow is higher than the setpoint for the existing RCS Boron concentration. An increase in actual RCS Boron concentration will insert negative reactivity which will cause the Source Range NI Audible Count Rate indication to lower.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2CV179 fails open. With 2CV179 open during an automatic RCS makeup, actual RCS Boron Concentration will lower. Lowering actual RCS Concentration will add positive reactivity which will cause the Source Range NI Audible Count Rate indication to rise.

✗ C. For Part 1, the Boric Acid Flow Deviation actuates when boric acid flow is greater than a MINIMUM of ±0.8 gpm above the setpoint. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the Primary Water Flow Deviation Alarm actuates when primary water flow is greater than a MINIMUM of ±0.8 gpm above the setpoint. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2CV179 fails open.

✗ D. For Part 1, the Boric Acid Flow Deviation actuates when boric acid flow is greater than a MINIMUM of ±0.8 gpm above the setpoint. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: NOS05CVCS00-17 (Chemical and Volume Control System) | LO: NOS05CVCS00-17 Obj 11 — Given a CVCS failure, predict the effect on the RCS | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, LCO 3.6.1.4 (INTERNAL PRESSURE) will NOT be met when containment pressure is greater than a minimum of +0.3 psig. For Part 2, when LCO 3.6.1.4 is NOT met, the crew is required to restore containment internal pressure within limits within a MAXIMUM of 60 minutes or place the Unit in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

✗ A. For Part 1, the BEZEL Hi CNTMT Pressure Alarm is 0.2 psid. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly determine that LCO 3.6.1.4 will NOT be met when containment pressure is greater than a minimum of +0.2 psig. For Part 2, there are other LCOs with 30 minutes REQUIRED ACTION (LCOs 3.2.1, 3.2.4, 3.4.10.2 and 3.7.2). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the restoration time is 30 minutes.

✗ B. For Part 1, the BEZEL Hi CNTMT Pressure Alarm is 0.2 psid. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, there are other LCOs with 30 minutes REQUIRED ACTION (LCOs 3.2.1, 3.2.4, 3.4.10.2 and 3.7.2). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the restoration time is 30 minutes.

Ref: NOS05CONTMT-15 (Containment and Containment Support Systems) | LO: NOS05CONTMT-15 Obj 9 — Given a Containment situation, apply the appropriate Tech Spec action | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Lower

✓ A. Correct. In accordance with S2.OP-SO.SF-0001 (Fill And Transfer Of The Spent Fuel Pool), the following water sources are allowed to be used for ROUTINE makeup to the Spent Fuel Pool: 1) Demineralized Water System, 2) Primary Water Storage Tank, 3) CVCS Holdup Tanks, 4) Refueling Water Storage Tank. The Fresh Water and Fire Protection Water Storage Tank is NOT an allowed ROUTINE makeup source.

✗ B. All of the listed water sources are actual Salem Water Sources. Consequently, all of the distractors are plausible when determining the allowed ROUTINE makeup sources to the Spent Fuel Pool.

✗ C. All of the listed water sources are actual Salem Water Sources. Consequently, all of the distractors are plausible when determining the allowed ROUTINE makeup sources to the Spent Fuel Pool.

✗ D. All of the listed water sources are actual Salem Water Sources. Consequently, all of the distractors are plausible when determining the allowed ROUTINE makeup sources to the Spent Fuel Pool.

Ref: NOS05SFP000-10 (Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System) | LO: NOS05SFP000-10 Obj 11 — Discuss procedural requirements associated with the SFP Cooling System | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, the Fuel Transfer Cart has two interlocks that will prevent/allow cart movement: upender must be in the horizontal position and the Fuel Transfer Tube Gate Valve must be open (as indicated with the open limit switch). At 09:00:00, both interlocks are not satisfied and the Fuel Transfer Cart can not be moved to containment. For Part 2, the crew can not close the Fuel Transfer Tube Gate Valve with the Fuel Transfer Cart located in the Fuel Handling Building.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the Fuel Transfer Tube Gate Valve can be closed regardless of the fuel transfer cart location (inside containment or inside the fuel handling building).

✗ C. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the fuel cart interlock was only based on position of the upender and the Fuel Transfer Tube Gate Valve was verified open administratively prior to moving the fuel transfer cart. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the valve can be closed regardless of fuel transfer cart location.

✗ D. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the fuel cart interlock was only based on position of the upender and the Fuel Transfer Tube Gate Valve was verified open administratively prior to moving the fuel transfer cart. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.FUEL-0002 (Loss Of Refueling Cavity Or Spent Fuel Pool Level), NOS05REFUEL-11 (Refueling System) | LO: NOS05REFUEL-11 Obj 5 — Outline the interlocks associated with refueling system components | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, with the plant initially at 100% Power, the Steam Dump System is in the T_AVG Mode. Consequently when the plant trips and ONLY Reactor Trip Train A Breaker opens, the Load Rejection Controller will control the steam dumps. If Reactor Trip Train B Breaker had opened then the Plant Trip Controller would have controlled the steam dumps. For Part 2, with the Load Rejection Controller in control of the steam dumps, there is a 4°F dead band associated with the controller. Consequently, the steam dumps will maintain RCS T_AVG at 551°F (547°F (no load T_AVG) + 5°F).

✗ A. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that steam dump Plant Trip Controller is based on Reactor Trip Train A Breaker opening. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly recall which steam dump controller has a dead band and incorrectly conclude that the Plant Trip Controller has a dead band, resulting in 551°F.

✗ B. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the Plant Trip Controller is based on Train A Breaker opening. For Part 2, the Plant Trip Controller has no dead band and will normally restore RCS T_AVG to RCS No-Load T_AVG (547°F).

✗ D. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, following a reactor trip in which both Reactor Trip Train A and B Breakers open, the steam dump system would maintain RCS T_AVG at 547°F. The candidate could incorrectly recall which controller has a dead band.

Ref: NOS05STDUMP-12 (Steam Dump System) | LO: NOS05STDUMP-12 Obj 7 — Describe function of Load Rejection and Plant Trip Controllers | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. As Seal Water temperature increases, Vacuum Pump performance decreases, and can result in degrading vacuum.

✗ A. Excessively low TAC supply temperature will cause Seal Water Temperature to lower which would actually improve Condenser Vacuum.

✗ B. Excessively high Vacuum Pump Seal Water flow will cause Seal Water Temperature to lower which would actually improve Condenser Vacuum.

✗ C. Vacuum Pump Separating Tank releasing through the overflow will cause Seal Water Temperature to lower which would actually improve Condenser Vacuum.

Ref: NOS05CAR000-07 (Condenser Air Removal and Priming System) | LO: NOS05CAR000-07 Obj 13 — Given plant conditions, relate the Condenser Air Removal and Priming System with the Main Condenser | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, with 21CN22 and 23CN22 closed, 2CN45 will modulate open to maintain <65 psid across 21 and 22 LP Heaters. With 2CN45 modulated, Feedwater temperature will lower. With SG Steam flow constant, Reactor power will rise. For Part 2, the CN22s only have indications in the Control Room (no controls). Consequently, the crew can not open 21CN22 and 23CN22 from the Control Room.

✗ A. For Part 1, the candidate could fail to recognize that with the given condensate transient, Feedwater temperature will lower, causing reactor power to rise. For Part 2, other CN valves associated with Feedwater heaters can be operated in the Control Room (e.g. 2CN45 and 2CN47). The candidate could incorrectly conclude that 21CN22 and 23CN22 can also be opened from the control room.

✗ B. For Part 1, the candidate could fail to recognize that Feedwater temperature will lower. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, other CN valves can be operated in the Control Room. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that 21CN22 and 23CN22 can also be opened from the control room.

Ref: NOS05CN&FDW-15 (Condensate and Feedwater System) | LO: NOS05CN&FDW-15 Obj 7 — Identify and describe local controls, indications, and alarms | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. ONLY the RCDT has a physical connection to the Waste Gas Compressor Header.

✗ B. Since all of the distractors are part of the tanks that comprise the Liquid Waste System, all of the distractors are plausible.

✗ C. Since all of the distractors are part of the tanks that comprise the Liquid Waste System, all of the distractors are plausible.

✗ D. Since all of the distractors are part of the tanks that comprise the Liquid Waste System, all of the distractors are plausible.

Ref: NOS05WASLIQ-09 (Radioactive Liquid Waste System) | LO: NOS05WASLIQ-09 Obj 14 — Given plant conditions, relate the Radioactive Liquid Waste System with the Waste Gas Vent Header | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ B. Correct. In accordance with S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003, the crew will record the time of MODE 2 entry in the Control Room Narrative Log when withdrawal of Control Bank "A" is imminent.

✗ A. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the plant enters Mode 2 when the reactor becomes critical.

✗ C. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the plant enters Mode 2 when the first bank of control rods is withdrawn.

✗ D. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the plant enters Mode 2 when the IR power has been stabilized at 2E-3% which is when data is collected IAW SC.RE-RA.ZZ-0002 (Inverse Count Rate Ratio During Reactor Startup).

Ref: NOS05IOP300-09 (Reactor Startup) | LO: NOS05IOP300-09 Obj 1 — Summarize the purpose of S1/S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003(Q), Hot Standby to Minimum Load | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Lower

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, LT-112 will cause CV-35 to ONLY fully divert to the CVCS Holdup Tanks at 87% (no modulation of CV-35). Consequently, when LT-112 fails to 80%, CV-35 will remain fully aligned to the VCT and ACTUAL VCT Level will remain stable. For Part 2, LT-112 is the controlling transmitter for AUTO MAKE-UP. Consequently, with LT-112 failed at 80%, an AUTO MAKE-UP will NOT start when ACTUAL VCT level reaches the AUTO MAKE-UP set point.

✗ A. For Part 1, the VCT has two level transmitters (LT-112 and LT-114). If LT-114 had failed to 80%, CV-35 would be almost fully diverted to the CVCS Holdup Tanks. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that CV-35 would be diverted, causing ACTUAL VCT level to lower. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that CV-35 would be diverted. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LT-114 controls the AUTO MAKE-UP function.

✗ D. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LT-114 controls the AUTO MAKE-UP function.

Ref: NOS05CVCS00-17 (Chemical and Volume Control System) | LO: NOS05CVCS00-17 Obj 7 — Identify and describe CVCS local controls, indications, and alarms | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. IAW S2-RE-RA.ZZ-0016 (Figure 17A or Table 2-1), for the given Core Burnup and RCS Boron Concentration, lowering power from 100% to 80% will add (+) 396 pcm of reactivity to the core. Since the crew will change core reactivity by (-) 216 pcm by raising RCS Boron Concentration, Control Bank D will need to make up for the remaining (-) 180 pcm by inserting from 228 steps. Using the Integral Rod Worth from IAW S2-RE-RA.ZZ-0016 Figure 2C, Control Bank D will be at approximately 186 steps after the down power and RCS Boron Concentration change are completed.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Determining the correct answer requires multiple calculations and reading of multiple curves / tables. Consequently, there are several incorrect steps the candidate could perform to incorrectly determine Control Bank D final position. Since the distractors are all possible positions of Control Bank D, all of the distractors are plausible.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Determining the correct answer requires multiple calculations and reading of multiple curves / tables. Consequently, there are several incorrect steps the candidate could perform to incorrectly determine Control Bank D final position. Since the distractors are all possible positions of Control Bank D, all of the distractors are plausible.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Determining the correct answer requires multiple calculations and reading of multiple curves / tables. Consequently, there are several incorrect steps the candidate could perform to incorrectly determine Control Bank D final position. Since the distractors are all possible positions of Control Bank D, all of the distractors are plausible.

Ref: S2-RE-RA.ZZ-0016 (Curve Book - Salem Unit 2 Cycle 23) | LO: NOS05RODS00-12 (Rod Control and Position Indication Systems) | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW S2.OP-ST.DG-0001, to prevent tripping the Diesel Generator Breaker on reverse power, generator load must be IMMEDIATELY raised to greater than a minimum of 500 KW after the breaker is closed. For Part 2 and IAW S2.OP-ST.DG-0001, during the Load Test, the 2A EDG may NOT exceed its 2600 KW Continuous Load Rating.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, S2.OP-ST.DG-0001 Precautions And Limitations states that the EDG is rated to 2750 KW for 2000 hours (2681 KW Local). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2750 KW is the Continuous Loading Rating on the EDG.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, S2.OP-ST.DG-0001 states that when unloading the EDG, generator load must be maintained at greater than 200 KW until the breaker is opened (to prevent tripping the Diesel Generator Breaker on reverse power). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that to prevent tripping the Diesel Generator Breaker on reverse power, generator load must be IMMEDIATELY raised to greater than a minimum of 200 KW after the breaker is closed. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, S2.OP-ST.DG-0001 states that when unloading the EDG, generator load must be maintained at greater than 200 KW until the breaker is opened (to prevent tripping the Diesel Generator Breaker on reverse power). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that to prevent tripping the Diesel Generator Breaker on reverse power, generator load must be IMMEDIATELY raised to greater than a minimum of 200 KW after the breaker is closed. For Part 2, S2.OP-ST.DG-0001 Precautions And Limitations states that the EDG is rated to 2750 KW for 2000 hours (2681 KW Local). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2750 KW is the Continuous Loading Rating on the EDG.

Ref: NOS05EDG000-12 (Emergency Diesel Generators) | LO: NOS05EDG000-12 LO 12 | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, SL 2.1.2 (Reactor Coolant System Pressure) will NOT be met when RCS pressure is greater than a MINIMUM of 2735 psig. For Part 2, if the Unit is in MODE 3 when RCS Pressure has exceeded the SL 2.1.2 limit, then RCS pressure must be reduced within its limit within a MAXIMUM of 5 minutes.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, 2485 psig is the setpoint for the PZR safety valves. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that SL 2.1.2 (Reactor Coolant System Pressure) will NOT be met when RCS pressure is greater than a MINIMUM of 2485 psig. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, 2485 psig is the setpoint for the PZR safety valves. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that SL 2.1.2 (Reactor Coolant System Pressure) will NOT be met when RCS pressure is greater than a MINIMUM of 2485 psig. For Part 2, IAW SL 2.1.2, if the Unit was in Mode 1 or 2 when SL 2.1.2 limits were exceeded, then RCS pressure must be reduced within its limit within a MAXIMUM of 60 minutes. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that if the Unit was in Mode 3 when SL 2.1.2 limits were exceeded, then RCS pressure must be reduced within its limit within a MAXIMUM of 60 minutes.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, IAW SL 2.1.2, if the Unit was in Mode 1 or 2 when SL 2.1.2 limits were exceeded, then RCS pressure must be reduced within its limit within a MAXIMUM of 60 minutes. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that if the Unit was in Mode 3 when SL 2.1.2 limits were exceeded, then RCS pressure must be reduced within its limit within a MAXIMUM of 60 minutes.

Ref: NOS05TECHSPEC-12 (Technical Specifications) | LO: NOS05TECHSPEC-12 LO 6, 7 | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Lower

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, RP-AA-4000 states that self-reading dosimeters should be read approximately every 15 minutes while working in a High Radiation Area. For Part 2, If an unexpected self-reading dosimeter comes into alarm, the NEO is REQUIRED to exit the area and notify RP personnel.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, RP-AA-4000 states that self-reading dosimeters should be read approximately every 30 minutes while working in a Radiation Area. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that self-reading dosimeters should always be read every 30 minutes. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that exiting the RA is not required until RP has verified the alarm is valid. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that going to a low dose area and notifying RP is the required response IAW RP-AA-4000.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, RP-AA-4000 states that self-reading dosimeters should be read approximately every 30 minutes while working in a Radiation Area. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that self-reading dosimeters should always be read every 30 minutes. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that exiting the RA is not required until RP has verified the alarm is valid. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that going to a low dose area and notifying RP is the required response IAW RP-AA-4000.

Ref: NOS05RADCON-05 (Radiation Protection Program) | LO: NOS05RADCON-05 LO 6 | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW RP-AA-460 Precautions and Limitations, "Any individual who determines that a HRA, LHRA, or VHRA is not being controlled adequately shall notify RP immediately (while maintaining positive control over the area to the extent possible during this notification period). After notifying RP, the individual shall return to the area and maintain positive control of the area, without personal endangerment, until an RP representative arrives." For Part 2 and IAW RP-AA-460, the dose rate for a LHRA is greater than a MINIMUM of 1000 mrem/hr @ 30 cm.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, greater than 100 mrem @ 30 cm is the definition for a High Radiation Area. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly determine that the dose rate for a LHRA is greater than a MINIMUM of 100 mrem/hr @ 30 cm.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the only requirement in RP-AA-460 for finding an unlocked and unmanned LHRA is to immediately notify RP. For Part 2, greater than 100 mrem @ 30 cm is the definition for a High Radiation Area. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly determine that the dose rate for a LHRA is greater than a MINIMUM of 100 mrem/hr @ 30 cm.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the only requirement in RP-AA-460 for finding an unlocked and unmanned LHRA is to immediately notify RP. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: NOS05PROCED-08 (Use and Control of Procedures) | LO: NOS05PROCED-08 LO 4 | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Lower

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, the Control Room Ventilation will shift to ACCIDENT PRESSURIZED MODE when 2R1B-2 goes into ALARM. This first occurs at 12:10. For Part 2, when 2R1B-2 (Rad monitor is located in Unit 1 Normal Intake Duct) goes into alarm, ONLY the Unit 2 EACS Intake dampers AUTOMATICALLY open.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, other Radiation Monitors (2R19s and 1R19s) have automatic functions when the monitor goes into WARNING. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that Control Room Ventilation will shift to ACCIDENT PRESSURIZED MODE when 2R1B-2 goes into WARNING. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, other Radiation Monitors (2R19s and 1R19s) have automatic functions when the monitor goes into WARNING. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that Control Room Ventilation will shift to ACCIDENT PRESSURIZED MODE when 2R1B-2 goes into WARNING. For Part 2, since Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room share the same Control Room Envelope, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that Unit 1 and Unit 2 EACS Intake dampers will automatically open.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room share the same Control Room Envelope, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that Unit 1 and Unit 2 EACS Intake dampers will automatically open.

Ref: NOS05CAVENT-11 (Control Area Ventilation System) | LO: NOS05CAVENT-11 LO 9 | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, IAW OP-AA-101-111-1003, CSF Hierarchy (high to low) is SHUTDOWN MARGIN, CORE COOLING, HEAT SINK, THERMAL SHOCK, CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT and COOLANT INVENTORY. Additionally, CFST Color Hierarchy (high to low) is red, purple, yellow, and green. Based on the status of the CFSTs, the crew is required to first address the challenge to Heat Sink. For Part 2, with verified Red and Purple CFSTs, OP-AA-101-111-1003 states that the CFSTs should be monitored continuously.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Since Core Cooling is a higher CSF than Heat Sink, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that based on the status of the CSFTs, the crew is required to first address the challenge to Core Cooling. For Part 2, OP-AA-101-111-1003 does have a provision to monitor CSFTs every 10-20 minutes (if no condition more serious than YELLOW is encountered). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that with verified Red and Purple CSFTs, OP-AA-101-111-1003 states that the CFSTs should be monitored every 10-20 minutes.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Since Core Cooling is a higher CSF than Heat Sink, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that based on the status of the CSFTs, the crew is required to first address the challenge to Core Cooling. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, OP-AA-101-111-1003 does have a provision to monitor CSFTs every 10-20 minutes (if no condition more serious than YELLOW is encountered). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that with verified Red and Purple CSFTs, OP-AA-101-111-1003 states that the CFSTs should be monitored every 10-20 minutes.

Ref: NOS05PROCED-08 (Use and Control of Procedures) | LO: NOS05PROCED-08 LO 5 | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW 1-EOP-TRIP-1 Step 19, since the SI CHG FLOW METER is reading greater than 100 gpm and RCS Pressure is greater than 1540 psig (non-adverse number), ECCS is properly established (even though SI Flow is 0 gpm). For Part 2 and IAW the CAS of 1-EOP-TRIP-1, the crew will stop the RCPs after ECCS flow is established and RCS Pressure is less than a maximum of 1350 psig.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, if RCS Pressure had been less than 1540 psig with no SI Flow, then ECCS would not be properly established. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly determine ECCS is not properly established given the current plant parameters. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, if RCS Pressure had been less than 1540 psig with no SI Flow, then ECCS would not be properly established. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly determine ECCS is not properly established given the current plant parameters. For Part 2, 1-EOP-TRIP-1 CAS also has a required action based on RCS pressure being less than 1500 psig. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew will stop the RCPs after ECCS flow is established and RCS Pressure is less than a maximum of 1500 psig.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, 1-EOP-TRIP-1 CAS also has a required action based on RCS pressure being less than 1500 psig. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew will stop the RCPs after ECCS flow is established and RCS Pressure is less than a maximum of 1500 psig.

Ref: NOS05TRP001-08 (EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) | LO: NOS05TRP001-08 LO 15 | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. IAW 1-EOP-TRIP-1, after the crew has actuated the Reactor Trip Switches and Reactor Trip Breaker Bezels, the crew's NEXT actions will be to open Breakers 1E 6D and 1G 6D then actuate the TURBINE TRIP Switch.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. All of the distractors are part of the immediate actions of Trip-1. Consequently, all of the distractors are plausible.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. All of the distractors are part of the immediate actions of Trip-1. Consequently, all of the distractors are plausible.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. All of the distractors are part of the immediate actions of Trip-1. Consequently, all of the distractors are plausible.

Ref: 1-EOP-TRIP-1 (Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection) | LO: NOS05TRP001-08 LO 16 | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Lower

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW 1-EOP-LOCA-2 Step 29, to have proper Natural Circulation flow, the following are required:
• RCS Subcooling based on CETs > 0°F
• RCS Subcooling is 9°F (T_SAT for 1645 psig (1660 psia — RCS Pressure) is 609°F and CETs are 600°F)
• SG Pressure stable or lowering (11 SG pressure is 725 psig and stable)
• RCS T_HOT stable or lowering (Loop 1 T_HOT is 530°F and stable)
• CETs stable or lowering (CETs are 600°F and stable)
• 11 SG pressure at saturation pressure for RCS T_COLD temperature.
• 11 T_COLD is 509°F (P_SAT is 725 psig or 740 psia) and 11 SG pressure is 725 psig
Consequently, natural circulation flow is indicated. For Part 2, 1-EOP-LOCA-2 Step 29, "Raise steam dumping rate to establish natural circulation flow."

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that raising 11 SG pressure (which is caused by lowering steam dumping rate) will establish natural circulation flow.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since there are 5 separate evaluations required to determine if natural circulation has been established, the candidate could incorrectly perform one of the evaluations and determine that natural circulation is not established. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since there are 5 separate evaluations required to determine if natural circulation has been established, the candidate could incorrectly perform one of the evaluations and determine that natural circulation is not established. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that raising 11 SG pressure (which is caused by lowering steam dumping rate) will establish natural circulation flow.

Ref: 1-EOP-LOCA-2 (Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) | LO: NOS05LOCA02-03 LO 5 | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, IAW S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 CAS, when motor flange vibration greater than 5 mils, the crew will perform S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 Attachment 2 and stop 22 RCP. For Part 2, LCO 3.4.1.2 only requires two of the reactor coolant loops to be OPERABLE (if the rod control system is de-energized). Consequently, at 07:00:00, RTB B is open and BOTH RTB Bypass Breakers are not racked in, so LCO 3.4.1.2 is met.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, LCO 3.4.1.2 requires all loops to be OPERABLE if rod control is energized. Consequently, based on the question stem conditions, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that all four of the reactor coolant loops are required to be OPERABLE. This would then cause the candidate to further incorrectly deduce that LCO 3.4.1.2 is not met.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 CAS requires the RCP to be secured when shaft vibration is greater than 20 mils or motor flange vibration is greater than 5 mils. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the 22 RCP is stopped when the motor flange vibration exceeded a minimum of 20 mils. For Part 2, LCO 3.4.1.2 requires all loops to be OPERABLE if rod control is energized. Consequently, based on the question stem conditions, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that all four of the reactor coolant loops are required to be OPERABLE. This would then cause the candidate to further incorrectly deduce that LCO 3.4.1.2 is not met.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 CAS requires the RCP to be secured when shaft vibration is greater than 20 mils or motor flange vibration is greater than 5 mils. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the 22 RCP is stopped when the motor flange vibration exceeded a minimum of 20 mils. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001, LCO 3.4.1.2 | LO: NOS05ABRCP0-06 | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, based on the question stem conditions, there is a leak on the CVCS charging line (seal injection lowering, PZR level lowering, Plant Radiation Monitor rising, and flashing in the letdown line). For Part 2, a leak in the charging supply line is an entry condition for S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, many of the indications given are also indicative of a letdown line leak (PZR level lowering and Plant Radiation Monitor rising). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that a leak on the CVCS letdown line exists. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that a leak on the letdown would ultimately affect charging flow rate. A reduction in charging flow is an entry condition to S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, many of the indications given are also indicative of a letdown line leak (PZR level lowering and Plant Radiation Monitor rising). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that a leak on the CVCS letdown line exists. For Part 2, a leak on the letdown line is not an entry condition to S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since RCS inventory is being lost, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that only entry conditions to S2.OP-AB.RC-0001 (Reactor Coolant System Leak) are met. Additionally, since the charging pump is providing flow to seal injection and the regenerative heat exchanger, the candidate could also incorrectly conclude S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 entry conditions are not met.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 (Loss Of Charging) | LO: NOS05ABRCP0-06 | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. IAW S1.OP-AB.RHR-0002 CAS, "IF AT ANY TIME, a Charging OR SI pump cannot be aligned and started to make up to the RCS, THEN the crew will ESTABLISH RWST Gravity Feed to RCS level > 97.5 feet."

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. All of the distractors use different combinations of the correct response. Consequently, all of the distractors are plausible.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. All of the distractors use different combinations of the correct response. Consequently, all of the distractors are plausible.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. All of the distractors use different combinations of the correct response. Consequently, all of the distractors are plausible.

Ref: S1.OP-AB.RHR-0001 (Loss Of RHR) | LO: NOS05ABRCP0-06 | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ C. Correct. IAW S1.OP-AB.CC-0001, "Any inleakage will dilute CC System Chromates and SW inleakage will increase Chloride concentration." Consequently, since Chemistry has reported that Chloride concentration has risen, there is SW inleakage into CCW. 12 CC Heat Exchanger is the source of the CCW leakage.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Since ALL three distractors will cause CCW Surge Tank level to rise and chromate concentration to lower, the candidate could incorrectly conclude any of the distractors are the source of the CCW leak.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Since ALL three distractors will cause CCW Surge Tank level to rise and chromate concentration to lower, the candidate could incorrectly conclude any of the distractors are the source of the CCW leak.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Since ALL three distractors will cause CCW Surge Tank level to rise and chromate concentration to lower, the candidate could incorrectly conclude any of the distractors are the source of the CCW leak.

Ref: S1.OP-AB.CC-0001 (Component Cooling Abnormality) | LO: NOS05ABCC01-09 | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. 2PR1 and 2PR2 require 2 channels (PT-455/PT-457 or PT-456/PT-474) to read greater than 2335 psig for the PORV to open. Consequently, at 22:00:05 with ONLY PT-455 reading greater than 2335 psig (due to PT-455 failing high), NO Power Relief Valves (2PR1 and 2PR2) are open.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could incorrectly conclude the PORVs open based on the master pressure controller. Consequently, when the controlling pressure channel fails (PT-455), the candidate would then incorrectly conclude that BOTH PORVs are open at 22:00:05.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could correctly realize that operation of the PORVs is dependent on specific PZR Pressure Transmitters. However, the candidate could then incorrectly understand how the PORV open logic works and/or which pressure transmitters operate each specific PORV. This would cause the candidate to incorrectly conclude that ONLY 2PR1 or ONLY 2PR2 is open at 22:00:05.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could correctly realize that operation of the PORVs is dependent on specific PZR Pressure Transmitters. However, the candidate could then incorrectly understand how the PORV open logic works and/or which pressure transmitters operate each specific PORV. This would cause the candidate to incorrectly conclude that ONLY 2PR1 or ONLY 2PR2 is open at 22:00:05.

Ref: NOS05PZRP&L-10 (Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control), Drawing 231357 (Units 1 & 2 Pressurizer 1PR1, 2PR1, 1PR2, 2PR2 Press. Power) | LO: NOS05PZRP&L-10 | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW 2-EOP-FRSM-1 Step 3, the crew will ensure at least two charging pumps are running. For Part 2 and IAW 2-EOP-FRSM-1 Step 3.1, the crew is not required to actuate Safety Injection.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, having 3 Charging Pumps running will inject Boron faster than only 2 Charging Pumps. Since an ATWS is in progress, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that FRSM-1 requires all 3 Charging Pumps in operation. For Part 2, 2-EOP-FRSM-1 has a provision for aligning the charging pumps to take suction from the RWST. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that for the given plant conditions, the crew will align the charging pumps to take suction from the RWST.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, having 3 Charging Pumps running will inject Boron faster than only 2 Charging Pumps. Since an ATWS is in progress, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that FRSM-1 requires all 3 Charging Pumps in operation. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that actuating Safety Injection is advantageous and required per FRSM-1.

Ref: 2-EOP-FRSM-1 (Response To Nuclear Power Generation) | LO: NOS05FRSM00-04 | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1, the reason ECCS flow is terminated during performance of 1-EOP-SGTR-1 is to prevent overfill of the ruptured SG (14 SG). For Part 2 and IAW 1-EOP-SGTR-1 CAS, the crew will reestablish ECCS flow if PZR level can not be maintained ≥ 11% OR Subcooling is ≤ 0°F.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1-EOP-SGTR-1 CAS requirements are to reestablish ECCS flow if ONLY PZR level can NOT be maintained ≥ 11%.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, 14 SG and the PZR are in hydraulic communication during a SGTR. The candidate may misunderstand the hydraulics between the RCS and the ruptured SG and incorrectly conclude that prolonged full ECCS flow will cause pressurizer level to rise and even possible overfill. Additionally, the steps prior to terminating ECCS flow include depressurization of the RCS. When the RCS is depressurized during EOP-SGTR-1, voiding in the upper head may occur which will cause PZR level to rapidly increase. The candidate could misapply the concern for rapidly rising PZR during RCS depressurization and incorrectly apply this concern to prolonged ECCS full flow during the performance of EOP-SGTR-1. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, 14 SG and the PZR are in hydraulic communication during a SGTR. The candidate may misunderstand the hydraulics between the RCS and the ruptured SG and incorrectly conclude that prolonged full ECCS flow will cause pressurizer level to rise and even possible overfill. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1-EOP-SGTR-1 CAS requirements are to reestablish ECCS flow if ONLY PZR level can NOT be maintained ≥ 11%.

Ref: 1-EOP-SGTR-1 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) | LO: NOS05SGTR01-04 | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ B. Correct. IAW S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 2.3.1, "IF RAMP RATES are not preset for SGFP runback, THEN: ADJUST RAMP RATES for less than or equal to 15%/MIN."

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. All of the distractors are Turbine Ramp Rates that are close to the actual procedural limit of S2.OP-AB.CN-0001. Consequently, ALL of the distractors are plausible.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. All of the distractors are Turbine Ramp Rates that are close to the actual procedural limit of S2.OP-AB.CN-0001. Consequently, ALL of the distractors are plausible.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. All of the distractors are Turbine Ramp Rates that are close to the actual procedural limit of S2.OP-AB.CN-0001. Consequently, ALL of the distractors are plausible.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 (Main Feedwater / Condensate System Abnormality) | LO: NOS05ABCN01-06 | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, IAW 1-EOP-LOPA-1, prior to restoring AC power, the crew will ensure ALL SECs are de-energized. For Part 2, IAW 1-EOP-LOPA-1, preventing damage to the RCP seals is a reason that the centrifugal charging pumps are not allowed to start automatically following power restoration.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, restoring seal injection is normally desirable and will usually help protect the RCP seals. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that preventing RCS seal damage is NOT a reason for preventing auto start of the centrifugal charging pumps following power restoration.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, blocking and resetting the SECs is performed throughout the EOP Network (e.g. EOP-TRIP-1). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that EOP-LOPA-1 requires ALL SECs to be blocked and reset.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, blocking and resetting the SECs is performed throughout the EOP Network (e.g. EOP-TRIP-1). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that EOP-LOPA-1 requires ALL SECs to be blocked and reset. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: 1-EOP-LOPA-1 (Loss Of All AC Power) | LO: NOS05LOPA00-06 | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, when the LOOP occurs at 12:00, 2A and 2B 4KV Vital Buses will sense an Instantaneous UV condition which will cause ALL three SECs (2A, 2B and 2C) to enter Mode II - Blackout Only (2/3 Vital Buses sensing Instantaneous UV condition). Since the 2C SEC has gone into Mode II, this will cause the running 2C EDG Output Breaker to OPEN. As the SEC 2C continues its sequencing, the 2C EDG Output Breaker will reclose. For Part 2, 21 RHR Pump is powered from 2A 4KV Vital Bus. With 2A SEC in Mode II, the 21 RHR will NOT be automatically loaded (during the 2A SEC sequencing). Consequently, at 12:15 (after SEC 2A has completed its sequencing), 21 RHR pump is stopped.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since 2C EDG was already running loaded during the LOOP, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2C EDG would remain closed as SEC 2C strips the loads off of 2C 4KV Vital Bus and then automatically loads the blackout loads. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since 2C EDG was already running loaded during the LOOP, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2C EDG would remain closed as SEC 2C strips the loads off of 2C 4KV Vital Bus and then automatically loads the blackout loads. For Part 2, the RHR pumps are automatically sequenced on their respective Vital Buses when the SECs are in Mode I (SI only) and Mode III (SI & Blackout). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that following a LOOP that an RHR pump that had been running in Shutdown Cooling will automatically restart after the SECs complete their sequencing.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the RHR pumps are automatically sequenced on their respective Vital Buses when the SECs are in Mode I (SI only) and Mode III (SI & Blackout). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that following a LOOP that an RHR pump that had been running in Shutdown Cooling will automatically restart after the SECs complete their sequencing.

Ref: NOS05EDG000-12 (Emergency Diesel Generators) | LO: NOS05EDG000-12 | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, IAW S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 Step 3.10, the crew is required to attempt to start the 2 Emergency Control Air Compressor when 2A Control Air Header less than or equal to 88 psig. The earliest time this occurs is 10:05:00. For Part 2, IAW S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 (Selected CAS Items), the reactor is first required to be tripped when BOTH 2A and 2B Control Air Headers indicate less than 80 psig. The earliest time this occurs is at 10:15:00.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, IAW S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 Step 3.7, if either Station Air Header is indicating less than 100 psig, the crew is required to attempt to start the remaining Station Air Compressor. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew is required to attempt to start the 2 Emergency Air Compressor when 2A Control Air Header pressure is less than 100 psig. For Part 2, the candidate may recognize the 80 psig Control Air Header threshold for tripping the reactor. However, the candidate may incorrectly conclude that reactor is required to be tripped when only one of the Control Air Header pressures is less than 80 psig.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, IAW S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 Step 3.7, if either Station Air Header is indicating less than 100 psig, the crew is required to attempt to start the remaining Station Air Compressor. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew is required to attempt to start the 2 Emergency Air Compressor when 2A Control Air Header pressure is less than 100 psig. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate may recognize the 80 psig Control Air Header threshold for tripping the reactor. However, the candidate may incorrectly conclude that reactor is required to be tripped when only one of the Control Air Header pressures is less than 80 psig.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 (Loss of Control Air) | LO: NOS05ABCA01-07 — Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 (Q) and the bases for the actions in accordance with the Technical Bases Document | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ C. Correct. IAW S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 (Abnormal Grid) Attachment 2 (Solar Magnetic Disturbance), the PO will depress SMD#1 RUNBACK and GO to initiate the generator load reduction.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. The TURBINE E-H CONTROL & STATUS touch screen monitor allows for manual entry of the setter and the reduction ramp rate. During manual entry the turbine won't move until the go button is depressed. Since the SMD#1 RUNBACK is a preset setter position with a preset ramp rate, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that only the SMD#1 RUNBACK button is depressed to start the load reduction.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. The TURBINE E-H CONTROL & STATUS touch screen monitor allows for manual entry of the setter and the reduction ramp rate. During manual entry the turbine won't move until the go button is depressed. Additionally, since there is a SMD#2 RUNBACK with a preset setter position with a preset ramp rate, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that only the SMD#2 RUNBACK button is depressed to start the load reduction.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that using the SMD#2 RUNBACK is required per S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 Attachment 2. Pressing GO is required to start the turbine load reduction.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 (Abnormal Grid) Attachment 2 | LO: NOS05ABGRID-12 — Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 (Q) and the bases for the actions in accordance with the Technical Bases Document | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1, IAW 1-EOP-LOCA-6 Step 2, the crew will close 11RH19 and 12RH19 which will separate the 11 and 12 RHR discharge lines. This will enhance the operator's ability to diagnose the success or failure of leak isolation. For Part 2, IAW 1-EOP-LOCA-6, the crew will monitor rising RCS Pressure to determine when the leak has been successfully isolated.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since ECCS flow is injecting water into the core during performance of 1-EOP-LOCA-6, RCS inventory will increase once the leak has been isolated. An increase in RCS inventory can be measured by rising PZR level. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1-EOP-LOCA-6 monitors rising PZR level as a determination that the leak has been successfully isolated.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, separating the 11 and 12 RHR discharge lines is not required to isolate the leak when performing 1-EOP-LOCA-6. Consequently, the candidate could fail to recognize the advantage of separating the 11 and 12 RHR discharge lines and incorrectly conclude that closing 11RH19 and 12RH19 is not required per 1-EOP-LOCA-6. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, separating the 11 and 12 RHR discharge lines is not required to isolate the leak when performing 1-EOP-LOCA-6. Consequently, the candidate could fail to recognize the advantage of separating the 11 and 12 RHR discharge lines and incorrectly conclude that closing 11RH19 and 12RH19 is not required per 1-EOP-LOCA-6. For Part 2, since ECCS flow is injecting water into the core during performance of 1-EOP-LOCA-6, RCS inventory will increase once the leak has been isolated. An increase in RCS inventory can be measured by rising PZR level. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1-EOP-LOCA-6 monitors rising PZR level as a determination that the leak has been successfully isolated.

Ref: EOP-LOCA-6 (LOCA Outside Containment) | LO: NOS05LOCA06-03 — Describe the EOP mitigation strategy during LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, IAW 1-EOP-FRHS-1 Step 23.2, as long as 1 Charging Pump and 1 SI Pump are running, the crew will continue attempts to start the 12 Charging Pump and 12 SI Pump while establishing an RCS Bleed Path. For Part 2, IAW 1-EOP-FRHS-1 Step 24, the crew will establish an RCS Bleed Path by opening BOTH PORVs.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the desired feed path in 1-EOP-FRHS-1 is to have BOTH SI Pumps and BOTH Charging Pumps feeding the RCS. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that an RCS Bleed Path can not be established until BOTH SI Pumps and BOTH Charging Pumps are running. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the desired feed path in 1-EOP-FRHS-1 is to have BOTH SI Pumps and BOTH Charging Pumps feeding the RCS. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that an RCS Bleed Path can not be established until BOTH SI Pumps and BOTH Charging Pumps are running. For Part 2, the Reactor Head Vents and the PORVs will both vent the RCS to the PRT. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1-EOP-FRHS-1 requires ALL Reactor Head Vents and BOTH PORVs to be opened as part of the RCS Bleed Path.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the Reactor Head Vents and the PORVs will both vent the RCS to the PRT. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1-EOP-FRHS-1 requires ALL Reactor Head Vents and BOTH PORVs to be opened as part of the RCS Bleed Path.

Ref: EOP-FRHS-1 (Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink) | LO: NOS05FRHS00-02 — Describe the EOP mitigation strategy for Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, IAW 1-EOP-LOCA-5 Step 24, with normal spray not available, the crew will depressurize the RCS using a PZR PORV. For Part 2, IAW 1-EOP-LOCA-5 Step 24, voiding in the upper head region will result in rapidly rising PZR Level. Since PZR Level has risen 35% in 30 seconds, there are indications that voiding is occurring in the upper head region.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, depressurizing the RCS using a PZR PORV will result in a loss of RCS inventory. The candidate may conclude that losing RCS inventory is not desirable and incorrectly conclude that the RCS will be depressurized using AUX SPRAY. For Part 2, the candidate may not understand the expected indications associated with voiding in the upper head region. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that there are not indications that voiding is occurring in the upper head region.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, depressurizing the RCS using a PZR PORV will result in a loss of RCS inventory. The candidate may conclude that losing RCS inventory is not desirable and incorrectly conclude that the RCS will be depressurized using AUX SPRAY. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate may not understand the expected indications associated with voiding in the upper head region. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that there are not indications that voiding is occurring in the upper head region.

Ref: 1-EOP-LOCA-5 (Loss Of Emergency Recirculation) | LO: NOS05LOCA05-04 — Determine the indications that are monitored to ensure proper system/component operation for each step in the EOP for LOSS OF EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, based on the question stem, BOTH MDAFW Pumps are not available (11 AFW Pump due to 1A 4KV bus being de-energized and 12 AFW Pump will NOT start). IAW 1-EOP-LOSC-2 Step 1, since the 13 AFW Pump is the only source of AFW flow, steam must be maintained to the 13 AFW pump. For Part 2, IAW 1-EOP-LOSC-2 Step 5, with RCS cooldown rate greater than 100 °F / HR, AFW flow will be reduced to no less than 1.0E04 LB/ HR to each SG.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, if the RCS cooldown rate was less than 100 °F / HR, the crew will control AFW flow to maintain SG NR Levels less than 33%. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that with the given plant conditions, AFW flow will be controlled to maintain SG NR Levels less than 33%.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, if a MDAFW Pump is available, then 1-EOP-LOSC-2 requires steam to be isolated to the 13 AFW Pump. Based on the plant conditions, the candidate could not recognize that the 11 AFW Pump is also not available. This would cause the candidate to incorrectly deduce that steam will be isolated to the 13 AFW Pump. For Part 2, if the RCS cooldown rate was less than 100 °F / HR, the crew will control AFW flow to maintain SG NR Levels less than 33%. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that with the given plant conditions, AFW flow will be controlled to maintain SG NR Levels less than 33%.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, if a MDAFW Pump is available, then 1-EOP-LOSC-2 requires steam to be isolated to the 13 AFW Pump. Based on the plant conditions, the candidate could not recognize that the 11 AFW Pump is also not available. This would cause the candidate to incorrectly deduce that steam will be isolated to the 13 AFW Pump. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: 1-EOP-LOSC-2 (Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization) | LO: NOS05LOCS02-03 — Given EOP-LOSC-2 and a set of plant conditions, determine a discrete path through the EOP | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, IAW S2.OP-AB.CR-0001 Attachment 6, the crew is required to perform an Emergency Boration for a duration of 35 minutes per each stuck rod. Consequently, with 2 Control Rods stuck, the crew is required to perform an Emergency Boration for a duration of 70 minutes. For Part 2, the RO will throttle 2CV55 (Cent Chg Pmp Flow Cont Valve) by adjusting the 2CV55 Manual HAND/AIR Regulator Controller located at Panel 216-2.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that Panel 216-2 only contains instrumentation readings and the 2CV55 Manual HAND/AIR Regulator Controller is actually located at the Hot Shutdown Panel.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, EOP-TRIP-2 also contains Emergency Boration guidelines. In EOP-TRIP-2, if the RWST is used as the source of the Emergency Boration, then the emergency boration duration will be 120 minutes for each stuck rod. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-AB.CR-0001 Attachment 6 requires the emergency boration duration to be 120 minutes for each stuck rod (240 minutes total). For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that Panel 216-2 only contains instrumentation readings and the 2CV55 Manual HAND/AIR Regulator Controller is actually located at the Hot Shutdown Panel.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, EOP-TRIP-2 also contains Emergency Boration guidelines. In EOP-TRIP-2, if the RWST is used as the source of the Emergency Boration, then the emergency boration duration will be 120 minutes for each stuck rod. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-AB.CR-0001 Attachment 6 requires the emergency boration duration to be 120 minutes for each stuck rod (240 minutes total). Part 2 is correct.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CR-0001 (Control Room Evacuation) | LO: NOS05ABCR01-05 — Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S1/S2.OP-AB.CR-0002(Q) and the bases for the actions | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, IAW S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 Step 3.7, the crew will reduce letdown to minimum by ONLY placing 2CV3 (45 gpm ORIFICE) in service. For Part 2, IAW S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 Step 3.11, the crew will initiate a safety injection prior to going to 2-EOP-TRIP-1.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could conclude that avoiding a safety injection and doing a controlled plant shutdown is preferable. Consequently, isolating letdown will give the crew the most margin to maintain PZR level and to prevent a safety injection. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 directs the crew to isolate letdown. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could conclude that avoiding a safety injection and doing a controlled plant shutdown is preferable. Consequently, isolating letdown will give the crew the most margin to maintain PZR level and to prevent a safety injection. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 directs the crew to isolate letdown. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that a manual safety injection is not required until the crew reaches 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Step 5 (is SI actuated or required).

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that a manual safety injection is not required until the crew reaches 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Step 5 (is SI actuated or required).

Ref: S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 (Steam Generator Tube Leak) | LO: NOS05ABSGTL-05 — Given a set of initial plant conditions, determine the appropriate abnormal procedure, describe the plant response to actions taken, and describe the final plant condition | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1, IAW S1.OP-AB.RC-0002 Step 3.15, the crew is required to transfer to a Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP). Consequently, the crew is required to secure the 13 Charging Pump (PDP) and place either 11 Charging Pump or 12 Charging Pump (CCPs) in service. For Part 2, IAW S1.OP-AB.RC-0002 Step 3.16, the crew is required to maximize letdown flow. Consequently, in addition to 1CV4, the crew is required to also place 1CV3 (45 GPM ORIFICE) in service.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could know that letdown should be maximized. However, the candidate could misinterpret this requirement to be having only the highest rated orifice (75 GPM) in service.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that either the 13 Charging Pump is a CCP or that the PDP Charging pump may remain in service when performing S1.OP-AB.RC-0002. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that either the 13 Charging Pump is a CCP or that the PDP Charging pump may remain in service when performing S1.OP-AB.RC-0002. For Part 2, the candidate could know that letdown should be maximized. However, the candidate could misinterpret this requirement to be having only the highest rated orifice (75 GPM) in service.

Ref: S1.OP-AB.RC-0002 (High Activity In Reactor Coolant System) | LO: NOS05ABRC02-05 — Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S2.OP-AB.RC-0002 and the bases for the actions in accordance with the Technical Bases Document | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Lower

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, IAW 2-EOP-LOCA-2 Step 11, the crew will maintain T-COLD Cooldown Rate less than a maximum of 100 °F / HR. For Part 2, IAW 2-EOP-LOCA-2 Step 11, depressing BOTH "BYPASS TAVG" BEZEL Pushbuttons is the MINIMUM pushbutton manipulation(s) required to have the Condenser Steam Dumps function when TAVG is less than 543 °F.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, other procedures (S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0006 (HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN)) have an RCS Cooldown limit of 50 °F / HR. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2-EOP-LOCA-2 also has an RCS Cooldown Rate limit of 50 °F / HR. For Part 2, if the Steam Dump Train A and Train B Blocking solenoids were in parallel, depressing BEZEL Pushbutton(s) A OR B would be the minimum pushbutton manipulation(s) to have the Condenser Steam Dumps function when TAVG is less than 543 °F. Additionally, for many safety systems, only 1 train is required to be OPERABLE for the safety system to perform its safety function. Consequently, the candidate could apply this logic to the steam dumps and incorrectly conclude that ONLY one Train of Steam Dumps need to be taken to "BYPASS TAVG" for Steam Dumps to function when TAVG is less than 543 °F.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, other procedures (S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0006 (HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN)) have an RCS Cooldown limit of 50 °F / HR. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2-EOP-LOCA-2 also has an RCS Cooldown Rate limit of 50 °F / HR. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, if the Steam Dump Train A and Train B Blocking solenoids were in parallel, depressing BEZEL Pushbutton(s) A OR B would be the minimum pushbutton manipulation(s) to have the Condenser Steam Dumps function when TAVG is less than 543 °F. Additionally, for many safety systems, only 1 train is required to be OPERABLE for the safety system to perform its safety function. Consequently, the candidate could apply this logic to the steam dumps and incorrectly conclude that ONLY one Train of Steam Dumps need to be taken to "BYPASS TAVG" for Steam Dumps to function when TAVG is less than 543 °F.

Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-2 (Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) | LO: NOS05LOCA02-03 — Determine the indications that are monitored to ensure proper system/component operation for each step in the EOP for POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, IAW 2-EOP-FRCC-2 Step 12, since only the AFWST LO LEVEL is illuminated, the crew is NOT required to shift AFW suction to an alternate source (need the AFWST LO-LO Level Alarm to switch to the alternate suction source). For Part 2, IAW 2-EOP-FRCC-2 Step 12, If NO INTACT SG is available, the crew can feed a FAULTED SG or RUPTURED SG.

✗ A. For Part 1, since the AFWST Lo Level alarm is valid, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew is required to shift AFW suction to an alternate source. For Part 2, 2-EOP-FRHS-1 (RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK) specifically forbids feeding a FAULTED SG if an INTACT or RUPTURED SG is available. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2-EOP-FRCC-2 also forbids feeding a FAULTED SG if an INTACT or RUPTURED SG is available.

✗ B. For Part 1, since the AFWST Lo Level alarm is valid, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew is required to shift AFW suction to an alternate source. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, 2-EOP-FRHS-1 (RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK) specifically forbids feeding a FAULTED SG if an INTACT or RUPTURED SG is available. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2-EOP-FRCC-2 also forbids feeding a FAULTED SG if an INTACT or RUPTURED SG is available.

Ref: EOP-FRCC-2 (Response To Degraded Core Cooling) | LO: NOS05LOCA02-03 (POST-LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION) | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1, IAW 1-EOP-FRHS-2 Step 5, lists the 13 AFW Pump as a permitted release path for the affected SG. Since the other permitted release paths are not available and 11 SG is a source of steam for the 13 AFW, the crew will start the 13 AFW Pump in an effort to release steam from 11 SG. For Part 2, IAW 1-EOP-FRHS-2 Step 9, if the crew is unable to release steam from 11 SG, then RCS T-HOTs will be maintained less than a maximum of 540 °F by using the unaffected SGs.

✗ B. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that establishing cool AFW flow to 11 SG will help reduce 11 SG pressure.

✗ C. For Part 1, the candidate may incorrectly determine that the 11 SG is not a source of steam to the 13 AFW Pump. Consequently, the candidate would then incorrectly determine that the crew will not start the 13 AFW Pump in an effort to release steam from 11 SG. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. For Part 1, the candidate may incorrectly determine that the 11 SG is not a source of steam to the 13 AFW Pump. Consequently, the candidate would then incorrectly determine that the crew will not start the 13 AFW Pump in an effort to release steam from 11 SG. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that establishing cool AFW flow to 11 SG will help reduce 11 SG pressure.

Ref: EOP-FRHS-2 (Response To Steam Generator Overpressure) | LO: NOS05FRHS00-02 (HEAT SINK FUNCTIONAL RESTORATION) | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, IAW 1-EOP-FRCE-1 Step 2, the CS pumps will be operated in as directed by 1-EOP-LOCA-5. Since LOCA-5 directed both CS Pumps to be stopped, the crew will NOT start both CS Pumps. For Part 2, with 1-EOP-LOCA-5 in effect, conserving RWST water is a reason for how Containment Spray Pumps are operated in 1-EOP-FRCE-1 Step 3.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate may incorrectly conclude that high containment pressure (last fission product barrier) is the highest priority and conserving RWST water is not a reason for how the CS pumps are operated in EOP-FRCE-1.

✗ C. For Part 1, both CS Pumps will normally be started in EOP-FRCE-1. The candidate could not recall the provision to operate the CS pumps as directed by EOP-LOCA-5 and incorrectly conclude that both CS Pumps will be started. For Part 2, the candidate may incorrectly conclude that high containment pressure (last fission product barrier) is the highest priority and conserving RWST water is not a reason for how the CS pumps are operated in EOP-FRCE-1.

✗ D. For Part 1, both CS Pumps will normally be started in EOP-FRCE-1. The candidate could not recall the provision to operate the CS pumps as directed by EOP-LOCA-5 and incorrectly conclude that both CS Pumps will be started. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: EOP-FRCE-1 (Response To Excessive Containment Pressure) | LO: NOS05FRCE00-06 (EOP-FRCE-1, 2, AND 3 CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT) | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, IAW 2-EOP-CFST-1, the crew entered 2-EOP-FRCE-2 when Containment Sump Level reached a minimum of 78% (75% adverse). Since the question stem indicates containment pressure is normal, the crew entered 2-EOP-FRCE-2 when Containment Sump Level reached a minimum of 78%. For Part 2, in accordance with 2-EOP-FRCE-2 Step 1, the crew will close 25SW58 (Inlet Water Valve) and 25SW72 (Outlet Water Valve).

✗ A. For Part 1, Containment Sump Level of 75% is the adverse level in which EOP-CFST-1 requires performance of EOP-FRCE-2. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude for the given plant conditions that 2-EOP-FRCE-2 is entered when Containment Sump Level reached a minimum of 75%. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. For Part 1, Containment Sump Level of 75% is the adverse level in which EOP-CFST-1 requires performance of EOP-FRCE-2. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude for the given plant conditions that 2-EOP-FRCE-2 is entered when Containment Sump Level reached a minimum of 75%. For Part 2, when 25 CFCU was stopped, 25SW223 automatically closed. 25SW223 is directly downstream of 25SW72. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2-EOP-FRCE-2 only requires the affected CFCU's SW Inlet valve (SW58) to be closed.

✗ D. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, when 25 CFCU was stopped, 25SW223 automatically closed. 25SW223 is directly downstream of 25SW72. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2-EOP-FRCE-2 only requires the affected CFCU's SW Inlet valve (SW58) to be closed.

Ref: 2-EOP-FRCE-2 (Response To High Containment Sump Level) | LO: NOS05FRCE00-06 (EOP-FRCE-1, 2, AND 3 CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT) | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1, IAW 2-EOP-CFST-1, since containment radiation is less than 1E05 R/HR, containment is considered NORMAL. For Part 2, IAW 2-EOP-FRCE-3 Step 2, the crew is required to operate the 21 THRU 25 CFCUs in low speed.

✗ B. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that running the CFCUs in high speed would better circulate the containment atmosphere which would better mitigate the high radiation condition.

✗ C. For Part 1, since 2R44A and 2R44B (High Range Containment Accident Monitors) are in alarm, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that containment is ADVERSE. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. For Part 1, since 2R44A and 2R44B (High Range Containment Accident Monitors) are in alarm, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that containment is ADVERSE. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that running the CFCUs in high speed would better circulate the containment atmosphere which would better mitigate the high radiation condition.

Ref: 2-EOP-FRCE-3 (Response To High Containment Radiation) | LO: NOS05FRCE00-06 (EOP-FRCE-1, 2, AND 3 CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT) | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1 and per the WOG Transient and Accident Analysis documentation, during a PZR Vapor Space LOCA, PZR level is NOT a valid indication of RCS inventory. For Part 2 and IAW 1-EOP-FRCI-3 Step 2, since BOTH SI Pumps are running (Safety Injection has occurred), then the crew will immediately return to procedure in effect (1-EOP-LOCA-1).

✗ A. For Part 1, the WOG Transient and Accident Analysis documentation states that during all other LOCAs, PZR level is a valid indication of RCS inventory. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that during a PZR Vapor Space LOCA, PZR level is also a valid indication of RCS inventory. For Part 2, establishing normal flow is the first step of 1-EOP-FRCI-3 in which components are realigned (Step 3). Consequently, if the candidate fails to recognize the transition out of 1-EOP-FRCI-3 at Step 2, the candidate would incorrectly conclude that establishing normal charging is the proper action given the plant conditions.

✗ B. For Part 1, the WOG Transient and Accident Analysis documentation states that during all other LOCAs, PZR level is a valid indication of RCS inventory. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that during a PZR Vapor Space LOCA, PZR level is also a valid indication of RCS inventory. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, establishing normal flow is the first step of 1-EOP-FRCI-3 in which components are realigned (Step 3). Consequently, if the candidate fails to recognize the transition out of 1-EOP-FRCI-3 at Step 2, the candidate would incorrectly conclude that establishing normal charging is the proper action given the plant conditions.

Ref: NOS05TAA007-00 (LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS), 1-EOP-LOCA-1, 1-EOP-FRCI-3 | LO: NOS05TAA007-00 & NOS05FRCI00-04 | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW 1-EOP-LOCA-1, the crew will start ONLY one Hydrogen Recombiner when Containment Hydrogen Concentration is greater than 0.5%. For Part 2 and IAW 1-EOP-LOCA-1, the crew is required to perform 1-EOP-LOCA-4 14 hours after the SI Actuation. Since the SI Actuation occurred at 07:00, the crew is required to perform 1-EOP-LOCA-4 at 21:00.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, EOP-LOCA-1 has a requirement to start preparations for Hot Leg Recirculation 12 hours after the SI Actuation. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew is required to perform 1-EOP-LOCA-4 at 19:00.

✗ C. For Part 1, there are two hydrogen recombiners. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that both hydrogen recombiners will be started during the performance of EOP-LOCA-1. For Part 2, EOP-LOCA-1 has a requirement to start preparations for Hot Leg Recirculation 12 hours after the SI Actuation. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew is required to perform 1-EOP-LOCA-4 at 19:00.

✗ D. For Part 1, there are two hydrogen recombiners. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that both hydrogen recombiners will be started during the performance of EOP-LOCA-1. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: 1-EOP-LOCA-1 | LO: NOS05LOCA01-05 (EOP-LOCA-01, LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT) | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW HU-AA-101 Step 4.8.6, "Peer checks for actions necessary to mitigate a transient are desired but not required". For Part 2 and IAW S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 Steps 3.20 through 3.22, the crew will FIRST open 21/22/23CN108 (Bypass Polisher Valves) in an effort to restore SGFP suction pressure.

✗ A. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that Peer Checks are required for all IMMEDIATE ACTIONS. For Part 2, opening 2CN47 will be opened after 21/22/23CN108s are opened to restore SGFP suction pressure. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 requires 2CN47 to be opened first.

✗ B. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that Peer Checks are required for all IMMEDIATE ACTIONS. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, opening 2CN47 will be opened after 21/22/23CN108s are opened to restore SGFP suction pressure. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 requires 2CN47 to be opened first.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CN-0001, HU-AA-101 (Human Performance Tools And Verification Practices) | LO: NOS05ABCN01-06 (MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE SYSTEM ABNORMALITY) | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1 and based on the question stem, RCP Seal Injection Flow AND RCP Thermal Barrier Component Cooling flows are lost concurrently. Since Seal Leakoff is < 6 gpm, then IAW S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 Attachment 2, the crew is not REQUIRED to close 21-24CV104s (SEAL LEAKOFF) within 3-5 minutes after stopping 21-24 RCPs (Step 1.4). For Part 2, IAW S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 Attachment 2 Step 5.0, since ALL RCP Seal Inlet Temperatures are NOT less than 225 °F, the crew will cool the RCP seals by performing S2.OP-AB.RC-0004 (Natural Circulation).

✗ B. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, if ALL RCP Seal Inlet Temperatures were less than 225 °F, the crew will cool the RCP seals by performing S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 Attachment 4. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that at 18:20:00, performing S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 Attachment 4 is required.

✗ C. For Part 1, since RCP Seal Injection Flow AND RCP Thermal Barrier Component Cooling flows are lost concurrently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew is REQUIRED to close 21-24CV104s (SEAL LEAKOFF) within 3-5 minutes after stopping 21-24 RCPs. For Part 2, if ALL RCP Seal Inlet Temperatures were less than 225 °F, the crew will cool the RCP seals by performing S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 Attachment 4. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that at 18:20:00, performing S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 Attachment 4 is required.

✗ D. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew is REQUIRED to close 21-24CV104s (SEAL LEAKOFF) within 3-5 minutes after stopping 21-24 RCPs. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 (Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormality) | LO: NOS05ABRCP0-06 (REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMALITY) | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW EOP-CFST-1, 1-EOP-FRHS-1 was REQUIRED to be performed because ALL SG NR Levels are less than 15% and Total Feedwater Flow to SGs are less than 22E04 LB/HR. For Part 2 and IAW 1-EOP-FRHS-1 Step 19, since Bleed and Feed has NOT been initiated and the condensate line has just been aligned to feed 12 SG, the crew will return to procedure when 12 SG WR level starts to rise.

✗ B. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, 1-EOP-FRHS-1 Step 19 also uses ANY SG NR is > than a MINIMUM of 15% (adverse) as a criteria to return to procedure and step in effect. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew will Return To Procedure in Effect ONLY after 12 SG NR is > than a MINIMUM of 15%.

✗ C. For Part 1, the distractor is partially correct. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1-EOP-FRHS-1 was REQUIRED to be performed because ALL SG NR Levels are less than 15% ONLY. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. For Part 1, the distractor is partially correct. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1-EOP-FRHS-1 was REQUIRED to be performed because ALL SG NR Levels are less than 15% ONLY. For Part 2, 1-EOP-FRHS-1 Step 19 also uses ANY SG NR is > than a MINIMUM of 15% (adverse) as a criteria to return to procedure and step in effect. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew will Return To Procedure in Effect ONLY after 12 SG NR is > than a MINIMUM of 15%.

Ref: NOS05FRHS00-02 (HEAT SINK FUNCTIONAL RESTORATION) | LO: NOS05TRP001-08 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION) | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW 2-EOP-LOCA-5, the crew will add makeup to the RWST per S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 Section 5.8. For Part 2, Since Containment Pressure is 12 psig, containment is ADVERSE. Therefore IAW 2-EOP-LOCA-5, after the crew has initiated an RWST makeup, the crew will maintain TOTAL feed flow greater than 22E04 LB/HR until at least one SG NR Level is greater than 15 %.

✗ B. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, if containment was normal, IAW 2-EOP-LOCA-5, after the crew has initiated an RWST makeup, then the crew will maintain TOTAL feed flow greater than 22E04 LB/HR until at least one SG NR Level is greater than 9 %. Consequently, given the plant conditions, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the crew will maintain TOTAL feed flow greater than 22E04 LB/HR until at least one SG NR Level is greater than 9 %.

✗ C. For Part 1, S2.OP-SO.SF-0001 Section 5.6 is an approved operations procedure to provide makeup to the RWST. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2-EOP-LOCA-5 directs the crew to initiate an RWST makeup per S2.OP-SO.SF-0001 Section 5.6. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. For Part 1, S2.OP-SO.SF-0001 Section 5.6 is an approved operations procedure to provide makeup to the RWST. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 2-EOP-LOCA-5 directs the crew to initiate an RWST makeup per S2.OP-SO.SF-0001 Section 5.6. For Part 2, if containment was normal, the crew will maintain TOTAL feed flow greater than 22E04 LB/HR until at least one SG NR Level is greater than 9 %.

Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-5 | LO: NOS05LOCA05-04 (EOP-LOCA-05, LOSS OF EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION) — 1. Describe the EOP mitigation strategy during LOSS OF EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1 since the controlling LT has failed high, 22 Backup heaters will automatically energize since there is a +5% PZR level deviation (LACTUAL - LREF). For Part 2 and in accordance LCO 3.3.1.1 (REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION), 2LT-459 must be placed in the tripped condition within a MAXIMUM of 6 hours.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LCO 3.3.1.1 (REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION) requires 2LT-459 must be placed in the tripped condition within a MAXIMUM of 1 hour.

✗ C. For Part 1, PZR B/U Heaters have an automatic function to energize when PZR pressure is less than 2210 psig. Since PZR pressure is > 2210 psig when LT-459 fails high, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the 22 Backup heaters are OFF. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LCO 3.3.1.1 requires 2LT-459 must be placed in the tripped condition within a MAXIMUM of 1 hour.

✗ D. For Part 1, PZR B/U Heaters have an automatic function to energize when PZR pressure is less than 2210 psig. Since PZR pressure is > 2210 psig when LT-459 fails high, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the 22 Backup heaters are OFF. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: LCO 3.3.1.1, NOS05PZRP&L-10 (PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTROL) | LO: 10. Given a situation dealing with Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control System operability, examine the situation and apply the appropriate Technical Specification action. | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, the 11 GDT discharges to the plant vent. Consequently, an alarm on R41D will alert the crew to the unplanned gaseous radioactive release. For Part 2, the crew will perform S1.OP-AB.RAD-0001 (Abnormal Radiation) Attachment 1 to ensure the unplanned gaseous radioactive release is stopped.

✗ A. For Part 1, 1R12A-B is a gaseous process radiation monitor. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that an alarm on 1R12A-B (Cont or Vent Gas Effluent/Iodine) will alert the crew to the unplanned gaseous radioactive release. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. For Part 1, 1R12A-B is a gaseous process radiation monitor. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that an alarm on 1R12A-B (Cont or Vent Gas Effluent/Iodine) will alert the crew to the unplanned gaseous radioactive release. For Part 2, most gaseous systems have some type of filter arrangement. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1R41D monitors a filter and S1.OP-AB.RAD-0001 (Abnormal Radiation) Attachment 2 will be used to ensure the unplanned gaseous radioactive release is stopped.

✗ D. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, most gaseous systems have some type of filter arrangement. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that 1R41D monitors a filter and S1.OP-AB.RAD-0001 (Abnormal Radiation) Attachment 2 will be used to ensure the unplanned gaseous radioactive release is stopped.

Ref: S1.OP-AB.RAD-0001 | LO: NOS05ABRAD1-06 (ABNORMAL RADIATION) — 2. Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001 (Q) and the bases for the actions in accordance with the Technical Bases Document | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, S2.OP-AB.CONT-0001 states that for a loss of RHR, Containment Closure should be established prior to Core Boiling. For Part 2, S2.OP-AB.CONT-0001 states that for a loss of RHR, the Outage Equipment Hatch may be closed using 4 corner bolts.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, if the reason for entering S2.OP-AB.CONT-0001 was due to something other than Loss of RHR, then the crew would install the Outage Equipment Hatch (using ALL 10 bolts) by using the guidance contained in SC.MD-FR.CAN-0001. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that with a loss of RHR in progress, the crew will install the Outage Equipment Hatch for Containment Closure by using the guidance contained in SC.MD-FR.CAN-0001.

✗ C. For Part 1, S2.OP-AB.CONT-0001 states that when the initiating event is other than a Fuel Handling Incident or Loss Of RHR, Containment Closure should be established within four hours. Additionally, with the cavity flooded, time to boil on a Loss of RHR can be several hours. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that with a Loss of RHR in progress and the cavity flooded, S2.OP-AB.CONT-0001 states that Containment Closure should be established within a MAXIMUM of four hours. For Part 2, if the reason for entering S2.OP-AB.CONT-0001 was due to something other than Loss of RHR, then the crew would install the Outage Equipment Hatch (using ALL 10 bolts) by using the guidance contained in SC.MD-FR.CAN-0001.

✗ D. For Part 1, S2.OP-AB.CONT-0001 states that when the initiating event is other than a Fuel Handling Incident or Loss Of RHR, Containment Closure should be established within four hours. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CONT-0001 | LO: NOS05ABCONT-07 (CONTAINMENT CLOSURE) — 2. Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S1/S2.OP-AB.CONT-0001 (Q) and the bases for the actions in accordance with the Technical Bases Document | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1 and in accordance with 2-EOP-CFST-1 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees), 2-EOP-FRCE-3 entry conditions are met when R44 radiation is ≥ 2 R/HR. The earliest time that this occurs is at 14:00. For Part 2, FRCE-3 is a yellow path procedure. In accordance with OP-AA-101-111-1003 (Use Of Procedures), yellow path function restoration procedures are not required to be performed.

✗ A. For Part 1, 100 R/HR is the warning setpoint for R44A/B. The candidate could incorrectly conclude FRCE-3 entry conditions are first met when R44A/B go into warning. For Part 2, since most procedures are required to be performed when entry conditions are met, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that FRCE-3 is required to be performed when the entry conditions are met.

✗ B. For Part 1, 100 R/HR is the warning setpoint for R44A/B. The candidate could incorrectly conclude FRCE-3 entry conditions are first met when R44A/B go into warning. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since most procedures are required to be performed when entry conditions are met, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that FRCE-3 is required to be performed when the entry conditions are met.

Ref: 2-EOP-CFST-1, OP-AA-101-111-1003 | LO: NOS05PROCED-08 (USE AND CONTROL OF PROCEDURES) — 5. Implement Rules Of Usage For Emergency Operating Procedures; NOS05FRCE00-06 (EOP-FRCE-1, 2 AND 3 CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONAL RESTORATION) — 1. Describe the EOP mitigation strategy | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW LCO 3.5.1, the boron concentration limit is between 2200 - 2500 ppm. Consequently, there are 2 Accumulators that are inoperable (21 at 2175 ppm is below 2200 ppm, 22 at 2550 ppm is above 2500 ppm). For Part 2, since BOTH accumulators are inoperable, LCO 3.0.3 is applicable and the Unit is required to be in HOT STANDBY within a MAXIMUM of 7 hours (1 hour to initiate action + 6 hours to HOT STANDBY).

✗ A. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly recall the boron concentration limits of LCO 3.5.1 and conclude that only 1 Accumulator is inoperable. For Part 2, the candidate could fail to recognize that LCO 3.0.3 is in effect. Consequently, the candidate would then incorrectly conclude that the Unit is required to be in HOT STANDBY within a MAXIMUM of 7 hours.

✗ B. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly recall the boron concentration limits of LCO 3.5.1 and conclude that only 1 Accumulator is inoperable. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could fail to recognize that LCO 3.0.3 is in effect. Consequently, the candidate would then incorrectly conclude that the Unit is required to be in HOT STANDBY within a MAXIMUM of 78 hours.

Ref: LCO 3.5.5 (redacted reference provided) | LO: NOS05ECCS00-09 (EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM) — 10. Given a situation dealing with ECCS operability, examine the situation and apply the appropriate Technical Specification action. | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. In accordance with S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001 CAS, "IF AT ANY TIME a loss of RCS inventory occurs, THEN PERFORM one of the following: IF in Mode 5 OR 6, THEN START Safety Injection and Charging Pumps as required AND CONTROL Pressurizer level between 5% and 50% while maintaining RHR System in service."

✗ A. Going to S2.OP-AB.LOCA-0001 (Shutdown LOCA) would have been correct if the unit was in MODE 4 when the RCS inventory was lost (IAW S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001 CAS).

✗ B. Performing S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001 Attachment 9 (Steam Generator Reflux Cooling) would have been correct if at any time a complete loss of all vital buses occurs, NOT as a result of a Beyond-Design-Basis-External-Event (IAW S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001 CAS).

✗ C. Going to S2.OP-AB.RHR-0002 (Loss of RHR at Reduced Inventory) would have been correct if RCS had been aligned for operation <101 ft. elevation (S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001 Steps 3.3 and 3.4).

Ref: S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001 (Loss Of RHR) | LO: NOS05ABRHR1-05 (LOSS OF RHR) — 4. Given a set of initial plant conditions: A. Determine the appropriate abnormal procedure, B. Describe the plant response to actions taken in the abnormal procedure, C. Describe the final plant condition that is established by the abnormal procedure. | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ D. Correct. At 08:00 on June 12th, LCO 3.6.2.1 is NOT met (BOTH Trains of Containment Spray are INOPERABLE). LCO 3.6.2.1 does not have any required actions for BOTH Trains of Containment Spray being INOPERABLE. Consequently, the crew must comply with the required actions of LCO 3.0.3. Since ONE Train of Containment Spray is declared OPERABLE at 10:00 on June 12th, the crew no longer has to complete the required actions of LCO 3.0.3. This results in the crew having to comply with the required action of LCO 3.6.2.1 ("With one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours"). Consequently, the crew has 72+6 hours from 08:00 on June 12th to place Unit 2 in HOT STANDBY (14:00 on June 15th).

✗ A. 14:00 on June 12th is the date/time if the candidate incorrectly concludes that the required actions of LCO 3.0.3 must be performed. Additionally, the candidate must also incorrectly apply LCO 3.0.3 to require being in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

✗ B. 15:00 on June 12th is the date/time if the candidate incorrectly concludes that the required actions of LCO 3.0.3 must be performed (1 hour to initiate actions to place the Unit in a Mode in which the specification does not apply + 6 more hours to be in HOT STANDBY).

✗ C. 08:00 on June 15th is the date/time if the candidate incorrectly interprets the required action of LCO 3.6.2.1 as only allowing 72 hours from 08:00 on June 12th to place Unit 2 in HOT STANDBY.

Ref: Technical Specifications (LCO 3.6.2.1 provided as reference) | LO: NOS05CSPRAY-06 (CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM) — 10. Given a situation dealing with Containment Spray System operability, examine the situation and apply the appropriate Technical Specification action. | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ C. Correct. When analyzing LCO 3.3.3.1 against the given plant conditions, the candidate will need to analyze Table 3.3-6. To properly analyze Table 3.3-6, the candidate must also know information contained in the Bases of LCO 3.3.3.1. R12A is the credited monitor to meet the Table 3.3-6 requirements of 2.a.1.a (Containment - Gaseous Activity - Purge & Pressure Vacuum Relief Isolation) and 2.a.1.b (Containment - Gaseous Activity - RCS Leak Detection). Since S2.OP-SO.CBV-0002 (Containment Pressure - Vacuum Relief System Operation) Section 5.3, "Performing a Containment Vacuum Relief" is in progress, 2R41 (2R41A, B and D) can also be used to meet the requirements of Table 3.3-6 requirements of 2.a.1.a (Containment - Gaseous Activity - Purge & Pressure Vacuum Relief Isolation). Consequently, with 2R12A failed, LCO 3.3.3.1 (RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION) is NOT met and the crew must perform Action 24 ONLY.

✗ A. The candidate could correctly conclude that R12A only meets the Table 3.3-6 requirements of 2.a.1.a (Containment - Gaseous Activity - Purge & Pressure Vacuum Relief Isolation) and 2.a.1.b (Containment - Gaseous Activity - RCS Leak Detection). However, the candidate could then incorrectly conclude that R41 is not allowed to be an alternate monitor to meet Table 3.3-6 requirements of 2.a.1.a. Consequently, the crew would only be required to perform Actions 24 and 26.

✗ B. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that R12A only meets the Table 3.3-6 requirements of 2.a.1.a (Containment - Gaseous Activity - Purge & Pressure Vacuum Relief Isolation). Consequently, the crew would only be required to perform Action 26.

✗ D. Since there are multiple R12s (R12A, R12B, R12C) and multiple R41s (A-D), the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LCO 3.3.3.1 is met with ONLY a failure of R12A.

Ref: Technical Specifications (LCO 3.3.3.1 provided as reference) | LO: NOS05CONTMT-15 (CONTAINMENT AND CONTAINMENT SUPPORT SYSTEMS) — 9. Given a situation dealing with Containment and Containment Support Systems operability, examine the situation and apply the appropriate Technical Specification action. | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, IAW S2.OP-AB.CA-0001, the BF19s (FW CONT VALVE) will fail closed as Control Air pressure lowers. Consequently, SG levels are expected to lower. For Part 2, IAW S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 (Selected CAS Items), once the reactor is tripped, the crew will perform 2-EOP-TRIP-1 and S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 concurrently.

✗ A. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the BF19s (FW CONT VALVE) will fail open as Control Air pressure lowers. Consequently, the candidate would then incorrectly deduce that the SG levels are expected to rise. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the BF19s (FW CONT VALVES) will fail open as Control Air pressure lowers. Consequently, the candidate would then incorrectly deduce that the SG levels are expected to rise. For Part 2, other Abnormal Procedures (e.g. OP-AB-COND-001) require the crew to only perform EOP-TRIP-1 when reactor trip criteria have been met. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that when reactor trip criteria have been met in S2.OP-AB.CA-0001, the crew will only perform 2-EOP-TRIP-1.

✗ D. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, other Abnormal Procedures (e.g. OP-AB-COND-001) require the crew to only perform EOP-TRIP-1 when reactor trip criteria have been met. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that when reactor trip criteria have been met in S2.OP-AB.CA-0001, the crew will only perform 2-EOP-TRIP-1.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CA-0001, Drawing 205302 - SH 3 (portion) | LO: NOS05ABCA01-07 (LOSS OF CONTROL AIR) — 2. Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 (Q) and the bases for the actions in accordance with the Technical Bases Document | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, with the ROD INSERT LIMIT LO-LO alarm present, the control rods are actually below the RIL. Consequently, SR 4.1.1.1.b (When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 with Keff greater than or equal to 1.0, in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that control banks are within the limits in the COLR per Specification 3.1.3.5) is not met. With SR 4.1.1.1 not being met, LCO 3.1.1.1 is also NOT met. For Part 2 and in accordance with the ROD INSERT LIMIT LO-LO Alarm Response Procedure, the crew can perform S2.OP-SO.CVC-0008 (Rapid Boration) ONLY to restore Control Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, raising turbine power will cause RCS TAVG to lower which would cause Control Rods to automatically withdraw. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the ROD INSERT LIMIT LO-LO Alarm Response Procedure allows the crew to raise turbine power to restore Control Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that SR 4.1.1.1 only requires a calculation of Shutdown Margin (SDM) and LCO 3.1.1.1 is met until the SDM calculation confirms that SDM is not adequate. For Part 2, raising turbine power will cause RCS TAVG to lower which would cause Control Rods to automatically withdraw. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the ROD INSERT LIMIT LO-LO Alarm Response Procedure allows the crew to raise turbine power to restore Control Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that SR 4.1.1.1 only requires a calculation of Shutdown Margin (SDM) and LCO 3.1.1.1 is met until the SDM calculation confirms that SDM is not adequate. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: ROD INSERT LIMIT LO-LO Alarm Response Procedure, LCO 3.1.1.1 | LO: NOS05RODS00-12 Obj 13 | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Higher | SRO Only: Analyze plant parameters and determine procedure to implement after rods go below RIL during turbine runback

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW S2.OP-AB.SF-0001, since SFP water is at the boiling point and SFP level at the Low Level alarm setpoint (128 feet, 0 inches), the crew is required to initiate makeup to the Spent Fuel Pool until the HI LEVEL ALARM actuates. For Part 2 and IAW S2.OP-AB.SF-0001, the crew can perform S2.OP-SO.SF-0006 (Spent Fuel Pool Emergency Fill) or S2.OP-SO.SF-0001 to raise Spent Fuel Pool Level.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since the SFP is boiling, the candidate could conclude that any makeup must be done as fast as possible. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-AB.SF-0001 only allows a SFP makeup using S2.OP-SO.SF-0006 (Spent Fuel Pool Emergency Fill).

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since SFP Level is above the low level alarm setpoint (128 feet, 2 inches), the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-AB.SF-0001 does not require a SFP makeup. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, since SFP Level is above the low level alarm setpoint (128 feet, 2 inches), the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-AB.SF-0001 does not require a SFP makeup. For Part 2, since the SFP is boiling, the candidate could conclude that any makeup must be done as fast as possible. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that S2.OP-AB.SF-0001 only allows a SFP makeup using S2.OP-SO.SF-0006 (Spent Fuel Pool Emergency Fill).

Ref: S2.OP-AB.SF-0001 | LO: NOS05ABSFP1-06 Obj 2 | Source: New | Cognitive: Higher | SRO Only: Analyze SFP parameters and select procedure to mitigate during Loss of SFP Cooling

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, based on location in which the Number 1 ECAC is physically connected into the Unit 1 Control Air System, the Number 1 ECAC will only provide air to the Unit 1 Control Air System (due to the presence of check valves between Unit 1 Control Air System and Station Air System). For Part 2 and IAW S1.OP-AB.CA-0001, the CRS will direct performance of S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 Attachment 12, "Local Control Of SG Pressure and Level", when BOTH 1A and 1B Control Air Headers indicate less than 80 psig.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could not recall the existence of the check valves between Unit 1 Control Air and Station Air. Consequently, the candidate could then incorrectly conclude that the Number 1 ECAC will provide air to Unit 1 Control Air and Station Air. For Part 2, as Control Air pressure lowers below 80 psig, AOV operation will start to be compromised. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the CRS will direct performance of S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 Attachment 12, "Local Control Of SG Pressure and Level", when EITHER 1A or 1B Control Air Headers indicates less than 80 psig.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, the candidate could not recall the existence of the check valves between Unit 1 Control Air and Station Air. Consequently, the candidate could then incorrectly conclude that the Number 1 ECAC will provide air to Unit 1 Control Air and Station Air. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, as Control Air pressure lowers below 80 psig, AOV operation will start to be compromised. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the CRS will direct performance of S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 Attachment 12, "Local Control Of SG Pressure and Level", when EITHER 1A or 1B Control Air Headers indicates less than 80 psig.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 | LO: NOS05ABCA01-07 Obj 2 | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower | SRO Only: Analyze plant parameters and determine when to implement attachment of a procedure

✓ D. Correct. For Part 1, IAW OP-AA-105-102, the quarterly shift requirement to maintain an SRO License is a MINIMUM of 56 hours to be completed with a combination of complete 8- and 12-hour shifts. For Part 2, IAW OP-AA-105-102, during a credited shift to meet the quarterly shift requirement, the SRO is NOT permitted to perform non-position related administrative tasks outside the control room.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, OP-AA-105-102 has a 40 hour OJT requirement to reactivate a license. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the quarterly shift requirement to maintain an SRO License is a MINIMUM of 40 hours to be completed with a combination of complete 8- and 12-hour shifts. For Part 2, since an activity such as receiving periodic NRC physicals is required to maintain an active license, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that an SRO is permitted to perform non-position related administrative tasks outside the control room for a credited shift.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, OP-AA-105-102 has a 40 hour OJT requirement to reactivate a license. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the quarterly shift requirement to maintain an SRO License is a MINIMUM of 40 hours to be completed with a combination of complete 8- and 12-hour shifts. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since an activity such as receiving periodic NRC physicals is required to maintain an active license, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that an SRO is permitted to perform non-position related administrative tasks outside the control room for a credited shift.

Ref: OP-AA-105-102 | LO: None listed | Source: Modified Bank | Cognitive: Lower | SRO Only: Conditions and Limitations in the Facility License

✓ C. Correct. For Part 1, IAW S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 (Selected CAS Items), if five minutes have elapsed since RCP BRG CLG WTR FLO LO alarm actuated, the crew will perform Attachment 2, Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps. Since the 21 RCP BRG CLG WTR FLO LO alarm actuated at 10:00:00, 10:05:00 is the earliest time that the crew is required to perform S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 Attachment 2. For Part 2, IAW S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 Attachment 2, if the Reactor Trip Breakers are CLOSED, the crew will perform a manual Reactor TRIP prior to stopping the affected RCPs.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 (Selected CAS Items) has an action which requires RCPs to be secured within 2 minutes to prevent RCP damage (RCP Seal Injection Flow AND RCP Thermal Barrier Component Cooling flow are lost concurrently). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that if the 21 RCP BRG CLG WTR FLO LO alarm is still active, 10:02:00 is the earliest time that the crew is required to perform S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 Attachment 2 (Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps). Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 (Selected CAS Items) has an action which requires RCPs to be secured within 2 minutes to prevent RCP damage (RCP Seal Injection Flow AND RCP Thermal Barrier Component Cooling flow are lost concurrently). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that if the 21 RCP BRG CLG WTR FLO LO alarm is still active, 10:02:00 is the earliest time that the crew is required to perform S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 Attachment 2 (Stopping Reactor Coolant Pumps). For Part 2, since the plant is in MODE 3 with ALL of the control rods already inserted fully into the core, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that a manual reactor trip is not required which allows the crew to secure the affected RCP faster.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since the plant is in MODE 3 with ALL of the control rods already inserted fully into the core, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that a manual reactor trip is not required which allows the crew to secure the affected RCP faster.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 | LO: NOS05ABCC01-09 Obj 4 | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Higher | SRO Only: Analyze plant parameters and determine when to implement attachments/appendices

✓ C. Correct. SR 4.0.3 allows a delay time of 24 hours OR up to the limit of the specified frequency, whichever is greatest. Since the specified frequency is MONTHLY (every 31 days), then November 21st + 31 days = December 22nd. A risk assessment also needs to be performed for delay periods greater than 24 hours. Consequently, assuming ALL other administrative requirements have been met, December 22nd at 13:00:00 is the LATEST time/date that SR 4.5.2.b.2 can be performed without having to perform the applicable REQUIRED ACTION(S) of LCO 3.5.2 (ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - TAVG ≥ 350 °F).

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. November 22nd is the date if the candidate incorrectly deduces that SR 4.0.3 allows a delay time of 24 hours OR up to the limit of the specified frequency, whichever is LEAST. November 21st + 24 hours = November 22nd.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. December 21st is the date if the candidate incorrectly assumes a MONTH frequency = 30 days (November 21st + 30 days = December 21st).

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. December 29th is the date if the candidate incorrectly deduces that SR 4.0.3 also allows a 25% extension to the specified frequency (as defined in SR 4.0.2). November 21st + 31 days + 7 days (25% of 31 days) = December 29th.

Ref: SR 4.0.2, LCO 3.5.2 | LO: NOS05TECHSPEC-12 Obj 13 | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Higher | SRO Only: Application of generic LCO requirements (SR 4.0.1 through 4.0.4) and knowledge of TS bases

✓ A. Correct. For Part 1 and IAW LCO 3.2.1, with Reactor Power at 95% power and LCO 3.2.1 NOT met at 15:30, the crew is required to reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER by 15:45 (within 15 minutes). For Part 2 and IAW LCO Bases, the LCO 3.2.1 REQUIRED power reduction will ensure F_Q(Z) (Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor) limit as specified in the COLR is NOT exceeded.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the LCO Bases for the Power Distribution LCOs (LCO 3.2.x) are designed to protect three different hot channel factors (Heat Flux Hot Channel, Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor and Radial Peaking Factor). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LCO 3.2.1 is designed to prevent exceeding the Radial Peaking Factor.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1 and IAW LCO 3.2.1, once reactor power is between 90%-50%, the crew must then reduce power to less than 50% in the next 30 minutes. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that when LCO 3.2.1 was first not met (with RX Power at 95%), the crew is required to reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER by 15:45 (within 15 minutes). Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1 and IAW LCO 3.2.1, once reactor power is between 90%-50%, the crew must then reduce power to less than 50% in the next 30 minutes. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that when LCO 3.2.1 was first not met (with RX Power at 95%), the crew is required to reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER by 15:45 (within 15 minutes). For Part 2, the LCO Bases for the Power Distribution LCOs (LCO 3.2.x) are designed to protect three different hot channel factors (Heat Flux Hot Channel, Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor and Radial Peaking Factor). Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that LCO 3.2.1 is designed to prevent exceeding the Radial Peaking Factor.

Ref: LCO 3.2.1 | LO: NOS05TECHSPEC-12 Obj 14 | Source: New | Cognitive: Lower | SRO Only: Knowledge of TS bases for LCO 3.2.1

✓ B. Correct. For Part 1, 2-EOP-TRIP-1 and 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Basis Document require rods to be inserted. The basis document allows rods to insert in AUTOMATIC if the RCS Temperature error is such that rods step in > 48 steps/minute. Since the plant is at 4% (turbine is not online), rods will not insert automatically greater than 48 steps/minute. Consequently, the rods will be inserted manually. For Part 2, IAW 2-EOP-TRIP-1, since the reactor is not tripped, the crew will go to 2-EOP-FRSM-1.

✗ A. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that entry into 2-EOP-FRSM-1 is NOT required since reactor power is less than 5%.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Basis Document allows rods to be left in automatic if certain conditions are met. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that allowing the rods to insert automatically is preferred. For Part 2, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that entry into 2-EOP-FRSM-1 is NOT required since reactor power is less than 5%.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. For Part 1, 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Basis Document allows rods to be left in automatic if certain conditions are met. Consequently, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that allowing the rods to insert automatically is preferred. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: 2-EOP-TRIP-1 | LO: Not listed | Source: Bank (modified from January 2017 ILOT Exam SRO Q3) | Cognitive: Higher | SRO Only: Assess plant conditions and select procedure to mitigate/recover

✓ A. Correct. IAW S2.OP-SO.WL-0001, if 2R18 is inoperable, then the CRS can approve the release permit provided a second sample was drawn, analyzed, and calculations were second verified prior to the release.

✗ B. Incorrect but plausible. Part 1 is correct. For Part 2, since 2R18 provides continuous monitoring during the release, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the effluent must be continuously sampled during the discharge.

✗ C. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate could incorrectly conclude that the release permit can not be approved until ONLY the 2R18 is repaired and returned to service.

✗ D. Incorrect but plausible. Since the 21 CVCS Monitor Tank can be discharged into the Unit 1 CW system, the candidate could incorrectly conclude that the Unit 1 R18 can be aligned to monitor the 21 CVCS Monitor Tank. Consequently, the candidate could then incorrectly determine that the release permit can not be approved until 2R18 is repaired and returned to service or until the Unit 1 R18 can be source checked and aligned to monitor the release.

Ref: S2.OP-SO.WL-0001 | LO: NOS05CAVENT-11 Obj 10 | Source: Bank | Cognitive: Lower | SRO Only: Knowledge of Radiation Hazards during Normal and Abnormal Situations