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Exams > 2020 NRC Operating Exam

2020 NRC Operating Exam

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2020 NRC Operating Exam

Overview

  • Exam: SALEM 2020 NRC Exam — 18-01 ILOT (Op-Test 19-01)
  • Admin JPMs (RO): 4
  • Admin JPMs (SRO): 5
  • Simulator JPMs: 8
  • In-Plant JPMs: 3
  • Simulator Scenarios: 5

View Operating Test PDF

JPMs

Simulator Scenarios

JPM RO-A1 — Calculate Shutdown Margin IAW SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 Admin | RO/SRO | G2.1.43 (4.1/4.3)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: Yes (60 minutes)
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 30 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 Reactor Power is 100%
- All Control Rod Group Demand Counters are at 225 steps
- Current boron concentration is 300 ppm
- Current core burnup is 10000 EFPH
- Control Rod 1D5 was been declared INOPERABLE at 1000 today due to not moving out during a rod exercise test
- You have been directed to perform a Shutdown Margin Calculation IAW SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 to satisfy the action requirement of TSAS 3.1.3.1 Action c.3 for a misaligned rod
- Control Rod 1D5 has been identified as trippable and is currently at 214 steps

Initiating Cue:
- You have been directed to perform a Shutdown Margin Calculation IAW SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 Attachment 3 to satisfy the one (1) hour action requirement of TSAS 3.1.3.1 Action c.3 to verify Shutdown Margin requirements is satisfied.
- When performing calculation, the CRS directs you to use only the tables as directed by SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002, do not use Figures.
- This is a Time Critical JPM.
Task Standard:
Perform SDM calculation within 1 hour and determines SDM of -2398 (+/- 5 pcm) is satisfactory.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
3.0 Reviews and signs off Precautions and Limitations Section 3.0 Reviews Precautions & Limitations and signs off Steps 3.1-3.7.
5.1 SELECT the applicable step below Determines 5.1.1.C is the correct step for the current conditions, which is to complete Attachment 3.
4.1 * Section 4.1 — Critical Conditions data entry 4.1.1: 100% | 4.1.2: 300 ppm | 4.1.3: D @ 225 steps | 4.1.4: 10000 EFPH | 4.1.5: 0 | 4.1.6: 1
4.2 * Section 4.2 — Calculation of Rod Worth 4.2.1: -3697 | 4.2.2: -3581 | 4.2.3: 920 | 4.2.4: 0 | 4.2.5: 500 | 4.2.6: 0 | 4.2.7: -5858
4.3 * Section 4.3 — Calculation of SDM 4.3.1: -5858 | 4.3.2: 636 | 4.3.3: 120 | 4.3.4: 2704 | 4.3.5: -2398
4.4.1 * Acceptance Criteria — IS THE SDM (Item 4.3.5) EQUAL TO OR MORE NEGATIVE THAN (-)1300 PCM? Reviews required SDM in MODE 1 or 2 of -1300 pcm and determines calculated SDM is SAT.
Key Decision Point:
Step 4.2.6 is the discriminating step — the applicant must recognize that the rod bank penalty is determined based on the position of the rod BANK (225 steps, ARO position), NOT the position of the individual misaligned rod (214 steps). Since all rods are at ARO position, the penalty is 0 pcm. Additionally, in Step 4.1.5 the number of untrippable rods is 0 (rod 1D5 is trippable), and 4.1.6 has 1 inoperable rod.
Ref: SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002(Q) (R24) + S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0016(Q) (R11) | Task: N1200030301 | K/A: G2.1.43 — Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A2 — Verification of Active License Status Admin | RO/SRO | G2.1.4 (3.3/3.8)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 30 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Both Units are operating at 100% power
- Today is January 1, 2020
- You are the on-shift RO on Unit 1
- You must leave the shift
- There are three replacement operators that are available on-site

Initiating Cue:
- Using the provided information, determine which of the three operators, if any, are qualified to relieve you IAW OP-AA-105-102, NRC Active License Maintenance and OP-AA-105-101, Administrative Process For NRC License and Medical Requirements.
- If any operators are not qualified, briefly explain why?
Task Standard:
1. Operator determines that RO #3 can relieve him.
2. Operator determines that RO #1 is not qualified due to not meeting the 72 hour shift hour requirement and RO #2 is not qualified due to not meeting license restrictions for wearing corrective lenses.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 * Reviews RO #1 data and determines eligibility for relief Determines that RO #1 is not qualified to relieve the RO due to not having the minimum five 12-hour shifts per calendar quarter IAW OP-AA-105-102 section 4.1.1.1.
2 * Reviews RO #2 data and determines eligibility for relief Determines that RO #2 is not qualified to relieve the RO due to not having the required corrective lenses IAW NRC Form 396 medical form restriction for corrective lenses.
3 * Reviews RO #3 data and determines eligibility for relief Determines that RO #3 is qualified to relieve the RO on Unit 1.
Key Decision Point:
Steps 1 and 2 are the discriminating steps. For RO #1, the applicant must count the number of qualifying 12-hour shifts in Q4 2019: RO #1 has only four qualifying shifts (11/2, 11/4, 12/24, and one of 11/3 or 11/5 as PO counts depending on the procedure, but the 11/4 shift included 2 hours attending meetings away from the control room). The applicant must determine RO #1 does not meet the minimum five 12-hour shifts requirement per OP-AA-105-102 section 4.1.1.1. For RO #2, the NRC Form 396 lists a restriction requiring corrective lenses for licensed duties, but RO #2 stated he left his prescription eyeglasses at home — he cannot meet the medical restriction.
Ref: OP-AA-105-101 (R16) + OP-AA-105-102 (R12) + RP-AA-440 (R10) | Task: N1200030301 | K/A: G2.1.4 — Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A3 — Identify Components to Isolate SW Leak Using Drawings Admin | RO/SRO | G2.2.41 (3.5/3.9)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 30 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is in a Refueling outage with the reactor defueled
- A Service Water leak has been identified by your field operator on a 2 inch drain valve (21SW268) near the 21SW76 valve inside the SW Valve Room, Auxiliary Building
- The 21SW76 is a manual isolation valve for the SW outlet of 21 CFCU
- The 21SW268, 21 NUC HDR FROM FCV DRAIN, is a 2 inch drain valve downstream of the 21SW76, 21 CFCU SW OUTLET VLV
- The field operator reports that the leak is at the body to bonnet location of the valve

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Work Control NCO
- The Work Control SRO directs you to identify the minimum number of components needed to isolate the leak
- Drains and vents are NOT required to be identified at this point
- A complete work clearance (tagout) with all required blocking points will be performed in accordance with station procedures after leak isolation
- Assume check valves will function as designed with no leak-by
- Mark up (or circle components) on the provided P&ID drawings for the valves required to be closed and document your list of valves on this Cue Sheet
Task Standard:
Operator identifies the following valves on drawing 205342 as a minimum to be closed to isolate leak:
21SW472 (sheet 3), 21SW355 (sheet 3), 21SW50 (sheet 3), 21SW414 (sheet 5), 21SW78 (sheet 6), 22SW76 (sheet 6), 21SW76 (sheet 6), 21SW646 (sheet 6), 22SW646 (sheet 6).

Optional Valves (credit for check valves preventing backflow): 21SW844 (sheet 3), 21/22/23SW45 (sheet 3).
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 * Mark up (or circle components) the provided P&ID drawings for the valves required to be closed Using the P&IDs provided, the operator highlights or marks the minimum valves to isolate (close) the leak.
2 * List the components needed to be closed to isolate the leak 21SW472 (sheet 3), 21SW355 (sheet 3), 21SW50 (sheet 3), 21SW414 (sheet 5), 21SW78 (sheet 6), 22SW76 (sheet 6), 21SW76 (sheet 6), 22SW646 (sheet 6), 21SW646 (sheet 6)
Key Decision Point:
The applicant must trace through P&ID 205342 (sheets 1-7) to identify all flow paths to the leaking drain valve 21SW268. The drain valve is downstream of 21SW76 (21 CFCU SW outlet valve) on the nuclear header. The key challenge is identifying all the boundary valves needed on multiple P&ID sheets — the leak location requires isolation from both the SW supply side (upstream through the CFCU) and the return/discharge side (downstream toward the nuclear header). The applicant must also determine which valves on the cross-connected headers (22SW76, 22SW646) are required. Optional valves (21SW844, 21/22/23SW45) are not required if the applicant takes credit for check valves preventing backflow.
Ref: Drawing 205342 Sheets 1-7 | Task: N1220050302 | K/A: G2.2.41 — Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A4 — Activate ERDS During an ALERT IAW EP-SA-325-F8 Admin | RO/SRO | G2.4.43 (3.2/3.8)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 5 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 was manually tripped from 100% power due to an RCS leak
- Safety Injection was manually initiated and all ECCS pumps are running
- The Shift Manager has declared an ALERT

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Work Control NCO and designated Secondary Communicator
- ACTIVATE ERDS IAW Step 1.2.b of EP-SA-325-F8, Secondary Communicator Log
- Notify the Shift Manager when ERDS is activated
Task Standard:
Activates ERDS by correctly performing steps 1.2.b.1 thru 1.2.b.6 IAW EP-SA-325-F8.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.2.b.1 * PROCEED to a computer with its monitor labeled "ERDS XXX" in the Salem Control Room and START the program by SELECTING the ERDS_Salem desktop icon Operator proceeds to ERDS XXX computer and selects the ERDS_Salem desktop icon.
1.2.b.2 * On the "Login For ERDS Display" popup window ENTER the PASSWORD and SELECT "Login" to proceed Operator enters the PASSWORD and selects "Login" to proceed.
1.2.b.3 * SELECT the Action button labeled <CONNECT> on the appropriate Salem 1 or Salem 2 "ERDS Link Control and Status Display Screen" Operator selects the button labeled <CONNECT> for Salem 2 "ERDS Link Control and Status Display Screen".
1.2.b.4 * SELECT the <YES> button in the "Current Link Control State is Disconnect. Do You Want To Connect?" box Operator selects <YES> button in the "Current Link Control State is Disconnect. Do You Want To Connect?" box.
1.2.b.5 * OBSERVE that Status changes to "Transmitting Data" Operator checks that the Status changes to "Transmitting Data".
1.2.b.6 * VERIFY successful communications status by observing that the "Messages Sent" value is increasing from zero "0" to some positive integer > "0" Operator verifies that the "Messages Sent" value is increasing from zero "0" to some positive integer > "0".
1.2.b.7 INFORM the CRS of successful ERDS activation status Terminate JPM when CRS/SM is notified ERDS is activated.
Key Decision Point:
Step 1.2.b.3 is the discriminating step — the applicant must select the correct unit (Salem 2) ERDS Link Control and Status Display Screen, since the initial conditions state Unit 2 was manually tripped due to an RCS leak. Selecting Salem 1 would be an incorrect action. This is the same discriminating step tested in the 2023 ERDS activation JPM.
Ref: EP-SA-325-F8 (R0) | Task: N1240110501 | K/A: G2.4.43 — Knowledge of emergency communications systems and techniques | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A1 — Review Completed Shutdown Margin Admin | SRO | G2.1.43 (4.3)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 30 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 load reduction in preparation for Main Turbine valve testing was placed on hold at 90% Power due to two Control Rods (1D4 and 1D2) stopped moving.
- Group Demand Counter for Control Bank D indicates 200 steps.
- The CRS has declared both Control Rods INOPERABLE and entered TS LCO 3.1.3.1 Action c.3.
- Current boron concentration is 1300 ppm.
- Current core burnup is 4000 EFPH.
Subsequently,
- Reactor Engineering informs you that both Control Rods are UNTRIPPABLE.
- The RO has completed a Shutdown Margin Calculation IAW SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 to satisfy the action requirement of TSAS 3.1.3.1 Action c.3.

Initiating Cue:
Review the completed Shutdown Margin Calculation for completeness and accuracy.
1. Identify discrepancies, if any, and how to correct them on the CUE SHEET by recording the step number in error and what the correction should be OR you can MARK UP the provided procedure by one lining the error and record the correction.
2. Does the Shutdown Margin Calculation meet the surveillance requirement (Yes/No)? If no, briefly explain why?
Task Standard:
Candidate identifies the following errors in Attachment 3:
1. Step 4.1.6 completed in error. Step 4.1.5 should be completed with a value of 2.
2. Step 4.2.5 completed in error. Step 4.2.4 should be completed with a value of 4330 pcm.
3. Step 4.2.7 completed in error. Trippable Rod Worth with Untrippable RCCA(s) should be used with a value of -2327.8 pcm (+/- 1 pcm).
4. Step 4.3.1 should be the same value as calculated in step 4.2.7 of -2327.8 pcm.
5. Step 4.3.5 SDM should be -269.5 pcm (+/- 1 pcm).
6. Step 4.4.1 marked incorrectly as SAT. With SDM of -269.5 pcm this step should be marked as UNSAT.
7. Step 4.4.2.A marked incorrectly as N/A, should be 315.5 pcm (+/- 1 pcm).
8. Step 4.4.2.B marked incorrectly as N/A, should be 19% RTP (15-20% RTP).
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
4.1.6 * # of Dropped or Misaligned RCCA(s) — identifies step 4.1.6 incorrectly filled out Both rods are UNTRIPPABLE, not dropped/misaligned. Step 4.1.5 should be completed with a value of 2 untrippable RCCA(s).
4.2.5 * Penalty for Dropped or Misaligned RCCA(s) — wrong penalty section used Step 4.2.4 "Penalty for Untrippable RCCA(s)" should be used. Calculates a value of 4330 pcm.
4.2.6 Integral Rod Worth inserted at position in Item 4.1.3 Control Bank D demand at 200 steps; Table 1-7 Integral Rod Worth at D-200 = 49.2 pcm. (At 225 steps this would be 0 pcm.)
4.2.7 * Choose appropriate rod worth calculation — wrong calculation selected "Trippable Rod Worth" calculation was incorrectly used. Must use "Trippable Rod Worth with Untrippable RCCA(s)" = -2327.8 pcm.
4.3.1 * Trippable Rod Worth Corrects to same value as step 4.2.7: -2327.8 pcm.
4.3.5 * SDM calculation Calculated SDM of -2815.5 pcm is incorrect. Correct SDM = -269.5 pcm.
4.4.1 * Is the SDM equal to or more negative than (-) 1300 pcm? Incorrectly marked SAT. With SDM of -269.5 pcm, step should be marked UNSAT.
4.4.2.A Calculate power defect required to achieve required SDM Incorrectly marked N/A. Required power defect = 315.5 pcm.
4.4.2.B Determine Reactor Power Level from power defect and boron concentration Incorrectly marked N/A. Per Figure 17A: 19% RTP (acceptable band 15-20% RTP).
Key Decision Point:
The RO's calculation incorrectly treated the rods as dropped/misaligned rather than untrippable. The candidate must recognize that untrippable rods require a different calculation pathway (step 4.1.5 instead of 4.1.6, step 4.2.4 instead of 4.2.5, and the "Trippable Rod Worth with Untrippable RCCA(s)" formula in step 4.2.7). This cascading error changes the SDM result from SAT to UNSAT, requiring power reduction to approximately 19% RTP to restore adequate shutdown margin.
Ref: SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002 (R24), S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0016 (R12) | Task: N1200030301 | K/A: G2.1.43 — Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor coolant system temperature, δt, control rod position, and boron concentration | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A2 — Evaluate Shift Staffing and Take Corrective Actions Admin | SRO | G2.1.5 (3.9)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 45 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Today is Thursday October 17, 2020.
- Both Units are at 100% power.
- You are the Shift Manager and your crew has just begun its 12 hour night shift starting at 1800 hours.
- The crew is at minimum staffing levels.
- At 1830 hours, the Plant Operator on Unit 2 has become ill and has been sent home, which places the shift BELOW MINIMUM staffing levels.
- There are NO qualified operators available on-site.
- Four (4) operators have been contacted at home.
- This call-out is NOT for an emergency.

Initiating Cue:
Based on Administrative requirements, determine the following from the given list of available operators and work schedules:
1. How soon must relief be found?
2. From the list provided, who is eligible to assume the shift duties. Assume the following: For hours worked, the Operator starts at 1800 on October 17th. Operator works the remaining hours of the shift AND they work the schedule provided in this JPM.
3. For those who are NOT eligible, state the reason why?
Task Standard:
1. Determines two (2) hours to restore shift crew to minimum staffing levels.
2. Determines Operator #1 can be called in.
3. States why operators are not eligible to assume the shift:
  a. Operator #2 is not fit for duty IAW SY-AA-102-201 due to consuming alcohol during the past five hours.
  b. Operator #3 will violate LS-AA-119-1003 work hour rule (> 16 hours in a 24-hour period) and/or break period (less than 10 hour break).
  c. Operator #4 is not fit for duty IAW SY-AA-102-201 due to use of medication affecting his/her ability to perform work.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 * How soon must relief be found? IAW Technical Specification Administrative section: two (2) hours to restore shift staffing to minimum levels.
2 * From the list provided, who is eligible to assume the shift duties? Operator #1 is eligible. Works the schedule without violating any LS-AA-119-1003 work hour rules or required rest periods (total hours would be 60 in 7 days). FFD self-report is satisfactory.
3 * For those NOT eligible, state the reason why Operator #2: NOT fit for duty per SY-AA-102-201 — consumed alcohol during the past five hours.
Operator #3: violates LS-AA-119-1003 — would work 22 hours in a 24-hour period (> 16 hr limit) AND less than 10-hour break between successive work periods.
Operator #4: NOT fit for duty per SY-AA-102-201 — took NyQuil medication that can cause impairment; self-reported not sure if fit for duty.
Operator Call-In Responses:
#1: Available in 45 min. Has not consumed alcohol in past 5 hours. Fit for duty.
#2: Available in 50 min. Has had beers with friends. Consumed alcohol in past 5 hours. Does not think fit for duty.
#3: Available in 30 min. Just got home from training at 1730. No alcohol. Fit for duty. (But worked 10 hrs of training same day.)
#4: Available in 60 min. Took NyQuil Liquid Nighttime Cold Medicine 1 hour ago. No alcohol. Not sure if fit for duty.
Key Decision Point:
The candidate must evaluate each operator against BOTH work hour rules (LS-AA-119-1003) AND fitness for duty requirements (SY-AA-102-201). Operators #2 and #4 fail FFD self-reports (alcohol and medication), while Operator #3 fails work hour rules (training 0700-1730 on the same day means only 30 minutes between work periods, violating the 10-hour break requirement AND exceeding 16 hours in 24 hours). Only Operator #1 passes both evaluations.
Ref: LS-AA-119-1003 (R8), SY-AA-102-201 (R11), LS-AA-119 (R12) | Task: N1230040302 | K/A: G2.1.5 — Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement or overtime limitations | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A3 — Determine Component Operability and TS Actions Admin | SRO | G2.2.37 (4.6)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem 1 is at 100% power.
- 13 SW Pump is C/T for motor replacement. Tagged at 0300 hours today.
- 1A EDG fails its Surveillance Test and was declared INOPERABLE today at 1200 hours.

Initiating Cue:
You are the Unit 1 CRS.
What Technical Specification Action statement(s) are applicable and why?
Task Standard:
Determines T/S 3.8.1.1 actions b.1 (1 hour), b.3 (24 hours), b.4 (72 hours) is applicable. The candidate provides correct supporting information to T/S action and IAW attached answer key.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
Part 1 * What Technical Specification Action statement(s) are applicable and why? TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.1 (1 hour) — perform operability verification of offsite sources.
TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.3 (24 hours) — demonstrate OPERABILITY of remaining EDGs.
TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.4 (72 hours) — restore 1A EDG to OPERABLE status.
SW Operability Analysis (Key to Correct Answer):
With 13 SW Pump C/T, TWO SW Loops remain OPERABLE because:
- One OPERABLE SW pump powered from A vital bus: YES (15 & 16 SW Pumps)
- One OPERABLE SW pump powered from B vital bus: YES (14 SW Pump)
- One OPERABLE SW pump powered from C vital bus: YES (11 & 12 SW Pumps)
- Two OPERABLE SW pumps per Bay: YES (#1 Bay = 11 & 12; #3 Bay = 15 & 16)

Since TWO SW Loops remain OPERABLE, TS 3.7.4.1 is NOT applicable, and therefore TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.2 (verify redundant required features OPERABLE within 4 hours) is NOT required. This is Special Case D (Service Water) / Case #1 from S1.OP-SO.DG-0005, Exhibit 1.
Key Decision Point:
The candidate must recognize that 13 SW Pump being C/T does NOT make a SW loop inoperable. Per S1.OP-SO.SW-0005, two independent operable SW loops require one pump per vital bus and two pumps per bay. With 13 SW Pump C/T, all four criteria are still met. Therefore TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.2 (4-hour required feature verification) does NOT apply — only the standard single-EDG-inoperable actions (b.1, b.3, b.4) are entered.
Ref: S1.OP-SO.DG-0005 (R10), S1.OP-SO.SW-0005 (R47), Salem Unit 1 Tech Specs 3.8.1.1 | Task: 112670302 | K/A: G2.2.37 — Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety-related equipment | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A4 — Select Release Path for Radioactive Liquid Waste Admin | SRO | G2.3.6 (3.8)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is in a refueling outage.
- ALL Unit 2 Circulators are out of service.
- 21 CCHX is in service at 1500 gpm and 22 CCHX is removed from service and drained.
- Salem Unit 1 is operating at 75% power.
- There are no active Tech Specs on Unit 1.
- 12A Circulator is C/T for waterbox cleaning.
- 11 and 12 CCHX's are in service.
- 12 CVCS Monitor Tank is in recirculation using 11 CVCS Monitor Tank Pump.
- Chemistry has granted permission to release the tank with a minimum dilution flow rate of 100000 gpm.

Initiating Cue:
You are the Unit 1 CRS.
DETERMINE which CCHX will be selected for the release of 12 CVCS Monitor Tank IAW S1.OP-SO.WL-0002, Attachment 2, Section 2.2 Release Verification.
Task Standard:
Selects 21 CCHX to 12A AND/OR 12B CW Pumps in service as release path.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 * Determine which CCHX will be selected for the release of 12 CVCS Monitor Tank Selects 21 CCHX to 12A AND/OR 12B CW Pumps in service as release flow path.
Release Path Analysis:
The liquid radwaste release path goes from the CVCS Monitor Tank through a CC Heat Exchanger to the CW (Circulating Water) system discharge. The candidate must determine which CCHX provides adequate dilution flow:

- Unit 1 CCHXs (11 & 12): both in service, but 12A Circulator is C/T for waterbox cleaning. Unit 1 circulators may not provide 100000 gpm minimum dilution.
- Unit 2 CCHXs: ALL Unit 2 circulators are OOS. 22 CCHX is removed and drained.
- 21 CCHX: in service at 1500 gpm with 12A and/or 12B CW Pumps in service providing adequate dilution flow.

The correct release path uses 21 CCHX because it provides the required dilution flow path through CW Pumps that are in service.
Key Decision Point:
The candidate must evaluate all available release paths per S1.OP-SO.WL-0002 Section 2.2 and select the CCHX that has both an in-service heat exchanger AND adequate CW pump dilution flow (minimum 100000 gpm). With Unit 2 circulators OOS and 12A Circulator C/T, the 21 CCHX with 12A/12B CW Pumps in service is the correct release path.
Ref: S1.OP-SO.WL-0002 (R31) | Task: N0680070302 | K/A: G2.3.6 — Ability to approve release permits | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A5 — Classify Event and Complete/Approve ICMF Admin | SRO | G2.4.41 (4.6)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: Yes
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 experienced a Large Break LOCA and an Automatic Safety Injection (SI).
- All available equipment started following SI signal.
- An ALERT was declared based on EAL# RB1.L, Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier.
- The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is currently aligned for Cold Leg Recirculation IAW EOP-LOCA-3.
- The crew is responding to the following alarms and indications:
  - OHA C-26, 21 RHR SUMP OVRFLO
  - Auxiliary Typewriter alarm point; 21 RHR Sump Pump start
  - 2R41D, Plant Vent Radiation Monitor, indicating 3.18E+05 µCi/sec and rising
- The crew responded to the alarms/indications by closing the 21SJ44, Containment Sump Suction Valve, to isolate the leak but the valve failed to close.
- The OCC is briefing a field team to investigate the breaker associated for the 21SJ44 valve.
- The 2R44A and 2R44B, Containment High Range Radiation Monitors, are currently reading 305 R/Hr.
- The 2R41D, Plant Vent Radiation Monitor, is currently reading 5.12E+6 µCi/sec and rising.
- Met Tower data indicates wind from 180 degrees at 5 mph.

Initiating Cue:
You are the Emergency Coordinator (EC).
CLASSIFY the event AND COMPLETE / APPROVE the ICMF IAW the applicable procedure.
THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM.
Task Standard:
1. Classifies the event as a General Emergency (GE) 13 points based on RB1.L or RB2.L (5 pts), FB2.L (5 pts), and CB2.L (3 pts) or CB3.L (3 pts) within 15 minutes.
2. Correctly completes sections I thru V of the ICMF IAW with attached answer key for the classified event within 15 minutes from event declaration.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 * CLASSIFY the event General Emergency (GE) — 13 points:
- RB1.L or RB2.L (5 pts): RCS Barrier lost (Large Break LOCA, ECCS in cold leg recirc)
- FB2.L (5 pts): Fuel Barrier lost (2R44A/B reading 305 R/Hr — containment high range rad monitors indicate fuel damage)
- CB2.L or CB3.L (3 pts): Containment Barrier lost/potentially lost (21SJ44 failed to close — unisolable leak outside containment, 2R41D reading 5.12E+6 µCi/sec and rising)
Must classify within 15 minutes.
2 * COMPLETE / APPROVE the ICMF Selects EP-SA-325-F4 (Attachment 4 — General Emergency). Correctly fills out Sections I thru V including: station identification, emergency classification as GE, declaration time, event description, release status (IN PROGRESS — due to unisolable containment sump leak path via failed 21SJ44 and elevated 2R41D readings), meteorological data (wind from 180 degrees at 5 mph), and protective action recommendations. Must complete within 15 minutes from event declaration.
Fission Product Barrier Assessment:
RCS Barrier (5 pts): RB1.L — Loss of RCS barrier. Large Break LOCA with ECCS in cold leg recirculation (EOP-LOCA-3) confirms RCS integrity has been lost.
Fuel Barrier (5 pts): FB2.L — Loss of Fuel barrier. Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (2R44A/B) reading 305 R/Hr indicates significant fuel damage.
Containment Barrier (3 pts): CB2.L or CB3.L — Loss or potential loss of Containment barrier. 21SJ44 (Containment Sump Suction Valve) failed to close, creating an unisolable leak path outside containment. 2R41D (Plant Vent Rad Monitor) at 5.12E+6 µCi/sec and rising confirms radioactivity is being released.

Total: 13 points = General Emergency (escalated from ALERT).
Key Decision Point:
The candidate must escalate from the existing ALERT to a General Emergency by performing a three-barrier assessment using the ECG books. The critical recognition is that all three fission product barriers are lost or potentially lost: (1) RCS lost from the LBLOCA, (2) fuel cladding lost per high containment radiation readings, and (3) containment lost/potentially lost because the 21SJ44 valve failed to close, allowing an unisolable leak path outside containment with confirmed elevated Plant Vent radiation. A release IS in progress (2R41D elevated and rising). The ICMF must correctly identify this as a GE with a release in progress and use Attachment 4 (EP-SA-325-F4).
Ref: EP-SA-325-101 (R01), EP-SA-325-123 (R00), EP-SA-325-F4 (R01), Salem ECG Books (R6) | Task: 1240020502 | K/A: G2.4.41 — Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications | Source: New | Time-Critical: Classify within 15 min / Complete ICMF within 15 min | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-i — Locally Control Charging Flow IAW S2.OP-AB.CR-0001 In-Plant (RCA) | RO/SRO | APE 068 AA1.22 (4.0/4.3)
Location: In-Plant — Unit 2 RCA (Panel 216-1, Chg Pmps FL & PR Inst Pnl)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- The Unit 2 Control Room has been evacuated in accordance with S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation.
- A reactor trip from 100% was initiated prior to evacuating the Control Room.

Initiating Cue:
- You are directed to take local control of charging flow IAW S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 5, starting at Step 8.0 (see attached page).
- Steps 1.0-7.0 of Attachment 5 have been completed.
Task Standard:
1. Locally controls Charging flow using hand air operator IAW S2.OP-AB.CR-0001
2. Correctly adjusts air operator to change charging flow to the desired flow of 70 gpm.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
8.0 TAKE control of 2CV55, Cent Chg Pmp Flow Cont Valve Proceeds to Unit 2 Panel 216-1, Chg Pmps FL & PR Inst Pnl.
8.1 RECORD the charging flow as indicated on 2FI-128A Records charging flow from 2FI-128A, Charging Pump Flow Indication (typically around 90 gpm).
8.2 * PLACE local E/P Bypass Line Selector Valve in Manual Locates local E/P Bypass Selector Valve and simulates rotating valve (clockwise) to MAN position.
8.3 Using the MANUAL hand air operator, ENSURE that the flow rate as noted in Step 8.1 is being maintained with 2CV55 Reads flowrate from 2FI-128A (labeled 2FT-128A on panel), Charging Pump Flow Indication, to ensure flow rate is maintained with 2CV55.
* Adjust charging flow using hand air operator to 70 gpm Simulates rotating hand air operator in the clockwise direction to RAISE air pressure to LOWER charging flow to 70 gpm. 2CV55 fails open on loss of air — raising air pressure closes the valve (lowers flow); decreasing air pressure opens the valve (raises flow).
Key Decision Point:
The discriminating step is the hand air operator adjustment — the applicant must understand that 2CV55 is a fail-open (air-to-close) valve. Rotating the hand air operator CLOCKWISE raises air pressure, which CLOSES the valve and LOWERS charging flow. If the applicant rotates counter-clockwise (lowering air pressure), flow increases instead of decreasing. The evaluator cue confirms: if rotated counter-clockwise, charging flow increases to 100 gpm.
Ref: S2.OP-AB.CR-0001 (R23) | Task: 1130070501 | K/A: APE 068 AA1.22 — Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: Flow control valve for RCS charging header | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-j — Start SBO Diesel Air Compressor IAW SC.OP-SO.CA-0001 In-Plant | RO/SRO | G2.1.23 (4.3/4.4)
Location: In-Plant — SBO Compressor Building (outside RCA, L-3 key if locked)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 20 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Both Salem Units have tripped due to a loss of off-site power.
- Equipment problems have resulted in NO Emergency Control Air Compressors (ECACs) running.

Initiating Cue:
- The Unit 2 CRS has directed you to start the Station Blackout Compressor (SBO) IAW SC.OP-SO.CA-0001, SBO Diesel Control Air Compressor, starting with Step 5.1.3 (see attached).
- Steps 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 are complete.
Task Standard:
Operator performs Steps 5.1.3 thru 5.1.16 of SC.OP-SO.CA-0001 correctly and in proper sequence to start the SBO Diesel Control Air Compressor.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
P&Ls Review Precautions and Limitations Operator reviews and signs P&Ls. P&L 3.1 requires hearing protection. P&L 3.10 is verified at the SBO.
5.1.3 OPEN both Engine intake louvers (located outside building on west wall) Locates louvers and demonstrates how to open.
5.1.4 OPEN 1CA1920, BLACKOUT AIR COMPRESSOR DRAIN VALVE, drain water, then CLOSE Locates 1CA1920 and simulates opening (counterclockwise). Drain cap must be removed.
5.1.5 OPEN 2FZSBO10, BATTERY CHARGER, breaker Locates 2FZSBO10 in Panel 2FZSBO, SBO Compressor Bldg Distribution Panel, and simulates opening.
5.1.6 PLACE SBO Control Air Dryer switch in ON position Locates switch and simulates turning to ON. Control Air On light illuminates.
5.1.7 RECORD Engine Hourmeter reading on Attachment 1 and in log book Locates Engine Hourmeter (1XA16993, Tachometer/Hourmeter) inside engine control panel and logbook on side of panel 2FZSBO.
5.1.8 PLACE UNLOADER VALVE selector switch in START position Locates UNLOADER VALVE selector switch and ensures in START position (normally in START when engine is shutdown).
5.1.9 * PRESS AND HOLD BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton Locates BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton in control panel and simulates depressing AND holding depressed.
5.1.10 * PLACE SBO-IGN-SWT, ENGINE IGNITION SWITCH in START until engine starts, then RELEASE to RUN While keeping BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton depressed, simulates placing SBO-IGN-SWT in START. After engine starts, releases to RUN. Must NOT release BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton until oil pressure is verified >15 psig in next step.
5.1.11 * When engine oil pressure is >15 psig, RELEASE BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton Identifies oil pressure reading on gauge inside control panel. After cue (40 psig), releases BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton. Releasing early (without checking oil pressure) causes the engine to stop.
5.1.12 ALLOW engine to run for 5 minutes to warm up N/A — wait for warm-up period.
5.1.13 * OPEN 1CA1913 SBO COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE VALVE to pressurize Control Air header Locates and simulates opening 1CA1913 (counterclockwise).
5.1.14 * OPEN 1CA1886, BLACKOUT AIR COMPRESSOR ISOLATION Locates and simulates opening 1CA1886 (counterclockwise). Located near entrance to Service Building past U2 mixing bottle.
5.1.15 * OPEN 2CA584, YARD CONTROL AIR SUPPLY VALVE to pressurize Aux. Building 1A and 2A Control Air headers Locates and simulates opening 2CA584 (counterclockwise). Located near entrance to Service Building past U2 mixing bottle.
5.1.16 * PLACE UNLOADER VALVE selector switch in RUN position Returns to SBO Compressor Building and places UNLOADER VALVE selector switch in RUN to load the compressor.
Key Decision Point:
Steps 5.1.10 and 5.1.11 are the discriminating steps — the applicant must keep the BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton depressed while starting the engine with SBO-IGN-SWT, then verify oil pressure >15 psig BEFORE releasing the bypass valve pushbutton. Releasing the bypass valve early (without checking oil pressure) causes the engine to stop, requiring a 5-minute cooldown before reattempting the start.
Ref: SC.OP-SO.CA-0001 (R14) | Task: N1150140501 | K/A: G2.1.23 — Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of operation | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-k — Place 11 CVCS Monitor Tank in Recirculation IAW S1.OP-SO.WL-0001 In-Plant (RCA) | RO/SRO | 068 A2.02 (2.7/2.8)
Location: In-Plant — Unit 1 RCA
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 25 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- The 11 CVCS Monitor Tank is at 90% and processing for release is being performed.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the extra NCO.
- The CRS directs you to place 11 CVCS Monitor Tank in recirculation using section 5.1 of S1.OP-SO.WL-0001, Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste from 11 CVCS Monitor Tank.
- 11 Monitor Tank Pump will be placed in service.
Task Standard:
1. Correctly performs recirculation valve lineup using Attachment 1 IAW S1.OP-SO.WL-0001
2. Correctly determines minimum recirculation time of 6 Hrs 30 Mins (band 6 Hrs 20 Mins to 6 Hrs 40 Mins)
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
NOTE Any additions made to Monitor Tank that is isolated and placed on recirculation for sampling will invalidate sample analysis, requiring further recirculation time and additional sampling. Operator reads note and continues.
5.1.1 * PLACE valves in "Recirc Position" IAW Attachment 1, Section 1.0 Correctly locates and re-positions each valve IAW Attachment 1: 11WR27 MT PMP SUCT V — OPEN; 11WR31 MT PMP DISCH V — OPEN; 12WR27 MT PMP SUCT V — CLOSED; 12WR31 MT PMP DISCH V — CLOSED.
5.1.2 DIRECT second Operator to PERFORM Independent Verification IAW Attachment 1, Section 1.0 Directs IV. CUE: IVs are complete.
5.1.3 PLACE LO-LEVEL CUT-OFF switch in TANK 11 position Operator places LO-LEVEL CUT-OFF switch in the TANK 11 position.
5.1.4 * IF recirculating 11 CVCS MT with 11 MT Pump, THEN START 11 MT Pump Operator starts 11 MT Pump by depressing start pushbutton.
5.1.5 IF recirculating 11 CVCS MT with 12 MT Pump, THEN START 12 MT Pump Operator marks step as N/A (using 11 MT Pump per cue).
5.1.6 * THROTTLE 11WR53, MT RECIRC V, to maintain 80 psig on discharge of operating MT Pump Throttles 11WR53 in the closed (clockwise) direction to raise discharge pressure from 40 psig to 80 psig.
5.1.7 * COMPLETE Attachment 1, Section 2.0 — determine tank volume and minimum recirculation time Records current time as start time (A). Records tank level = 90%. Refers to S1.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 (CVCS Monitor Tank curve, Page 8) and determines tank volume = 19500 gallons (acceptable band 19000 to 20000). Calculates minimum recirculation time: (Volume x 3) / 150 gpm = 6 Hrs 30 Min (acceptable band: 6 Hrs 20 Min to 6 Hrs 40 Min). Adds time (B) to start time (A) for completion time.
5.1.8 DIRECT second Operator to PERFORM Independent Verification of calculations in Attachment 1, Section 2.0 Directs IV of calculations. CUE: IV is complete.
Key Decision Point:
Step 5.1.7 is the discriminating step — the applicant must correctly interpret the CVCS Monitor Tank capacity curve from S1.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 to convert 90% tank level to approximately 19500 gallons, then correctly apply the recirculation time formula: (Volume x 3) / 150 gpm. Incorrect curve reading or calculation error will yield a wrong minimum recirculation time. The formula requires multiplying volume by 3 (three tank volume turnovers) and dividing by the 150 gpm pump flow rate.
Ref: S1.OP-SO.WL-0001 (R28) | Task: N0680010101 | K/A: 068 A2.02 — Ability to (a) predict the impacts of malfunctions or operations on the Liquid Radwaste System; and (b) use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate: Lack of tank recirculation prior to release | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-a — Failed Open PZR Spray Valve Sim | RO/SRO | 010 A4.01 (3.7/3.5)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 5 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- The Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with no major equipment out of service.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- Respond to all indications and alarms.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
Stops the RCS pressure decrease by closing 2PS1, or Trips the Reactor and stops 21 and 23 RCPs, before an Automatic SI occurs.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
Observe Recognize PZR Pressure Channel 1 failed high Scans control board; recognizes PZR Pressure Channel 1 is failed high. OHA D-8 (RC PRESS HI), OHA E-42 (2PR1 1/2 TRIP) annunciate.
MPC * Place Master Pressure Controller in MANUAL Depresses the MANUAL pushbutton for the Master Pressure Controller (MPC).
MPC * LOWER demand on MPC to close spray valves Depresses the PRESS INC pushbutton on the MPC to lower the demand.
Alt * Recognize 2PS1 is fully OPEN after MPC demand is zeroed With MPC demand at zero, operator reports 2PS1 remains fully OPEN. Alternate Path starts here.
3.18 * Place 2PS1 in MANUAL and CLOSE Depresses MANUAL pushbutton for 2PS1, then depresses the CLOSE pushbutton. 2PS1 valve demand lowers and open light extinguishes.
3.19 * OPERATE Spray Valves to control pressure per Attachment 2 Depresses CLOSE PB for 2PS1; recognizes 2PS1 demand is lowering and open light extinguished. Reports 2PS1 is CLOSED and RCS pressure is stable or rising.
Key Decision Point:
The alternate path / discriminating step occurs when the operator lowers MPC demand to close both spray valves but 2PS1 remains fully open. The applicant must recognize the stuck-open spray valve, place 2PS1 in manual, and close it directly. If the operator enters AB.PZR-0001 first rather than taking immediate action, the procedure leads through Steps 3.3 (identify failed channel), 3.5 (MPC to Manual), 3.6 (adjust MPC), then to 3.17/3.18/3.19 for the failed spray valve. Both paths are acceptable. Alternate task standard: if RCS pressure drops to 2000 psig and continues to drop, trip the reactor and stop 21 and 23 RCPs (spray is fed from Loops 1 and 3 cold legs).
Ref: S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 (R18) | Task: 1140240401 | K/A: 010 A4.01 — Ability to predict impacts of PZR spray valve malfunction and use procedures to mitigate | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-b — Loss of Both RHR Pumps in Mode 5 Sim | RO/SRO | 005 A2.03 (2.9/3.1)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 25 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 5 following a 30 day refueling outage.
- The RCS is depressurized AND vented using 2PS59 as the approved vent path.
- The Containment Equipment Hatch is CLOSED.
- The crew is performing S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0002, Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby.
- PZR level is 30%
- 21 Charging Pump in service
- 21 and 22 SI Pumps are C/T
- 22 Charging Pump is C/T
- RHR Letdown Booster Pump in service with 2CV8 throttled
- RCS temperature is 149°F at the RHR Inlet.
- 22 RHR Pump is aligned for Shutdown Cooling

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The in-service RHR pump (21 RHR Pump) providing shutdown cooling has just tripped due to an electrical fault on the motor.
- INITIATE S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001, Loss of RHR.
Task Standard:
Initiates COLD LEG Injection by transferring Charging Pump suction to RWST, opening BIT Isolation valves and closing Charging discharge valve IAW S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001, Attachment 8.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
3.3 * Determine RCS NOT aligned for reduced inventory (<101 ft) No. 0% PZR level cold cal corresponds to 108.92 ft elevation when RCS is filled and vented.
3.5 Loss of RHR due to mechanical/electrical failure? Yes — GO TO Step 3.50.
3.50-3.51 Heat sink available? RHR Loop available? Yes — CCW to RHR and SW to CCW available. 22 RHR aligned for shutdown cooling.
3.52 Start alternate RHR loop — perform Attachment 3 Closes 21RH18, closes 21CC16, opens 22CC16, starts 22 RHR Pump.
Alt 22 RHR Pump trips shortly after starting — both RHR pumps now lost Alternate path starts here. Operator re-enters procedure or returns to Step 3.52. Both RHR Pumps unavailable.
3.9 Stop RHR Letdown Booster Pump, isolate RHR Letdown to CVCS Depresses STOP PB for L/D Booster Pump. Depresses CLOSED PB for 2CV8.
3.32 Initiate Attachment 8, Cold Leg Injection Core exit TCs <200°F — selects Attachment 8, Cold Leg Injection (preferred method if RCS <200°F).
Att 8, 1.A.1 * OPEN RWST outlet to Charging Pumps (2SJ1 or 2SJ2) Depresses OPEN pushbutton for 2SJ1 or 2SJ2.
Att 8, 1.A.2 * CLOSE VCT outlet to Charging Pumps (2CV40 or 2CV41) Depresses CLOSED pushbutton for 2CV40 or 2CV41.
Att 8, 1.A.4 * OPEN BIT Inlet/Outlet valves, CLOSE Charging Discharge Isolation 21 Charging Pump already running. Opens 2SJ4 or 2SJ5 (BIT Inlet) AND 2SJ12 or 2SJ13 (BIT Outlet). CLOSES 2CV68 or 2CV69 (Charging Discharge Isolation).
Key Decision Point:
The alternate path / discriminating step is when 22 RHR Pump trips shortly after starting, leaving both RHR Pumps unavailable. The applicant must recognize no RHR cooling is available and navigate through AB.RHR-0001 to select the correct alternate decay heat removal method — Attachment 8, Cold Leg Injection — based on core exit TCs being less than 200°F. The cold leg injection flow path uses the charging pump aligned to the RWST through the BIT and into the cold legs, providing borated injection to the RCS. Key valve lineup: RWST outlet to charging (2SJ1/2SJ2), close VCT outlet (2CV40/2CV41), open BIT valves (2SJ4/2SJ5, 2SJ12/2SJ13), close charging discharge (2CV68/2CV69).
Ref: S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001 (R21) | Task: 1140730402 | K/A: 005 A2.03 — Ability to predict impacts of RHR pump/motor malfunction and use procedures to mitigate | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-c — Control Rod System Surveillance Sim | RO/SRO | 001 A2.11 (4.4/4.7)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power BOL.
- No major equipment is out of service and no Tech Specs are active.
- The rod control system surveillance is in progress with the only remaining rod bank to test is Control Bank D.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to complete the rod control system surveillance IAW S2.OP-ST.RCS-0001, Reactivity Control System Rod Control Assemblies.
- A Maintenance Technician is stationed at the Rod Control Power Cabinets (Relay Room)
- CRS directs that 15 steps of rod insertion will be performed to ensure each rod moves at least 10 steps.
- Pre-Test D bank rod positions were recorded and attached with your Cue Sheet.
- Notify the CRS when the testing is complete.
- Your evaluator will take care of all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
1. Correctly performs rod control surveillance using approved procedure. 2. Responds to continuous rod movement by manually tripping the reactor.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.1.10.A Ensure Tavg within +/-1°F of Tref Checks Tavg/Tref recorder on 2RP4 and determines Tavg is within +/-1°F of Tref.
5.1.10.B * Place Bank Selector Switch in CBD position Rotates selector switch clockwise to the CBD position.
5.1.10.C Ensure GRP SELECT B lights illuminated on Power Cabinets Contacts Maintenance Technician; reports GRP SELECT B lights illuminated on Cabinets 21BD and 22BD.
5.1.10.D * Maneuver Control Bank D at least 10 steps in one direction Inserts Control Bank D 15 steps.
5.1.10.E Ensure each rod in CBD indicated movement of at least 10 steps Monitors rod position on P-250 and determines D bank rods all moved at least 10 steps.
5.1.10.F * Record test results as SAT Records test results as SAT using Acceptance Criteria in Attachment 1.
5.1.10.G Restore Control Bank D to pre-test position Withdraws Bank D to previous position (ARO).
5.1.11.C * Place Bank Selector Switch in AUTO — recognize continuous rod insertion and manually trip the reactor Determines Turbine Power is >15% and rotates selector switch to AUTO position. Announces rods are stepping in with no runback in progress. Places rod bank switch to Manual — rod motion has NOT stopped. Manually trips the reactor.
Key Decision Point:
Step 5.1.11.C is the alternate path / discriminating step. After completing the CBD surveillance and restoring rods, the procedure directs placing the rod bank selector switch in AUTO (since Turbine Power is >15%). An uncontrolled rod insertion malfunction activates when the switch is placed in AUTO. The applicant must recognize that rods continue inserting even after placing the switch in Manual (the malfunction inserts rods in both AUTO and MANUAL), and manually trip the reactor. The operator may reference AB.ROD-0003 (Continuous Rod Motion) to support the decision to trip.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.RCS-0001 (R23), OP-AP-300-1001 | Task: N0010070101 | K/A: 001 A2.11 — Ability to predict impacts of situations requiring a reactor trip on CRDS and use procedures to mitigate | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-d — Raise Level in 21 SI Accumulator Sim | RO/SRO | 006 A4.07 (4.4/4.4)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- The Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with no major equipment out of service.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- RAISE level in 21 SI Accumulator Tank to at least 60% IAW Section 5.2 of S2.OP-SO.SJ-0002, Accumulator Operations, using 21 SI pump.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
Raises level in 21 SI Accumulator to at least 60% or as directed IAW S2.OP-SO.SJ-0002.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.2.1 Ensure ALL RCS Cold Leg Temperatures >312°F OR Rx Vessel Head removed Determines RCS Cold Leg temperatures are >312°F and continues on.
5.2.2 If RCS pressure <2000 psig, ENSURE CLOSED 21SJ134 Determines RCS is >2000 psig; marks step as N/A.
5.2.3 * START 21 Safety Injection Pump Depresses START pushbutton for 21 SI Pump.
5.2.4 * OPEN 2SJ53, 21 SI Pump Discharge Test Line Valve Depresses OPEN pushbutton for 2SJ53.
5.2.5 * OPEN 2SJ123, Test Line to CVCS HUT Depresses OPEN pushbutton for 2SJ123.
5.2.6 * OPEN 21SJ20, Accumulator Fill valve Depresses OPEN pushbutton for 21SJ20. CAUTION: Do NOT cross-tie Accumulators at any time OPERABILITY is required.
5.2.7 * CLOSE 21SJ20 when desired level reached (at least 60%) Depresses CLOSE pushbutton for 21SJ20 when level is at least 60%.
5.2.9-11 Close 2SJ53, Close 2SJ123, Stop 21 SI Pump Restores system: closes test line valves and stops 21 SI Pump.
Key Decision Point:
This is a straight-path (non-alternate-path) JPM testing systematic procedure execution. Key knowledge: RCS Cold Leg temperatures must be >312°F to use 21 SI Pump for accumulator makeup (Section 5.2). If RCS pressure were <2000 psig, 21SJ134 (Cold Leg Discharge) must be closed first to prevent uncontrolled injection. CAUTION: closing 21SJ134 may require entry into TSAS 3.5.2. CAUTION: do NOT cross-tie accumulators at any time OPERABILITY is required. A maximum of one SI Pump OR one Centrifugal Charging Pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 312°F.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.SJ-0002 (R24) | Task: N0060040101 | K/A: 006 A4.07 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: ECCS pumps and valves | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-e — Manual Containment Spray and Phase B Sim | RO/SRO | 026 A4.01 (4.5/4.3)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- A Large Break LOCA has occurred.
- The Reactor Automatically Tripped and SI was actuated.
- The crew has completed Steps 1 through 10 of 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to continue on with EOP-TRIP-1 starting at STEP 11.
- Your evaluator will respond to any alarms not associated with your task.
Task Standard:
1. Manually initiates Containment Spray using key switches. 2. Closes 2CC131 OR 2CC190 Phase B valves. 3. Opens 2CS16 OR 2CS17 NaOH Discharge Valves.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
11 * Has containment pressure remained less than 15 psig? NO — Containment pressure has NOT remained less than 15 psig.
11 * Initiate Phase B and Spray Actuation using safeguards key switches Uses both Safeguards Keys and simultaneously rotates both keys on 2CC1 to actuate Phase B and Spray Actuation on at least one Safeguards train.
11.2 Did any available CNMT Spray pump fail to start? No — both CS pumps are running.
11.3 Initiate Loops 21-24 Main Steam Isolation; Stop 21-24 RCPs Determines MSLI previously actuated (from hi-hi containment pressure signal). Reports 21-24 RCPs are stopped.
11.4 * Are valve groups in Table D in Safeguards positions? NO — identifies 2CC131 and 2CC190 remain OPEN (should be closed for Phase B isolation) AND 2CS16 and 2CS17 remain CLOSED (should be open for NaOH spray additive).
11.4 * Place valves in Safeguards position Depresses CLOSED pushbutton for 2CC131 and 2CC190; verifies CLOSED bezels illuminated. Depresses OPEN pushbutton for 2CS16 and 2CS17; verifies OPEN bezels illuminated.
Key Decision Point:
Step 11.4 is the alternate path / discriminating step. After manually actuating Phase B and Containment Spray using the safeguards key switches, the automatic CS and Phase B actuation signals failed to reposition all valves. The applicant must check Table D valve groups and identify that 2CC131 and 2CC190 (CCW containment isolation valves — Phase B) failed to close AND 2CS16 and 2CS17 (NaOH discharge valves for spray additive) failed to open. The applicant must then manually reposition these valves to their safeguards positions. Key knowledge: Phase B isolates CCW supply/return to containment; NaOH valves must open to add sodium hydroxide to the containment spray for iodine scrubbing and pH control.
Ref: 2-EOP-TRIP-1 (R33) | Task: N1150500502 | K/A: 026 A4.01 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CSS pumps and valves | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-f — Remove Power Range Channel from Service Sim | RO Only | 015 A4.03 (3.8/3.9)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- The Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with no major equipment out of service.
- Power Range NIS Channel 2N41 has failed high.
- The crew has placed rod control in Manual and performed all the required actions in S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
- The following OHA Alarms are lit:
  - E-15, PR HI RNG FLUX HI
  - E-31, PR OVRPWR ROD STOP
  - E-39, PR CH DEV
  - E-47, PR NEUT FLUX RATE HI

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Plant Operator.
- REMOVE the failed 2N41 Channel from service IAW S2.OP-SO.RPS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Trip/Restoration (see attached pages).
Task Standard:
Removes 2N41 Channel from service by performing Steps 5.1.5.A thru 5.1.5.E correctly IAW S2.OP-SO.RPS-0001.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.1.1 Ensure tripping bistable will NOT result in ESF or RPS actuation Checks 2RP4 panel; ensures tripping bistable will not result in Rx Trip.
5.1.2 Ensure 2N41 Channel NOT selected on NIS Recorder 2NR45 Checks 2N41 recorder; ensures not selected on 2NR45.
5.1.3 Ensure Rod Control is in Manual Verifies rod control is in Manual.
5.1.4 Enter TS 3.3.1.1 for 2N41 CRS will enter Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 for 2N41.
5.1.5.A * Place DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR, UPPER SECTION switch in PRN41 At NI Rack No. 81: places switch to PRN41 position. Verifies CHANNEL DEFEAT lamp illuminates. OHA E-38 (UPPER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR) clears.
5.1.5.B * Place DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR, LOWER SECTION switch in PRN41 Places switch to PRN41 position. Verifies CHANNEL DEFEAT lamp illuminates. OHA E-46 (LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR) clears.
5.1.5.C * Place POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch in BYPASS PR N41 Defeats input to Rod Control by placing switch in BYPASS PR N41 position.
5.1.5.D * Place ROD STOP BYPASS switch in BYPASS PR N41 Places ROD STOP BYPASS switch to BYPASS PR N41 position. Verifies 2RP4 OVER POWER ROD STOP MANUAL BYPASS, CH I is illuminated. OHA E-31 (PR OVERPWR ROD STOP) clears.
5.1.5.E * Place COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch in N41 Places switch in N41 position. Verifies COMPARATOR DEFEAT lamp illuminated. OHA E-39 (PR CH DEV) clears.
Key Decision Point:
This is a straight-path JPM testing knowledge of Power Range NIS channel removal from service. The applicant must execute five switch manipulations at NI Rack No. 81 in the correct sequence (Steps 5.1.5.A through 5.1.5.E), verifying the correct indications at each step. Key knowledge points: (1) DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switches (upper and lower) defeat the axial flux difference comparison for the channel; (2) POWER MISMATCH BYPASS defeats the input to rod control that would cause rod withdrawal on power mismatch; (3) ROD STOP BYPASS defeats the overpower rod stop; (4) COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT removes the channel from the PR channel deviation comparison. All five switches must be placed before the channel is considered removed from service. This is distinct from IR channel removal which uses the LEVEL TRIP switch.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.RPS-0001 (R6) | Task: N1140230401 | K/A: 015 A4.03 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Trip bypasses | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-g — RCS Cooldown Using MS10s Sim | RO/SRO | 039 A4.07 (2.8/2.9)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 5 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- The Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped and Safety Injection was actuated due to a verified Steam Generator Tube Rupture on 24 Steam Generator.
- All required actions in EOP-TRIP-1 are complete.
- The crew is currently implementing EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and all steps up to Step 9 are complete.
- Steam Dump Permissive light on 2RP4 is NOT illuminated due to an instrumentation failure. Steam Dumps are NOT available.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Plant Operator.
- The CRS DIRECTS you to PERFORM an RCS Cooldown starting at Step 10 of 2-EOP-SGTR-1.
Task Standard:
Correctly implements the steps of EOP-SGTR-1 to cooldown the RCS using MS10s to the required temperature of 503°F.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
10 * Determine required RCS temperature using Table B Uses Table B; determines required RCS temperature based on current ruptured 24 SG pressure (approx. 1045 psi) is 503°F.
10.1 Is intact SG available for cooldown? Yes — 3 intact SGs are available for cooldown.
10.2 Are condenser steam dumps available? NO — Steam Dumps are NOT available (permissive light on 2RP4 is NOT illuminated).
10.2 * Dump steam at maximum rate using intact SG MS10s LOWERs setpoint on all intact SGs (21, 22, 23) until each MS10 is fully open.
10.5 Is hottest CET less than RCS cooldown temp? No — waits for CET to reach target temperature (approx. 6-8 minutes).
10.6 * Stop cooldown — adjust each intact SG MS10 setpoint to match current SG pressure Adjusts each intact SG MS10 setpoint to match current SG pressure, stopping steam release.
Key Decision Point:
This JPM tests the RCS cooldown pathway during an SGTR when condenser steam dumps are unavailable. The applicant must: (1) use Table B to determine the target RCS temperature based on ruptured SG pressure (1045 psi corresponds to 503°F target); (2) recognize that steam dumps are NOT available due to the instrumentation failure (permissive light not illuminated on 2RP4) and select the MS10 atmospheric relief valves as the cooldown method; (3) lower setpoints on the three intact SGs (21, 22, 23 — NOT ruptured 24 SG) to fully open the MS10s for maximum-rate cooldown; (4) stop the cooldown by matching MS10 setpoints to current SG pressures when hottest CET reaches 503°F. Key SGTR concept: cooldown to a target temperature allows subsequent RCS depressurization to equalize pressure across the ruptured tube.
Ref: 2-EOP-SGTR-1 (R32) | Task: N1150190501 | K/A: 039 A4.07 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Steam dump valves | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-h — Transfer 4KV Group Buses SPT to APT Sim | RO/SRO | 062 A2.04 (3.1/3.4)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 power ascension is in progress following refueling outage.
- Reactor power is at 20%.
- The Main Generator is connected to the grid with 190 MWe output.
- Steam Dumps are in Tavg Mode - Auto
- Rod Control is in Manual (D-104) until Group Buses are transferred
- Group Buses are currently powered from the Station Power Transformers (SPT).

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Plant Operator.
- The CRS directs you to TRANSFER all 4KV Group Buses from their respective Station Power Transformers (SPT) to the Aux Power Transformers (APT) IAW S2.OP-SO.4KV-0008, 4KV Group Buses Power Supply Transfer in the following order:
  1. 2F IAW section 5.2
  2. 2G IAW section 5.3
  3. 2H IAW section 5.4
  4. 2E IAW section 5.1
- All pre-requisites are completed SAT.
Task Standard:
1. Correctly performs the transfer of 2F 4KV Group Bus from SPT to APT IAW S2.OP-SO.4KV-0008. 2. Manually trips the Reactor IAW Alarm Response Procedure following the loss of one RCP (24 RCP).
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
P&L Review Precautions and Limitations Reviews P&Ls. Notes P&L 3.3: OHA J-39 GROUP BUS XFER FAIL will illuminate then clear on bus transfer (expected response). ARP applicable when alarm does NOT clear following bus transfer.
5.2.1 Ensure all OHA for 2 APT are clear Checks OHA windows; determines all OHA for 2 APT are clear.
5.2.2 Ensure 2A APT voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV Checks 2A APT reading on 2CC3; ensures voltage is 4.22 - 4.36KV.
5.2.4 * Press Mimic Bus 2F GROUP BUS INFEED 2BFGD BREAKER pushbutton Depresses Mimic Bus 2F pushbutton; verifies console bezel 2BFGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is illuminated.
5.2.5 * Press 2BFGD CLOSE pushbutton and verify transfer Depresses 2BFGD CLOSE pushbutton. Verifies: A. 22FSD is OPEN. B. 2BFGD is CLOSED. C. 2F voltage is 4.22-4.36KV. D. MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is extinguished.
5.3.4 * Press Mimic Bus 2G GROUP BUS INFEED 2BGGD BREAKER pushbutton Depresses Mimic Bus 2G pushbutton; verifies console bezel 2BGGD MIMIC BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION is illuminated.
5.3.5 * 2G 4KV Group Bus fails to transfer — loss of 24 RCP Presses 2BGGD CLOSE pushbutton. 2G bus does NOT transfer — bus de-energizes. Multiple OHAs annunciate: J-8 (2G 4KV GRP BUS DIFF/OVRLD), J-38 (4KV GRP BUS UNDRVOLT), J-39 (4KV GRP BUS XFER FAIL), D-31 (24 RCP BKR OPEN/FLO LO). 24 RCP trips due to loss of bus.
ARP * Respond to OHA ARPs — Trip the Reactor Identifies from OHA J-38 or D-31 ARP: IF ANY RCP Trips, THEN TRIP Reactor, GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1. Manually trips the reactor.
Key Decision Point:
Step 5.3.5 is the alternate path / discriminating step. The 2F Group Bus transfers successfully, but when attempting to transfer the 2G Group Bus from SPT to APT, the bus fails to transfer and de-energizes. This causes the loss of 24 RCP (powered from 2G bus). Multiple OHA alarms annunciate simultaneously. The applicant must recognize the significance of losing an RCP and use the Alarm Response Procedures (J-39 directs to J-38; J-38/D-31 both direct: IF ANY RCP Trips, THEN TRIP Reactor and GO TO EOP-TRIP-1) to determine that a manual reactor trip is required. Key P&L knowledge: P&L 3.3 warned that J-39 alarm illuminating is expected during transfer, but if it does NOT clear, the ARP response applies. The applicant must recognize the difference between the expected transient alarm and the actual failure.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.4KV-0008 (R13), S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0009 (R28) | Task: N0620110101 | K/A: 062 A2.04 — Ability to predict impacts of bus failure on AC distribution and use procedures to mitigate | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

Scenario 1 — Power Ascension / Station Blackout Simulator | 6 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-201: 90% power, MOL; 23 Charging Pump is in service. The following equipment is out of service: 2C EDG C/T for governor oil replacement and fuel rack lube.

Turnover: The crew is directed to continue power ascension to 100% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 using dilution, control rods and turbine load control.
Major Events:
  1. Power Ascension to 100% at 10%/hour
  2. RCS Wide Range Pressure Channel (2PT-405) fails low (TS only)
  3. PZR Level Channel 1 fails low (TS)
  4. Loss of #4 SPT and Loss of 23 CW Bus (power reduction) (TS)
  5. Loss of Offsite Power
  6. Loss of 2A Vital Bus and 2B EDG trips on overspeed
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Power Ascension to 100% CRS holds crew brief to discuss Rx Plan for power ascension IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004. RO commences dilution IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006. PO raises main generator loading IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001.
2 RCS Wide Range Pressure Channel 2PT-405 fails low RO reports OHA D-40 SUBCLG CH A MARGIN LO. RO reports Subcooling Channel A lost on 2RP4 and recorder on 2CC2. Crew refers to ARP, determines invalid indication. CRS enters TS 3.3.3.7 Action a.1 (30 days).
3 PZR Level Channel 1 fails low RO reports OHA E-36, PZR HTR OFF LVL LO. Letdown isolates. CRS enters AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging. RO takes manual control of charging flow, selects operable channel for Control/Alarm/Recorder, energizes PZR heaters to normal alignment. Restores letdown: opens 2CV7, 2CV18 in Manual, opens 2CV2 and 2CV277 in Auto, ensures charging flow ~85-90 gpm, opens one letdown orifice. CRS enters TS 3.3.1.1 Action 6 (6 hours).
4 Loss of #4 SPT and Loss of 23 CW Bus PO reports 500 KV Bus Section 1 de-energized, loss of #4 SPT, all Vital Buses energized from 24 SPT. 21A-23A CW pumps trip. Crew enters AB.CW-0001. PO reports condenser DTs exceed 27 F — turbine load reduction to less than 80% required. Crew briefs reactivity plan, initiates load reduction IAW AB.LOAD-0001. Crew enters AB.LOOP-0003, Partial Loss of Offsite Power. PO re-energizes 23 CW Bus from Bus Section 24 via cross-tie breaker IAW Attachment 4. CRS enters TS 3.8.1.1 Action C (1 hour and 12 hours) for one offsite source and one EDG inoperable.
5 Loss of Offsite Power Reactor automatically trips. RO performs TRIP-1 immediate actions: trips reactor, confirms trip, trips main turbine. All 4KV Vital Buses de-energize (2A Vital Bus lost on Bus Differential protection, 2B EDG trips on overspeed 30 seconds after trip). Crew transitions to EOP-LOPA-1, Loss of All AC Power.
6 Loss of all AC — EDG recovery RO performs LOPA-1 immediate actions. Closes 2CV2 and 2CV277. CRS dispatches operator to de-energize all SECs. PO stops 2A EDG (no SW pumps running). Crew identifies 2C EDG as recovery path (2B EDG overspeed with bent fuel rack, 2A Vital Bus lost on Bus Differential). After SI Reset, maintenance returns 2C EDG. PO starts 2C EDG, closes output breaker to energize 2C 4KV Vital Bus [CT#1]. PO starts 25 or 26 SW pump for EDG cooling [CT#2].
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-24): Energize at least one AC emergency bus before transition out of EOP-LOPA-1. Safety significance: failure to energize an emergency bus results in loss of all pumped ECCS capability and station blackout conditions with no forced cooling or RCP seal injection. The crew must identify that 2C EDG (returned from maintenance) is the only available path after 2A Bus Differential and 2B EDG overspeed trip.

CT#2 (CT-25): Manually start one SW pump for EDG cooling before transition out of EOP-LOPA-1. Safety significance: without SW cooling, the running EDG will overheat and trip, returning the plant to station blackout. The crew must recognize that no SW pumps are running and start one immediately after energizing the bus.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 (PZR level channel fail) → S2.OP-AB.CW-0001 (CW pump trips) → S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0003 (partial LOOP) → S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001 (load reduction for DTs) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip on LOOP) → EOP-LOPA-1 (all three 4KV Vital Buses de-energized) → Scenario terminated after 2C 4KV Vital Bus energized and SW pump started for EDG cooling
Source: 19-01 NRC ESG-1 | View Scenario PDF

Connections

Scenario 2 — Load Reduction / LBLOCA / Loss of Emergency Recirculation Simulator | 7 Events | 3 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-211: 100% power, EOL; 21 Charging Pump I/S. The following equipment is out of service: 23 Charging Pump and 21 RHR Pump are C/T for maintenance.

Turnover: The crew is directed to reduce power to 89% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 using boration, control rods and turbine load control in preparation for Main Turbine valve testing.
Major Events:
  1. Planned Load Reduction to 89% at 10%/hour
  2. 23 SG Pressure Channel 3 fails low (TS only)
  3. 24 Vacuum Pump trips
  4. RC Loop 24 Cold Leg RTD fails high (TS)
  5. RCS Leak escalating to LBLOCA
  6. 22 RHR Pump fails to start on SEC signal
  7. Loss of Emergency Recirculation capability (22 RHR Pump trips)
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Planned Load Reduction to 89% CRS briefs crew on power reduction IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Section 4.3. RO briefs boration plan, initiates boration IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006. PO initiates turbine load reduction IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0002. RO monitors Tavg and control rods for proper response.
2 23 SG Pressure Channel 3 fails low PO reports OHA alarms G-17 LOOP 23 STM LN DP LO and G-33 STM LN PRESS LO. PO reports bistables lit on 2RP4 for STM LINE DIFFERENTIAL LOOP 23 and LOW STEAMLINE PRESSURE LOOP 23. Crew reviews ARP, determines no impact to plant operations. CRS directs removal from service IAW S2.OP-SO.RPS-0004. CRS enters TS 3.3.2.1.b Action 19 (72 hours).
3 24 Vacuum Pump trips PO reports unexpected trip. CRS enters AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum. PO initiates Att 1 CAS, dispatches operator for Att 2 local checks (no abnormal conditions found). PO starts all available vacuum pumps. 22 Vacuum Pump trips after start; 25AR25 fails to open on 25 Vacuum Pump start — PO manually opens 25AR25. Condenser backpressure improves.
4 24 Loop Cold Leg RTD fails high RO reports unexpected continuous rod insertion with no turbine runback in progress. RO places rod control in Manual — rod motion stops. CRS enters AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. RO reports 24 RC Loop Tavg Channel failed high. RO places MFC in Manual, adjusts charging flow. RO defeats 24 loop DT and Tavg on 2CC2, selects operable channel. Restores rods to Auto after ensuring Tavg within 1.5 degrees of Tref. CRS enters TS 3.3.1.1 Action 6 (72 hours) and TS 3.3.2.1.b Action 19 (72 hours).
5 RCS Leak escalating to LBLOCA — Auto SI fails RO reports OHA E-28 PZR HTR ON PRESS LO, console alarms PZR LEVEL LO and CONT PRESS HI. RO reports rapidly lowering PZR level and RCS pressure. CRS enters AB.RC-0001 — directs Trip Rx, Confirm Rx Trip, Initiate SI. Immediately after trip, RCS leak escalates to LBLOCA. Auto SI fails on both trains. RO manually actuates SI on one train, verifies other train actuated [CT#1]. RO continues TRIP-1 immediate actions.
6 22 RHR Pump fails to start on SEC signal PO reports SEC loading for 2B Vital Bus is NOT complete. 22 RHR pump failed to start (21 RHR is C/T). PO blocks and resets 2B SEC. RO starts 22 RHR pump [CT#2]. Containment pressure exceeds 15 psig — Phase B and Spray auto-initiate. MSLI auto-initiates. Crew transitions to EOP-LOCA-1 based on containment pressure >4 psig.
7 22 RHR Pump trips — Loss of Emergency Recirculation RO reports 22 RHR Pump tripped (overcurrent relay flag dropped). No RHR pumps available (21 RHR C/T, 22 RHR tripped). CRS transitions to EOP-LOCA-5. CRS determines no CS pumps required (Table C). RO resets Spray actuation, stops 21 and 22 CS pumps, closes 21 and 22 CS2s [CT#3 Part 1]. RO initiates RWST makeup IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 [CT#3 Part 2]. RO stops all but one charging pump, runs only one SI pump [CT#3 Part 3]. PO initiates RCS cooldown at 100 F/hr using intact MS10s.
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-2): Manually actuate SI before transition out of EOP-TRIP-1. Safety significance: with a LBLOCA in progress and auto SI failed on both trains, failure to manually initiate SI results in loss of all emergency core cooling. The crew must recognize the absence of SI actuation (no SEC loading, no ECCS pump starts, rising containment pressure) and manually actuate.

CT#2 (CT-5): Manually start one low head ECCS pump before transition out of EOP-TRIP-1. Safety significance: with 21 RHR C/T and 22 RHR failed to start on SEC signal, the crew has no low-head ECCS injection. The crew must block and reset 2B SEC, then manually start 22 RHR pump to establish low-head injection flow for core cooling during the LBLOCA.

CT#3 (CT-29): Makeup to the RWST and minimize RWST outflow before ECCS pumps cavitate. This CT is satisfied when the following series of actions are completed to conserve RWST inventory: (1) Stop Containment Spray pumps, (2) Initiate RWST makeup, (3) Reduce SI to one train. Safety significance: with no RHR pumps available for cold leg recirculation transfer, continued RWST drawdown will result in ECCS pump cavitation and loss of all pumped safety injection.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-AB.COND-0001 (vacuum pump trip) → S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 (RTD fail, continuous rod insertion) → S2.OP-AB.RC-0001 (RCS leak) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip/SI — manual SI required, manual RHR pump start) → EOP-LOCA-1 (containment pressure >4 psig, RCS leak identified) → EOP-LOCA-5 (no RHR pumps available — loss of emergency recirculation) → Scenario terminated after crew stops all but one charging pump
Source: 19-01 NRC ESG-2 | View Scenario PDF

Connections

Scenario 3 — ATWS / Feedwater Line Break Simulator | 7 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-203: 100% power, MOL; 21 SW Pump is C/T for pump repack.

Turnover: Maintain current power level.
Major Events:
  1. VCT Level channel fails high (2LT-114)
  2. 21 SW Accumulator Tank Pressure Low
  3. 23 SW Pump trips and 26 SW Pump fails to auto start
  4. 23 Condensate Pump trips
  5. 21 Feedwater Line break inside containment
  6. ATWS
  7. 21BF13 fails to close on SI signal
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 VCT Level channel 2LT-114 fails high Crew recognizes VCT level lowering or 2CV35 diverting to CVCS HUT. CRS enters AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging. RO reports 2LT-114 has failed high on P-250 computer. RO takes manual control of 2CV35 and positions to VCT. CRS directs RO to maintain VCT level by cycling 2CV35 or initiating manual makeup IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006.
2 21 SW Accumulator Tank low pressure Crew reports OHA B-47, 21 SW Accumulator Tank Trouble. Dispatches field operator — reports pressure at 137 psig and slowly lowering, hissing sound from flanged connection near 21SW542 nitrogen fill line. Crew declares 21 SW Accumulator inoperable (band is 138-157 psig). PO stops 21 and 22 CFCUs and isolates from field by closing 21/22 SW76 and 21/22 SW54. CRS enters TS 3.6.1.1 (1 hour) and TS 3.6.2.3 (14 days) for two CFCUs inoperable.
3 23 SW Pump trips, 26 SW Pump fails to auto start RO reports OHA B-13/B-14/B-15 for SW header pressure low. RO reports 23 SW Pump tripped, 26 SW Pump in Auto failed to start. RO starts 26 SW pump manually. CRS enters AB.SW-0001. PO reports no indication of SW Bay leak, SW header alarms cleared. CRS enters TS 3.7.4 (72 hours) — 21 and 23 SW Pumps inoperable in one bay, only one operable SW loop.
4 23 Condensate Pump trips PO reports 23 Condensate Pump tripped. CRS enters AB.CN-0001. PO reports SGFP suction pressure less than 320 psig. PO opens 21-23 CN108s (Polisher Bypass valves). CRS evaluates Att 2, Section 4.0 — determines load reduction to 85% at 5%/min required. CRS briefs load reduction and reactivity plan. RO initiates boration IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006. PO initiates load reduction IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001. CRS enters AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction.
5 21 SG Feedwater Line break inside containment — ATWS RO reports demand for First-Out OHA F-3, 21 SG LVL LO-LO but reactor fails to auto trip. RO trips reactor by opening both M-G set breakers (2E6D and 2G6D) [CT#1]. RO performs TRIP-1 immediate actions. RO reports large oscillating feed flow on 21 SG with no steam flow; other SGs indicating ~11% steam flow. RO manually initiates MSLI. Auto SI actuates on containment pressure high. RO identifies 21 SG as faulted. PO closes 21AF21 and 21AF11 to isolate faulted SG [CT#2 Part 1].
6 21BF13 fails to close — safeguards valve alignment RO reports 21BF13 and 21BF19 are open. PO manually closes 21BF13 (isolates main feed flow to 21 SG into containment). PO attempts to close 21BF19 via SLIMMs — unsuccessful. CRS dispatches operator to close 21BF19 from field. RO reports both RTBs are NOT open — CRS directs WCC to locally open both RTBs. Crew transitions to EOP-LOSC-1.
7 Faulted SG isolation and SI Termination PO verifies closed: 21BF13, 21BF40, 21MS7, 21MS10, 21MS18, 21MS167, and 21GB4 [CT#2 Part 2]. PO trips and stops 23 AFW pump. CRS dispatches operator to close 21MS45. RO resets Phase A, SG sample isolation. CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-3. RO resets SI, Phase A, Phase B. Stops all but one charging pump, stops SI pumps, stops RHR pumps. Restores normal charging alignment and normal letdown — opens 2CV2 and 2CV277, opens 2CV7, places letdown orifice in service, adjusts 2CV18 to maintain 300 psig.
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-1): Manually initiate reactor trip before transition to EOP-FRSM-1 is required. Safety significance: with the auto reactor trip and manual trip pushbuttons failed, the crew must trip the reactor by opening both rod drive M-G set breakers (2E6D and 2G6D). Failure to trip the reactor during an ATWS with a feedwater line break results in continued nuclear power generation with degrading secondary heat sink, potentially challenging core cooling and RCS integrity.

CT#2 (CT-17): Isolate feed and steam flow to faulted 21 SG before transition out of EOP-LOSC-1. This CT is comprised of two parts: (1) Isolate feed flow by closing 21AF21 and 21AF11, and (2) Isolate steam and remaining feed flow by closing/verifying closed 21BF13, 21BF40, 21MS7, 21MS10, 21MS18, 21MS167, and 21GB4. Safety significance: the feedwater line break inside containment is feeding uncontrolled mass and energy release. Failure to isolate results in continued containment pressurization, RWST depletion from containment spray, and potential loss of containment integrity.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 (VCT level fail) → S2.OP-AB.SW-0001 (SW pump trip) → S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 (condensate pump trip) → S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001 (load reduction) → EOP-TRIP-1 (ATWS — manual trip via M-G set breakers, faulted SG identification, MSLI) → EOP-LOSC-1 (faulted SG isolation — 21 SG depressurized in uncontrolled manner) → EOP-TRIP-3 (SI termination — RCS pressure stable/rising, PZR level adequate) → Scenario terminated after normal letdown restored
Source: 19-01 NRC ESG-3 | View Scenario PDF

Connections

Scenario 4 — SGTR / PORV Failure Simulator | 8 Events | 3 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-204: 2% power, BOL; 21 SGFP I/S. 25 CFCU is in low speed to monitor bearing temperatures following maintenance.

Turnover: The crew is directed to continue power ascension to 10% reactor power IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 using control rods, steam dumps, and turbine load control. Control Bank D at 114 steps. Steam dumps in MS Pressure Control, Automatic, set at 1000 psig. Rod control in manual. 25 CFCU running in low speed — System Engineering monitoring remotely using PI. RCS boron 1584 ppm. 22 SGFP is O/S in standby.
Major Events:
  1. Power ascension to 10%
  2. 2R1B Control Room Radiation Monitor Channel 1 fails high
  3. 25 CFCU trips in low speed
  4. 21 SGFP trips and failure of Auto AFW start signal
  5. 23 RCP high vibration (major transient — reactor trip)
  6. 21 SG Tube Rupture (650 gpm)
  7. 21 SI Pump fails to start on SEC signal
  8. PZR PORV fails to close during RCS depressurization
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Power ascension to 10% CRS directs power ascension using main steam dumps in MS Pressure Control and control rods. PO raises steam dump demand IAW S2.OP-SO.MS-0002, section 5.4. RO withdraws control rods at specified increments to maintain Tavg on program (~549 F at 10%). RO announces 5% reactor power and records Mode 1 entry time.
2 2R1B Control Room Radiation Monitor Channel 1 fails high RO announces OHA alarm A-6 RMS HI RAD OR TRBL. CRS places power ascension on hold. RO reports control room ventilation in Accident Pressurized mode. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001, Abnormal Radiation. RO reports 2R1B Channel 1 failed high and alarm is invalid. PO calls Unit 1 operator to check 1R1B Channel 2 reading (reading normal). CRS enters TS 3.3.3.1.b Action 28 (immediately place in Accident Pressurized or Recirculation mode). CRS requests assistance in troubleshooting failed RMS channel.
3 25 CFCU trips in low speed RO reports 25 CFCU tripped in low speed (overcurrent flag up on low speed breaker). CRS may direct starting 23 CFCU in high speed. CRS enters TS 3.6.2.3 Action a (14 days) and TS 3.6.1.1 (1 hour containment integrity until control power removed). CRS directs WCC to open control power for 25 CFCU high and low speed breakers.
4 21 SGFP trips — AFW fails to auto-start RO reports 21 SGFP thrust bearing oil pressure high and 21 SGFP tripped. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CN-0001, Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality. CRS determines immediate actions not met. PO initiates Att 1 CAS. RO reduces reactor power to less than 4% by inserting control rods. PO reports AFW is not in operation (auto start failed). PO sets 21-24 AF21 demands to 0% and manually starts 21 and 22 AFW pumps. PO adjusts AF21s to maintain SG levels between +/-5% of program.
5 23 RCP high shaft vibration — reactor trip RO reports OHA alarm D-36 RCP VIB HI. RO reports 23 RCP shaft vibration exceeds 20 mils on 2RP3 monitor. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 and implements CAS action. RO trips the reactor, confirms trip, and stops 23 RCP. CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1. RO performs immediate actions. CRS and RO confirm no SI required. PO throttles AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lbm/hr. CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-2.
6 21 SG Tube Rupture (650 gpm ramped over 5 min) RO reports RCS pressure and PZR level lowering. RO reports OHA A-6 alarm — 2R15 condenser off-gas rad monitor in alarm. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 and implements CAS. RO initiates Safety Injection. CRS re-enters EOP-TRIP-1. PO reports 21 SI pump failed to start — PO blocks and resets 2A SEC, RO manually starts 21 SI pump. PO reports 21 SG NR levels rising — closes 21AF21 and 21AF11 to isolate feed flow to ruptured SG (CT#1 Part 1). RO verifies valve groups in safeguards positions, containment pressure <15 psig. RO reports 21 SG NR level rising uncontrolled. CRS transitions to EOP-SGTR-1.
7 EOP-SGTR-1: Isolate ruptured SG, cooldown RCS PO sets 21MS10 to 1045 psig. PO reports 21MS18, 21MS7, and 21GB4 closed. PO closes 21MS167 (CT#1 Part 2 — steam isolation). PO trips 23 AFW pump. CRS directs WCC to close 21MS45 and 2SS321. CRS determines RCS target temperature using Table B (SG pressure >1000 psig = 503 F CETs). PO dumps steam using steam dumps on intact SGs (CT#2 Part 1 — cooldown). When hottest CETs < RCS target temp, PO stops cooldown by placing MS Pressure Control in Auto (CT#2 Part 2).
8 PZR PORV fails to close during RCS depressurization RO reports normal PZR spray NOT available (23 RCP stopped). RO reports PZR PORVs are available. CRS reviews depressurization termination criteria IAW Table E. RO opens one PZR PORV. When depressurization criteria met, RO attempts to close PZR PORV — PORV fails to close. RO reports PORV failed to close and closes the associated PZR PORV block valve (CT#3). RCS pressure rising confirms block valve closed.
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-18): Isolate feed and steam flow to ruptured SG before a transition to SGTR-3 occurs. Part 1: isolate feed flow to ruptured 21 SG (close 21AF21 and 21AF11) within 10 minutes. Part 2: isolate steam flow to ruptured 21 SG (close 21MS167). Safety significance: failure to isolate the ruptured SG allows continued primary-to-secondary leakage, overfilling the ruptured SG and potentially lifting the SG safety valve, creating an unmonitored release path to the atmosphere.

CT#2 (CT-19): Control initial RCS cooldown so that transition from EOP-SGTR-1 does not occur due to low subcooling, or severe challenge on CFST Thermal Shock or Shutdown Margin. This CT has two parts: (1) establish RCS cooldown using steam dumps on intact SGs to reach CET target temperature of 503 F (from Table B, SG pressure >1000 psig), and (2) maintain RCS temperature at or below target by placing MS Pressure Control in Auto. Safety significance: uncontrolled overcooling during SGTR can cause loss of subcooling margin (transition to SGTR-3/4), PTS concerns, or loss of shutdown margin.

CT#3 (CT-10): Close PZR PORV block valve of stuck open PZR PORV by completion of MCA step in SGTR-1 that directs closing PZR PORV block valve. Safety significance: a stuck-open PORV during SGTR creates a small break LOCA in addition to the tube rupture, degrading RCS inventory and pressure control, complicating SGTR recovery by allowing continued primary system depressurization.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 (power ascension) → S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001 (rad monitor fail high) → S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 (SGFP trip) → S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 (23 RCP high vibration) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip, no SI required) → EOP-TRIP-2 (reactor trip response) → S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 (SG tube leak identified) → EOP-TRIP-1 (re-entered following manual SI on SGTR) → EOP-SGTR-1 (21 SG NR level rising uncontrolled — isolate ruptured SG, cooldown, depressurize) → Scenario terminated after PZR PORV block valve closed
Source: 19-01 NRC ESG-4 | View Scenario PDF

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Scenario 5 — Loss of Heat Sink / Condensate Recovery Simulator | 8 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-210: 85% power, EOL. 21 Charging Pump in service. 23 Charging Pump C/T for pulsation damper maintenance. 23 Condensate Pump just returned from maintenance.

Turnover: Commence power ascension to 100% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 using dilution, control rods, and turbine load control following return to service of 23 Condensate Pump. Rx Plan: add 2200 gallons of water along with withdrawing control rods to maintain Tavg on program. Reactor Engineering directs the crew to perform a dilution first. RCS boron 843 ppm. MWe 1020. Blowdown 35K per loop to 23 condenser/flashtank. Polisher in service.
Major Events:
  1. Power ascension to 100% at 10%/hour
  2. 2PT-505 Turbine Inlet Pressure Channel fails low (continuous rod insertion)
  3. 22 ABV Exhaust Fan damper fails closed
  4. 23BF19 Feedwater Reg Valve fails closed (major transient)
  5. Main Turbine fails to Auto trip and Auto MSLI fails to actuate
  6. Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus (loss of 22 MDAFW Pump)
  7. Loss of all AFW flow (21 AFW trips, 23 AFW trips on overspeed)
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Power ascension to 100% at 10%/hour CRS briefs crew on power ascension to 100% at 10%/hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation. RO briefs reactivity plan. PO briefs turbine load control plan. RO initiates dilution IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 or uses control rods. PO initiates turbine load control IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001. RO monitors Tavg and control rods for proper response.
2 2PT-505 Turbine Inlet Pressure Channel fails low RO announces rods stepping in at 72 steps per minute, no load reject in progress, requests rod control in Manual. CRS directs RO to place rods in Manual — rod motion stops. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. CRS directs RO to maintain Tavg within 1.5 F of Tref. RO reports Tavg and NIS channels NOT failed. RO reports rods above RIL. PO reports PT-505 failed low. PO places main steam dumps in MS Pressure Control-Auto. CRS enters TSAS 3.3.2.1.b Action 19 (72 hours). CRS initiates S2.OP-SO.RPS-0006 for turbine channel trip/restoration. RO withdraws control rods to ARO position.
3 22 ABV Exhaust Fan damper fails closed (low air flow) RO reports unexpected console alarm for 22 ABV Exhaust Fan "AIR FLOW LOW". PO refers to 2CC1 ARP. RO reports 22 ABV Exhaust Fan running. PO dispatches operator to check breaker status (breaker closed). RO confirms exhaust filter lineup IAW S2.OP-SO.ABV-0001. PO dispatches operator to check exhaust fan inlet vanes — reports 2ABV14 damper closed. CRS determines exhaust flow cannot be restored and directs starting standby 23 ABV Exhaust Fan. CRS enters TSAS 3.7.7 Action a (14 day LCO).
4 23BF19 Feedwater Reg Valve fails closed PO reports OHA alarms: G-15 ADFCS TRBL, G-23 21/22 SGFP SPEED DEVIATION, and 23 SG Program Setpoint Deviation. PO reports 23BF19 closing. PO attempts manual control — unsuccessful. PO reports 23 SG NR levels lowering, recommends reactor trip. RO manually trips the reactor and enters EOP-TRIP-1 immediate actions.
5 Main Turbine fails to Auto trip — Manual trip required RO reports main turbine failed to Auto trip. RO reports manual trip using pistol grip switch unsuccessful. RO manually trips the main turbine by depressing turbine trip bezel pushbutton (CT#1). SI auto actuates following reactor trip — RO backs up SI signal. CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1.
6 21 AFW Pump trips / Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus PO reports 21 AFW pump tripped (overcurrent relay flag up) and only 23 AFW pump running. PO reports 2B 4KV Vital Bus NOT energized (bus differential protection — loss of 22 MDAFW pump). CRS directs assistance restoring 2B 4KV bus IAW S2.OP-AB.4KV-0002. PO reports 2A and 2C Vital Buses energized. PO reports SEC loading not complete for 2A and 2B bus. PO reports several SI and feedwater isolation valves not in position but redundant valves are in safeguards position. CRS directs WCC to locally position valves. PO starts 23 switchgear supply fan after 2C SEC blocked and reset. RO reports one CCW pump running, both CCW HX in Auto.
7 23 AFW pump trips on overspeed — loss of all AFW flow PO reports 23 AFW pump tripped. PO reports NO AFW flow. PO reports no SG NR levels >9% (15% adverse) and total AFW flow <22E4 lbm/hr. CRS transitions to EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. PO reports condensate system in service. PO reports no SGFPs available (tripped on SI). MSPI AFW pump fails on overspeed. RO resets SI, Phase A, Phase B. RO opens both CA330s. PO resets SECs and control centers.
8 Condensate Recovery — EOP-FRHS-1 Crew selects one SG for depressurization to <575 psig (Caution: steam 21 and 23 SGs last to maximize 23 AFW pump steam supply). PO depressurizes using steam dumps or MS10s. CRS dispatches operator to open selected SG BF40 or BF19 valve locally (120 ft elevation TGA). PO opens selected SG BF13. PO opens 21 and 22 CN48 (SGFP bypass valves) and closes 21 and 22 CN32 (SGFP suction valves). PO reports condensate flow established to selected SG or CETs lowering (CT#2). CRS directs maintaining selected SG pressure <575 psig. Crew reports bleed and feed NOT initiated, transitions to EOP-TRIP-1.
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-13): Manually trip the turbine before a severe challenge develops to either subcriticality or integrity CFST, or transition to EOP-LOSC-1. Safety significance: failure to trip the main turbine following a reactor trip results in continued steam demand on the SGs, causing an excessive cooldown of the RCS. This can challenge subcriticality (return to power) and RCS integrity (pressurized thermal shock). The turbine must be tripped using the bezel pushbutton when both the auto trip and pistol grip manual trip fail.

CT#2 (CT-43): Establish feedwater flow into at least one SG before bleed and feed is required. Safety significance: with all AFW sources lost (21 AFW tripped on overcurrent, 22 MDAFW lost with 2B 4KV bus, 23 AFW tripped on overspeed, MSPI AFW pump failed), the only remaining heat removal path is condensate recovery through EOP-FRHS-1. SGs must be depressurized to <575 psig to allow condensate system injection. Bleed and feed criteria: three SG wide range levels <20% (25% adverse). Failure to establish feed flow before bleed and feed criteria are met results in initiation of bleed and feed (opening PZR PORVs for core cooling), which is a last-resort measure with significant challenges to RCS integrity.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 (power ascension) → S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 (continuous rod motion from PT-505 failure) → S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 (ABV exhaust fan low air flow ARP) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip on lowering SG levels / BF19 failure) → EOP-FRHS-1 (all AFW lost — no SG NR levels >9%, total AFW flow <22E4 lbm/hr) → Condensate Recovery (depressurize selected SG to <575 psig, establish condensate feed flow) → Return to EOP-TRIP-1 (after feed flow established, bleed and feed NOT initiated)
Source: 19-01 NRC ESG-5 | View Scenario PDF

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