2022 NRC Operating Exam
Overview
- Exam: SALEM 2022 NRC Exam — 20-01 ILOT
- Admin JPMs (RO): 4
- Admin JPMs (SRO): 5
- Simulator JPMs: 8
- In-Plant JPMs: 3
- Simulator Scenarios: 3
JPMs
Simulator Scenarios
JPM RO-A1 — Determine Maximum Reactor Vessel Vent Time
Admin | RO/SRO | G2.1.25 (3.9)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 has experienced a small break LOCA.
- The crew has performed an RCS cooldown and depressurization in EOP-LOCA-2.
- During the depressurization the crew experienced some complications and indications of upper head voiding are now present.
- STA reports a valid CFST YELLOW path exists on Coolant Inventory.
- The TSC recommends initiating EOP-FRCI-3, Response to Void in Reactor Vessel.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the extra NCO.
- The crew has completed actions in EOP-FRCI-3 up to step 17.3 and has directed you to PERFORM Attachment 1 of EOP-FRCI-3 to determine the maximum venting time.
- The following conditions exist in Unit 2 containment:
- Containment temperature is 140 F
- Containment hydrogen concentration is 2.3%
- RCS pressure is 1600 psig
- During your calculations, ONLY perform "rounding" when determining the vent time to the nearest tenths.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 has experienced a small break LOCA.
- The crew has performed an RCS cooldown and depressurization in EOP-LOCA-2.
- During the depressurization the crew experienced some complications and indications of upper head voiding are now present.
- STA reports a valid CFST YELLOW path exists on Coolant Inventory.
- The TSC recommends initiating EOP-FRCI-3, Response to Void in Reactor Vessel.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the extra NCO.
- The crew has completed actions in EOP-FRCI-3 up to step 17.3 and has directed you to PERFORM Attachment 1 of EOP-FRCI-3 to determine the maximum venting time.
- The following conditions exist in Unit 2 containment:
- Containment temperature is 140 F
- Containment hydrogen concentration is 2.3%
- RCS pressure is 1600 psig
- During your calculations, ONLY perform "rounding" when determining the vent time to the nearest tenths.
Task Standard:
Calculates Maximum Venting Time of 4.5 mins (4.2 - 4.7 mins acceptable band).
Calculates Maximum Venting Time of 4.5 mins (4.2 - 4.7 mins acceptable band).
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Record data from initial conditions (containment temp, H2 concentration, RCS pressure) | Records provided data in steps 1.1 through 1.3 |
| 2.1 * | Calculate containment absolute temperature (Tabs) | Tabs = 140 + 460 = 600 R |
| 2.2 * | Calculate containment temperature standardization factor (Tfact) | Tfact = 492/600 = 0.82 |
| 2.3 * | Calculate containment air volume (V) at STP | V = 2.62E06 x 0.82 = 2148400 ft3 |
| 3.3 * | Calculate maximum vent volume (M) | M = (3.0% - 2.3%) x 2148400 / 100% = 15038.8 ft3 |
| 4.3 * | Determine hydrogen vent flow rate from Figure 1 at 1600 psig | Using Figure 1, determines Hydrogen Flow Rate of 3333 cfm (+/- 100 cfm readability allowance) |
| 4.4 * | Calculate maximum vent time (Tv) | Tv = 15038.8 / 3333 = 4.5 mins (4.2 - 4.7 mins acceptable) |
Key Decision Point:
Step 4.3 is the discriminating step -- the applicant must correctly read the Hydrogen Flow Rate from Figure 1 at 1600 psig RCS pressure (3333 cfm). The graph has readability challenges, so a +/- 100 cfm allowance is factored into the acceptable vent time band. The final calculation in step 4.4 (Tv = M/F) is straightforward, but depends entirely on the correct flow rate from the graph. Rounding should only be applied at the final vent time calculation (to nearest tenths).
Step 4.3 is the discriminating step -- the applicant must correctly read the Hydrogen Flow Rate from Figure 1 at 1600 psig RCS pressure (3333 cfm). The graph has readability challenges, so a +/- 100 cfm allowance is factored into the acceptable vent time band. The final calculation in step 4.4 (Tv = M/F) is straightforward, but depends entirely on the correct flow rate from the graph. Rounding should only be applied at the final vent time calculation (to nearest tenths).
Ref: 2-EOP-FRCI-3 (Rev 40) | Task: N1150410501 | K/A: G2.1.25 — Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables | Source: Bank (Rev 02) | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: RCS, Containment
- Related EOPs: EOP-FRCI-3 — Response to Void in Reactor Vessel
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM RO-A2 — Determine Boration Time for 3 Stuck Rods and Final BAST Level
Admin | RO/SRO | G2.1.20 (4.6)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 8 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 experienced an automatic Reactor Trip from an inadvertent Main Turbine Trip.
- SI is not required and the crew is implementing 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response.
- Three Control Rods from Control Bank Delta have failed to FULLY insert.
- Current BAST levels:
- 21 BAST level: 94%
- 22 BAST level: 76%
Initiating Cue:
- You are the extra NCO.
- The CRS has directed you to determine the amount of time Rapid Boration is required IAW 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Step 4 for the Three Control rods that have failed to insert on Control Bank Delta.
1. How many total minutes of Rapid Boration is required?
2. What will be the final BAST levels?
- Assume the Rapid Boration flowrate remains at 40 GPM for the entire duration required in question 1, and Both BASTs lower equal amounts.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 8 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 experienced an automatic Reactor Trip from an inadvertent Main Turbine Trip.
- SI is not required and the crew is implementing 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response.
- Three Control Rods from Control Bank Delta have failed to FULLY insert.
- Current BAST levels:
- 21 BAST level: 94%
- 22 BAST level: 76%
Initiating Cue:
- You are the extra NCO.
- The CRS has directed you to determine the amount of time Rapid Boration is required IAW 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Step 4 for the Three Control rods that have failed to insert on Control Bank Delta.
1. How many total minutes of Rapid Boration is required?
2. What will be the final BAST levels?
- Assume the Rapid Boration flowrate remains at 40 GPM for the entire duration required in question 1, and Both BASTs lower equal amounts.
Task Standard:
1. CALCULATES the total boration time for 3 stuck control rods to be 105 minutes.
2. Calculates total amount of gallons injected to be 4200 gallons and final BAST levels are at 21: 67% +/- 2% and 22: 49% +/- 2%.
1. CALCULATES the total boration time for 3 stuck control rods to be 105 minutes.
2. Calculates total amount of gallons injected to be 4200 gallons and final BAST levels are at 21: 67% +/- 2% and 22: 49% +/- 2%.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 1 * | Determine boration time for 3 stuck rods using EOP-TRIP-2 Step 4 | 35 MIN x 3 rods = 105 minutes total Rapid Boration |
| 2.1 * | Determine total volume of boric acid injected | 105 MIN x 40 GPM = 4200 gallons total. Each BAST lowers by 4200/2 = 2100 gallons. |
| 2.2 * | Determine 21 BAST final level using S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 tank curve (Figure 2) | Start = 94% = 7400 gal. Used = 2100 gal. Remaining = 5300 gal. From tank curve: 5300 gal = 67% (+/- 2%) |
| 2.3 * | Determine 22 BAST final level using S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 tank curve (Figure 2) | Start = 76% = 6000 gal. Used = 2100 gal. Remaining = 3900 gal. From tank curve: 3900 gal = 49% (+/- 2%) |
Key Decision Point:
Step 1 is the primary discriminating step -- the applicant must correctly use EOP-TRIP-2 Step 4 to determine 35 minutes per stuck rod. The applicant must then correctly convert BAST levels from percent to gallons using the S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 tank capacity curve (Figure 2), subtract the volume used, and convert back to percent. The +/- 2% acceptance band accounts for readability errors when using the tank curve (each conversion from %→gallons or gallons→% has a +/- 1% readability error).
Step 1 is the primary discriminating step -- the applicant must correctly use EOP-TRIP-2 Step 4 to determine 35 minutes per stuck rod. The applicant must then correctly convert BAST levels from percent to gallons using the S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 tank capacity curve (Figure 2), subtract the volume used, and convert back to percent. The +/- 2% acceptance band accounts for readability errors when using the tank curve (each conversion from %→gallons or gallons→% has a +/- 1% readability error).
Ref: 2-EOP-TRIP-2 (Rev 41), S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 (Rev 8) | Task: N1150030501 | K/A: G2.1.20 — Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps | Source: New | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: CVCS
- Related EOPs: EOP-TRIP-2 — Reactor Trip Response
- Related procedures: S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 — Tank Capacity Data
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM RO-A3 — Perform Manual QPTR Calculation Surveillance
Admin | RO/SRO | G2.2.12 (3.7)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 20 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when rod 2D4 dropped fully into the core. OHAs E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR, and E-38 UPPER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR, annunciated, cleared and continue to annunciate then clear.
- Operators have not yet started reducing power to 74% to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d IAW S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002, Dropped Rod.
Initiating Cue:
- The CRS has directed you to perform a Manual QPTR Calculation IAW S2.OP-ST.NIS-0002. Maintain all calculations at three significant digits to the right of the decimal point (Thousandths) unless otherwise directed by procedure.
- All pre-requisites are completed SAT.
- Notify CRS of test results after Step 5.3 is complete and compliance with Technical Specification.
- NI currents are:
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 20 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when rod 2D4 dropped fully into the core. OHAs E-46, LOWER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR, and E-38 UPPER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR, annunciated, cleared and continue to annunciate then clear.
- Operators have not yet started reducing power to 74% to comply with TSAS 3.1.3.1.c.3.d IAW S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002, Dropped Rod.
Initiating Cue:
- The CRS has directed you to perform a Manual QPTR Calculation IAW S2.OP-ST.NIS-0002. Maintain all calculations at three significant digits to the right of the decimal point (Thousandths) unless otherwise directed by procedure.
- All pre-requisites are completed SAT.
- Notify CRS of test results after Step 5.3 is complete and compliance with Technical Specification.
- NI currents are:
| Upper Detectors | Lower Detectors | |
|---|---|---|
| N41 | 189 | 188 |
| N42 | 206 | 221 |
| N43 | 192 | 193 |
| N44 | 135 | 151 |
Task Standard:
1. Manually calculates the highest QPTR as UNSAT (highest N42T AND N42B) with a value of 1.041 and 1.032 respectively (+/- 0.002).
2. Identifies Maximum Power Tilt exceeds 1.02 and identifies T/S LCO 3.2.4 is NOT met.
1. Manually calculates the highest QPTR as UNSAT (highest N42T AND N42B) with a value of 1.041 and 1.032 respectively (+/- 0.002).
2. Identifies Maximum Power Tilt exceeds 1.02 and identifies T/S LCO 3.2.4 is NOT met.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0 | Read Precautions and Limitations 3.1-3.5 | Reads P&Ls prior to performing calculations |
| 5.1.2 | Record date, time, reactor power, and reason for QPTR on Attachment 2 | Records current date/time, 100% reactor power, and OHA E-46 as reason |
| 5.1.3 | Record NI currents and 100% NI current values from REM on Attachment 1 | Records N41-44 upper and lower detector currents and 100% values from S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0011 Table 2 |
| 5.1.4 * | Complete Attachment 1 QPTR calculations | For each upper and lower detector: calculates detector ratio (current/100% value), sums ratios, divides by number of operable detectors (4) to get average, divides each ratio by average to get power tilt |
| 5.1.5 * | Record Power Tilt, Maximum Power Tilt, and test results on Attachment 2 | Maximum Power Tilt for N42T = 1.041 and N42B = 1.032 (+/- 0.002). Marks UNSAT. |
| 5.1.6 | Direct Independent Verification of Attachment 1 calculations | CUE: IV is complete SAT |
| 5.1.7 * | Determine Maximum Power Tilt exceeds 1.02 and refer to TS 3.2.4 | Determines QPTR exceeds 1.02 limit and TS LCO 3.2.4 is NOT met |
| 5.3.2 * | Record surveillance as UNSAT, initiate NOTF | Records surveillance as UNSAT. CRS initiates NOTF and notifies Reactor Engineering. |
Answer Key (Upper Detectors):
Answer Key (Lower Detectors):
| Det | Current | 100% Val | Ratio | Avg | Power Tilt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N41T | 189 | 221.1 | 0.855 | 0.864 | 0.990 |
| N42T | 206 | 229.1 | 0.899 | 0.864 | 1.041 |
| N43T | 192 | 218.6 | 0.878 | 0.864 | 1.016 |
| N44T | 135 | 163.7 | 0.825 | 0.864 | 0.955 |
| Det | Current | 100% Val | Ratio | Avg | Power Tilt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N41B | 188 | 226 | 0.832 | 0.878 | 0.948 |
| N42B | 221 | 243.8 | 0.906 | 0.878 | 1.032 |
| N43B | 193 | 215.6 | 0.895 | 0.878 | 1.019 |
| N44B | 151 | 172.1 | 0.877 | 0.878 | 0.999 |
Key Decision Point:
Step 5.1.7 is the discriminating step -- after completing the multi-step calculation, the applicant must recognize that the Maximum Power Tilt (N42T = 1.041, N42B = 1.032) exceeds the TS 3.2.4 limit of 1.02 and declare TS LCO 3.2.4 NOT met. The dropped rod (2D4) in the N42 quadrant causes asymmetric flux distribution. The applicant must mark the surveillance UNSAT and initiate corrective actions.
Step 5.1.7 is the discriminating step -- after completing the multi-step calculation, the applicant must recognize that the Maximum Power Tilt (N42T = 1.041, N42B = 1.032) exceeds the TS 3.2.4 limit of 1.02 and declare TS LCO 3.2.4 NOT met. The dropped rod (2D4) in the N42 quadrant causes asymmetric flux distribution. The applicant must mark the surveillance UNSAT and initiate corrective actions.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.NIS-0002 (Rev 15), REM Salem 2 Cycle 25 (Rev 33) | Task: N0150020201 | K/A: G2.2.12 — Knowledge of surveillance procedures | Source: Bank (Rev 06) | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: Excore NIs
- Related tech specs: TS 3/4.2 — Power Distribution
- Related procedures: S2.OP-ST.NIS-0002 — Power Distribution QPTR Surveillance, AB.ROD-0002 — Dropped Rod
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM RO-A4 — Determine Radiological Dose and Stay Times for Containment Entry
Admin | RO/SRO | G2.3.13 (3.4)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Salem is in Mode 1 at 100%.
- The 22 CFCU has been declared inoperable.
- Tagging has been completed.
Initiating Cue:
- You have been directed by the WCCS to determine stay times for entering containment to hang additional tags on 22 CFCU.
- Assume the following:
- Safety has determined the heat stress stay time to be 15 minutes
- Radiation protection has limited total dose received by individual to 0.002 REM gamma and 0.008 REM Neutron
1. In accordance with the provided survey map perform the following:
1.1 Calculate the following for the Operator:
- Gamma dose stay time _____ minutes
- Neutron dose stay time _____ minutes
1.2 Determine most limiting allowable time for containment entry team based on ALARA and Heat Stress:
- Limiting containment entry time _____ minutes
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Salem is in Mode 1 at 100%.
- The 22 CFCU has been declared inoperable.
- Tagging has been completed.
Initiating Cue:
- You have been directed by the WCCS to determine stay times for entering containment to hang additional tags on 22 CFCU.
- Assume the following:
- Safety has determined the heat stress stay time to be 15 minutes
- Radiation protection has limited total dose received by individual to 0.002 REM gamma and 0.008 REM Neutron
1. In accordance with the provided survey map perform the following:
1.1 Calculate the following for the Operator:
- Gamma dose stay time _____ minutes
- Neutron dose stay time _____ minutes
1.2 Determine most limiting allowable time for containment entry team based on ALARA and Heat Stress:
- Limiting containment entry time _____ minutes
Task Standard:
Determines that based on the dose limits Gamma dose stay time is 24 minutes, Neutron dose stay time is 12 minutes, and heat stress stay time is 15 minutes. Determines that limiting entry time will be based on Neutron dose at 12 minutes.
Determines that based on the dose limits Gamma dose stay time is 24 minutes, Neutron dose stay time is 12 minutes, and heat stress stay time is 15 minutes. Determines that limiting entry time will be based on Neutron dose at 12 minutes.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.A * | Calculate Neutron dose stay time | From survey map: neutron dose rate at 22 CFCU area = 40 mrem/hr. Limit = 0.008 REM = 8 mrem. Stay time = (8 mrem / 40 mrem/hr) x 60 min/hr = 12 minutes |
| 1.1.B * | Calculate Gamma dose stay time | From survey map: gamma dose rate at 22 CFCU area = 5 mrem/hr. Limit = 0.002 REM = 2 mrem. Stay time = (2 mrem / 5 mrem/hr) x 60 min/hr = 24 minutes |
| 1.2 * | Determine most limiting allowable time for containment entry | Compare: Neutron = 12 min, Heat Stress = 15 min, Gamma = 24 min. Most limiting = Neutron dose at 12 minutes. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 1.2 is the discriminating step -- the applicant must compare all three limiting factors (gamma dose stay time of 24 min, neutron dose stay time of 12 min, and heat stress stay time of 15 min) and correctly identify the neutron dose as the most limiting at 12 minutes. The applicant must read dose rates from the survey map for the 22 CFCU area, correctly convert REM limits to mrem for the calculation, and identify the lowest stay time as the controlling factor for entry.
Step 1.2 is the discriminating step -- the applicant must compare all three limiting factors (gamma dose stay time of 24 min, neutron dose stay time of 12 min, and heat stress stay time of 15 min) and correctly identify the neutron dose as the most limiting at 12 minutes. The applicant must read dose rates from the survey map for the 22 CFCU area, correctly convert REM limits to mrem for the calculation, and identify the lowest stay time as the controlling factor for entry.
Ref: RP-AA-300 (Rev 6), Radiological Survey Map #2213000 (dated 8-5-21) | Task: N1200100104 | K/A: G2.3.13 — Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties | Source: New | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: CFCUs, Radiation Monitoring
- Related procedures: RP-AA-300 — Radiological Survey Program
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM SRO-A1 — Isolate Non-Essential Chilled Water Loads
Admin | SRO | G2.1.7 (4.7)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- It is July 15th time 1800 and you have just assumed the watch as the Unit 2 CRS. It was turned over that both 21 and 22 Chillers tripped at 1600 and you are currently in T/S 3.7.10 action 'b', entered at 1600.
- To comply with the T/S action, the crew is implementing S2.OP-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation, Section 4.6, Isolation of Non-Essential Heat Loads.
- During preparations to align #2 ECAC cooling to Service Water IAW S2.OP-SO.CA-0001, Control Air System Operation, it was reported that the spool pieces required to align to service water cannot be located.
- Unit 2 CREACS has been removed from service IAW step 4.6.2 of S2.OP-SO.CH-0001.
- CW Inlet Water Temperature Readings from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(Q), Circulating / Service Water Log are:
2TL3756 = 83.4°F
2TL3757 = 83.6°F
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Unit 2 CRS.
- The Shift Manager directs you to NOT isolate the #2 ECAC and to re-perform the Non-Essential heat load determination IAW Attachment 2.
- DETERMINE the total Non-Essential heat load and SELECT the required components for isolation IAW S2.OP-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation, Attachment 2 to comply with Tech Specs.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- It is July 15th time 1800 and you have just assumed the watch as the Unit 2 CRS. It was turned over that both 21 and 22 Chillers tripped at 1600 and you are currently in T/S 3.7.10 action 'b', entered at 1600.
- To comply with the T/S action, the crew is implementing S2.OP-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation, Section 4.6, Isolation of Non-Essential Heat Loads.
- During preparations to align #2 ECAC cooling to Service Water IAW S2.OP-SO.CA-0001, Control Air System Operation, it was reported that the spool pieces required to align to service water cannot be located.
- Unit 2 CREACS has been removed from service IAW step 4.6.2 of S2.OP-SO.CH-0001.
- CW Inlet Water Temperature Readings from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(Q), Circulating / Service Water Log are:
2TL3756 = 83.4°F
2TL3757 = 83.6°F
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Unit 2 CRS.
- The Shift Manager directs you to NOT isolate the #2 ECAC and to re-perform the Non-Essential heat load determination IAW Attachment 2.
- DETERMINE the total Non-Essential heat load and SELECT the required components for isolation IAW S2.OP-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation, Attachment 2 to comply with Tech Specs.
Task Standard:
1. Determines the Total Heat Load Isolation value required is 902.8 kBTU/HR.
2. Selects the required components on Table B for isolation and ensures that the total value (906.6 kBTU/HR) is greater than 902.8 kBTU/HR.
1. Determines the Total Heat Load Isolation value required is 902.8 kBTU/HR.
2. Selects the required components on Table B for isolation and ensures that the total value (906.6 kBTU/HR) is greater than 902.8 kBTU/HR.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| Att 2 1.A | RECORD inlet water temperature data for Table A from SC.OP-DL.ZZ-0008(Q) | Enters temperatures from cue sheet. Records highest temperature (83.6°F) and adds 1.5°F instrument uncertainty = 85.1°F. |
| Att 2 1.B | RECORD number of inoperable Chiller Units | Lists 2 Chillers Inoperable. |
| 1.C * | RECORD the TOTAL HEAT LOAD ISOLATION from Table A | From Table A, determines 902.8 kBTU/HR based on inlet water temp of 85.1°F, 2 chillers inoperable, in Maintenance Mode with Unit 2 EACS Out of Service. |
| 1.D | IDENTIFY the components to be isolated in Table B | Selects non-essential loads for isolation. |
| 1.E * | RECORD heat load values into Isolation column for selected components | Selects values from Table B to ensure total exceeds value from Step 1.C: 21 PACU = 145.7, 22 PACU = 145.7, 23 PACU = 145.7, Secondary Lab = 192.1, Primary Lab = 165.9, Counting Room = 73.0, PASS = 38.5 |
| 1.F * | RECORD "N/A" for components selected to remain available | Selects N/A for Emergency Control Air Compressor (ECAC) — per Shift Manager direction, ECAC is NOT isolated. |
| 1.G * | ADD values recorded in Isolation column and RECORD Total Isolation value | Determines Total Heat Load Isolation per Table B is 906.6 kBTU/HR. |
| 1.H * | ENSURE Total Isolation value (Table B) > Total Heat Load Isolation (Step C) | Determines 906.6 kBTU/HR > 902.8 kBTU/HR — isolation is adequate. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 1.C is the first discriminating element — the applicant must correctly enter Table A using 85.1°F (highest CW temp + 1.5°F uncertainty), 2 chillers inoperable, and Maintenance Mode with EACS out of service to determine 902.8 kBTU/HR. Step 1.E is the second key decision — the applicant must select enough non-essential loads to exceed 902.8 kBTU/HR while keeping the ECAC available per SM direction. The specific combination totaling 906.6 kBTU/HR excludes the ECAC.
Step 1.C is the first discriminating element — the applicant must correctly enter Table A using 85.1°F (highest CW temp + 1.5°F uncertainty), 2 chillers inoperable, and Maintenance Mode with EACS out of service to determine 902.8 kBTU/HR. Step 1.E is the second key decision — the applicant must select enough non-essential loads to exceed 902.8 kBTU/HR while keeping the ECAC available per SM direction. The specific combination totaling 906.6 kBTU/HR excludes the ECAC.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.CH-0001 (Rev 36) | Task: 0980020202 | K/A: G2.1.7 — Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: Chill Water, Control Air, Service Water
- Related procedures: S2.OP-SO.CH-0001 — Chilled Water System Operation
- Related tech specs: TS 3/4.7 — Plant Systems
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM SRO-A2 — Boration Time for Stuck Rods and BAST Level Evaluation
Admin | SRO | G2.1.20 (4.6)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 experienced an automatic Reactor Trip from an inadvertent Main Turbine Trip.
- 2SJ2 was tagged for emergent repairs prior to the trip.
- SI is not required and the crew is implementing 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response.
- Three Control Rods from Control Bank Delta have failed to FULLY insert.
- RWST Concentration is 2350 ppm, and BAST concentration is 6650 ppm.
- Unit 2 remains in Mode 3 throughout the boration.
- Current BAST levels:
21 BAST level: 70%
22 BAST level: 70%
Initiating Cue:
- You are the CRS.
- Determine the amount of time Rapid Boration is required IAW 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Step 4 for the Three Control rods that have failed to insert on Control Bank Delta:
1. How many total minutes of Rapid Boration is required?
2. What will be the final BAST levels in percent IAW S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002?
- Assume the Rapid Boration flowrate remains at 40 GPM for the entire duration required in question 1, and Both BASTs lower equal amounts.
3. Based on plant conditions after completion of the boration, identify any Tech spec(s) and Tech Spec action statement(s) required related to the boric acid system.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 experienced an automatic Reactor Trip from an inadvertent Main Turbine Trip.
- 2SJ2 was tagged for emergent repairs prior to the trip.
- SI is not required and the crew is implementing 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response.
- Three Control Rods from Control Bank Delta have failed to FULLY insert.
- RWST Concentration is 2350 ppm, and BAST concentration is 6650 ppm.
- Unit 2 remains in Mode 3 throughout the boration.
- Current BAST levels:
21 BAST level: 70%
22 BAST level: 70%
Initiating Cue:
- You are the CRS.
- Determine the amount of time Rapid Boration is required IAW 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Step 4 for the Three Control rods that have failed to insert on Control Bank Delta:
1. How many total minutes of Rapid Boration is required?
2. What will be the final BAST levels in percent IAW S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002?
- Assume the Rapid Boration flowrate remains at 40 GPM for the entire duration required in question 1, and Both BASTs lower equal amounts.
3. Based on plant conditions after completion of the boration, identify any Tech spec(s) and Tech Spec action statement(s) required related to the boric acid system.
Task Standard:
1. Calculates the total boration time for 3 stuck control rods to be 105 minutes.
2. Determines final BAST tank levels for 21 tank at 43% +/-2% and 22 tank at 43% +/-2%.
3. Determines that TS LCO 3.1.2.6.a.1 is not met and action is required.
1. Calculates the total boration time for 3 stuck control rods to be 105 minutes.
2. Determines final BAST tank levels for 21 tank at 43% +/-2% and 22 tank at 43% +/-2%.
3. Determines that TS LCO 3.1.2.6.a.1 is not met and action is required.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 1 * | Determine boration time for 3 stuck rods IAW 2-EOP-TRIP-2 Step 4 | Determines 3 control rods failed to fully insert. Boration time = 35 min x 3 rods = 105 minutes. |
| 2.1 * | Determine total volume of boric acid added | 105 min x 40 GPM = 4200 gallons total. Both BASTs lower equal amounts: 4200 / 2 = 2100 gallons per tank. |
| 2.2 * | Determine 21 BAST final level using S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 tank curve | Start level = 70% = 5500 gallons. Final volume = 5500 - 2100 = 3400 gallons. Using tank curve, 3400 gallons = 43% (+/-2%). |
| 2.3 * | Determine 22 BAST final level using S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 tank curve | Start level = 70% = 5500 gallons. Final volume = 5500 - 2100 = 3400 gallons. Using tank curve, 3400 gallons = 43% (+/-2%). |
| 3 * | Evaluate Tech Specs for boric acid system after boration | With RWST boron concentration of 2350 ppm and BAST boron concentration of 6650 ppm, TS 3.1.2.6 Figure 3.1-2 requires BAST level > 96.5%. Final combined BAST level is 86% (43% + 43%), which is below the required level. Determines LCO 3.1.2.6.a.1 is NOT met — Action a: restore storage system to OPERABLE within 72 hours or be in Hot Standby within next 6 hours. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 3 is the discriminating step — after completing the boration calculations, the applicant must recognize that the final BAST levels (43% each, 86% combined) fall below the required level from TS 3.1.2.6 Figure 3.1-2 (> 96.5% at the given RWST/BAST boron concentrations). This requires the applicant to enter the TS figure with both the RWST concentration (2350 ppm) and BAST concentration (6650 ppm) to determine the minimum required level, then compare it against the post-boration tank levels. The applicant must then identify the correct LCO and action statement.
Step 3 is the discriminating step — after completing the boration calculations, the applicant must recognize that the final BAST levels (43% each, 86% combined) fall below the required level from TS 3.1.2.6 Figure 3.1-2 (> 96.5% at the given RWST/BAST boron concentrations). This requires the applicant to enter the TS figure with both the RWST concentration (2350 ppm) and BAST concentration (6650 ppm) to determine the minimum required level, then compare it against the post-boration tank levels. The applicant must then identify the correct LCO and action statement.
Ref: 2-EOP-TRIP-2 (Rev 40), S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 (Rev 8), TS 3.1.2.6 | Task: N1150510502 | K/A: G2.1.20 — Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps | Source: New | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: CVCS
- Related procedures: EOP-TRIP-2 — Reactor Trip Response, S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 — Tank Capacity Data
- Related tech specs: TS 3/4.1.2 — Boration Systems
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM SRO-A3 — Review Containment Ventilation Valve Surveillance
Admin | SRO | G2.2.12 (4.1)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Completed surveillance was given to you at turnover and is in your inbox for review.
- Turnover stated it is just awaiting review and approval.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Unit 2 CRS.
- Review the completed surveillance for compliance with Acceptance Criteria and document results.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Completed surveillance was given to you at turnover and is in your inbox for review.
- Turnover stated it is just awaiting review and approval.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Unit 2 CRS.
- Review the completed surveillance for compliance with Acceptance Criteria and document results.
Task Standard:
Upon reviewing the completed surveillance procedure, the SRO identifies that 2VC5 stroke time is in the Required Action Range, declares the 2VC5 Inoperable, and determines TS LCO 3.6.3 is NOT met.
Upon reviewing the completed surveillance procedure, the SRO identifies that 2VC5 stroke time is in the Required Action Range, declares the 2VC5 Inoperable, and determines TS LCO 3.6.3 is NOT met.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 5.4.3.A | REVIEW procedure with Attachments 1-4 for completeness and accuracy | Operator initials after correction is made to the surveillance procedure. |
| 5.4.3.B | IF valve stroke times are within ACCEPTABLE RANGE, DECLARE applicable valve(s) OPERABLE | Initials this step since all valves except 2VC5 were in the Acceptable Range. |
| 5.4.3.C | IF ANY valve stroke time is in REQUIRED EVALUATION RANGE | N/A — valve is in Required Action Range, not Evaluation Range. |
| 5.4.3.D.1 * | IF ANY valve stroke time is in REQUIRED ACTION RANGE, immediately DECLARE respective valve(s) inoperable | Declares 2VC5 inoperable based on stroke time of 2.83 seconds exceeding the Required Action Range of > 2.0 seconds. |
| 5.4.3.D.2 * | EVALUATE Technical Specification requirements for system operability | Determines TS LCO 3.6.3 is NOT MET for 2VC5. Minimum TS action 1a is applicable. TS action 1.b: 2VC6 must be closed and deactivated within 4 hours. OR TS action 1.c: penetration must be isolated within 4 hours. OR TS action 1.d: Hot Standby in 6 hours and Cold Shutdown in 30 hours. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 5.4.3.D.1 is the discriminating step — the applicant must catch that the 2VC5 stroke time of 2.83 seconds falls in the Required Action Range (> 2.0 seconds), not just the Required Evaluation Range. This requires immediately declaring 2VC5 inoperable (not retesting). The applicant must then evaluate TS 3.6.3 and identify the applicable actions, including the option to close and deactivate the companion valve 2VC6 within 4 hours.
Step 5.4.3.D.1 is the discriminating step — the applicant must catch that the 2VC5 stroke time of 2.83 seconds falls in the Required Action Range (> 2.0 seconds), not just the Required Evaluation Range. This requires immediately declaring 2VC5 inoperable (not retesting). The applicant must then evaluate TS 3.6.3 and identify the applicable actions, including the option to close and deactivate the companion valve 2VC6 within 4 hours.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.CBV-0001 (Rev 9), S2.RA-ST.CBV-0001 (Rev 7) | Task: N1230010302 | K/A: G2.2.12 — Knowledge of surveillance procedures | Source: New | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: Containment
- Related procedures: S2.OP-ST.CBV-0001 — Inservice Testing Containment Ventilation Valves
- Related tech specs: TS 3/4.6 — Containment
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM SRO-A4 — Personnel Exposure for Containment Entry at Power
Admin | SRO | G2.3.4 (3.7)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 20 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Salem 2 is at 100% power reducing power at 10% per hour to perform Turbine valve testing.
- The 22 CFCU has been declared inoperable.
- Tagging has been completed.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the WCCS and need to send operators into containment to remove tags to allow work on 22 CFCU disassembly to continue.
- Operator A has 1992 mrem TEDE for the year and Operator B has 1496 mrem TEDE for the year so far.
- Using the provided Radiological Survey Map and procedures, determine the following:
1. Whose authorization outside of Operations, by position, is needed to enter the containment during the downpower?
2. In accordance with the provided survey map perform the following:
2.1. Calculate the dose for each operator (Assume both operators each take 12 minutes in the area to perform their tagging evolution):
Gamma dose ___ mrem
Neutron dose ___ mrem
2.2. Will the operators exceed the Administrative Annual Dose limit? If so, identify which Operator(s)?
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 20 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Salem 2 is at 100% power reducing power at 10% per hour to perform Turbine valve testing.
- The 22 CFCU has been declared inoperable.
- Tagging has been completed.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the WCCS and need to send operators into containment to remove tags to allow work on 22 CFCU disassembly to continue.
- Operator A has 1992 mrem TEDE for the year and Operator B has 1496 mrem TEDE for the year so far.
- Using the provided Radiological Survey Map and procedures, determine the following:
1. Whose authorization outside of Operations, by position, is needed to enter the containment during the downpower?
2. In accordance with the provided survey map perform the following:
2.1. Calculate the dose for each operator (Assume both operators each take 12 minutes in the area to perform their tagging evolution):
Gamma dose ___ mrem
Neutron dose ___ mrem
2.2. Will the operators exceed the Administrative Annual Dose limit? If so, identify which Operator(s)?
Task Standard:
1. Determines the Radiation Protection Supervisor must authorize entry.
2. Determines Gamma dose for each operator is 1 mrem.
3. Determines Neutron dose for each operator is 8 mrem.
4. Determines Operator A total dose is 2001 mrem and Operator B total dose is 1505 mrem. Operator A exceeds administrative dose control limit of 2000 mrem.
1. Determines the Radiation Protection Supervisor must authorize entry.
2. Determines Gamma dose for each operator is 1 mrem.
3. Determines Neutron dose for each operator is 8 mrem.
4. Determines Operator A total dose is 2001 mrem and Operator B total dose is 1505 mrem. Operator A exceeds administrative dose control limit of 2000 mrem.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 * | Determine whose authorization outside of Operations is needed for containment entry during downpower | Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) as designated in RP-SA-102 and SC.SA-ST.ZZ-0001. |
| 2.1.A * | Calculate Gamma dose for each operator | 12 minutes / 60 minutes x 5 mrem/hr = 1 mrem gamma. |
| 2.1.B * | Calculate Neutron dose for each operator | 12 minutes / 60 minutes x 40 mrem/hr = 8 mrem neutron. |
| 2.2 * | Determine if operators exceed Administrative Annual Dose limit and identify which operator(s) | Operator A: 1992 + 1 + 8 = 2001 mrem — EXCEEDS ADCL of 2000 mrem (1 mrem above). Operator B: 1496 + 1 + 8 = 1505 mrem — below ADCL (495 mrem below). Only Operator A exceeds the administrative dose control limit. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 2.2 is the discriminating step — the applicant must add BOTH gamma (1 mrem) and neutron (8 mrem) doses to each operator's existing annual TEDE, then compare against the 2000 mrem Administrative Dose Control Limit. Operator A at 1992 + 9 = 2001 mrem just barely exceeds the limit by 1 mrem. The applicant must correctly include neutron dose (which is the dominant contributor at 40 mrem/hr vs 5 mrem/hr gamma) in the total to recognize the exceedance.
Step 2.2 is the discriminating step — the applicant must add BOTH gamma (1 mrem) and neutron (8 mrem) doses to each operator's existing annual TEDE, then compare against the 2000 mrem Administrative Dose Control Limit. Operator A at 1992 + 9 = 2001 mrem just barely exceeds the limit by 1 mrem. The applicant must correctly include neutron dose (which is the dominant contributor at 40 mrem/hr vs 5 mrem/hr gamma) in the total to recognize the exceedance.
Ref: RP-SA-102 (Rev 0), SC.SA-ST.ZZ-0001 (Rev 5), RP-AA-300 (Rev 6), RP-AA-463 (Rev 6), RP-AA-203 (Rev 6) | Task: 1200100104 | K/A: G2.3.4 — Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions | Source: New | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: CFCUs, Containment
- Related procedures: RP-SA-102 — Containment Entries at Power, RP-AA-203 — Exposure Control and Authorization, RP-AA-300 — Radiological Survey Program
- Related admin: RP-AA-460 — Controls for High and Very High Radiation Areas
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM SRO-A5 — Classify Event and Determine PARs
Admin | SRO | G2.4.41 (4.6)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: Yes
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Salem Units 1 and 2 are at 100% power.
- 23 Station Power Transformer (SPT) is tagged and is 12 hours into a 24 hour scheduled maintenance window.
- An electrical grid disturbance on the 500 kV lines has caused the Unit 2 Main Generator protection circuit to automatically trip the Unit 2 reactor.
- The crew is transitioning from EOP-TRIP-1 to EOP-TRIP-2.
- Following transition to TRIP-2, 24 SPT de-energizes due to actuation of electrical protection relays.
- The 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started then tripped on overspeed and could not be reset; and the 2B 4 KV Vital Bus de-energized following a Bus Differential protection trip.
- Minutes later the Primary Operator reports a loud sound from the EDG rooms and 2C EDG trips.
Initiating Cue:
- Maintenance provides you the following updates:
- 2A EDG will take 5 hours to repair the bent linkage to the fuel racks.
- 2B 4 KV Vital Bus has sustained significant damage to the bus bars due to a ground fault.
- 2C EDG has sustained significant engine damage due to an engine piston failure.
- 23 SPT needs 8 hours to restore and release tags.
- 24 SPT sustained an internal fault and will need outside vendor support. Vendor is expected to be on-site in 3.5 hours.
- You are the Emergency Coordinator:
1. Classify the emergency event, and
2. Complete the Initial Contact Message Form (ICMF).
- MET computer 33 FT. level wind direction is steady from 90 degrees at 2 mph.
- 2R41D, Plant Vent Radiation monitor is reading normal.
- THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM
Time-Critical: Yes
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Salem Units 1 and 2 are at 100% power.
- 23 Station Power Transformer (SPT) is tagged and is 12 hours into a 24 hour scheduled maintenance window.
- An electrical grid disturbance on the 500 kV lines has caused the Unit 2 Main Generator protection circuit to automatically trip the Unit 2 reactor.
- The crew is transitioning from EOP-TRIP-1 to EOP-TRIP-2.
- Following transition to TRIP-2, 24 SPT de-energizes due to actuation of electrical protection relays.
- The 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started then tripped on overspeed and could not be reset; and the 2B 4 KV Vital Bus de-energized following a Bus Differential protection trip.
- Minutes later the Primary Operator reports a loud sound from the EDG rooms and 2C EDG trips.
Initiating Cue:
- Maintenance provides you the following updates:
- 2A EDG will take 5 hours to repair the bent linkage to the fuel racks.
- 2B 4 KV Vital Bus has sustained significant damage to the bus bars due to a ground fault.
- 2C EDG has sustained significant engine damage due to an engine piston failure.
- 23 SPT needs 8 hours to restore and release tags.
- 24 SPT sustained an internal fault and will need outside vendor support. Vendor is expected to be on-site in 3.5 hours.
- You are the Emergency Coordinator:
1. Classify the emergency event, and
2. Complete the Initial Contact Message Form (ICMF).
- MET computer 33 FT. level wind direction is steady from 90 degrees at 2 mph.
- 2R41D, Plant Vent Radiation monitor is reading normal.
- THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM
Task Standard:
1. Classifies the event as GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) based on EAL SG1.1 within 15 minutes.
2. Completes Attachment 4 Sections I thru V of the ICMF and selects Default PAR (No RPSA) within 15 minutes from event declaration.
1. Classifies the event as GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) based on EAL SG1.1 within 15 minutes.
2. Completes Attachment 4 Sections I thru V of the ICMF and selects Default PAR (No RPSA) within 15 minutes from event declaration.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 1 * | Classify the emergency event | Classifies as GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) based on ECG — EAL Section S (System Malfunction), S1 Loss of AC Power, EAL# SG1.1. Must be classified within 15 minutes. |
| 2 * | Complete the ICMF (Attachment 4, Sections I thru V) | Accurately completes EP-SA-325-F4 Sections I thru V per answer key. Must be completed within 15 minutes of event declaration. |
| 2 (cont.) | Determine Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) using Appendix 1 | Using Attachment 4, EP-SA-325-F4, Appendix 1: - Initial PAR — Yes - GE based on Loss of Three Fission Product Barriers? — No - Hostile Action Event in Progress affecting the GE? — No - Selects Default PAR (No RPSA): Evacuate All Sectors 0-5 miles Monitor & Prepare All Sectors 5-10 miles |
Key Decision Point:
Step 1 is the discriminating step — the applicant must recognize this is a General Emergency, not just a Site Area Emergency. The scenario involves loss of ALL AC power sources to Unit 2: both offsite sources (23 SPT tagged out, 24 SPT faulted) AND all three EDGs (2A tripped/unrepairable quickly, 2B vital bus damaged, 2C engine failure). EAL SG1.1 (Loss of AC Power — GE) applies because AC power cannot be restored within the EAL timeframe. The applicant must then correctly apply the Default PAR decision tree: no fission product barrier loss and no hostile action leads to Default PAR — evacuate 0-5 miles, monitor/prepare 5-10 miles.
Step 1 is the discriminating step — the applicant must recognize this is a General Emergency, not just a Site Area Emergency. The scenario involves loss of ALL AC power sources to Unit 2: both offsite sources (23 SPT tagged out, 24 SPT faulted) AND all three EDGs (2A tripped/unrepairable quickly, 2B vital bus damaged, 2C engine failure). EAL SG1.1 (Loss of AC Power — GE) applies because AC power cannot be restored within the EAL timeframe. The applicant must then correctly apply the Default PAR decision tree: no fission product barrier loss and no hostile action leads to Default PAR — evacuate 0-5 miles, monitor/prepare 5-10 miles.
Ref: EP-SA-325-114 (Section S1, Rev 00), EP-SA-325-F4 (GE, Rev 01) | Task: 1240020502 | K/A: G2.4.41 — Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications | Source: Modified | Time-Critical: 15/15 minutes | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: EDGs, 4KV, 500KV
- Related procedures: EP-SA-325 — Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures
- Related tech specs: TS 3/4.8 — Electrical
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM IP-i — Transfer PZR Backup Heater to Emergency Power Supply
In-Plant | RO/SRO | 010 A4.03 (3.6/3.4)
Location: In-Plant — 78 ft. and 84 ft. Electrical Penetration / Switchgear Room
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred on Units 1 and 2.
- The Unit 2 CRS has initiated S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0001, Loss of Offsite Power.
Initiating Cue:
You have been directed to TRANSFER the 22 Backup Group Pressurizer Heaters to the Emergency Power Supply IAW Section 5.3 of S2.OP-SO.PZR-0010, Pressurizer Backup Heaters Power Supply Transfer.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred on Units 1 and 2.
- The Unit 2 CRS has initiated S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0001, Loss of Offsite Power.
Initiating Cue:
You have been directed to TRANSFER the 22 Backup Group Pressurizer Heaters to the Emergency Power Supply IAW Section 5.3 of S2.OP-SO.PZR-0010, Pressurizer Backup Heaters Power Supply Transfer.
Task Standard:
Transfers the 22 Backup Group Pressurizer heaters to the Emergency Power source by placing 11 of 14 disconnects in OFF, placing the 2EP PZR HTR BUS EMERGENCY FEED DISCONNECT SWITCH in ON, and using the interlock key to unlock breaker 2AX1AX14X.
Transfers the 22 Backup Group Pressurizer heaters to the Emergency Power source by placing 11 of 14 disconnects in OFF, placing the 2EP PZR HTR BUS EMERGENCY FEED DISCONNECT SWITCH in ON, and using the interlock key to unlock breaker 2AX1AX14X.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 5.3.1 | ENSURE 2AX1AX14X, 2EP PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS FEED (EMERGENCY) is OPEN (84 ft. Swgr Rm) | Verifies breaker is OPEN. |
| 5.3.2 * | Request NCO to PLACE 22 Backup Group in MANUAL and PRESS 22 BACKUP OFF pushbutton | Directs NCO to place 22 B/U Group in Manual and PRESS 22 B/U OFF pushbutton. |
| 5.3.3 | ENSURE 2EX1EP2EPX, 2EP 480V PRESSURIZER HEATER BUS MAIN BREAKER is OPEN (78 ft. Electrical Penetration) | Verifies breaker is OPEN. |
| 5.3.4 * | REMOVE interlock key from breaker 2EX1EP2EPX | Operator simulates removing interlock key from breaker. |
| 5.3.5 * | PLACE any eleven (11) of the following disconnects in OFF (only three disconnects are to remain ON): 2EX1EP1X through 2EX1EP14X, PZR HTR B/U GRP 22 | Operator selects three (3) disconnects to remain ON and PLACES eleven (11) disconnects to OFF position. This limits the heater load to stay within the 460V Vital Bus capacity. |
| 5.3.6 * | PLACE 2AX1AX14X-1, 2EP PZR HTR BUS EMERGENCY FEED DISCONNECT SWITCH in the ON position (Elev. 78 ft. Electrical Penetration) using JAM Key to unlock | Simulates using JAM Key to unlock disconnect AND then placing the disconnect switch to the ON position. |
| 5.3.7 * | INSERT interlock key AND UNLOCK breaker 2AX1AX14X | Operator simulates inserting key into breaker and then rotating to unlock the breaker. |
| 5.3.8 | NOTIFY NCO that PZR Htr 22 B/U Group has been transferred to the emergency power supply (2A 460V Vital Bus) | NCO is notified that 22 B/U Group is transferred to the emergency power supply. |
Key Decision Point:
Steps 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 are the discriminating steps. The applicant must correctly place 11 of the 14 heater disconnects in OFF (leaving only 3 ON to limit load within the 460V Vital Bus capacity), then use the JAM key to unlock the 2EP PZR HTR BUS EMERGENCY FEED DISCONNECT SWITCH and place it in ON. The sequential interlock key transfer from the main breaker (2EX1EP2EPX) to the emergency feed breaker (2AX1AX14X) ensures proper electrical isolation during the transfer.
Steps 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 are the discriminating steps. The applicant must correctly place 11 of the 14 heater disconnects in OFF (leaving only 3 ON to limit load within the 460V Vital Bus capacity), then use the JAM key to unlock the 2EP PZR HTR BUS EMERGENCY FEED DISCONNECT SWITCH and place it in ON. The sequential interlock key transfer from the main breaker (2EX1EP2EPX) to the emergency feed breaker (2AX1AX14X) ensures proper electrical isolation during the transfer.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.PZR-0010 (R32) | Task: 1130040501 | K/A: 010 A4.03 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Pressurizer heaters | Source: New | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: Pressurizer & PRT, Pressurizer Level & Press Control, 460/230V AC
- Related procedures: S2.OP-SO.PZR-0010 — Pressurizer Backup Heaters Power Supply Transfer, AB.LOOP-0001 — Loss of All Offsite Power
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM IP-j — Locally Open Reactor Trip Breakers IAW AB.CR-0001
In-Plant | RO/SRO | 012 A4.06 (4.3/4.3)
Location: In-Plant — Unit 1 RCA, 84 ft. Switchgear Room and 460V Vital Bus Room
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 25 minutes
Unit: Salem Unit 1 ONLY
Initial Conditions:
- The Unit 1 Control Room has been evacuated in accordance with S1.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation.
- A reactor trip was NOT initiated prior to evacuating the Control Room.
Initiating Cue:
You are directed to perform Unit 1 S1.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 5.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 25 minutes
Unit: Salem Unit 1 ONLY
Initial Conditions:
- The Unit 1 Control Room has been evacuated in accordance with S1.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation.
- A reactor trip was NOT initiated prior to evacuating the Control Room.
Initiating Cue:
You are directed to perform Unit 1 S1.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 5.
Task Standard:
1. Locally opens Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers.
2. Locally opens breakers for 13 Charging Pump and 1CV175 Rapid Borate valve.
1. Locally opens Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers.
2. Locally opens breakers for 13 Charging Pump and 1CV175 Rapid Borate valve.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | OBTAIN: copy of procedure, radio (Appendix R Cabinet), key ring set and tools (JA Master, Breaker Keyswitch, screwdriver, adjustable wrench), Security Master Key from Unit 1 CRS | Operator reviews S1.OP-AB.CR-0001 Att. 5 and proceeds to El. 84 switchgear room. |
| 2.0 * | PROCEED to Rod Drive MG Set Control Panel (460V Vital Bus Room - El 84 ft.) AND OPEN the following breakers: 2.1 Reactor Trip Breaker A 2.2 Reactor Trip Breaker B 2.3 Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker A 2.4 Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker B |
Operator simulates opening breakers by simulating removing cover and depressing the trip (open) pushbuttons for all four breakers. |
| 3.0 | CONFIRM with the Hot Shutdown Panel Operator (PO) that 11 or 12 Charging Pump is operating | Confirms 11 Charging Pump is operating. |
| 4.0 * | PROCEED to 1AX1AX7X, #13 Charging Pump breaker AND OPEN the breaker | Locates 1AX1AX7X, #13 Charging Pump breaker AND simulates depressing the trip PB to open the breaker. |
| 5.0 * | PROCEED to 1C West Valve & Misc 230V Control Center - El 84 ft. AND OPEN Breaker 1CY2AX4I, 1CV175 - Rapid Borate Stop Valve | Locates 1C West Valve & Misc 230V Control Center - El 84 ft. and simulates opening Breaker 1CY2AX4I, 1CV175 - Rapid Borate Stop Valve. |
| 6.0 | NOTIFY the CRS of the following: 6.1 The Reactor Trip and Bypass breakers are OPEN 6.2 #13 Charging Pump Breaker is OPEN |
Contacts CRS and reports the Reactor Trip and Bypass breakers are open and #13 Charging Pump Breaker is open. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 2.0 is the primary discriminating step — the applicant must locate the Rod Drive MG Set Control Panel in the 460V Vital Bus Room at El 84 ft. and open ALL FOUR breakers (Trip A, Trip B, Bypass A, Bypass B). Opening only the trip breakers without the bypass breakers would be unsatisfactory. Steps 4.0 and 5.0 test the applicant's knowledge that during a control room evacuation without a prior reactor trip, the 13 Charging Pump must be tripped (to stop uncontrolled charging) and the 1CV175 Rapid Borate Stop Valve breaker must be opened (to de-energize the valve and stop potential uncontrolled boration).
Step 2.0 is the primary discriminating step — the applicant must locate the Rod Drive MG Set Control Panel in the 460V Vital Bus Room at El 84 ft. and open ALL FOUR breakers (Trip A, Trip B, Bypass A, Bypass B). Opening only the trip breakers without the bypass breakers would be unsatisfactory. Steps 4.0 and 5.0 test the applicant's knowledge that during a control room evacuation without a prior reactor trip, the 13 Charging Pump must be tripped (to stop uncontrolled charging) and the 1CV175 Rapid Borate Stop Valve breaker must be opened (to de-energize the valve and stop potential uncontrolled boration).
Ref: S1.OP-AB.CR-0001, Att. 5 (R19) | Task: 1130070501 | K/A: 012 A4.06 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Reactor trip breakers | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: RPS/SSPS, CVCS
- Related procedures: AB.CR-0001 — Control Room Evacuation
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM IP-k — Perform a Radioactive Liquid Release
In-Plant | RO/SRO | 068 A4.03 (3.9/3.8)
Location: In-Plant — 64 ft. Elevation Aux Bldg (RCA), Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room, CVCS MT Room, 104 Panel area
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 25 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Preparations for a release of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank via Unit 2 SW system to Unit 1 CW system is in progress IAW S2.OP-SO.WL-0001, RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE FROM 21 CVCS MONITOR TANK.
- Chemistry has granted permission to release 21 CVCS MT at a Maximum Release Rate of 45 gpm due to the high activity (Curie) content of the tank.
- 2R18 Radiation Monitor AND 2FR1064 Flow Recorder are both OPERABLE.
- All Unit 1 CW pumps are in service.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the extra NCO.
- The CRS directs you to release 21 CVCS MT IAW Section 5.5 of S2.OP-SO.WL-0001.
- The Maximum Release Rate and Release Path are recorded on Attachment 2, Section 2.2 of the procedure.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 25 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Preparations for a release of 21 CVCS Monitor Tank via Unit 2 SW system to Unit 1 CW system is in progress IAW S2.OP-SO.WL-0001, RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE FROM 21 CVCS MONITOR TANK.
- Chemistry has granted permission to release 21 CVCS MT at a Maximum Release Rate of 45 gpm due to the high activity (Curie) content of the tank.
- 2R18 Radiation Monitor AND 2FR1064 Flow Recorder are both OPERABLE.
- All Unit 1 CW pumps are in service.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the extra NCO.
- The CRS directs you to release 21 CVCS MT IAW Section 5.5 of S2.OP-SO.WL-0001.
- The Maximum Release Rate and Release Path are recorded on Attachment 2, Section 2.2 of the procedure.
Task Standard:
1. Controls the discharge of 21 CVCS MT to less than the Maximum Release rate of 45 gpm.
2. Notifies control room to close 2WL51 following high alarm on the 2R18 radiation monitor.
1. Controls the discharge of 21 CVCS MT to less than the Maximum Release rate of 45 gpm.
2. Notifies control room to close 2WL51 following high alarm on the 2R18 radiation monitor.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 5.5.1 | IF 2FR1064, RADWASTE OVERBOARD DISCH FLOW RECORDER is INOPERABLE, THEN INITIATE Attachment 4, Section 4.0 | Marks step N/A; 2FR1064 is OPERABLE. |
| 5.5.2 * | DIRECT Unit 2 NCO to OPEN 2WL51, LIQUID RELEASE STOP VALVE | Operator simulates calling control room and DIRECTS Unit 2 NCO to OPEN 2WL51. |
| 5.5.3 | DIRECT second Operator to PERFORM Independent Verification of 2WL51 position in Attachment 2 | IV has been performed. |
| 5.5.4 * | THROTTLE OPEN 2WR59, MT PMPS OB STOP VALVE, to obtain less than or equal to Maximum Release Rate recorded in Attachment 2, Step 2.2.2 | Operator locates 2WR59 (Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room, 64 ft. El. Aux Bldg) and simulates opening valve by turning hand wheel counterclockwise. 2FR1064 reads 5 gpm with 2WR59 full open. |
| 5.5.5 | DIRECT second Operator to PERFORM Independent Verification of 2WR59 position in Attachment 2 | IV has been performed. |
| Caution | Completely closing 21WR53 will NOT provide sufficient recirculation to protect the pump should 2WL51 isolate due to high radiation alarm | Operator reads Caution and continues. |
| 5.5.6 * | IF Maximum Release Rate NOT obtained with 2WR59 fully open, THEN THROTTLE 21WR53, MT RECIRC V, to obtain less than or equal to Maximum Release Rate (CVCS MT Room, 64 ft. El. Aux Bldg, 21WR53 is about 7 feet above the floor) | Operator locates 21WR53 and simulates throttling valve CLOSED (clockwise) to raise discharge flow. Flow initially reads 50 gpm (exceeds 45 gpm max). Operator then OPENS 21WR53 (counterclockwise) to lower flow to 40 gpm (below 45 gpm limit). |
| 5.5.7 | IF 2FR1064 flow monitor is OPERABLE, THEN RECORD time, date, and tank identification on recorder | Operator simulates annotating recorder with time, date, and tank. |
| 5.5.8 | COMPLETE Attachment 2, Section 5.1 — 21 CVCS MT Release Initial Data: 21 CVCS MT Level (2LIS180), Tank Volume from S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002, Dilution Flow Rate, Discharge Flow Rate (2FR1064), 2R18 Monitor Reading | Records: 2LIS-180 indicates 90%. Tank volume 19500 gallons (acceptable 19200-19800). Dilution Water Flowrate 200000 gpm (all CW pumps in service, 2 circulators x 100000). Discharge flow 40 gpm. 2R18 reads 105 counts per minute and 2R18 High Radiation light is illuminated. |
| 5.5.9 * | IF any of the following occur during release, THEN DIRECT NCO to CLOSE 2WL51, LIQUID RELEASE STOP VALVE: - LOSS of dilution water flow - 2FR1064 becomes inoperable - 2R18 Monitor ALARMS - MT Pump pressure falls below MDP allowed IAW Attachment 4 |
Operator recognizes 2R18 is in ALARM (High Radiation light illuminated, 105 CPM) and simulates calling the main control room to report 2R18 is in ALARM and DIRECTS the NCO to CLOSE 2WL51. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 5.5.6 tests whether the applicant understands the relationship between 2WR59 (overboard stop valve) and 21WR53 (recirculation valve) for controlling release rate. With 2WR59 fully open and flow only at 5 gpm, throttling 21WR53 CLOSED diverts more flow overboard, but can exceed the 45 gpm max release rate (flow initially reads 50 gpm). The applicant must then OPEN 21WR53 to bring flow back below 45 gpm. Step 5.5.9 is the alternate path trigger — the applicant must recognize that the 2R18 High Radiation alarm (105 CPM with high radiation light illuminated) requires immediately directing the NCO to close 2WL51 to terminate the release.
Step 5.5.6 tests whether the applicant understands the relationship between 2WR59 (overboard stop valve) and 21WR53 (recirculation valve) for controlling release rate. With 2WR59 fully open and flow only at 5 gpm, throttling 21WR53 CLOSED diverts more flow overboard, but can exceed the 45 gpm max release rate (flow initially reads 50 gpm). The applicant must then OPEN 21WR53 to bring flow back below 45 gpm. Step 5.5.9 is the alternate path trigger — the applicant must recognize that the 2R18 High Radiation alarm (105 CPM with high radiation light illuminated) requires immediately directing the NCO to close 2WL51 to terminate the release.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.WL-0001 (R28) | Task: N0685140104 | K/A: 068 A4.03 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Liquid radwaste system | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related systems: Waste Liquid, Radiation Monitoring
- Related procedures: S2.OP-SO.WL-0001 — Release of Radioactive Liquid Waste
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM Sim-a — Perform Control Rod System Surveillance
Sim | RO | 001 A2.11 (4.4/4.7)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power BOL.
- No major equipment is out of service and no Tech Specs are active.
- The rod control system surveillance is in progress. All sections are complete, except for exercising Control Bank D.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to complete the rod control system surveillance IAW S2.OP-ST.RCS-0001, Reactivity Control System Rod Control Assemblies.
- A Maintenance Technician is stationed at the Rod Control Power Cabinets (Relay Room).
- CRS directs that 15 steps of rod insertion will be performed to ensure each rod moves at least 10 steps.
- Notify the CRS when the testing is complete.
- Your evaluator will take care of all alarms not related to your task.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power BOL.
- No major equipment is out of service and no Tech Specs are active.
- The rod control system surveillance is in progress. All sections are complete, except for exercising Control Bank D.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to complete the rod control system surveillance IAW S2.OP-ST.RCS-0001, Reactivity Control System Rod Control Assemblies.
- A Maintenance Technician is stationed at the Rod Control Power Cabinets (Relay Room).
- CRS directs that 15 steps of rod insertion will be performed to ensure each rod moves at least 10 steps.
- Notify the CRS when the testing is complete.
- Your evaluator will take care of all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
Exercises Control Bank D at least 10 steps and upon completion of the test recognizes unexpected continuous rod movement requiring a manual reactor trip.
Exercises Control Bank D at least 10 steps and upon completion of the test recognizes unexpected continuous rod movement requiring a manual reactor trip.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.10.1 | Ensure Tavg is within +/-1F of Tref | Checks Tave/Tref recorder on 2RP4 and determines Tavg is within +/-1F of Tref. |
| 4.1.10.2 * | Place Bank Selector Switch in CBD position | Rotates selector switch clockwise to the CBD position. |
| 4.1.10.3 | Ensure GRP SELECT B lights illuminated on Cabinets 21BD and 22BD | Contacts Maintenance Technician at Power Cabinets. Technician reports GRP SELECT B lights are illuminated. |
| 4.1.10.4-5 | Insert/Withdraw Control Bank D 1 step (repeat 3 times) | Inserts one step, withdraws one step. Repeated three times consecutively. |
| 4.1.10.6 * | Maneuver Control Bank D at least 10 steps in one direction | Inserts Control Bank D 15 steps. |
| 4.1.10.7 | Ensure each rod in CBD indicated movement of at least 10 steps | Monitors rod position on P-250 and determines D bank rods all moved at least 10 steps. |
| 4.1.10.8 * | Record test results as SAT | Records test results as SAT using Acceptance Criteria in Attachment 1, Rod Control Assembly Data. |
| 4.1.10.9 * | Restore Control Bank D to pre-test position | Withdraws Bank D to previous position (ARO). |
| 4.1.11.3 * | Place Bank Selector Switch in AUTO — recognize unexpected continuous rod insertion and manually trip the reactor | Determines Turbine Power is >15% and rotates selector switch to AUTO position. Announces rods are stepping in with no runback in progress. Places rod bank switch to Manual — rod motion has NOT stopped. Manually trips the reactor. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 4.1.11.3 is the alternate path / discriminating step. After placing the rod bank selector switch in AUTO, an uncontrolled rod insertion malfunction activates (rods insert in both AUTO and MANUAL). The applicant must recognize that rods continue inserting even after placing the switch in Manual, and manually trip the reactor. The operator may reference S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion, to confirm the action.
Step 4.1.11.3 is the alternate path / discriminating step. After placing the rod bank selector switch in AUTO, an uncontrolled rod insertion malfunction activates (rods insert in both AUTO and MANUAL). The applicant must recognize that rods continue inserting even after placing the switch in Manual, and manually trip the reactor. The operator may reference S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion, to confirm the action.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.RCS-0001 (Rev 25) | Task: 50638 | K/A: 001 A2.11 — Ability to predict the impacts of continuous rod insertion/withdrawal on reactor power (4.4/4.7) | Safety Fn: 1 | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related procedures: S2.OP-ST.RCS-0001 — Rod Control Assemblies Surveillance, AB.ROD-0003 — Continuous Rod Motion
- Related systems: Control Rod Drive
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM Sim-b — Perform Manual Makeup to VCT
Sim | RO/SRO | 004 A4.04 (3.2/3.6)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- 100% power, MOL. RCS boron concentration is 900 ppm.
- The crew has entered S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, due to VCT level channel 2LT112 failing high.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to PERFORM a manual makeup of the VCT to RESTORE VCT level to 53% IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006, Boron Concentration Control, Section 5.2, Manual Makeup Mode.
- All prerequisites are complete.
- Boric Acid Storage Tank boron concentration is 6700 ppm.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- 100% power, MOL. RCS boron concentration is 900 ppm.
- The crew has entered S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, due to VCT level channel 2LT112 failing high.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to PERFORM a manual makeup of the VCT to RESTORE VCT level to 53% IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006, Boron Concentration Control, Section 5.2, Manual Makeup Mode.
- All prerequisites are complete.
- Boric Acid Storage Tank boron concentration is 6700 ppm.
Task Standard:
Initiates manual makeup to VCT and stops the makeup when informed that VCT level is at 53%.
Initiates manual makeup to VCT and stops the makeup when informed that VCT level is at 53%.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2.1 * | Determine Boric Acid Flow Setpoint from S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012 | Uses Figure 100A for 62 gpm Primary Water Flow with BAST concentration at 6700 ppm. Graph yields ~10 gpm; calculation yields 9.6 gpm. Acceptable range: 9-11 gpm. |
| 5.2.2 | Reset COUNT A on Makeup Flow Registers to zero | Resets COUNT A for Boric Acid and Primary Water flow IAW Exhibit 1. |
| 5.2.3 * | Press Makeup Control Mode Select STOP pushbutton | Presses Makeup Control Mode Select STOP pushbutton and verifies bezel illuminates. |
| 5.2.4 * | Place 2CV179 (Primary Water Flow) in MANUAL and CLOSE | Depresses 2CV179 MANUAL PB until bezel illuminates. Note: when selected to manual, 2CV179 will initially go full open (expected). Depresses 2CV179 CLOSE PB until bezel illuminates. |
| 5.2.5 * | Place 2CV172 (Boric Acid Flow) in MANUAL and CLOSE | Depresses 2CV172 MANUAL PB until bezel illuminates. Depresses 2CV172 CLOSE PB until bezel illuminates. |
| 5.2.6 * | Align outlet of Boric Acid Blender — OPEN 2CV185 or 2CV181 | Selects one flowpath alignment by depressing the MANUAL PB, then the OPEN PB for 2CV185 (preferred — to charging pump suction) or 2CV181. |
| 5.2.7 * | START a Primary Water Pump and PLACE a Boric Acid Pump in MANUAL/FAST START | Depresses MANUAL PB for selected PW pump, depresses START PB. Depresses MANUAL PB for selected BAT pump, depresses FAST START PB. |
| 5.2.8 * | Adjust 2CV172 flow (FI110A) to setpoint from Step 5.2.1 | Adjusts Boric Acid Flow on FI110A to the value recorded in Step 5.2.1 by depressing 2CV172 OPEN/CLOSE PBs. |
| 5.2.10 * | Adjust 2CV179 setpoint to 62 gpm on FI111A | Adjusts Primary Water flow on FI111A to 62 gpm (acceptable range 60-64 gpm) by depressing 2CV179 OPEN/CLOSE PBs. |
| 5.2.12 * | When VCT level at 53%: CLOSE 2CV179, 2CV172, and 2CV185/2CV181; STOP Primary Water Pump; place Boric Acid Pump in SLOW speed | Depresses CLOSE PBs for 2CV179, 2CV172, and the makeup flowpath valve. Depresses STOP PB for Primary Water Pump. Places selected Boric Acid Pump in SLOW speed. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 5.2.1 is the discriminating step. The applicant must correctly determine the Boric Acid flow setpoint using Figure 100A from S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012 (not Figure 100C, which is for 9000 ppm boron). With 900 ppm RCS boron and 6700 ppm BAST concentration at 62 gpm Primary Water flow, the correct setpoint is approximately 9.6 gpm (acceptable 9-11 gpm). Using the wrong figure or the existing console setpoint without verification would result in an incorrect makeup composition.
Step 5.2.1 is the discriminating step. The applicant must correctly determine the Boric Acid flow setpoint using Figure 100A from S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012 (not Figure 100C, which is for 9000 ppm boron). With 900 ppm RCS boron and 6700 ppm BAST concentration at 62 gpm Primary Water flow, the correct setpoint is approximately 9.6 gpm (acceptable 9-11 gpm). Using the wrong figure or the existing console setpoint without verification would result in an incorrect makeup composition.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 (Rev 25), S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012 (Rev 225) | Task: 0040130101 | K/A: 004 A4.04 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CVCS (3.2/3.6) | Safety Fn: 2 | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related procedures: S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 — Boron Concentration Control, AB.CVC-0001 — Loss of Charging
- Related systems: CVCS
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM Sim-c — Isolate ECCS Accumulators in EOP-LOCA-1
Sim | RO/SRO | 006 A3.10 (4.0/3.9)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- The reactor was tripped when a RCS leak occurred.
- The operating crew has progressed through the EOPs and is now in 2-EOP-LOCA-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to isolate the SI Accumulators IAW Step 14 of 2-EOP-LOCA-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
- Notify the CRS when Step 14 is completed.
- Your evaluator will take care of all alarms not related to your task.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- The reactor was tripped when a RCS leak occurred.
- The operating crew has progressed through the EOPs and is now in 2-EOP-LOCA-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to isolate the SI Accumulators IAW Step 14 of 2-EOP-LOCA-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
- Notify the CRS when Step 14 is completed.
- Your evaluator will take care of all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
1. Closes 21, 22, and 23 SJ54s. 2. Vents 24 SI Accumulator to atmospheric pressure.
1. Closes 21, 22, and 23 SJ54s. 2. Vents 24 SI Accumulator to atmospheric pressure.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 14 | Are at least two RCS T-Hots less than 405F | YES. Operator verifies at least two RCS T-Hots less than 405F. |
| 14.1 * | Remove lockout from 21-24 SJ54 (Accumulator Outlet Valves) | At 2RP4 Panel, selects VALVE OPERABLE on 21-24 SJ54 Accumulator Outlet Valves Lockout Switch. |
| 14.1 (contd) * | CLOSE 21 thru 24 SJ54 | Depresses CLOSE pushbuttons for 21 thru 24 SJ54 Accumulator Outlet Valves and verifies each CLOSE bezel illuminates. |
| 14.2 | Are 21 thru 24 SJ54 CLOSED | NO. Operator determines 24SJ54 Accumulator Outlet Valve is OPEN. May re-check lockout switch position or attempt to depress Close PB again. |
| 14.2 (contd) * | Vent unisolated accumulator: OPEN 2NT35 (N2 HDR Valve) and 24SJ93 (N2 Supply Valve) | Depresses OPEN PB for 2NT35 (N2 HDR Valve) until OPEN bezel illuminates. Depresses OPEN PB for 24SJ93 (N2 Supply Valve) until OPEN bezel illuminates. Observes 24 Accumulator pressure lowering to ZERO. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 14.2 is the alternate path / discriminating step. After closing 21-23 SJ54, the applicant discovers that 24SJ54 fails to close (valve stuck open). Rather than continuing to attempt closure, the applicant must recognize that the accumulator cannot be isolated normally and must vent the 24 Accumulator to atmospheric pressure by opening 2NT35 (N2 Header Valve) and 24SJ93 (N2 Supply Valve), then verify accumulator pressure reaches zero.
Step 14.2 is the alternate path / discriminating step. After closing 21-23 SJ54, the applicant discovers that 24SJ54 fails to close (valve stuck open). Rather than continuing to attempt closure, the applicant must recognize that the accumulator cannot be isolated normally and must vent the 24 Accumulator to atmospheric pressure by opening 2NT35 (N2 Header Valve) and 24SJ93 (N2 Supply Valve), then verify accumulator pressure reaches zero.
Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-1 (Rev 40) | Task: N0060100101 | K/A: 006 A3.10 — Ability to monitor automatic operations of the ECCS (4.0/3.9) | Safety Fn: 3 | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related procedures: EOP-LOCA-1 — Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
- Related systems: ECCS
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM Sim-d — Respond to RCP Standpipe Low Level Alarm
Sim | RO/SRO | 003 A1.10 (2.5/2.7)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 6 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- No major equipment is out of service and no Tech Specs are active.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- Respond to all alarms and indications.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 6 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- No major equipment is out of service and no Tech Specs are active.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- Respond to all alarms and indications.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
Upon receipt of a RCP standpipe low level alarm, the operator aligns valves to fill the standpipe with primary water, and terminates the fill when the high level alarm is received.
Upon receipt of a RCP standpipe low level alarm, the operator aligns valves to fill the standpipe with primary water, and terminates the fill when the high level alarm is received.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| CUE | 21 RCP standpipe low console alarm illuminates | Operator reports standpipe level low console alarm for 21 RCP. |
| 1.0 | Review CAUSES per S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 | Reads likely causes: low seal flow across #2 seal, excessive flow through #3 seal. |
| 3.1 | Determine if standpipe low level AND seal water leakoff flow alarm occur together | Determines no seal leakoff flow alarm is concurrent with standpipe level low — marks step N/A (does NOT go to AB.RCP-0001). |
| 3.2.A | If required, START 21 or 22 Primary Water Pump | Selects one Primary Water pump in Manual and depresses START PB. (Conditional — fill can be done without starting PW pump, but fill takes longer.) |
| 3.2.B * | OPEN 2WR80, PW TO CONTMT STOP V | Depresses OPEN PB for 2WR80 on 2CC2 console (PRT bezels) and verifies OPEN PB illuminates. |
| 3.2.D * | OPEN 21WR62, Standpipe Supply Valve for 21 RCP | Depresses the OPEN PB for 21WR62 on 21 RCP bezel and verifies OPEN PB illuminates. |
| 3.3.A * | When hi level alarm received: STOP the Primary Water Pump | Depresses STOP PB for running Primary Water pump (if previously started) and verifies STOP PB illuminates. |
| 3.3.B * | CLOSE 2WR80, PW TO CONTMT STOP V | Depresses CLOSED PB for 2WR80 and verifies CLOSED PB illuminates. |
| 3.3.C * | CLOSE 21WR62, Standpipe Supply Valve | Depresses CLOSED PB for 21WR62 and verifies CLOSED PB illuminates. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 3.1 is the discriminating step. The applicant must evaluate whether the standpipe low level alarm is accompanied by a concurrent seal water leakoff flow alarm. If BOTH alarms are present, the applicant must transition to AB.RCP-0001 (RCP Abnormality) indicating a potential seal problem. In this JPM, only the standpipe low level alarm is present (caused by #3 seal leak), so the correct action is to continue with the standpipe fill procedure rather than entering the AB.
Step 3.1 is the discriminating step. The applicant must evaluate whether the standpipe low level alarm is accompanied by a concurrent seal water leakoff flow alarm. If BOTH alarms are present, the applicant must transition to AB.RCP-0001 (RCP Abnormality) indicating a potential seal problem. In this JPM, only the standpipe low level alarm is present (caused by #3 seal leak), so the correct action is to continue with the standpipe fill procedure rather than entering the AB.
Ref: S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 (Rev 63) | Task: N0020160101 | K/A: 003 A1.10 — Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the RCPS controls: Standpipe level (2.5/2.7) | Safety Fn: 4-Pri | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related procedures: S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 — Alarm Response (2CC1), AB.RCP-0001 — RCP Abnormality
- Related systems: RCPs
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM Sim-e — Loss of SGFP Immediate Actions
Sim | RO/SRO | 059 A4.14 (3.1/3.3)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 5 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 power ascension is in progress to 90% at 10% per hour.
- S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001 Attachment 5 is in progress up to step 4.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all indications and alarms.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 5 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 power ascension is in progress to 90% at 10% per hour.
- S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001 Attachment 5 is in progress up to step 4.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all indications and alarms.
Task Standard:
Initiates a manual Main Turbine load reduction at 15%/min to 66% and inserts control rods in MANUAL due to failure of the rods to insert in AUTO.
Initiates a manual Main Turbine load reduction at 15%/min to 66% and inserts control rods in MANUAL due to failure of the rods to insert in AUTO.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 2.3 | Recognize loss of SGFP with Turbine Power >70% | Acknowledges alarms and indications of SGFP trip. Performs immediate actions of S2.OP-AB.CN-0001. |
| 2.3.1.A | Verify Automatic Turbine Runback has or is occurring | Identifies that an AUTO Main Turbine runback has NOT occurred (SGFP RUNBACK OPERATE light NOT lit, generator load NOT trending to ~775 MW). |
| 2.3.1.B * | Initiate manual Main Turbine load reduction to <66% at 15%/min | Identifies ramp rates are NOT preset for SGFP runback (as-found: 90% at 10%/hr). Depresses MIN/HR toggle to select %/MIN. Adjusts ramp rate to 15. Adjusts SETTER to 66. Selects GO. |
| 2.3.2 * | Control Tavg — recognize rods fail to insert in AUTO, place in MANUAL, insert rods | Ensures Rod Bank Selector Switch in AUTO. As RCS heats up during downpower, identifies rods not inserting when demanded (Terr). Places Rod Bank Selector Switch to MANUAL and inserts rods. |
Key Decision Point:
This JPM has two discriminating elements. First (Step 2.3.1.B): the automatic turbine runback fails, so the applicant must recognize the runback has not initiated and manually set up the DEHC panel for a 15%/min load reduction to 66% — this requires toggling from %/hr to %/min units. Second (Step 2.3.2): during the load reduction, Tavg rises above Tref because rods fail to insert in AUTO. The applicant must recognize the Terr divergence, take rods to MANUAL, and manually insert rods at 48 steps/min to restore Tavg to Tref.
This JPM has two discriminating elements. First (Step 2.3.1.B): the automatic turbine runback fails, so the applicant must recognize the runback has not initiated and manually set up the DEHC panel for a 15%/min load reduction to 66% — this requires toggling from %/hr to %/min units. Second (Step 2.3.2): during the load reduction, Tavg rises above Tref because rods fail to insert in AUTO. The applicant must recognize the Terr divergence, take rods to MANUAL, and manually insert rods at 48 steps/min to restore Tavg to Tref.
Ref: S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 (Rev 31), S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001 | Task: N1140100401 | K/A: 059 A4.14 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Main Feedwater (3.1/3.3) | Safety Fn: 4-Sec | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related procedures: AB.CN-0001 — Condensate System Abnormality
- Related systems: Feed & Condensate, Control Rod Drive
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM Sim-f — Manually Actuate Containment Spray
Sim | RO/SRO | 026 A2.03 (4.4/4.4)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- A Large Break LOCA has occurred.
- The Reactor Automatically Tripped and SI was actuated.
- The crew has completed Steps 1 through 8 of 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to continue on with EOP-TRIP-1 starting at STEP 9.
- Your evaluator will respond to any alarms not associated with your task.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- A Large Break LOCA has occurred.
- The Reactor Automatically Tripped and SI was actuated.
- The crew has completed Steps 1 through 8 of 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to continue on with EOP-TRIP-1 starting at STEP 9.
- Your evaluator will respond to any alarms not associated with your task.
Task Standard:
1. Manually initiates Containment Spray and Phase B isolation. 2. Closes 2CC131 OR 2CC190 Phase B valves. 3. Opens 2CS16 OR 2CS17 NaOH Discharge Valves.
1. Manually initiates Containment Spray and Phase B isolation. 2. Closes 2CC131 OR 2CC190 Phase B valves. 3. Opens 2CS16 OR 2CS17 NaOH Discharge Valves.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| 9.a * | Has containment pressure remained less than 15 psig | NO. Operator determines containment pressure has NOT remained less than 15 psig. |
| 9.b * | Initiate Phase B and Spray Actuation | Uses both Safeguards keys and simultaneously rotates both keys on 2CC1 to actuate Phase B and Spray Actuation on at least one Safeguards train. |
| 9.c | Did any available CNMT Spray pump fail to start | No. Operator determines that both CS pumps are running. |
| 9.d | Are valve groups in Table B in Safeguards positions | NO. Operator identifies that 2CC131 and 2CC190 remain OPEN AND 2CS16 and 2CS17 remain CLOSED. |
| 9.e * | Place valves in Safeguards position: CLOSE 2CC131 or 2CC190 and OPEN 2CS16 or 2CS17 | Depresses CLOSED pushbutton for 2CC131 OR 2CC190 and verifies CLOSED bezel illuminates. Depresses OPEN pushbutton for 2CS16 OR 2CS17 and verifies OPEN bezel illuminates. (Closing both 2CC131 and 2CC190 and opening both 2CS16 and 2CS17 is acceptable.) |
Key Decision Point:
Step 9.e is the alternate path / discriminating step. After manually actuating Phase B and Containment Spray using the safeguards key switches, the applicant must verify that Table B valve groups are in their safeguards positions. Both 2CC131 and 2CC190 (Phase B valves) failed to auto-close, and both 2CS16 and 2CS17 (NaOH discharge valves) failed to auto-open on the CS signal. The applicant must recognize the mispositioned valves and manually reposition them — close at least one Phase B valve and open at least one NaOH discharge valve.
Step 9.e is the alternate path / discriminating step. After manually actuating Phase B and Containment Spray using the safeguards key switches, the applicant must verify that Table B valve groups are in their safeguards positions. Both 2CC131 and 2CC190 (Phase B valves) failed to auto-close, and both 2CS16 and 2CS17 (NaOH discharge valves) failed to auto-open on the CS signal. The applicant must recognize the mispositioned valves and manually reposition them — close at least one Phase B valve and open at least one NaOH discharge valve.
Ref: 2-EOP-TRIP-1 (Rev 41) | Task: N1150500502 | K/A: 026 A2.03 — Ability to predict the impacts of containment spray system operation on CSS (4.4/4.4) | Safety Fn: 5 | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related procedures: EOP-TRIP-1 — Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
- Related systems: Containment Spray
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM Sim-g — Respond to Loss of 2A 4KV Vital Bus
Sim | RO | 062 A2.04 (3.1/3.4)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- 100% power, BOL.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all indications and alarms.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- 100% power, BOL.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator. Respond to all indications and alarms.
Task Standard:
Operator closes the 2CV55 and starts 21 Charging Pump. Upon receiving indications that 21 Charging Pump trips; starts 22 Charging Pump.
Operator closes the 2CV55 and starts 21 Charging Pump. Upon receiving indications that 21 Charging Pump trips; starts 22 Charging Pump.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| CUE | Loss of 2A 4KV Vital Bus alarms and indications | Acknowledges alarms and indications of vital bus loss. Enters S2.OP-AB.4KV-0001 based on assessment of OHAs or alarm response procedures. |
| 3.1 | Initiate Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary | Reviews CAS and determines no actions required at this time. |
| 3.2 | Initiate Diesel Generator running checks | Identifies that A EDG has started. Notifies CRS that the A EDG needs running checks completed. |
| 3.3 | If 23 Charging Pump was providing to Unit 1, notify Unit 1 NCO | Identifies 23 CV pump was in operation to Unit 2 RCS. |
| 3.4 * | Was 23 Charging Pump providing Seal Injection and Charging Flow to Unit 2 | Operator answers YES and continues to step 3.5. |
| 3.5 * | CLOSE 2CV55 | Operator closes 2CV55. (Note: valve has a long stroke time, approximately two minutes.) |
| 3.6 * | START 21 Charging Pump | Starts 21 Charging Pump by depressing pushbutton. Subsequently identifies that the pump has tripped and acknowledges flashing stop pushbutton. |
| 3.7 * | Is 21 Charging Pump running — NO | Operator answers NO and continues to step 3.8. |
| 3.8 * | START 22 Charging Pump | Operator starts 22 Charging Pump by depressing pushbutton. |
Key Decision Point:
Steps 3.7/3.8 are the alternate path / discriminating steps. After the loss of the 2A 4KV Vital Bus, the 23 Charging Pump (which was providing seal injection and charging flow to Unit 2) is lost. The operator closes 2CV55 and attempts to start 21 Charging Pump, but it trips on start. The applicant must recognize that 21 Charging Pump has failed (answer step 3.7 as NO) and immediately start 22 Charging Pump per step 3.8 to restore RCP seal injection and charging flow.
Steps 3.7/3.8 are the alternate path / discriminating steps. After the loss of the 2A 4KV Vital Bus, the 23 Charging Pump (which was providing seal injection and charging flow to Unit 2) is lost. The operator closes 2CV55 and attempts to start 21 Charging Pump, but it trips on start. The applicant must recognize that 21 Charging Pump has failed (answer step 3.7 as NO) and immediately start 22 Charging Pump per step 3.8 to restore RCP seal injection and charging flow.
Ref: S2.OP-AB.4KV-0001 (Rev 11) | Task: N1140050401 | K/A: 062 A2.04 — Ability to predict the impacts of loss of AC electrical distribution on AC electrical distribution (3.1/3.4) | Safety Fn: 6 | Source: New | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related procedures: AB.4KV-0001 — Loss of 4KV Vital Bus
- Related systems: 4KV, CVCS, EDGs
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
JPM Sim-h — Respond to Fire Alarm
Sim | RO/SRO | 086 A4.02 (3.5/3.5)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- 100% power.
- All systems are in Automatic and normal alignment.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- Respond to all alarms and indications.
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes
Initial Conditions:
- 100% power.
- All systems are in Automatic and normal alignment.
Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- Respond to all alarms and indications.
Task Standard:
Upon fire alarm in control room, the operator makes page announcement for fire location, places Control Room Ventilation in FIRE INSIDE MODE, places the 2PR1 and 2PR2 in Manual and Closed, Closes 2PR6 and 2PR7, and dispatches operator to place the PZR PORV valves in EMERG CLOSE.
Upon fire alarm in control room, the operator makes page announcement for fire location, places Control Room Ventilation in FIRE INSIDE MODE, places the 2PR1 and 2PR2 in Manual and Closed, Closes 2PR6 and 2PR7, and dispatches operator to place the PZR PORV valves in EMERG CLOSE.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
| Step | Critical Element | Standard |
|---|---|---|
| CUE | Fire alarm actuates: OHA A-7 FIRE PROT TRBL, A-8 FIRE PROT CO2/HALON DISCH, coded fire alarm #91 on 2RP5 | Audible coded fire alarm heard in control room (stops after ~30 seconds). Operator responds to 2RP5 coded alarm to identify fire location. |
| 3.1 * | Scan 2RP5 to determine Fire Zone, Area, and Elevation | Identifies fire alarm on 2RP5 is for Relay Room, 100 ft. elevation (code 91 — Aux. Bldg., Relay & Battery Rooms). |
| 3.3 | Notify Emergency Services, dispatch Fire Brigade Liaison, notify RP and SM | All notifications made. Fire Brigade Liaison dispatched to scene. |
| 3.4 | If alarm is valid, go to S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0001 | Goes to S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0001. Records fire information: Unit 2, Auxiliary Bldg., 100 ft. elevation, Relay Room, Zone 91, Fire Suppression activated: YES. |
| AB 3.3 * | Make station page announcement for fire location | Completes page announcement: "Attention all personnel — a fire is reported in Unit 2 Relay Room 100 ft. elevation. All personnel please evacuate the area." |
| AB 3.8 | Is the fire in an area serviced by CAACS or Chiller Room | YES — the Relay Room is in the area serviced by CAACS. |
| AB 3.9 * | At 2RP2, select FIRE INSIDE CONTROL AREA | At 2RP2 panel, depresses the pushbutton for FIRE INSIDE CONTROL AREA. |
| AB 3.10 * | Direct Unit 1 NCO to select FIRE INSIDE CONTROL AREA | Directs Unit 1 NCO to select FIRE INSIDE CONTROL AREA. |
| AB 3.19.A * | Select MANUAL and CLOSE on PORVs 2PR1 and 2PR2 | Depresses MANUAL pushbutton for 2PR1 and 2PR2 on 2CC2 console. (Note: 2PR1 and 2PR2 are normally closed during power operation.) |
| AB 3.19.B * | CLOSE PORV Block Valves 2PR6 and 2PR7 | Depresses CLOSE pushbutton for 2PR6 and 2PR7 (STOP VALVES) on 2CC2 console. |
| AB 3.20 * | Dispatch operator to align PORV block valve circuits to EMERG CLOSE per Attachment 15 | Dispatches operator to perform step 3.20. |
Key Decision Point:
Step 3.1 (from the ARP) is the discriminating step. The applicant must correctly identify the fire location from the 2RP5 coded fire alarm (code 91 = Aux. Bldg., Relay & Battery Rooms, 100 ft. elevation). This identification drives the entire procedure path — because the fire is in the Relay Room (an area serviced by CAACS), the operator must place ventilation in FIRE INSIDE mode and isolate the PORVs (since the Relay Room contains PORV control circuitry). If the fire location is incorrectly identified, the wrong fire response actions will be performed.
Step 3.1 (from the ARP) is the discriminating step. The applicant must correctly identify the fire location from the 2RP5 coded fire alarm (code 91 = Aux. Bldg., Relay & Battery Rooms, 100 ft. elevation). This identification drives the entire procedure path — because the fire is in the Relay Room (an area serviced by CAACS), the operator must place ventilation in FIRE INSIDE mode and isolate the PORVs (since the Relay Room contains PORV control circuitry). If the fire location is incorrectly identified, the wrong fire response actions will be performed.
Ref: S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0001 (Rev 12), S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0001 (Rev 59) | Task: N0220080101 | K/A: 086 A4.02 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Fire detection panels (3.5/3.5) | Safety Fn: 8 | Source: New | View JPM PDF
Connections
- Related procedures: AB.FIRE-0001 — Control Room Fire Response, S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0001 — Overhead Annunciators Window A
- Related systems: Fire Protection, Pressurizer Level & Press Control, CAV
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
Scenario 1 — Load Reduction / LBLOCA
Simulator | 8 Events | 3 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-240: Unit 2 is at 100% power, EOL; 21 Charging Pump I/S. The following equipment is out of service: 23 Charging Pump and 21 RHR Pump are C/T for maintenance.
Turnover: The crew is directed to reduce power to 89% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 using boration, control rods and turbine load control in preparation for Main Turbine Valve testing.
Turnover: The crew is directed to reduce power to 89% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 using boration, control rods and turbine load control in preparation for Main Turbine Valve testing.
Major Events:
- Planned Load Reduction to 89% at 10%/hour
- 24 Vacuum Pump trips
- RC Loop 24 Cold Leg RTD Fails High (TS)
- RCS Leak — 20 gpm (TS)
- LBLOCA (leak worsens to 350 gpm)
- Auto SI fails to actuate
- 22 RHR Pump Fails to Start on SEC Signal
- Loss of Emergency Recirculation capability (22 RHR Pump Trips)
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
| # | Event | Expected Crew Response |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Planned Load Reduction to 89% | CRS briefs crew on power reduction to 89% at 10%/hr IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Section 4.3 Power Reduction. RO briefs boration plan, initiates boration IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006. PO briefs turbine load control plan and initiates load reduction IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0002. RO monitors Tavg and control rods for proper response. |
| 2 | 24 Vacuum Pump trips | PO reports unexpected trip of 24 Vacuum Pump. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum. PO initiates Att 1 CAS, dispatches operator for Att 2 local checks. PO reports 24 Vacuum Pump stopped and 24AR25 closed, condenser backpressure rising. PO starts all available vacuum pumps — 22 Vacuum Pump trips after starting, 25 Vacuum Pump starts but 25AR25 fails to open. PO manually opens 25AR25 and reports backpressure improving. |
| 3 | 24 Loop Cold Leg RTD fails high | RO reports unexpected continuous rod insertion with no turbine runback in progress. RO places rod control in Manual. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. RO reports 24 RC Loop Tavg channel failed high. RO places Master Flow Controller (MFC) to Manual. CRS directs RO to adjust rods in manual to maintain Tavg within 1.5 deg of T program. CRS directs RO to stop any dilution in progress. RO defeats 24 loop RC Differential Temperature and Average Temperature on 2CC2. RO selects alternate channel. RO restores PZR level to program, places MFC in auto. RO restores control rods to previous position and places rod control in Auto. CRS enters TS 3.3.1.1 Action 6 (place channel in tripped condition within 72 hours) and TS 3.3.2.1.b Action 19 (place channel in tripped condition within 72 hours). CRS initiates S2.OP-SO.RPS-0002 to place 24 loop Tavg in tripped condition. |
| 4 | RCS Leak — 20 gpm inside containment | RO reports counts on 2R11A containment radiation monitor rising and PZR level lowering. RO reports RCS leak inside containment. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.RC-0001, RCS Leakage. PO initiates Att 1 CAS. RO reports RCS temp above 350 F, unit not in Mode 3, PZR level lowering, centrifugal charging pump in service. CRS directs RO to adjust charging flow to stabilize PZR level. RO adjusts charging flow and determines RCS leak rate. CRS enters TS 3.4.7.2.b (1 gpm unidentified leakage), Action b (reduce leakage within 4 hours or be in Hot Standby). |
| 5 | LBLOCA — RCS leak worsens to 350 gpm | RO reports PZR level lowering rapidly. RO attempts to maintain PZR level by adjusting charging flow, reports leak exceeds makeup capability. CRS implements Att 1 CAS and briefs RO to trip the reactor and actuate SI. RO trips the reactor and actuates SI. |
| 6 | Auto SI fails to actuate on both trains (CT#1) | RO may report SI failed to auto actuate. RO manually actuates SI on one train and verifies the other train actuated. RO continues TRIP-1 immediate actions: reports Main Turbine tripped and backs up trip, reports all 4KV vital buses energized, reports SI has been initiated. CRS and RO verify immediate actions complete. CRS directs TRIP-1 CAS actions: stop RCPs (1350 psig), close charging mini-flows (1500 psig). RO announces Rx Trip and SI on station PA. PO reports all vital buses energized but SEC loading for 2B vital bus NOT complete. |
| 7 | 22 RHR Pump fails to start on SEC signal (CT#2) | PO reports 22 RHR pump failed to start. PO blocks and resets 2B SEC. RO starts 22 RHR pump. PO throttles AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lbm/hr while SG NR levels remain <9% (15% adverse). RO reports containment pressure NOT remained <15 psig — Phase B and Spray auto-initiated. MSLI auto-initiated. RO reports 2 CCW pumps running, both CCW HXs in Auto, 2CC131 (Thermal Barrier Return) closed. CRS notifies WCC to monitor SFP temperature and level. RO reports RWST Lo Level alarm not yet actuated. RO reports charging, SI pump and RHR pump flows consistent with RCS pressure. RO closes charging pump mini-flows when RCS pressure <1500 psig with BIT flow established. RO stops RCPs when RCS pressure <1350 psig with ECCS flow established. CRS transitions to EOP-LOCA-1 based on containment pressure >4 psig or two or more Table J channels not normal. |
| 8 | 22 RHR Pump trips — Loss of Emergency Recirculation (CT#3) | In LOCA-1: RO reports all RCPs stopped. PO maintains AFW flow. RO resets Phase A, opens 21 and 22 CA330s. RO resets SG B/D Sample Isolation Bypass, opens 21-24 SS94s. RO reports both PORVs closed/block valves open. RO reports subcooling NOT >0 F. RO reports both CS pumps running. RO resets both trains of SI, PO resets each SEC. PO stops unloaded EDGs. RO reports 22 RHR Pump tripped, no RHR pumps available. CRS determines loss of emergency recirculation and transitions to EOP-LOCA-5. In LOCA-5: RO reports both ECCS pump trains normal. RO resets SI, PO resets SECs (if not done). RO reports containment sump level >62% lights illuminated. RO reports no emergency recirculation available. CRS directs investigation into both RHR pump trips. CT#3 Part 1: CRS determines no CS pumps required (Table C). RO resets Spray actuation, stops 21 and 22 CS pumps, closes 21 and 22 CS2s. CT#3 Part 2: RO initiates makeup to RWST IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 — PO starts RWST Heater Pump, ensures VCT level adequate, obtains BA flow setpoint (≥20 gpm), places makeup control in stop, places 2CV179 in Manual (full open), places 2CV172 in Manual, starts 22 Primary Water pump, dispatches operator to locally open 2CV182 and 2CV184, starts 22 BA pump in Manual/Fast, adjusts 2CV172 flow (≥20 gpm), adjusts 2CV179 to 50 gpm. CT#3 Part 3: RO stops all but one charging pump, runs only one SI pump. If RWST Lo-Lo Level alarm actuates: CRS takes CAS action from Step 7, goes to Step 29. CT#3 Part 4: RO stops ALL pumps taking suction from the RWST (RHR, SI, Charging, CS). Scenario terminated. |
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-2): Manually actuate at least one train of Safety Injection before transition out of TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Safety significance: failure to manually actuate SI results in degraded ECCS capacity — no systematic actuation of SIS-actuated safeguards (ECCS, Phase A containment isolation, CCW/SW, containment fan coolers not in safeguards mode). FSAR analyses assume at least one train of safeguards actuates; without SI actuation, FSAR assumptions and results are invalid, constituting a violation of the facility license condition. Cues: PZR pressure or SG pressure less than SI actuation setpoint, containment pressure greater than SI actuation setpoint, subcooled margin or PZR level less than foldout page criteria. Measurable standard: manually actuate at least one train of SI before transition to any LOCA, SGTR, or LOSC series procedure or FRG — confirmed by indication that at least one train of SI is actuated.
CT#2 (CT-5): Manually start at least one low head ECCS pump before transition out of TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Safety significance: FSAR large-break LOCA analysis assumes minimum ECCS pumped injection — one each high-head, intermediate-head, and low-head pump. Failure to start a low-head pump leaves the plant in an unanalyzed condition and constitutes a violation of the facility license condition. Cues: SI actuated, RCS pressure below shutoff head of low-head ECCS pumps, no low-head ECCS pump injecting (breakers open, discharge pressure and flow zero). Measurable standard: manually start at least one low-head ECCS pump before transition out of TRIP-1 — confirmed by breaker closed and flow indication.
CT#3 (CT-29): Make up to the RWST, minimize RWST outflow, and if RWST Lo-Lo level alarm received stop ECCS pumps prior to cavitation. Safety significance: failure to establish RWST makeup and minimize outflow accelerates depletion of RWST inventory to the point where ECCS pumps must be stopped. Loss of pumped injection coincident with loss of emergency recirculation leads to severe or extreme challenge to core cooling CSF. Measurable standard: (1) stop Containment Spray Pumps, (2) initiate RWST makeup, (3) reduce SI to one train, (4) if RWST Lo-Lo alarm received, stop running ECCS pumps taking suction from RWST prior to cavitation. Cues: SI required (RCS pressure, containment pressure), emergency recirculation not established despite attempts, RWST level decreasing, procedural cue to make up and minimize outflow.
CT#1 (CT-2): Manually actuate at least one train of Safety Injection before transition out of TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Safety significance: failure to manually actuate SI results in degraded ECCS capacity — no systematic actuation of SIS-actuated safeguards (ECCS, Phase A containment isolation, CCW/SW, containment fan coolers not in safeguards mode). FSAR analyses assume at least one train of safeguards actuates; without SI actuation, FSAR assumptions and results are invalid, constituting a violation of the facility license condition. Cues: PZR pressure or SG pressure less than SI actuation setpoint, containment pressure greater than SI actuation setpoint, subcooled margin or PZR level less than foldout page criteria. Measurable standard: manually actuate at least one train of SI before transition to any LOCA, SGTR, or LOSC series procedure or FRG — confirmed by indication that at least one train of SI is actuated.
CT#2 (CT-5): Manually start at least one low head ECCS pump before transition out of TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Safety significance: FSAR large-break LOCA analysis assumes minimum ECCS pumped injection — one each high-head, intermediate-head, and low-head pump. Failure to start a low-head pump leaves the plant in an unanalyzed condition and constitutes a violation of the facility license condition. Cues: SI actuated, RCS pressure below shutoff head of low-head ECCS pumps, no low-head ECCS pump injecting (breakers open, discharge pressure and flow zero). Measurable standard: manually start at least one low-head ECCS pump before transition out of TRIP-1 — confirmed by breaker closed and flow indication.
CT#3 (CT-29): Make up to the RWST, minimize RWST outflow, and if RWST Lo-Lo level alarm received stop ECCS pumps prior to cavitation. Safety significance: failure to establish RWST makeup and minimize outflow accelerates depletion of RWST inventory to the point where ECCS pumps must be stopped. Loss of pumped injection coincident with loss of emergency recirculation leads to severe or extreme challenge to core cooling CSF. Measurable standard: (1) stop Containment Spray Pumps, (2) initiate RWST makeup, (3) reduce SI to one train, (4) if RWST Lo-Lo alarm received, stop running ECCS pumps taking suction from RWST prior to cavitation. Cues: SI required (RCS pressure, containment pressure), emergency recirculation not established despite attempts, RWST level decreasing, procedural cue to make up and minimize outflow.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 (load reduction) → S2.OP-AB.COND-0001 (vacuum pump trip) → S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 (continuous rod insertion from RTD failure) → S2.OP-AB.RC-0001 (RCS leak) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip/SI — manual SI required, CT#1; manual start 22 RHR, CT#2) → EOP-LOCA-1 (containment pressure >4 psig; possible CFST Purple Path on Thermal Shock — enter/exit FRTS-1, no actions) → EOP-LOCA-5 (22 RHR trips, no emergency recirculation; stop CS pumps, RWST makeup, reduce to one SI train, CT#3) → Scenario terminated when ECCS reduced to one train or ECCS pumps stopped on RWST Lo-Lo
S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 (load reduction) → S2.OP-AB.COND-0001 (vacuum pump trip) → S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 (continuous rod insertion from RTD failure) → S2.OP-AB.RC-0001 (RCS leak) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip/SI — manual SI required, CT#1; manual start 22 RHR, CT#2) → EOP-LOCA-1 (containment pressure >4 psig; possible CFST Purple Path on Thermal Shock — enter/exit FRTS-1, no actions) → EOP-LOCA-5 (22 RHR trips, no emergency recirculation; stop CS pumps, RWST makeup, reduce to one SI train, CT#3) → Scenario terminated when ECCS reduced to one train or ECCS pumps stopped on RWST Lo-Lo
Source: 20-01 ESG-1 | View Scenario PDF
Connections
- Related systems: RCS, ECCS, Containment Spray, RHR, CVCS, Condenser Air Removal, Control Rod Drive, Pressurizer & PRT, CCW, AFW, SECs
- Related EOPs: EOP-TRIP-1 — Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, EOP-LOCA-1 — Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, EOP-LOCA-5 — Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation
- Related procedures: AB.COND-0001 — Loss of Condenser Vacuum, AB.ROD-0003 — Continuous Rod Motion, AB.RC-0001 — Reactor Coolant System Leak
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
Scenario 3 — Power Ascension / Loss of Heat Sink
Simulator | 8 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-242: Unit 2 is at 93% power, MOL; 2A EDG is running unloaded for maintenance run. The following equipment is out of service: 21 AFW Pump C/T for oil bubbler replacement and 21 Containment Spray pump for lube.
Turnover: The crew is directed to continue power ascension to 98% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 by use of dilution, control rods and turbine load control.
Turnover: The crew is directed to continue power ascension to 98% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 by use of dilution, control rods and turbine load control.
Major Events:
- Power ascension to 100% at 10%/hour
- 21 CRDM Vent Fan damper fails closed
- PZR Level controlling channel fails high (TS)
- 21CN22 FWH Inlet valve fails closed
- 2A EDG emergency trip (TS)
- 23 RCP motor oil level low
- Main turbine fails to trip by all means in the control room
- Loss of all AFW flow and recovery by initiating Condensate flow using MS10
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
| # | Event | Expected Crew Response |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Power ascension to 98% at 10%/hour | CRS briefs crew on power ascension to 98% at 10%/hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004. RO briefs reactivity plan. PO briefs turbine load control plan. RO initiates dilution IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 or uses control rods. PO initiates turbine load control IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001. RO monitors Tavg and control rods for proper response. |
| 2 | 21 CRDM Vent Fan damper fails closed | PO announces console alarm for 21 CRDM Vent Fan Low Flow. PO refers to ARP for 2CC1 and reports sequence complete light for 21 CRDM Fan is not illuminated. CRS directs PO to start standby CRDM Vent Fan IAW ARP. PO stops 21 CRDM Fan and starts 23 CRDM Fan. |
| 3 | PZR Level controlling channel fails high | RO reports unexpected alarms OHA E-4 PZR LVL HI and E-20 PZR HTR ON LVL HI. RO reports PZR Level Channel I has failed high and charging flow has lowered. RO places Master Flow Control in Manual and raises charging flow to restore PZR level to program. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001. RO selects operable Channel 3 for control and operable Channel 2 or 3 for recorder. CRS evaluates TS 3.3.1.1 action 6 (72 hours to place channel in tripped condition). |
| 4 | 21CN22 LP FWH Inlet valve fails closed | PO reports unexpected alarm OHA G-22, FW HTR IN VLV TRIP & LVL HI. PO refers to ARP and depresses STOP VALVE CLOSED on 2CC2. PO reports 21CN22 is closed. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CN-0001. PO reports SGFP did not trip and condensate pump did not trip. CRS reviews Attachment 2 for load limitations and determines load reduction required to 1098 MWe. RO briefs reactivity plan and PO initiates load reduction. |
| 5 | 2A EDG emergency trip | PO reports console alarm for 2A EDG Emergency Trip. CRS evaluates TS 3.8.1.1 action b.1 (1 hour line surveillance) and action b.4 (72 hours to restore EDG to Operable status). CRS directs operator to perform the 1 hour line surveillance. |
| 6 | 23 RCP motor bearing oil level low — temperatures and vibrations rising | RO reports OHA alarm for 23 RCP low oil level. RO reports motor bearing temperatures and vibrations rising. PO reports motor bearing temp > 175 degF or motor vibrations > 5 mils. CRS directs RO to trip the reactor and stop 23 RCP IAW AB.RCP-0001 Attachment 2. RO trips reactor and stops 23 RCP. RO performs immediate actions of 2-EOP-TRIP-1. |
| 7 | Main turbine fails to auto trip AND fails to manually trip using pistol grip switch AND console pushbutton. MSLI fails to auto actuate. 23 AFW Pump fails to auto start. | RO reports main turbine failed to auto trip. RO reports turbine failed to manually trip by all means. RO isolates turbine by manually initiating MSLI using Fast Close pushbuttons on 2CC2 (CT#1). RO reports SI auto actuated and manually backs up SI signal. CRS enters 2-EOP-TRIP-1. PO reports 22 AFW Pump running and 23 AFW Pump failed to start. PO manually starts 23 AFW Pump. CRS directs PO to throttle AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lbm/hr. |
| 8 | 22 AFW Pump trips on overcurrent. 23 AFW Pump trips on overspeed. Loss of all AFW flow. CFST Heat Sink Red Path. | PO reports 22 and 23 AFW Pump tripped — NO AFW flow. PO reports no SG NR levels > 9% (15% adverse). CRS transitions to 2-EOP-FRHS-1. RO reports RCS pressure > SG pressure. RO reports RCS Thots > 350 degF. CRS reads bleed and feed criteria (3 WR levels < 20%, 25% adverse). PO closes all GB4s and reports no AFW flow. RO stops all RCPs. CRS directs SI reset, Phase A reset, Phase B reset. RO opens both CA330s. Crew selects one SG for depressurization — PO fully opens selected SG MS10. CRS dispatches operator to open selected SG BF40 or BF19 valve (120 ft TGA). PO opens selected SG BF13 and SGFP bypass valves (CN48). PO closes SGFP suction valves (CN32). PO reports feed flow established — SG Wide Range Level rising or CETs lowering (CT#2). |
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-12): Manually actuate main steamline isolation before a Red path to either subcriticality or the integrity CFST, or transition to EOP-LOSC-2, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators.
Safety Significance: Failure to close the MSIVs under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. The crew must recognize a failure of an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system and take action to prevent a challenge to plant safety. In this scenario the break is downstream of the MSIVs — closure of all MSIVs terminates all uncontrolled blowdown. If the crew allows all MSIVs to remain open, all SGs depressurize uncontrollably, causing excessive RCS cooldown well beyond FSAR-analyzed conditions, creating large thermal stresses in the reactor pressure vessel and rapid insertion of positive reactivity. Failure to close MSIVs challenges the Integrity and Subcriticality CSFs.
Cues: Indication that main steamline isolation is required AND indication that MSLI has not actuated automatically (MSIVs indicate open, uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs).
Measurable Standard: MSIVs undergo fast-closure using the Fast Closure pushbuttons on 2CC2 or using the Loops 21-24 MSLI on 2CC1 Safeguards bezels. MSIVs indicate closed. Feedback: steam flow from all SGs decreases to zero, all SGs stop depressurizing, RCS cooldown stops.
CT#2 (CT-43): Establish feed flow to one SG before RCS bleed and feed is required.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the crew having to rely on the lower-priority action of RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. SG dryout deteriorates primary-to-secondary heat transfer, allowing core decay heat to increase RCS temperature and pressure. Increasing RCS pressure forces PORVs to open (small-break LOCA), degrading the RCS fission-product barrier. As long as RCS pressure remains high, PORV flow exceeds ECCS flow, depleting RCS inventory until the core uncovers and severe fuel damage occurs.
Cues: Extreme (RED path) challenge to the heat sink CSF AND RCS pressure above pressure of all SGs AND RCS temperature above RHR service temperature AND no AFW flow available after repeated attempts AND RCS bleed and feed not yet required.
Measurable Standard: Feed flow established to one SG before bleed and feed. Feedback: indication of feedwater flow into at least one SG, indication of increasing water level in at least one SG.
CT#1 (CT-12): Manually actuate main steamline isolation before a Red path to either subcriticality or the integrity CFST, or transition to EOP-LOSC-2, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators.
Safety Significance: Failure to close the MSIVs under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. The crew must recognize a failure of an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system and take action to prevent a challenge to plant safety. In this scenario the break is downstream of the MSIVs — closure of all MSIVs terminates all uncontrolled blowdown. If the crew allows all MSIVs to remain open, all SGs depressurize uncontrollably, causing excessive RCS cooldown well beyond FSAR-analyzed conditions, creating large thermal stresses in the reactor pressure vessel and rapid insertion of positive reactivity. Failure to close MSIVs challenges the Integrity and Subcriticality CSFs.
Cues: Indication that main steamline isolation is required AND indication that MSLI has not actuated automatically (MSIVs indicate open, uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs).
Measurable Standard: MSIVs undergo fast-closure using the Fast Closure pushbuttons on 2CC2 or using the Loops 21-24 MSLI on 2CC1 Safeguards bezels. MSIVs indicate closed. Feedback: steam flow from all SGs decreases to zero, all SGs stop depressurizing, RCS cooldown stops.
CT#2 (CT-43): Establish feed flow to one SG before RCS bleed and feed is required.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the crew having to rely on the lower-priority action of RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. SG dryout deteriorates primary-to-secondary heat transfer, allowing core decay heat to increase RCS temperature and pressure. Increasing RCS pressure forces PORVs to open (small-break LOCA), degrading the RCS fission-product barrier. As long as RCS pressure remains high, PORV flow exceeds ECCS flow, depleting RCS inventory until the core uncovers and severe fuel damage occurs.
Cues: Extreme (RED path) challenge to the heat sink CSF AND RCS pressure above pressure of all SGs AND RCS temperature above RHR service temperature AND no AFW flow available after repeated attempts AND RCS bleed and feed not yet required.
Measurable Standard: Feed flow established to one SG before bleed and feed. Feedback: indication of feedwater flow into at least one SG, indication of increasing water level in at least one SG.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 (CRDM vent fan alarm) → S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 (PZR level channel fail high — loss of charging) → S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 (FWH inlet valve closure — load reduction) → S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0013 (FWH alarm) → S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 (RCP motor bearing temps > 175 degF) → Rx trip → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip/SI — turbine fails to trip, manually initiate MSLI) → Auto SI actuates (SGFPs trip, no steam dumps available) → CFST Heat Sink Red Path (all AFW lost) → EOP-FRHS-1 (loss of secondary heat sink — depressurize one SG via MS10, establish condensate feed flow via BF40/BF19 and CN48 bypass) → Scenario terminated when SG WR level rising or CETs lowering
S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 (CRDM vent fan alarm) → S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 (PZR level channel fail high — loss of charging) → S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 (FWH inlet valve closure — load reduction) → S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0013 (FWH alarm) → S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 (RCP motor bearing temps > 175 degF) → Rx trip → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip/SI — turbine fails to trip, manually initiate MSLI) → Auto SI actuates (SGFPs trip, no steam dumps available) → CFST Heat Sink Red Path (all AFW lost) → EOP-FRHS-1 (loss of secondary heat sink — depressurize one SG via MS10, establish condensate feed flow via BF40/BF19 and CN48 bypass) → Scenario terminated when SG WR level rising or CETs lowering
Source: 20-01 NRC ESG-3 | View Scenario PDF
Connections
- Related systems: RCS, RCPs, CVCS, Main Steam, AFW, Feed & Condensate, EDGs, Control Rod Drive, Pressurizer Level & Press Control, Main Turbine, Steam Dumps, Containment Spray
- Related EOPs: EOP-TRIP-1 — Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, EOP-FRHS-1 — Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, EOP-LOSC-2 — Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators
- Related procedures: AB.CVC-0001 — Loss of Charging, AB.CN-0001 — Condensate System Abnormality, AB.RCP-0001 — RCP Abnormality
- Related tech specs: TS 3/4.3 — Instrumentation, TS 3/4.8 — Electrical
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam
Scenario 4 — Startup / SGTR
Simulator | 7 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-243: Unit 2 is at 2% power, BOL; 21 SGFP in service.
Turnover: The crew is directed to continue power ascension to 10% reactor power IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 using control rods, steam dumps, and turbine load control.
Turnover: The crew is directed to continue power ascension to 10% reactor power IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 using control rods, steam dumps, and turbine load control.
Major Events:
- Power Ascension
- 2PR2 PZR PORV leakage
- High DP across 23A CW Traveling Screen
- 23 SG Tube Leak (35 gpm)
- 23 SG Tube Rupture (650 gpm)
- 21 CFCU fails to start in LOW speed
- PZR Spray Valve 2PS3 fails to close during RCS depressurization
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
| # | Event | Expected Crew Response |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Power Ascension to 10% / Mode 1 entry | CRS directs power ascension using main steam dumps in MS Pressure Control and control rods. PO raises steam dump demand IAW S2.OP-SO.MS-0002 section 5.4 using Attachments 3 or 4. RO withdraws control rods at specified increments to maintain Tavg on program. RO announces when NIS indicates 5% Reactor Power and records time of Mode 1 entry in Control Room Narrative Log. |
| 2 | 2PR2 PZR PORV seat leakage — OHA E-28 PZR HTR ON PRESS LO | RO announces OHA E-28 alarm. CRS places power ascension on hold. RO reports PZR PORV tailpipe temperature rising/elevated. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001. RO verifies POPs not in service, pressure control channel not failed, spray valve not failed open, PORV not failed open but tailpipe temperature elevated. CRS directs RO to close 2PR6 and 2PR7 block valves. RCS pressure stabilizes. RO reopens 2PR6 — tailpipe temp not rising. RO reopens 2PR7 — tailpipe temp rising. RO recloses 2PR7, isolating 2PR2 as the leaking PORV. CRS evaluates Tech Specs: enters TS 3.4.5 action a (1 hour to close PZR PORV block valve with power maintained) and TS 3.2.5.b if RCS pressure below 2200 psia [2185 psig]. |
| 3 | High DP across 23A CW Traveling Screen — OHA K-1 | PO reports OHA K-1 (21-23 A CW SCRNWSH TRBL) alarm and 23A CW Traveling Screen running in Fast Speed with rising DP. CW operator reports heavy grass and debris on screens, shear pin NOT broken. CRS refers to OHA ARP or S2.OP-AB.CW-0001. DP continues to rise. CRS directs stopping 23A CW Pump when screen DP exceeds 6 feet and/or emergency trips CW pump when DP exceeds 8 feet. PO stops or emergency trips 23A CW Pump. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CW-0001. |
| 4 | 23 SG Tube Leak — RMS alarms (2R15, 2R19C, 2R53C) | RO reports OHA A-6 for 2R15 in alarm, then 2R53C (MS Line Rad Monitor) and 2R19C (23 SG B/D Rad Monitor) in alarm. RO reports PZR level lowering. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.SG-0001. CRS directs RO to determine RCS leak rate. PO initiates Attachment 1 CAS. RO reports PZR level not stable or rising and no centrifugal charging pump running. CRS directs transfer to centrifugal charging pump IAW step 3.5. Following transfer, RO reports PZR level can be maintained stable. Crew determines RCS leak rate around 20-30 gpm. CRS evaluates Tech Specs: enters TS 3.4.7.2.c action a (be in Hot Standby within 6 hours). |
| 5 | 23 SG Tube Rupture — leak worsens to 650 gpm (CT-1 and CT-2) | RO reports leak rate worsened, exceeds makeup capability. CRS implements Attachment 1 CAS — trip the reactor and actuate SI. RO trips reactor, confirms trip, actuates SI. CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1. RO continues immediate actions. PO throttles AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lbm/hr. PO reports 23 SG NR levels rising — CT#1 Part 1: PO closes 23AF21 and 23AF11 to isolate feed flow to ruptured SG. RO reports containment pressure < 15 psig, 2RP4 does NOT indicate high steam flow coincident with low steam pressure or low-low Tavg. RO reports 2 CCW pumps running, both CCW HXs in Auto, 2CC131 open. PO reports all valve groups per Table E in safeguards positions. RO reports ECCS flow as expected. PO maintains AFW flow > 22E4 lbm/hr until one SG NR level > 9%, then maintains 19-33%. RO reports all RCPs running, Tcolds stable or trending to 547 F, both PZR PORVs closed (only 2PR6 block valve open — 2PR7 closed from earlier isolation), RCS pressure not < 1240 psig. PO reports NO SG pressures dropping uncontrolled. RO reports 23 SG NR level rising uncontrolled — CRS transitions to EOP-SGTR-1. |
| 6 | 21 CFCU fails to start in LOW speed on SEC signal | PO reports SEC loading NOT complete — 21 CFCU failed to start. PO blocks 2A SEC. PO resets 2A SEC. RO starts 21 CFCU in LOW speed. |
| 5 (cont'd) |
SGTR-1 actions: identify and isolate ruptured SG, cooldown, depressurize | RO reports RCP trip criteria NOT met. PO reports NR levels rising in 23 SG. PO sets 23MS10 to 1045 psig. PO reports 23 SG is ruptured. PO lowers 23 AFW pump speed to minimum, then trips 23 AFW pump. CRS dispatches operator to close 23MS45. PO reports 23MS18, 23MS7, and 23GB4 are closed. CT#1 Part 2: PO closes 23MS167 — steam side of ruptured SG isolated (CT#1 complete). PO reports 23MS167, 23MS18, and 23MS7 closed. CRS directs WCC to close 2SS333. CRS determines RCS target temperature using Table B (SG pressure > 1000 psig = 503 F CETs). PO reports steam dumps available. PO places steam dumps in Manual, sets valve demand to 0%, places in MS Press Control, adjusts demand to cooldown at maximum rate. When Tavg Lo-Lo is reached, PO depresses Bypass Tavg pushbuttons. CT#2 Part 1: PO dumps steam using steam dumps on intact SGs to cool down to target temperature. CRS continues in SGTR-1. PO maintains AFW flow > 22E4 lbm/hr until one SG NR level > 9%, then maintains 19-33%. RO reports power available to both PZR PORV stop valves and both PZR PORVs closed. RO resets SI, Phase A, and Phase B. PO resets each SEC and associated control centers. RO opens 21 and 22 CA330s. RO reports RHR suction aligned to RWST, stops both RHR pumps. Crew waits until hottest CETs less than RCS target cooldown temp (approx. 5 min). CT#2 Part 2: PO stops cooldown by placing MS Pressure Control in Auto (CT#2 complete). CRS directs PO to dump steam to maintain CET temp less than required. PO reports ruptured SG pressure stable or rising. RO reports RCS subcooling > 20 F and normal PZR spray available. |
| 7 | PZR Spray Valve 2PS3 fails to close during RCS depressurization | RO reports PZR spray valves available. CRS reviews depressurization termination criteria IAW Table D. RO opens both PZR spray valves. RO reports RCS pressure lowering. When termination criteria met, RO closes both spray valves — 2PS3 fails to close. RO reports 2PS3 spray valve failed to close. CRS directs RO to stop 21 and 23 RCPs. RO stops 21 and 23 RCPs. RO reports RCS pressure NOT dropping in uncontrolled manner. CRS continues in SGTR-1 step 19. Scenario terminated. |
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-18): Isolate feed and steam flow to ruptured SG before transition to SGTR-3, SGTR with LOCA -- Subcooled Recovery, occurs.
Safety significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The crew allowing differential pressure to dissipate forces a transition to contingency ERG ECA-3.1, which delays RCS depressurization and SI termination. A SGTR violates the RCS fission-product barrier -- radioactive RCS inventory leaks into the SG, increasing SG inventory, radioactivity, and pressure. If primary-to-secondary leakage is not stopped, SG pressure increases until the PORV or safety valve(s) open, releasing radioactivity to the environment. To stop leakage the crew must: (1) identify and isolate the ruptured SG, (2) cool down to establish RCS subcooling margin, (3) depressurize RCS to restore inventory, and (4) terminate SI. The crew cannot start cooldown until the ruptured SG is completely isolated (all steam flow from and all feedwater flow into the SG stopped). Isolation maintains a 250 psi differential pressure between ruptured and intact SGs, ensuring minimum RCS subcooling remains after depressurization. Without steam isolation, the differential drops below 250 psi during cooldown, forcing transition to ECA-3.1. For feedwater, isolation must occur after ruptured SG level exceeds minimum indication (tubes covered) -- feedwater coverage of tubes provides a water barrier preventing steam from contacting tubes during cooldown, which would condense steam and reduce SG pressure below the 250 psi differential.
Measurable standard: Isolate feed and steam flow before transition to SGTR-3 occurs -- MSIV position lamps closed, MSIV bypass valve position lamps closed, PORV setpoint adjusted to ERG Footnote O.03, blowdown isolation valve closed, steam isolation valve to TDAFW pump closed, AFW valve position lamps closed, feedwater isolation valve position lamps closed.
Feedback: Stable or increasing pressure in the ruptured SG. Decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate in the ruptured SG.
CT#2 (CT-19): Cooldown RCS to target temperature so that transition from SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, does not occur.
Safety significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency ERG. Terminating cooldown before reaching target temperature prevents achieving minimum RCS subcooling, forcing transition to ECA-3.1 and delaying depressurization and SI termination -- allowing excessive SG inventory to accumulate until overpressure components release water or SG overfill occurs. Terminating cooldown too late challenges the subcriticality CSF or integrity CSF (because cooldown is at maximum rate) -- the crew would then transition to an integrity or subcriticality FRG, also delaying depressurization and SI termination. The crew must both achieve AND maintain the target temperature.
Measurable standard: Cooldown RCS to target temperature so that transition from SGTR-1 does not occur -- steam dump valve position lamps indicate closed, SG PORV valve position lamps indicate closed. RCS temperature not too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, and not below the temperature that causes an extreme (RED) or severe (PURPLE) challenge to the subcriticality and/or integrity CSF.
Feedback: Indication of steam flow rate greater than zero. RCS temperature decreasing. RCS temperature less than target temperature.
CT#1 (CT-18): Isolate feed and steam flow to ruptured SG before transition to SGTR-3, SGTR with LOCA -- Subcooled Recovery, occurs.
Safety significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The crew allowing differential pressure to dissipate forces a transition to contingency ERG ECA-3.1, which delays RCS depressurization and SI termination. A SGTR violates the RCS fission-product barrier -- radioactive RCS inventory leaks into the SG, increasing SG inventory, radioactivity, and pressure. If primary-to-secondary leakage is not stopped, SG pressure increases until the PORV or safety valve(s) open, releasing radioactivity to the environment. To stop leakage the crew must: (1) identify and isolate the ruptured SG, (2) cool down to establish RCS subcooling margin, (3) depressurize RCS to restore inventory, and (4) terminate SI. The crew cannot start cooldown until the ruptured SG is completely isolated (all steam flow from and all feedwater flow into the SG stopped). Isolation maintains a 250 psi differential pressure between ruptured and intact SGs, ensuring minimum RCS subcooling remains after depressurization. Without steam isolation, the differential drops below 250 psi during cooldown, forcing transition to ECA-3.1. For feedwater, isolation must occur after ruptured SG level exceeds minimum indication (tubes covered) -- feedwater coverage of tubes provides a water barrier preventing steam from contacting tubes during cooldown, which would condense steam and reduce SG pressure below the 250 psi differential.
Measurable standard: Isolate feed and steam flow before transition to SGTR-3 occurs -- MSIV position lamps closed, MSIV bypass valve position lamps closed, PORV setpoint adjusted to ERG Footnote O.03, blowdown isolation valve closed, steam isolation valve to TDAFW pump closed, AFW valve position lamps closed, feedwater isolation valve position lamps closed.
Feedback: Stable or increasing pressure in the ruptured SG. Decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate in the ruptured SG.
CT#2 (CT-19): Cooldown RCS to target temperature so that transition from SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, does not occur.
Safety significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency ERG. Terminating cooldown before reaching target temperature prevents achieving minimum RCS subcooling, forcing transition to ECA-3.1 and delaying depressurization and SI termination -- allowing excessive SG inventory to accumulate until overpressure components release water or SG overfill occurs. Terminating cooldown too late challenges the subcriticality CSF or integrity CSF (because cooldown is at maximum rate) -- the crew would then transition to an integrity or subcriticality FRG, also delaying depressurization and SI termination. The crew must both achieve AND maintain the target temperature.
Measurable standard: Cooldown RCS to target temperature so that transition from SGTR-1 does not occur -- steam dump valve position lamps indicate closed, SG PORV valve position lamps indicate closed. RCS temperature not too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, and not below the temperature that causes an extreme (RED) or severe (PURPLE) challenge to the subcriticality and/or integrity CSF.
Feedback: Indication of steam flow rate greater than zero. RCS temperature decreasing. RCS temperature less than target temperature.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 (power ascension) → S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 (PORV leakage) → S2.OP-AB.CW-0001 (CW screen DP) → S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 (SG tube leak) → EOP-TRIP-1 (manual reactor trip/SI on 23 SG tube rupture exceeding makeup capability) → EOP-SGTR-1 (23 SG NR level rising uncontrolled — ruptured SG identified and isolated, cooldown to target temp using steam dumps on intact SGs, depressurize RCS using PZR spray) → 2PS3 spray valve fails to close during depressurization → stop 21 and 23 RCPs to eliminate spray flow path → continue in SGTR-1 step 19 → Scenario terminated
S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 (power ascension) → S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 (PORV leakage) → S2.OP-AB.CW-0001 (CW screen DP) → S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 (SG tube leak) → EOP-TRIP-1 (manual reactor trip/SI on 23 SG tube rupture exceeding makeup capability) → EOP-SGTR-1 (23 SG NR level rising uncontrolled — ruptured SG identified and isolated, cooldown to target temp using steam dumps on intact SGs, depressurize RCS using PZR spray) → 2PS3 spray valve fails to close during depressurization → stop 21 and 23 RCPs to eliminate spray flow path → continue in SGTR-1 step 19 → Scenario terminated
Source: 20-01 ESG-4 | View Scenario PDF
Connections
- Related systems: RCS, Pressurizer & PRT, Steam Generator & Blowdown, Main Steam, Steam Dumps, Circ Water, CFCUs, AFW, ECCS, CVCS, RCPs, SECs
- Related EOPs: EOP-TRIP-1 — Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, EOP-SGTR-1 — Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- Related procedures: AB.PZR-0001 — Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction, AB.CW-0001 — Circulating Water Malfunction, AB.SG-0001 — Steam Generator Tube Leak
- Related exam: 2022 NRC Operating Exam