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2019 NRC Operating Exam

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2019 NRC Operating Exam

Overview

  • Exam: SALEM 2019 NRC Exam — 17-01 ILOT (Op-Test 17-01)
  • Date: January 14, 2019
  • Admin JPMs (RO): 4
  • Admin JPMs (SRO): 5
  • Simulator JPMs: 8
  • In-Plant JPMs: 3
  • Simulator Scenarios: 3 (NRC-1/ESG-1, NRC-3/ESG-3, NRC-4/ESG-5)

View Operating Test PDF

JPMs

Simulator Scenarios

JPM RO-A1 — Determine Maximum Vent Time in EOP-FRCI-3 Admin | RO/SRO | G2.1.25 (3.9)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 has experienced a small break LOCA.
- The crew has performed an RCS cooldown and depressurization in EOP-LOCA-2.
- During the depressurization the crew experienced some complications and indications of upper head voiding are now present.
- STA reports a valid CFST YELLOW path exists on Coolant Inventory.
- The TSC recommends initiating EOP-FRCI-3, Response to Void in Reactor Vessel.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the extra NCO.
- The crew has completed actions in EOP-FRCI-3 up to step 19.1 and has directed you to PERFORM Attachment 1 of EOP-FRCI-3 to determine the maximum venting time.
- The following conditions exist in Unit 2 containment:
  - Containment temperature is 140 F
  - Containment hydrogen concentration is 1.8%
  - RCS pressure is 1200 psig
- Round off to the nearest tenths when performing your calculations
Task Standard:
1. Correctly performs calculations IAW EOP-FRCI-3, Attachment 1.
2. Calculates Maximum Venting Time of 10.2 mins (9.2 - 11.2 mins acceptable band).
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 Record data from initial conditions (containment temp, H2 concentration, RCS pressure) Records provided data in steps 1.1 through 1.3
2.1 * Calculate containment absolute temperature (Tabs) Tabs = 140 + 460 = 600 R
2.2 * Calculate containment air volume (V) at STP V = 1.28E09 / 600 = 2.13E06 ft3 (2133333 ft3 acceptable with rounding)
3.3 * Calculate maximum hydrogen vent volume (M) M = (3% - 1.8%) x 2.13E06 / 100% = 25560 ft3 (25500 to 25600 ft3 acceptable band)
4.1 Record RCS pressure from step 1.3 Records 1200 psig
4.2 Record calculated maximum vent volume (M) from step 3.3 Records M = 25560 ft3
4.3 * Determine hydrogen vent flow rate from Figure 1 at 1200 psig Using Figure 1, determines Hydrogen Flow Rate of 2500 cfm (+/- 100 cfm readability allowance)
4.4 * Calculate maximum vent time (Tv) Tv = 25560 / 2500 = 10.2 mins (+/- 1.0 mins; 9.2 - 11.2 mins acceptable)
Key Decision Point:
Steps 4.3 and 4.4 are the discriminating steps. The applicant must correctly read the Hydrogen Flow Rate from Figure 1 at 1200 psig RCS pressure (2500 cfm). The graph has readability challenges, so a +/- 100 cfm allowance is factored into the acceptable vent time band. The V calculation formula in this revision uses V = 1.28E09 / Tabs (differs from the 2022 version which uses V = 2.62E06 x Tfact). Due to rounding in intermediate steps, the acceptable vent time band is wide (9.2 - 11.2 mins). Rounding should only be applied to the nearest tenths at the final vent time calculation.
Ref: 2-EOP-FRCI-3 (Rev 30) | Task: N1150880502 | K/A: G2.1.25 — Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables | Source: New (Rev 01) | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A2 — Perform Borated Water Source Surveillance Admin | RO/SRO | G2.2.37 (3.6)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- 21 BAT pump developed a leak that went unnoticed until the cross-connected BASTs reached their low level alarm setpoint.
- 21 BAT pump and the leak are isolated. BAST levels are stable.
- 21 BAST level: 48.0%
- 22 BAST level: 48.0%
- 21 BAST temp: 100 F
- 22 BAST temp: 98.1 F
- RWST temperature: 70 F
- RWST levels are: CH II = 41.4, CH III = 41.4, CH IV = 41.4
- Chemistry reports current RWST and BAST boron concentrations are:
  - 21 BAST: 6650 ppm
  - 22 BAST: 6650 ppm
  - RWST: 2350 ppm

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- Perform S2.OP-ST.CVC-0010, Borated Water Sources.
- All Prerequisites are completed SAT.
- Based on the Test Results is the surveillance SAT or UNSAT? (circle one)
Task Standard:
Correctly completes Attachment 2 of S2.OP-ST.CVC-0010 and determines Test Results for combined BAST Volume is UNSAT.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
3.0 Read and initial Precautions and Limitations Operator reads and initials steps
Att 2 * Record RWST level and verify acceptance criteria Records RWST level from initial cue sheet. Determines Test Results is SAT (364500 to 400000 gals / 40.5 ft to 41.9 ft)
Att 2 * Record RWST temperature and verify acceptance criteria Records 70 F. Determines Test Results is SAT (≥35 F)
Att 2 * Record RWST boron concentration and verify acceptance criteria Records 2350 ppm. Determines Test Results is SAT (≥2300 and ≤2500 ppm)
Att 2 * Record combined BAST volume and verify against TS 3.1.2.6 Figure 3.1-2 Calculates combined BAST level of 96% (48% + 48%). Using Figure 3.1-2, determines required BAST level is >96.5%. Test Results is UNSAT (96% < 96.5% required).
Att 2 * Record BAST temperature and verify acceptance criteria Records temperatures (100 F and 98.1 F). Determines Test Results is SAT (≥63 F)
Att 2 * Record BAST boron concentration and verify against TS 3.1.2.6 Figure 3.1-2 Records 6650 ppm for both BASTs. Using current BAST level of 96% and Figure 3.1-2, determines required concentration is >6650 ppm (~6675 ppm). Test Results is UNSAT (6650 ppm < ~6675 ppm required).
5.3 * Determine overall surveillance result Determines surveillance is UNSAT based on BAST volume and concentration results
Key Decision Point:
The discriminating steps are the BAST volume and concentration checks using TS 3.1.2.6 Figure 3.1-2. The combined BAST level is 96% (48% + 48%), and the applicant must use the figure to determine that the required level at the given boron concentration is >96.5% — making the volume UNSAT by a very narrow margin. Similarly, the boron concentration of 6650 ppm is right at the border of the required concentration from Figure 3.1-2, which shows ~6675 ppm required at 96% level — also UNSAT. The narrow margins are designed to test whether the applicant can correctly read the figure and compare values precisely rather than rounding favorably.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.CVC-0010 (Rev 10) | Task: N0040420201 | K/A: G2.2.37 — Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment | Source: New (Rev 01) | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A3 — Determine Personnel Exposure and Special Requirements Admin | RO/SRO | G2.3.4 (3.2)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem 1 is at 100% power.
- A Locked Valve surveillance IAW S1.OP-ST.CAN-0001, Primary Containment Valves Monthly, is scheduled to be performed on your shift.
- One of the valves to be verified is located in the Unit 1 Pipe Alley, Elevation 84 ft, Auxiliary Building.
- An entry into the Pipe Alley has been made since the last performance of this surveillance requiring this valve position to be verified.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Unit 1 RO and have been assigned to perform the valve verification in the Unit 1 Pipe Alley.
- Using the provided Radiological Survey Map and procedures, determine the following:
  1. What is the Radiological Posting for the area that the task will be performed?
  2. What is the highest On Contact radiation dose rate?
  3. What is the highest General Area dose rate?
  4. What protective clothing is required to enter this area?
  5. Calculate your personnel dose exposure. Assume the following:
    - It will take 1 minute to complete the task
    - Use the highest On Contact radiation dose rate as the General Area dose rate for the room
Task Standard:
1. High Radiation Area (HRA), Contaminated Area (CA)
2. 205 mrem/hr
3. 10 mrem/hr
4. Protective Clothing: lab coat, booties and rubber gloves
5. 3.42 mrem (if rounded up 3.5 is acceptable)
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 * Determine radiological posting for the work area Refers to Radiological Survey Map #1108410 and determines the work area is in a High Radiation Area (HRA) and Contaminated Area (CA)
2 * Determine highest On Contact radiation dose rate Refers to Survey Map and determines highest On Contact dose rate is 205 mrem/hr. (RP-AA-300, Attachment 2 provides definitions of survey map symbols.)
3 * Determine highest General Area (GA) dose rate Refers to Survey Map and determines highest General Area dose rate is 10 mrem/hr
4 * Determine protective clothing requirements Reviews HRA Briefing Sheet and determines Protective Clothing required: lab coat, booties, and rubber gloves for entry into CA
5 * Calculate personnel dose exposure [205 mrem/hr x 1 hr/60 mins] x 1 min = 3.42 mrem (round up to 3.5 mrem acceptable)
Key Decision Point:
Step 5 is the discriminating step. The applicant must use the highest On Contact dose rate (205 mrem/hr) as the General Area dose rate per the initiating cue, then calculate the dose for a 1-minute exposure: 205 mrem/hr / 60 min/hr x 1 min = 3.42 mrem. The trap is to use the General Area dose rate (10 mrem/hr) instead of the On Contact rate as instructed. The HRA Briefing Sheet includes a dose rate alarm setpoint of 250 mrem/hr (increased from 205 to avoid conflict with the survey map dose rate) — the applicant should not confuse this alarm setpoint with the actual dose rate.
Ref: RP-AA-460 (Rev 19), RP-AA-463 (Rev 5), RP-AA-300 (Rev 6) | Task: 1200100104 | K/A: G2.3.4 — Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions | Source: New (Rev 01) | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A4 — Perform Duties as Primary Communicator IAW EP-SA-111-F6 Admin | RO/SRO | G2.4.43 (3.2)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: Yes
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 was manually tripped from 100% power due to an RCS leak.
- Safety Injection was manually initiated and all ECCS pumps are running.
- The Shift Manager has declared an ALERT.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Primary Communicator.
- Make the required notifications to the State of New Jersey and Delaware within the required 15 minutes IAW EP-SA-111-F6, Primary Communicator Log.
- Notify the Shift Manager when your 15 minute notifications are complete.
- Prior to making each phone call, SIMULATE to the evaluator the actions you would take to make the phone call, THEN WAIT for the evaluator to prompt you to pick up the phone.
- THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL TASK
Task Standard:
1. Makes the required notifications to the State of NJ and DE IAW EP-SA-111-F6 within 15 minutes.
2. Reads sections I thru V of the ICMF form correctly to the contacted organization.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
A.1 Ensure Secondary Communicator has copy of ICMF CUE: Secondary Communicator is not available to assist
15.a * Notify NJ State Police via NETS (dial 5400) Selects NETS phone, dials 5400, correctly reads sections I thru V of the ICMF form to SGT Smith, records notification information, waits for repeat back
15.b * Verify NJ notification successful, proceed to Salem County Determines Step 15.a was successful and proceeds to Salem County, Cumberland County
15.e * Notify Delaware State Police / DEMA via NETS (dial 5406) ALTERNATE PATH: Primary (NETS 5406) does not respond. Secondary (302-659-2341) does not respond. NAWAS does not respond. Operator determines Step 15.e is NOT SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED and performs Steps 15.f-g.
15.f * Notify New Castle County via NETS (dial 5408) — alternate contact for Delaware Selects NETS phone, dials 5408, correctly reads sections I thru V of the ICMF form to Tom Grey (New Castle County), records notification information, waits for repeat back
15.g * Notify Kent County via NETS (dial 5409) Selects NETS phone, dials 5409, correctly reads sections I thru V of the ICMF form to Joe Black (Kent County), records notification information, waits for repeat back
Key Decision Point:
Step 15.e is the discriminating step (alternate path). Delaware State Police cannot be reached on any of the three contact methods (NETS primary, secondary phone number, NAWAS backup). The applicant must recognize that the notification was NOT successfully completed and proceed to Steps 15.f-g to notify Delaware counties (New Castle County and Kent County) directly as the alternate path. The 15-minute time limit makes this time-critical — the applicant cannot spend excessive time attempting to reach Delaware State Police before moving to the alternates.
Ref: EP-SA-111-F6 (Rev 22) | Task: N1240110501 | K/A: G2.4.43 — Knowledge of emergency communications procedures and equipment | Source: New (Rev 02) | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A1 — Determine Which ECCS Pumps Can Be Stopped Admin | SRO | G2.1.7 (4.7)
Location: Classroom
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 5 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- At 0500 Salem 2 reactor was manually tripped and Safety Injection automatically actuated as a result of a small break LOCA.
- 21 RHR pump was C/T for maintenance and 22 RHR pump tripped while in 2-EOP-LOCA-1.
- The crew has transitioned to 2-EOP-LOCA-5 due to no recirculation capability.
- The crew is performing the major action steps (minimum SI flow for decay heat removal) of 2-EOP-LOCA-5.
- The following ECCS pumps are running:
  - 21 SI pump with indicated flow of 420 gpm
  - 22 Charging pump with indicated flow of 360 gpm

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Unit 2 CRS at Step 19.2 of 2-EOP-LOCA-5.
- DETERMINE the following:
  1. At time 0550 hours, what is the minimum SI flow required from Figure A (attached)?
  2. Which ECCS pumps can be stopped (if any) to reduce injection flow as close as possible to minimum flow from Figure A (assume that ECCS pump flows remain stable)?
Task Standard:
1. Min flow injection of 390 gpm (+/- 10 gpm).
2. Stops 22 Charging pump.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 * Using Figure A, determine minimum SI flow at 50 minutes after trip Time after trip = 0550 - 0500 = 50 minutes. From Figure A (Minimum ECCS Flow Versus Time After Trip), minimum SI flow is 390 gpm (+/- 10 gpm).
2 * Determine which ECCS pumps can be stopped 21 SI pump (420 gpm) must remain in service — it alone exceeds the 390 gpm minimum. 22 Charging pump (360 gpm) can be stopped — it alone does NOT meet the 390 gpm minimum, and the 21 SI pump alone provides sufficient flow.
Key Decision Point:
The applicant must first calculate time after trip (0550 - 0500 = 50 minutes), then read Figure A to determine 390 gpm minimum. The critical determination is which pump to keep and which to stop: 21 SI pump at 420 gpm exceeds the 390 gpm minimum alone, so it must stay running. 22 Charging pump at 360 gpm is below the minimum by itself and therefore can be stopped. Compare with the similar 2023 SRO-A1.a JPM where NEITHER pump could be stopped (160 gpm + 220 gpm = 380 gpm, but neither alone meets the 290 gpm minimum at 100 minutes).
Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-5 (Rev 31) | Task: 1150680502 | K/A: G2.1.7 — Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A2 — Determine Heat Stress Requirements for Containment Entry Admin | SRO | G2.1.26 (3.6)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- 2PS3, PZR Spray Valve, is operating erratically and a decision has been made to enter containment to isolate the 2PS3 by closing the manual isolation valve (2PS28).
- The 2PS28 is located inside the PZR housing (dog house), upper elevation, and is known to be very physically demanding on the operators to operate. Two operators will be required to simultaneously operate the valve using a valve wrench during the entire valve operation. Operators will also have to climb ladders to access the 2PS28 in the dog house.
- The Shift Manager needs to determine the amount of resources needed to close this valve given the Heat Stress conditions.
- Rad Pro has provided a Wet Bulb Globe Thermometer (WBGT) temperature of 89 F for the work area.
- Rad Pro has determined that operators will need to wear double PCs.
- Cooling Garments will not be used.

Initiating Cue:
You are the Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor.
DETERMINE the following using SA-AA-111, Heat Stress Control for the two workers:
1. What is the Stay Time?
2. Assume the task will need more time. What is the Maximum Extended Stay Time?
3. Assume the task will NOT use the Maximum Extended Stay Time. What is the Recovery Time?
Task Standard:
Determines: Stay Time = 20 mins, Maximum Extended Stay Time = 30 mins, and Recovery Time = 60 mins.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
4.1.1 Record WBGT temperature for work area CRS records Wet Bulb Globe Temperature given from Initiating Cue as 89 F on Attachment 4.
4.1.2 Classify the work environment CRS classifies work environment as High Temperature based on work area temperature of 89 F.
4.2.1 * Determine Work Rate using Attachment 2 CRS determines Work Rate is HIGH. The 2PS28 valve operation is historically very hard to operate and physically demanding, requiring two operators with a valve wrench and climbing ladders inside the PZR dog house — this is High Work Rate activity (>50% of work time).
4.3 * Determine clothing ensemble adjustment factor Determines the clothing ensemble to be Double Cloth Coveralls (double PCs) and the adjustment factor to add 9 F to the WBGT.
4.4 * Determine Stay Time using Attachment 3 CRS uses: WBGT = 89 F, Work Rate = High, Clothing = Double PCs. Adds adjustment factor: 89 F + 9 F = 98 F. Using Attachment 3 with WBGT of 98 F and High work demand: Stay Time = 20 min.
4.6 * Calculate Maximum Extended Stay Time CRS calculates Maximum Extended Stay Time (1.5 x ST): 1.5 x 20 mins = 30 mins. Check Times cannot extend beyond 1.5 times the established Stay Time.
4.8 * Determine Recovery Time Stay Time (ST) = 20 mins. Actual Work Time = Stay Time. Recovery Time = (20/20) x 60 = 60 mins.
Key Decision Point:
The applicant must correctly classify the work rate as HIGH based on the physical demands described in the initial conditions (valve wrench, climbing ladders, two operators simultaneously operating a valve in the PZR dog house). This drives the Stay Time determination. With WBGT of 89 F + 9 F clothing adjustment = 98 F effective WBGT, and High work rate, Attachment 3 yields a Stay Time of 20 minutes. The Maximum Extended Stay Time is simply 1.5x the Stay Time, and Recovery Time uses the formula (Actual Work Time / Stay Time) x 60 minutes.
Ref: SA-AA-111 (Rev 12) | Task: N1220400302 | K/A: G2.1.26 — Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (SRO Only) | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A3 — Determine Technical Specification Action for Inoperable Component Admin | SRO | G2.2.40 (4.7)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem 1 is at 100% power.
- 12 Charging pump is in service.
- 1B EDG is CIT for scheduled maintenance. TS 3.8.1.1 action b was entered with 60 hours remaining of the LCO.
- S1.OP-SO.DG-0005, Preparation for Removing a Diesel Generator from Service, was reviewed by the CRS prior to CIT the 1B EDG.

At 0700 hours:
- 12 Charging pump trips.
- Crew responds to the event and enters S1.OP-AB.CVC-0001 and starts 13 Charging pump and restores letdown and PZR level.

Initiating Cue:
You are the Unit 1 CRS.
Evaluate the impact to Technical Specifications and DETERMINE the following:
1. What LCO action(s) are applicable at 0700 hours?
2. At 1100 hours you're notified that 12 Charging pump troubleshooting is still ongoing and 1B EDG will need 6 hours to restore from maintenance. What action(s) are required and by what times?
Task Standard:
1. Determines TS 3.8.1.1 action b.2 (4 hours) and 3.5.2.a action a (72 hours) are applicable.
2. At 1100 hours, be in Mode 3 at 1700 hours and Mode 5 at 2300 hours the next day.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 Review S1.OP-SO.DG-0005 to identify redundant required features for 1B EDG CRS reviews procedure to determine what components are redundant required features powered from the 1B EDG bus.
2.0 * Determine applicable LCOs at 0700 hours Operator determines the following Tech Spec LCOs are applicable: (1) TS 3.5.2.a Action a (72 hours) for 12 Charging pump being inoperable, and (2) TS 3.8.1.1 Action b.2 (4 hours) for 1B EDG and redundant component (12 Charging pump) inoperable.
3.0 * Determine required actions at 1100 hours SRO determines that at 1100 hours the Unit must be in Mode 3 at 1700 hours and Mode 5 at 2300 hours the next day (Mode 3 in next 6 hours and Mode 5 within the following 30 hours).
Key Decision Point:
The applicant must recognize that the 12 Charging pump is a redundant required feature supported by the 1B EDG (per S1.OP-SO.DG-0005). When 12 Charging pump trips while the 1B EDG is already CIT, TS 3.8.1.1 action b.2 applies — 4 hours to restore the inoperable EDG OR the redundant required feature, otherwise shutdown per TS 3.0.3 (Mode 3 in 6 hours, Mode 5 in the following 30 hours). Separately, TS 3.5.2.a action a gives 72 hours to restore one ECCS subsystem (charging). At 1100 hours, 4 hours have elapsed since 0700 — neither the EDG nor the charging pump will be restored in time, so the shutdown actions begin immediately: Mode 3 by 1700 and Mode 5 by 2300 the next day. TS 3.0.3 is NOT appropriate because specific action statements (b.2) exist for this condition.
Ref: S1.OP-SO.DG-0005 (Rev 9), Salem Unit 1 Tech Specs | Task: 112670302 | K/A: G2.2.40 — Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system (SRO Only) | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A4 — Determine Personnel Exposure and Authorization for Entry Admin | SRO | G2.3.4 (3.7)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 20 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem 1 is at 100% power.
- A Locked Valve surveillance IAW S1.OP-ST.CAN-0001, Primary Containment Valves Monthly, is scheduled to be performed on your shift.
- One of the valves to be verified is located in the Unit 1 Pipe Alley, Elevation 84 ft. Auxiliary Building.
- An entry into the Pipe Alley has been made since the last performance of this surveillance requiring this valve position to be verified.

Initiating Cue:
You are the Unit 1 CRS.
Using the provided Radiological Survey Map and procedures, determine the following:
1. What is the Radiological Posting for the area that the task will be performed?
2. What is the highest On Contact radiation dose rate?
3. What is the highest General Area dose rate?
4. What authorization is needed to enter this room?
5. Calculate the total personnel dose exposure. Assume the following:
  - two (2) operators are needed to complete the task
  - it will take 1 minute per operator to complete the task
  - use the highest On Contact radiation dose rate as the General Area dose rate for the room
Task Standard:
1. High Radiation Area (HRA), Contaminated Area (CA)
2. 205 mrem/hr
3. 10 mrem/hr
4. SRPT (may also specify signing onto RWP-1 and HRA brief)
5. 6.8 mrem (6-7 mrem is acceptable)
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 * Determine Radiological Posting for the work area Operator refers to Radiological Survey Map #1108410 and determines that the work area is in a High Radiation Area (HRA) and Contaminated Area (CA).
2.0 * Determine highest On Contact radiation dose rate Operator refers to Radiological Survey Map and determines that the highest On Contact radiation dose rate is 205 mrem/hr. (RP-AA-300, Attachment 2 provides definitions of survey map symbols and abbreviations.)
3.0 * Determine highest General Area dose rate Operator refers to Radiological Survey Map and determines that the highest General Area (GA) radiation dose rate is 10 mrem/hr.
4.0 * Determine authorization needed for entry Operator determines that the SRPT (Senior Radiation Protection Technician) needs to authorize the key release for entry into the HRA IAW RP-AA-463, Attachment 1. Operator may also identify signing onto RWP-1 and receiving an HRA brief from Rad Pro (RP-AA-460 P&Ls 2.1.1 and 2.1.3).
5.0 * Calculate total personnel dose exposure Operator calculates: [205 mrem/hr x (1 hr / 60 mins)] x 2 mins = 6.8 mrem (6-7 mrem acceptable). Note: 2 minutes total (1 minute per operator x 2 operators), using the 205 mrem/hr On Contact dose rate as the General Area dose rate per the initiating cue.
Key Decision Point:
The applicant must correctly read the radiological survey map symbols to identify the HRA/CA posting, distinguish between On Contact (205 mrem/hr) and General Area (10 mrem/hr) dose rates, and determine that SRPT authorization is required for HRA key release per RP-AA-463. The dose calculation uses the On Contact dose rate (205 mrem/hr) as specified in the initiating cue, not the General Area dose rate, and accounts for 2 minutes total work time (1 minute per operator x 2 operators).
Ref: RP-AA-460 (Rev 19), RP-AA-463 (Rev 5), RP-AA-300 (Rev 6), Radiological Survey Map #1108410 | Task: 1200100104 | K/A: G2.3.4 — Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions (SRO Only) | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A5 — Classify an Event and Complete ICMF IAW EP-SA-111-101 Admin | SRO | G2.4.41 (4.6)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: Yes (15 minutes)
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem 2 is at 100% power.
- The control room is responding to valid indications of a Steam Generator tube leak in 23 Steam Generator IAW S2.OP-AB.SG-0001.
- The RO reports that PZR level and RCS pressure are lowering rapidly.
- The CRS implemented the CAS of AB.SG-0001 to trip the Reactor and initiate Safety Injection.
- The crew is currently implementing 2-EOP-SGTR-1.
- 23 MS167 failed to close from the control room and the crew has initiated close on 21, 22, and 24 MS167's.
- Following the closing of the 21, 22, & 24 MS167's, the control room suddenly hears a loud roaring noise.
- The PO reports that 23 SG pressure is 850 psig and lowering rapidly and steam flows are approx. 12% and rising. All other SG pressures are stable around 995 psig with 0-1% steam flow.
- Met Tower data indicates wind from 105 degrees at 5 mph.

Initiating Cue:
You are the Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor (CRS).
CLASSIFY the event AND COMPLETE the ICMF IAW the applicable attachment.
The JPM will stop when you have submitted the ICMF to your evaluator.
THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM.
Task Standard:
1. Classifies the event as a Site Area Emergency (SAE) — 8 points based on RB3.L (5 pts) and CB3.L (3 pts) or CB4.L (3 pts).
2. Properly completes sections I thru IV of the ICMF for the classified event.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 * Classify the event using Fission Product Barrier assessment Operator classifies the event as a Site Area Emergency (SAE) based on Fission Product Barrier Section F — EAL#: RB3.L (5 pts) and CB3.L (3 pts) or CB4.L (3 pts). Total = 8 points, which meets SAE threshold. The SGTR with a stuck-open MSIV on the affected SG constitutes loss or potential loss of both the RCS barrier and the containment barrier (uncontrolled release path from RCS through ruptured SG tube through open MSIV to atmosphere).
2.0 * Select correct ICMF attachment for classification level Operator selects EP-SA-111-F3, Attachment 3 for Site Area Emergency (not Attachment 1/UE, Attachment 2/Alert, or Attachment 4/GE).
3.0 * Complete ICMF Sections I thru IV Operator accurately and completely fills out Sections I thru IV of the ICMF for Site Area Emergency (SAE) IAW EP-SA-111-F3, Attachment 3. Note: a release IS in progress due to the event (SGTR with stuck-open MSIV = unmonitored release path).
Time-Critical:
This JPM must be completed within 15 minutes. The clock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue.
Key Decision Point:
The applicant must recognize the fission product barrier status: (1) RCS barrier is lost — SGTR is a direct breach of the RCS pressure boundary (RB3.L = 5 pts), and (2) Containment barrier is lost or potentially lost — the stuck-open 23 MS167 (MSIV) creates an uncontrolled release path from the RCS through the ruptured 23 SG tube, out the open MSIV to atmosphere (CB3.L or CB4.L = 3 pts). Total of 8 points meets the SAE threshold. The loud roaring noise with rapidly lowering 23 SG pressure and rising steam flow confirms the stuck-open MSIV is passing steam to atmosphere. A release IS in progress via this path.
Ref: EP-SA-111-101 (Rev 01), EP-SA-111-121 (Rev 00), EP-SA-111-F3 (Rev 03), Salem ECG Books | Task: 1240020502 | K/A: G2.4.41 — Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications (SRO Only) | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-i — Locally Borate the RCS In-Plant (RCA) | RO/SRO | 004 A4.18 (4.3/4.1)
Location: In-Plant — Unit 1 RCA, El 122 ft (near Boric Acid Storage Tanks) and Panel 216-1
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 1 control room was evacuated due to a security event.
- The immediate actions of 1-EOP-TRIP-1 were completed.
- 3 control rods remain withdrawn following the Rx trip.
- CRS is performing actions of S1.OP-AB.CR-0001, Control Room Evacuation.
- Attachment 5, Steps 1 thru 9 of S1.OP-AB.CR-0001 are complete with 1CV55 maintaining Charging flow at 90 gpm and RCP seal injection flows being maintained at 6 gpm to each seal.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- Perform Emergency Boration for the stuck control rods IAW Attachment 5, Step 10, of S1.OP-AB.CR-0001.
Task Standard:
1. Perform steps to close 11 and 12 CV160 recirc valves.
2. Simulate locally opening 1CV175 Rapid Boration valve.
3. Simulate adjusting charging flow to >= 99 gpm.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
10.1 PROCEED to Unit 1 Cont Air Redundant Air Supply Wall Mntd Pnl 701-1A, El 122 ft, near the Boric Acid Storage Tanks Locates Unit 1 Cont Air Redundant Air Supply Wall Mntd Pnl 701-1A.
10.2 * CLOSE the Air Supply Isolation Valve, 11CV160 A/S, AIR SUPPLY FOR 11CV160 Locates and simulates closing the Supply Isolation Valve, 11CV160 A/S.
10.3 * OPEN draincock for control air regulator for 11CV160 Simulates opening draincock for 11CV160 control air regulator.
10.4 PROCEED to Unit 1 Cont Air Redundant Air Supply Wall Mntd Pnl 701-1B, El 122 ft, near the Boric Acid Storage Tanks Locates Unit 1 Cont Air Redundant Air Supply Wall Mntd Pnl 701-1B.
10.5 * CLOSE the Air Supply Isolation Valve, 12CV160 A/S, AIR SUPPLY FOR 12CV160 Locates and simulates closing the Supply Isolation Valve, 12CV160 A/S.
10.6 * OPEN draincock for control air regulator for 12CV160 Simulates opening draincock for 12CV160 control air regulator.
10.7 * OPEN 1CV175, Rapid Borate Stop Valve — disengage clutch and rotate handwheel counterclockwise Locates 1CV175 (Rapid Borate Stop Valve) and simulates opening by disengaging clutch and rotating handwheel counterclockwise. This establishes boric acid flow path to charging pump suction.
10.8 * PROCEED to 1CV55 and ADJUST flow for 75 gpm above existing total flow for all RCP seal flows — charging flow to >= 99 gpm (75 gpm + 24 gpm for seals) At Panel 216-1, operator adjusts the MANUAL hand sender in the direction to lower the air signal to open 1CV55 and raise charging to desired flow. 1CV55 is air-to-close — lowering air signal opens valve and raises flow. Target: 75 gpm boration + 24 gpm seal injection = 99 gpm total.
Key Decision Point:
Steps 10.2/10.3 and 10.5/10.6 are critical — the applicant must close BOTH 11CV160 and 12CV160 air supply isolation valves AND open BOTH draincocks to bleed the control air from the recirc valve diaphragms. This causes both CV160 recirc valves to close (fail closed on loss of air), eliminating the recirculation path back to the boric acid storage tanks and forcing all boric acid through the charging pump suction. Step 10.7 (opening 1CV175) establishes the rapid boration flow path. Step 10.8 requires the applicant to calculate the correct charging flow: 75 gpm boration + 24 gpm for four RCP seals (6 gpm each) = 99 gpm, then adjust the hand sender at Panel 216-1 to raise flow (lower air signal to open 1CV55).
Ref: S1.OP-AB.CR-0001 (R18) Attachment 5 | Task: N1130140504 | K/A: 004 A4.18 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Boric acid flow control (locally) | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-j — Startup and Parallel a RDMG Set In-Plant | RO/SRO | 012 A4.07 (3.9/3.9)
Location: In-Plant — 84 ft. Elevation, Unit 1 Switchgear Room
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 1 is operating at 75% power.
- 11 Rod Drive MG (RDMG) set tripped 3 days ago.
- Maintenance has completed repairs and is ready to start.

Initiating Cue:
- Start up 11 RDMG set and parallel it to 12 RDMG set IAW S1.OP-SO.RCS-0001, section 5.4.
- Maintenance personnel are standing by to take the required voltage readings.
Task Standard:
Simulate starting and paralleling 11 RDMG set with 12 RDMG set IAW approved procedures.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.4.1 ENSURE A AND B REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS are CLOSED; Running RDMG Set GENERATOR LINE VOLTS is 260V (247V-273V) AND GENERATOR LINE AMPS is ~80 DC AMPS Locates A AND B REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS and verifies closed. Locates 12 RDMG Set GENERATOR LINE VOLT AND GENERATOR LINE AMPS meters and checks readings.
5.4.2 ALIGN MG Set Controls for MG Set to be started IAW Attachment 1 Using Attachment 1, determines 11 MG set controls are aligned: Voltmeter selector switch on A-B, Voltage adjust Vertical, Ammeter selector switch in A, Motor Breaker Control Switch target GREEN / breaker OPEN, Synchronize switch OFF, Generator Breaker Control Switch target GREEN / breaker OPEN.
5.4.3 * CLOSE MOTOR Breaker AND ALLOW at least 20 seconds for MG Set to reach rated speed Simulates rotating motor breaker control switch and waits at least 20 seconds before proceeding.
5.4.4 * PRESS AND HOLD GEN FIELD FLASH pushbutton UNTIL Generator voltage stops rising (GENERATOR LINE VOLTS should indicate ~260V) Simulates pressing GEN FIELD FLASH pushbutton until Generator voltage stops rising.
5.4.5.A ADJUST VOLTAGE ADJUST full counterclockwise to LOW (~220V) Simulates adjusting VOLTAGE ADJUST full counterclockwise to LOW.
5.4.5.B ADJUST VOLTAGE ADJUST full clockwise to HIGH (~300V) Simulates adjusting VOLTAGE ADJUST full clockwise to HIGH.
5.4.5.C ADJUST VOLTAGE ADJUST until GENERATOR LINE VOLTS indicates ~260V Simulates adjusting VOLTAGE ADJUST counterclockwise until GENERATOR LINE VOLTS indicates ~260V.
5.4.5.D Direct Maintenance to OBTAIN voltage reading on Running MG Set using DMM at back of installed voltmeter Directs Maintenance to perform IV and obtain DMM voltage reading on Running MG Set. DMM reads ~130V (approximately half of installed voltmeter).
5.4.5.E Direct Maintenance to MONITOR voltage reading on In-coming MG Set using DMM at back of installed voltmeter Directs Maintenance to perform IV and monitor DMM voltage reading on In-coming MG Set. DMM reads ~129V.
5.4.5.F * ADJUST VOLTAGE ADJUST until DMM voltage is 0-2.5 volts higher than the reading obtained in Step 5.4.5.D (Running MG Set) Simulates adjusting VOLTAGE ADJUST clockwise to raise voltage until DMM reads 0-2.5V higher than the running set (130V). Incoming MG set voltage must be adjusted ABOVE the running set voltage before paralleling.
5.4.5.G Direct Maintenance to REMOVE DMM AND CLOSE panel doors Directs Maintenance to remove DMM and close panel doors.
5.4.6 * PLACE MG Set SYNCHRONIZE Switch to ON — OBSERVE Generator Breaker automatically closes and load divides equally (~40 DC Amps each) If necessary, simulates moving the Synchronize Switch from 12 MG set and inserting into 11 MG set, then places in ON. Generator breaker auto-closes and load stabilizes at ~40 amps on each generator. CAUTION: Do NOT manually close generator output breaker — could trip both MG Sets. Auto-closure could take as long as 60 seconds.
5.4.7 PLACE MG Set SYNCHRONIZE Switch to OFF Simulates placing 11 MG Set SYNCHRONIZE Switch to OFF.
Key Decision Point:
Steps 5.4.5.F and 5.4.6 are the discriminating steps — the applicant must adjust the incoming MG set voltage 0-2.5V HIGHER than the running set using DMM readings (CLOCKWISE to raise), then place the SYNCHRONIZE switch to ON to auto-close the generator breaker. The single synchronize handle must be moved from the 12 MG set to the 11 MG set. Manually closing the generator output breaker could trip both MG sets. This is the identical procedure section as the 2023 JPM IP-j (section 4.4 vs section 5.4 — the procedure was revised between exams but the task is the same).
Ref: S1.OP-SO.RCS-0001 (R32) + OTSC 32A | Task: N0015010104 | K/A: 012 A4.07 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: M/G set breakers | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-k — Conduct an Authorized Waste Gas Release In-Plant (RCA) | RO/SRO | 071 A4.26 (3.1/3.9)
Location: In-Plant — Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, Panel 104-2 (RCA entry required)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 25 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Both Salem Units are operating at 100% power.
- 21 Waste Gas Decay Tank is in Standby at 15 psig.
- 22 Waste Gas Decay Tank is in Holdup at 90 psig.
- 23 Waste Gas Decay Tank is O/S at 15 psig.
- 24 Waste Gas Decay Tank is O/S at 15 psig.
- 2R41 Plant Vent radiation monitor is Operable.
- Plant vent flow rate and sample flow rate monitors are Operable.

Initiating Cue:
- CRS directs you to PERFORM a release of 22 Waste Gas Decay Tank IAW S2.OP-SO.WG-0009, Discharge of 22 Gas Decay Tank to Plant Vent, starting at Step 5.2.11.
- Section 5.1 and Steps 5.2.1 through 5.2.10 are complete.
- You have the Tag Release for 22WG31.
Task Standard:
1. Performs a Radiological Waste Gas release IAW S2.OP-SO.WG-0009.
2. Terminates the Waste Gas release as directed by procedure.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.2.11.A ENSURE 22 GDT is NOT in service Verifies that 22 WGDT is NOT in service.
5.2.11.B ENSURE 22 GDT is NOT selected for "Standby" Verifies 22 GDT is NOT selected for Standby.
5.2.11.C RECORD 22 GDT "Initial Pressure" (PIS2037) on Attachment 3 Records 22 GDT pressure as 90 psig from PIS2037.
5.2.11.D.1 * TURN 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias fully counterclockwise until indicator <0% (NOTE: 2HIC-14 must be set to <0% or 2WG41 will NOT latch) Simulates turning Flow Bias knob fully COUNTER-CLOCKWISE until indicator is <0%. Must set bias to <0% before opening to latch and set the valve.
5.2.11.D.2 * POSITION 2WG41 Selector Switch to OPEN AND RELEASE to AUTO position (spring return) Simulates positioning selector switch to OPEN, then releases to AUTO.
5.2.11.D.3 * TURN 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias clockwise until indicator >= 100% Simulates turning Flow Bias CLOCKWISE until indicator reads >= 100%. 2WG41 will not fully open until flow bias is 100%.
5.2.11.D.4 ENSURE with Unit 2 Control Room that 2WG41 has lost CLOSED indication AND audible alarm received Calls Control Room to verify 2WG41 has lost closed indication and audible alarm received.
5.2.11.D.5 * TURN 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias fully counterclockwise until indicator <0% Simulates turning Flow Bias fully COUNTER-CLOCKWISE until indicator <0%.
5.2.11.D.6 ENSURE with Unit 2 Control Room that 2WG41 has CLOSED indication Calls Control Room to verify 2WG41 has CLOSED indication.
5.2.11.D.7 * POSITION 2WG41 Selector Switch to CLOSE Simulates positioning 2WG41 selector switch to CLOSE.
5.2.11.E PERFORM IV of 2WG41 Flow Bias position, RECORD on Attachment 1, Section 2.0 Requests IV on 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias position.
5.2.11.F * OPEN 22WG31 Simulates rotating valve counter-clockwise to open 22WG31.
5.2.11.G * Slowly OPEN 22WG34 Simulates slowly rotating counter-clockwise to open 22WG34.
5.2.11.H RECORD IV of 22 GDT discharge valves 22WG31 and 22WG34 on Attachment 1, Section 3.0, prior to commencing 22 GDT release Requests IV of 22 GDT discharge valves prior to commencing release.
5.2.12.A * POSITION 2WG41 Selector Switch to OPEN AND RELEASE to AUTO (spring return) — commence release Simulates positioning 2WG41 selector switch to OPEN and releasing to AUTO to commence the release.
5.2.12.B * SLOWLY SET 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias to <= 100% Simulates adjusting 2WG41 Flow Bias to <= 100%. Records release data on Attachment 2, Section 5.1. 2WG38 pressure on 2PL8678 reads 7.8 psig.
5.2.13.A CALCULATE 22 GDT Average Release Rate every 10 minutes on Attachment 3 Operator reads step and determines no action at this time until 10 minutes has elapsed. Continues on.
5.2.13.B RECORD Meteorological Data in Attachment 2, Section 5.2 Records MET Data: Wind Speed 5.8 MPH at El 33 ft, Wind Direction 290 degrees at El 33 ft, Delta T (33 ft - 33 ft) = 0 degrees C.
5.2.13.D IF pressure downstream of 2WG38 is >8.0 psig OR 2WG41 CLOSES, THEN TERMINATE release Operator reads step and determines none of these conditions are present. Marks N/A and continues.
Term * 22 WGDT pressure reaches 10 psig — TURN 2WG41 Flow Bias fully counterclockwise until indicator <= 0% Operator turns 2WG41 Flow Bias fully counter-clockwise until indicator reads 0%.
Term * PLACE 2WG41-SWT to CLOSED position Operator places 2WG41-SWT to the closed position.
Term * CLOSE 22WG34 Operator closes 22WG34.
Key Decision Point:
The latch-and-set sequence (Step 5.2.11.D) is the most complex portion — the applicant must correctly manipulate 2WG41 Flow Bias and Selector Switch in the proper order (bias to <0%, open to auto, bias to 100%, verify lost closed indication, bias back to <0%, verify closed, then position selector to CLOSE). For the actual release (Step 5.2.12), the applicant opens 2WG41 to AUTO and sets flow bias to <= 100%. Upon reaching 10 psig tank pressure, the release is terminated by reducing flow bias to <0%, closing 2WG41-SWT, and closing 22WG34. This is procedurally identical to the 2023 JPM IP-k except for the tank number (22 GDT vs 21 GDT) and the associated procedure (S2.OP-SO.WG-0009 vs S2.OP-SO.WG-0008).
Ref: S2.OP-SO.WG-0009 (R29) | Task: N0715070104 | K/A: 071 A4.26 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Waste gas release termination controls | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-a — Respond to Loss of All Control Rod Drive Vent Fans Simulator | RO/SRO | 001 A2.01 (3.1/3.7)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 5 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 at 100% power, BOL.
- No equipment is out of service and no active Tech Specs are in effect.

Initiating Cue:
You are the Reactor Operator.
Respond to all alarms and indications.
Task Standard:
1. STARTs Standby CRDM Vent Fan IAW ARP based on abnormal console indications.
2. TRIPs the Reactor IAW ARP based on no CRDM Vent Fans running.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
— Recognize abnormal console alarm Operator reports receipt of unexpected console alarm on 21 CRD Vent Fan: AIR FLOW LO and SEQUENCE COMPLETE bezel extinguished. Operator refers to 2CC1 ARP S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 page 13.
3.1 Evaluate if Rod Drive Vent Fan has just been started Operator reads step 3.1 and determines that a Vent Fan has NOT been started. Marks step N/A and continues on.
3.2 * Determine SEQUENCE COMPLETE is extinguished and swap to standby fan Operator determines step is applicable based on SEQUENCE COMPLETE indication bezel being extinguished. Continues to perform applicable steps.
3.2.A * STOP affected Rod Drive Vent Fan Operator depresses STOP PB for 21 Fan and verifies STOP bezel illuminates Green.
3.2.B * START standby Rod Drive Vent Fan Operator depresses START PB for standby vent fan and verifies START bezel illuminates RED. Operator reports SEQUENCE COMPLETE bezel is illuminated and AIR FLOW LO is extinguished as expected.
— ALTERNATE PATH: Both remaining running vent fans trip Shortly after starting the standby fan, both the 23 CRD Fan (40 seconds) and 22 CRD Fan (50 seconds) trip. Operator receives AIR FLOW LO alarms for both fans. No CRDM Vent Fans are now running.
3.2.C Evaluate if standby fan cannot be started Operator marks step as N/A based on standby fan having started (initially).
3.2.D * IF no Rod Drive Vent Fans in operation THEN TRIP the Reactor This step was initially marked N/A when the standby fan started. It becomes applicable when all running vent fans trip. Operator TRIPs the Reactor when NO Vent Fans are in operation. JPM terminates when the reactor is tripped.
Key Decision Point:
This is an alternate path JPM. The initial response (swap to standby fan) succeeds, but then both remaining running fans trip within seconds. The applicant must recognize that step 3.2.D — which was initially marked N/A — now becomes applicable because NO CRD Vent Fans are in operation. The ARP directs an immediate reactor trip when no CRDM Vent Fans are running, because loss of cooling to the rod drive coils could degrade the CRDM holding capability and lead to uncontrolled rod motion. The operator must trip the reactor per step 3.2.D.1. Performing EOP-TRIP-1 immediate actions is NOT required to complete this JPM.
Ref: S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 (Rev 60), S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001 (Rev 34) | Task: 0220040101 | K/A: 001 A2.01 — Ability to predict the impacts of CRD mechanism malfunctions on plant conditions (RO 3.1 / SRO 3.7) | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-b — Transfer To Hot Leg Recirculation IAW EOP-LOCA-4 Sim | RO/SRO | 006 A4.05 (3.9/3.8)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 5 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 experienced a Large Break LOCA.
- The crews have completed actions to transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation IAW EOP-LOCA-3 and have transitioned back to EOP-LOCA-1.
- 22 SI pump tripped during LOCA-3 and is being investigated.
- 21 RHR pump and 21SJ45 were C/T for scheduled maintenance prior to the event.
- The crew has just reached the 4.5 hour wait time at Step 26 of EOP-LOCA-1.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to continue with EOP-LOCA-1 starting at Step 27.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
Align RCS for Hot Leg Recirculation IAW 2-EOP-LOCA-4 Steps 3 thru 4.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
27 * DEPRESS "CLOSE" PUSHBUTTON FOR 21 AND 22 SJ40 (Hot Leg Discharge Valves) Depresses CLOSE PB for 21 and 22 SJ40 on 2CC1.
27.1 * REMOVE LOCKOUTS FOR 21 AND 22 SJ40 (Hot Leg Discharge Valves) Places 21 and 22 SJ40 Lockout CMC switches to "Valve Operable" and verifies Valve Operable backlight illuminates.
27.1 (cont'd) ARE "VALVE OPERABLE" BACKLIGHTS LIT FOR 21SJ40 AND 22SJ40? YES — verifies Valve Operable backlights are lit on 2RP4 for both 21 and 22 SJ40.
28 WAIT UNTIL 6.5 HOURS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE SI ACTUATION CUE: 6.5 hours has elapsed since SI actuation. CRS directs transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation by performing EOP-LOCA-4.
LOCA-4 Step 1 ARE BOTH RHR PUMPS RUNNING? Determines that ONLY 22 RHR Pump is running (21 RHR pump is C/T). Goes to Step 3.
3 IS 22 RHR Pump Running? YES — determines that 22 RHR Pump is running.
4 * CLOSE 22CS36 (RHR SUPPLY TO CS VALVE) Depresses CLOSE PB for 22CS36 and verifies CLOSE PB illuminates.
4 (cont'd) IS 21SJ45 (RHR DISCHARGE TO SI PUMPS VALVE) OPEN? NO — determines 21SJ45 is CLOSED due to 21 RHR pump maintenance. (Alternate Path #1)
4 (cont'd) * OPEN 22SJ49 (COLD LEG ISOLATION VALVE) Depresses OPEN PB for 22SJ49 and verifies OPEN PB illuminates.
4.1 IS 22 SI Pump Running? NO — determines 22 SI pump is NOT running (tripped during LOCA-3). Goes to step 6.1. (Alternate Path #2)
6.1 * STOP 21 SI Pump Depresses 21 SI Pump STOP PB on 2CC1 and verifies STOP PB illuminates.
6.1 (cont'd) * CLOSE 21SJ134 (Cold Leg Discharge Valve) Depresses CLOSE PB for 21SJ134 on 2CC1 and verifies CLOSE PB illuminates.
6.1 (cont'd) * OPEN 21SJ40 (Hot Leg Discharge Valve) Opens 21SJ40 by inserting key and rotating; verifies OPEN PB illuminates.
6.1 (cont'd) * START 21 SI Pump Depresses START PB for 21 SI Pump and verifies START PB illuminates.
End Return to Procedure in Effect JPM is complete when operator returns to procedure in effect.
Key Decision Point:
This JPM has two alternate path decision points. First, at Step 4 (cont'd), the applicant must recognize that 21SJ45 is CLOSED for 21 RHR pump maintenance, so the RHR-to-SI pump cross-connect path is unavailable. Second, at Step 4.1, the applicant must recognize that 22 SI pump is NOT running (tripped during LOCA-3) and navigate to Step 6.1, which uses 21 SI pump for Hot Leg injection: STOP 21 SI Pump, CLOSE 21SJ134 (cold leg discharge), OPEN 21SJ40 (hot leg discharge, key-locked), START 21 SI Pump.
Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-4 (Rev 30), 2-EOP-LOCA-1 (Rev 31) | Task: N1150110501 | K/A: 006 A4.05 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor ECCS | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-c — Respond to Spray Valve Failing to Close during RCS Depressurization Sim | RO/SRO | 010 A2.02 (3.9/3.9)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 was manually tripped at 100% power due to Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) on 22 SG.
- Safety Injection (SI) was initiated successfully on both trains.
- The crew is implementing 2-EOP-SGTR-1.
- The crew has just completed the RCS cooldown to the target temperature and the steam dumps are in Auto in MS Mode.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to PERFORM RCS depressurization using normal spray starting at Step 19 of 2-EOP-SGTR-1.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
1. Performs RCS depressurization IAW EOP-SGTR-1 Step 19.
2. Identifies one PZR Spray Valve failed to close and Stops 21 and 23 RCPs.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
19 IS NORMAL SPRAY AVAILABLE? YES — determines from initial cue that CRS directed use of Normal Spray.
19.1 WHEN ANY CONDITION IN TABLE D OCCURS, THEN CLOSE THE PZR SPRAY VALVES Reads Continuous Action Step and continues. Opens 2PS1 and 2PS3 spray valves and verifies OPEN bezels illuminate.
19.2 IS PZR SPRAY REDUCING RCS PRESSURE? YES — checks RCS pressure is lowering.
19.2 (cont'd) HAS ANY CONDITION IN TABLE D OCCURRED? NO — checks parameters listed in Table D and determines conditions are not met yet.
19.3 CONTINUE DEPRESSURIZATION Continues depressurization. During validation, approx 5-7 minutes until Table D conditions met (RCS pressure less than ruptured SG pressure AND PZR level > 11%).
19.2 (return) HAS ANY CONDITION IN TABLE D OCCURRED? YES — CUE: PZR Level is now 79% and rising slowly. Determines a condition of Table D has occurred.
19.1 (CAS) CLOSE THE PZR SPRAY VALVES Depresses CLOSE PB for 2PS1 and 2PS3. Verifies 2PS1 CLOSE PB illuminates.
19.1 (cont'd) 2PS3 Fails to Close Identifies that 2PS3 will NOT close. (Alternate Path starts here.)
19.4 ARE BOTH PZR SPRAY VALVES CLOSED? NO — reports that 2PS3 will NOT CLOSE.
19.4 (cont'd) * STOP 21 and 23 RCPs Depresses STOP PBs for 21 and 23 RCPs and verifies STOP bezel illuminates.
19.4 (cont'd) IS RCS PRESSURE DROPPING UNCONTROLLED? NO — reports that RCS pressure is rising.
19.4 (cont'd) GO TO STEP 27 JPM is complete when operator goes to Step 27.
Key Decision Point:
When the Table D depressurization criteria are met and the CAS at Step 19.1 directs closing the spray valves, the applicant must recognize that 2PS3 has failed to close. The corrective action at Step 19.4 is to stop the RCPs that supply flow to the stuck-open spray valve (21 and 23 RCPs supply flow through 2PS3) to eliminate the spray flow path and halt the uncontrolled depressurization. 2PS3 spray valve is supplied by 21 and 23 RCP discharge; stopping these pumps removes the driving head for spray flow.
Ref: 2-EOP-SGTR-1 (Rev 32) | Task: N1150190501 | K/A: 010 A2.02 — Ability to determine or interpret PZR pressure control malfunctions | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-d — Initiate Feed and Bleed using Reactor Head Vents IAW EOP-FRHS-1 Sim | RO/SRO | 002 A2.04 (4.3/4.6)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 was manually tripped at 90% power due to elevated main turbine vibrations IAW S2.OP-AB.TL-0001.
- An inadvertent feedwater isolation actuation occurred resulting in the loss of all main feedwater.
- Loss of all AFW flow occurred when all AFW pumps tripped.
- The crew has entered 2-EOP-FRHS-1 due to valid RED Path on Heat Sink CFST based on all SG NR levels < 9% and AFW flow < 22E4 lbm/hr.
- Plant conditions have continued to deteriorate and three (3) steam generator Wide Range levels are now less than 20%.
- MSPI AFW pump failed to start.
- The CRS is implementing the CAS action to Initiate Bleed and Feed.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to Initiate Bleed and Feed starting at Step 21 IAW 2-EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
1. Initiates Safety Injection (SI).
2. Opens one PZR PORV.
3. Opens 2RC40 thru 2RC43 Reactor Head Vents IAW 2-EOP-FRHS-1.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
21 CAUTION To establish RCS Heat Sink Removal by RCS Bleed and Feed, Steps 24 thru 29 Must Be Performed Quickly and Without Interruption Reads Caution and continues on.
21 STOP ALL RCPs Verifies that all RCPs are already stopped (Step 7 of FRHS-1 stopped RCPs).
22 * INITIATE SI Initiates SI on both trains by inserting key and turning switch clockwise until SI Operate bezel illuminates and SI Reset bezel extinguishes.
23 Are SI Valves in Safeguards Position? YES — checks that all SI valve bezels on 2RP4 are illuminated.
23.1 Is 21 or 22 Charging Pump Running? YES — reports both Charging pumps running as indicated by START bezels illuminated Red.
23.1 (cont'd) Is BIT Flow Established? YES — reports BIT flow established by indication of flow on Charging flowmeter (approximately 235 gpm during validation).
23.2 Is any SI Pump Running? YES — reports both SI pumps running by START PBs illuminated Red.
23.2 (cont'd) Are Valves in Table C Open for At Least One Running SI Pump? YES — verifies all valves OPEN in Table C for both running SI pumps as indicated by OPEN bezels illuminated.
23.2 (cont'd) Are All Charging and SI Pumps Running And Aligned to Deliver Flow? YES — identifies all Charging and SI Pumps are running and valves in safeguards positions.
24 * Open Both PZR PORV Stop Valves Reports both PZR PORV Stop Valves (2PR6 and 2PR7) are OPEN as indicated by OPEN bezels illuminated.
24 (cont'd) * Open Both PZR PORVs Places both PZR PORVs in Manual and depresses OPEN PBs for 2PR1 and 2PR2. 2PR1 opens. 2PR2 will NOT open.
24.1 Are Both PZR PORV Stop Valves Open? YES — reports both 2PR6 and 2PR7 are open as indicated by OPEN bezels illuminated.
24.1 (cont'd) Are Both PZR PORVs Open? NO — reports that 2PR2 will NOT OPEN. (Alternate Path starts here.)
24.1 (cont'd) * OPEN 2RC40 thru 2RC43 Reactor Head Vents At the 2RP2 backpanel, obtains keys, inserts key into each keyswitch one at a time and turns clockwise until OPEN bezel illuminates for all four valves.
Key Decision Point:
At Step 24.1, the applicant must recognize that 2PR2 fails to open and that an adequate bleed path requires at least one PORV and additional bleed capability. With only 2PR1 open, the applicant must use the reactor head vent valves (2RC40 through 2RC43, key-locked on the 2RP2 backpanel) as an alternate bleed path to supplement 2PR1. The evaluator provides the four keys needed to open the head vent valves.
Ref: 2-EOP-FRHS-1 (Rev 36) | Task: N1150290501 | K/A: 002 A2.04 — Ability to determine or interpret RCS bleed path conditions | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-e — Perform Retest on a Main Turbine Stop Valve IAW S2.OP-PT.TRB-0003 Sim | RO | 045 A4.01 (3.1)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 89% power.
- Power ascension is on hold to complete Main Turbine Valve testing IAW S2.OP-PT.TRB-0003, Main Turbine Valve Stroke Testing.
- A Retest on 22MS28 Main Turbine Stop Valve is required due to the valve failing to stroke during valve testing.
- Maintenance repairs are complete and the valve is turned over to the operating shift for testing.
- Control Rods are in Manual with rods at D-200.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Plant Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to PERFORM retest on 22MS28 Main Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) IAW S2.OP-PT.TRB-0003, Main Turbine Valve Stroke Testing, section 5.4.3.
- All Prerequisites and P&Ls are satisfied.
- Test Preparation section 5.2 is complete.
- An operator is in the field standing by the 22MS28 valve to monitor the valve stroke.
- Notify the CRS the results of the valve stroke test.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
Performs valve stroke steps in the correct order on Turbine Stop Valve IAW approved procedure.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.4.3 IF performing 22MS28/22MS29 testing, THEN: Reads step, confirms correct valve (22MS28) and continues on.
5.4.3.A ENSURE TEST PERMISSIVES are green: TURBINE INLET PRESSURE OK, NO OTHER TESTS IN PROGRESS At TURBINE E-H CONTROL & STATUS monitor, STOP/GOVERNOR VALVE TESTS screen, verifies test permissives are GREEN. Navigates from Operating Screen by selecting TEST then STOP/GOV TEST.
CAUTION Failure of any Main Turbine Stop Valve or Governor Valve to reopen while the Main Turbine is operating, requires compliance with P&L 3.4.3 Reads Caution and continues. P&L 3.4.3: Main Turbine should be operated at <=75% of turbine load with any one HP Turbine inlet valve (MS28/MS29) CLOSED; <=30% with any two CLOSED.
5.4.3.B DIRECT Operator to monitor 22MS28 AND 22MS29 for full stroke CUE: Field Operator will monitor 22MS28 and 22MS29 for stroke.
5.4.3.C RECORD 22MS28 AND 22MS29 positions on Attachment 1, Section 3.0, by initialing TEST POSITION 1 Records 22MS28 and 22MS29 are both OPEN. (22MS29 Governor Valve considered OPEN when local position >= 17.9% / >= 2.5 inches.)
5.4.3.D * SELECT 22MS28/22MS29 START TEST on HMI screen Selects START TEST on HMI. Verifies 22MS28/22MS29 changes from NORMAL OPERATION to TEST IN PROGRESS. Contacts field operator confirming standing by to monitor.
5.4.3.E WHEN TSV (22MS28) CLOSED indication is received, THEN RECORD positions Expects OHA G-12 TURB STM STOP VLV CLSD when 22MS28 closes. Time to close 22MS29 Governor Valve ~2 min from start. Time for full TSV stroke (closed to open) ~25 sec. TSV stays CLOSED ~10 sec then reopens.
5.4.3.E (cont'd) Field operator reports: 22MS29 is CLOSED and 22MS901 is OPEN, but missed monitoring the 22MS28 stroke Records 22MS29 CLOSED (Test Position 2) and 22MS901 OPEN (Test Position 1). Must recognize need to RESTROKE to verify 22MS28. (Alternate Path starts here.)
RESTROKE * SELECT RESTROKE on HMI Test screen Selects RESTROKE on HMI. Records positions of 22MS28 and 22MS901 after restroke. CUE: Field operator reports 22MS28 valve stroked fully closed and open with no issues noted. 22MS901 is OPEN and 22MS29 remains CLOSED.
5.4.3.F * SELECT 22MS28/22MS29 END TEST on HMI screen Selects END TEST on HMI screen.
5.4.3.H WHEN 22MS28/22MS29 changes from TEST IN PROGRESS to NORMAL OPERATION, RECORD positions CUE: Field operator reports 22MS28 & 22MS29 are OPENED and 22MS901 is CLOSED. Records 22MS28 OPEN (Test Position 3), 22MS29 OPEN (Test Position 4), 22MS901 CLOSED (Test Position 2). Time to open 22MS29 ~2 min.
5.4.3.I IF all STOP/GOVERNOR VALVE TESTS are completed, THEN SELECT CLOSE WINDOW JPM is complete.
Key Decision Point:
At Step 5.4.3.E, the field operator reports missing the 22MS28 stop valve stroke. The applicant must recognize that the valve stroke was not verified by local observation (required by P&L 3.6) and select RESTROKE on the HMI to re-cycle the stop valve so the field operator can properly observe and verify full stroke. Without the restroke, the test would be incomplete and 22MS28 could not be declared operable.
Ref: S2.OP-PT.TRB-0003 (Rev 20) | Task: N0450130201 | K/A: 045 A4.01 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor Main Turbine Generator | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-f — Perform 22 CFCU Surveillance Test IAW S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003 Sim | RO/SRO | 022 A1.04 (3.2/3.3)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- No major equipment out of service and no active Tech Specs are in effect.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to PERFORM a scheduled surveillance test on 22 CFCU IAW S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Systems - Cooling Systems.
- All Prerequisites are completed SAT and all required M&TE are installed in the field.
- A field NEO is standing by to provide SW header differential pressure when directed.
- Notify CRS of test results.
Task Standard:
PERFORMS surveillance test IAW S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003 and determines 22 CFCU Test Results is UNSAT.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS Reads and initials all P&Ls.
P&L 3.4 After recording DP reading, select corresponding minimum flow value from Exhibit 1. IF measured DP is between DP values in Exhibit 1, THEN select minimum flow for next higher DP value Reads and understands P&L 3.4 (e.g., if measured DP is 101 psid, use minimum flow required at 105 psid).
5.1.1 * ENSURE CFCU being tested is in LOW SPEED IAW S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001 Goes to S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001, Containment Ventilation Operation, to place CFCU in LOW SPEED.
5.1.2 * PRESS FAN HIGH SPEED STOP bezel Depresses HIGH SPEED STOP bezel for 22 CFCU and verifies STOP bezel illuminates.
NOTE Steps 5.1.2B and 5.1.2C should be coordinated for 25 second delay prior to energizing slow speed windings Reads Note and continues on.
5.1.2.B ENSURE FAN STOP bezel is illuminated Verifies HIGH SPEED STOP bezel is illuminated.
5.1.2.C * When 25 seconds have elapsed from pressing HIGH SPEED STOP, PRESS FAN LOW SPEED START bezel Waits 25 seconds from when HIGH SPEED STOP bezel was depressed. Depresses LOW SPEED START bezel for 22 CFCU and verifies START bezel illuminates.
5.1.2.D ENSURE following dampers are in indicated positions Verifies for 22 CFCU: ROUGH FLT DAMPER CLOSED bezel extinguished, HEPA INLET DAMPER OPEN bezel illuminated, HEPA OUTLET DAMPER OPEN bezel illuminated.
5.1.2.E IF Service Water flow is less than 1465 gpm, THEN STOP the CFCU Determines SW flow is > 1465 gpm and marks step N/A.
5.1.2.F ENSURE Service Water flow >= 1465 gpm Verifies SW flow > 1465 gpm.
5.1.1.B RECORD Start Time Returns to S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003. Records START time.
5.1.1.C * WHEN at least 15 minutes has elapsed, RECORD: Stop Time, SW flow, SW header DP CUE: 15 minutes have elapsed. Records STOP time. Records SW flow on 22 CFCU (1787 +/- 5 gpm). Contacts field NEO and records SW header DP of 106 psi.
5.1.1.C (cont'd) * Determine Test Results: SAT or UNSAT Records Test Results as UNSAT. 22 CFCU is Inoperable based on Cooling Water Flow Rate (~1787 gpm) being less than the Minimum Flow Rate (1811 gpm) required in Exhibit 1 by selecting a SW DP of 110 psi (per P&L 3.4, measured DP of 106 psi rounds up to 110 psid).
Key Decision Point:
At Step 5.1.1.C, the applicant must correctly apply P&L 3.4 to determine the test result. The measured SW header DP is 106 psi, which falls between 105 and 110 psid in Exhibit 1. Per P&L 3.4, the applicant must use the next HIGHER DP value (110 psid), which requires a minimum flow rate of 1811 gpm. Since the actual CFCU flow is approximately 1787 gpm (less than 1811 gpm required), the test result is UNSAT and 22 CFCU is inoperable. A common error would be selecting 105 psid (minimum flow 1769 gpm), which would incorrectly yield a SAT result.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003 (Rev 20) | Task: N0220130201 | K/A: 022 A1.04 — Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with CFCU operation | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-g — Start and Load an EDG During Loss of All Off-Site Power Simulator | RO/SRO | 064 A4.06 (3.9/3.9)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 experienced a Reactor Trip following a total loss of off-site power.
- The crew is implementing 2-EOP-LOPA-1 with all actions completed through Step 12.
- The following is a status of AC Power:
  - 2A EDG tripped shortly after the reactor was tripped and is being investigated by Maintenance.
  - 2B EDG was secured (stopped) by the crew due to the bus being locked out on Bus Differential.
  - 2C EDG was C/T for scheduled maintenance prior to this event.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Plant Operator.
- WCC Supervisor reports that 2C EDG has been restored from maintenance and tags are fully released.
- The CRS directs you to start and load 2C EDG starting at Step 13 of EOP-LOPA-1.
- Your evaluator will respond to all other alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
1. Starts 2C EDG and one SW pump for that bus, and closes 23SW20 valve.
2. Starts all directed C bus loads IAW Table C of EOP-LOPA-1.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
13 CAUTION — 4KV VITAL BUS LOADING SHOULD NOT EXCEED POWER SUPPLY CAPACITY: DG 2000-HR LIMIT 2750 KW, DG 2-HR LIMIT 2860 KW, DG HALF-HR LIMIT 3100 KW Operator reviews CAUTION and continues on.
14 * Start 2C EDG by depressing DIESEL GEN START PB Operator starts 2C EDG and verifies FREQUENCY is >= 60 Hz and VOLTS is >= 4.15 KV.
14 * (contd) Close 2C EDG output breaker — depress MIMIC PB for 2C DG 4KV BKR 2CDD, verify MIMIC PB illuminates Yellow and BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION bezel illuminates Yellow, then depress 2C BREAKER CLOSE PB Operator must select the 2C DG output breaker via the MIMIC PB first, verify both the MIMIC PB and BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION bezel illuminate yellow, then close the breaker. 2C TROUBLE console alarm will be illuminated due to loss of bus voltage.
14 * (contd) Start one SW pump on 2CC1 (25 or 26 SW pump) Operator depresses START PB for either 25 or 26 SW pump and verifies associated amps are increasing.
14 * (contd) Check loading on 2C EDG and close 23SW20 Operator checks loading on 2C EDG by observing KW meter, then depresses CLOSED PB for 23SW20 on 2CC1 and verifies PB illuminates.
15 SEND OPERATORS TO START NON OPERATING DGs AND TO MONITOR OPERATING DGs CRS will dispatch operator to monitor 2C DG, CRS directs you to continue on with the procedure.
16 IS ANY 4 KV VITAL BUS ENERGIZED YES: Operator determines that 2C 4KV Vital bus is energized.
17 IS SI ACTUATED / IS SI REQUIRED NO to both: Operator determines SI has not actuated and SI is not required.
17 * (contd) Start all directed C bus loads IAW Table C: 22 Charging Pump, 23 CCW Pump, #2 ECAC Operator starts the required loads by depressing the START PBs and verifying PB illuminates followed by amps increasing. Operator monitors EDG loading during starting loads.
Key Decision Point:
The discriminating step is closing the 2C EDG output breaker — the operator must first depress the MIMIC PB for 2C DG 4KV BKR 2CDD, verify both the MIMIC PB illuminates Yellow AND the BUS INTLK CLOSE SELECTION bezel illuminates Yellow, then depress 2C BREAKER CLOSE PB. The 2C TROUBLE console alarm will be illuminated (from loss of bus voltage prior to energizing), and the operator must not be distracted by it. After energizing the bus, starting a SW pump is critical for EDG cooling — the EDG has no cooling water without a SW pump running on its bus.
Ref: 2-EOP-LOPA-1 (R31) | Task: N0640010101 | K/A: 064 A4.06 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Emergency generator breakers | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-h — Respond to CCW Leak Inside Containment IAW S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 Simulator | RO/SRO | 008 A2.02 (3.2/3.5)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 at 100% power, MOL.
- No equipment is out of service and no active Tech Specs are in effect.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- Respond to all alarms and indications.
Task Standard:
1. Opens 2DR107 to makeup to CCW surge tank.
2. TRIPs the Reactor, Stops RCPs, and Closes CNTMT CCW valves IAW Attachment 2.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
CUE OHA C-2 CNTMT SUMP PMP START received, followed by CCW Console Window Alarm for SURGE TANK LEVEL HI-LO Operator reports receipt of unexpected OHA C-2 and shortly thereafter console alarm for CCW Surge Tank Level Hi-Lo. Refers to OHA ARP and/or 2CC1 ARP.
ARP 3.1 MONITOR CC Surge Tank Level on 2LI-628A and C on Bezel Operator monitors Surge Tank Level and observes lowering.
ARP 3.3.A * OPEN 2DR107, Surge Tank Makeup Operator opens 2DR107. Reports CCW Surge Tank Level is rising.
ARP 3.3.B GO TO S2.OP-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality Operator transitions to AB.CC-0001.
3.1 INITIATE Attachment 1, GAS Operator reviews Attachment 1 GAS and determines none are applicable at this time.
3.2 Is CCW Surge Tank Level > 58% and rising? NO: Operator determines CCW Surge Tank Level is NOT rising above 58% and goes to Step 3.13.
3.13 Is CCW Surge Tank level < 42% and dropping? YES: Operator determines CCW Surge Tank level is < 42% and dropping. INITIATE makeup to CCW Surge Tank (OPEN 2DR107 if not already performed).
3.15-3.19 Locate leak — determine leak is in containment (OHA C-2 received) CRS dispatches operators. Operator checks recorders on 2RP1 back panel — 22 WHUT level is rising. Determines CCW leak is in containment.
3.21 ISOLATE CCW to the Excess Letdown HX — ENSURE 2CV132 CLOSED, 2CC215 CLOSED, 2CC113 CLOSED Operator determines 2CV132 and 2CC215 are already CLOSED. Depresses CLOSED PB for 2CC113 (Exc LHX Outlet).
3.24 * IF CC Surge Tank level indication can NOT be maintained >5%, THEN STOP RCPs IAW Attachment 2 — Operator determines leak exceeds makeup capability with 2DR107 open AND lowering CCW Surge Tank level ALTERNATE PATH: CCW leak worsens beyond makeup capacity. Operator recognizes that Surge Tank level cannot be maintained and transitions to Attachment 2 (Stopping RCPs and Isolating CCW to Containment).
Att 2 * TRIP the Reactor using either Rx Trip pistol grip switches Operator TRIPs the Reactor. Confirms Reactor is Tripped.
Att 2 * STOP ALL RCPs Operator STOPs ALL RCPs.
Att 2 1.D * CLOSE CNTMT CCW isolation valves: 2CC131 (RCP Therm Bar CC Cont W), 2CC136 (RCP CLG OIL CLR Outlet), 2CC190 Operator closes all listed CCW containment isolation valves by depressing CLOSED PB for each valve and verifying CLOSED PB illuminates.
Att 2 GO TO 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection JPM is complete when 2CC190 is CLOSED.
Key Decision Point:
Step 3.24 is the discriminating step (alternate path) — after the initial CCW leak is managed with 2DR107 makeup, the leak worsens and exceeds makeup capacity. The operator must recognize that CCW Surge Tank level cannot be maintained above 5% and transition to Attachment 2. In Attachment 2, the operator must trip the reactor, stop ALL RCPs, and close the CCW containment isolation valves (2CC131, 2CC136, 2CC190). The operator who enters AB.CC-0001 early may also take the GAS action to trip the Rx and stop RCPs before reaching step 3.24.
Ref: S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 (R16) | Task: N1140080401 | K/A: 008 A2.02 — Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of: CCW System leakage | Source: Modified | View JPM PDF

Connections

Scenario 1 — Power Ascension / LOCA Outside Containment Simulator | 7 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-256: 4% power, BOL; 23 Charging Pump is running, 21 SGFP is in service with AFW pumps secured, power ascension in progress at 10% per hour with control rods in manual and steam dumps in MS mode in Auto. 22 SW pump C/T for strainer motor replacement.

Turnover: Crew is directed to continue raising Rx power to 10% and enter Mode 1 using Control Rods and Main Steam Dumps IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003.
Major Events:
  1. Power ascension at 10% per hour and enter Mode 1
  2. PZR pressure controlling channel fails high (TS exercised)
  3. 21 SG NR level fails low (TS only)
  4. 21A Main Condenser tube leak
  5. 22 RCP motor oil leak requiring manual reactor trip
  6. RHR intersystem RCS leak on 22 RHR heat exchanger during EOP-TRIP-2
  7. One train of SI fails to manually actuate; 22 Charging pump fails to start on SEC; 2CV116 and 2CV284 fail to close on Phase A
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Power ascension and enter Mode 1 (5%) CRS directs RO to withdraw control rods or raise demand on steam dumps to raise reactor power IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load. RO withdraws rods in manual to raise power. RO reports reactor power is 5% and the unit is in Mode 1.
2 PZR Pressure Channel I fails high RO reports unexpected OHA D-8 RC PRESS HI and E-42 2PR1 1/2 TRIP. RO reports PZR Pressure Channel I has failed high and RCS pressure is lowering. RO places Master Pressure Controller (MPC) in Manual. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001. RO reports POPS is not in service. RO selects Channel III for control. RO places MPC to Auto. CRS refers to Tech Specs. CRS enters TSAS for 3.3.3.1 Action 6 (6 hour LCO), 3.3.2.1 Action b.19 (6 hour LCO), 3.4.5 Action b (1 hour LCO), and 3.2.5.b (2 hour LCO if RCS pressure < 2200 psia). CRS directs RO to place 2PR1 in Manual and close 2PR6 Block Valve to comply with Tech Specs. CRS directs WCC to remove control power to 2PR6.
3 21 SG Narrow Range Level Channel II fails low (TS only) RO reports unexpected OHA G-15 ADFCS TROUBLE and 21 SG Console Alarm for PROTECTION LEVEL LO-LO. PO reports 2PR4 bistable illuminated for SG Lo-Lo Level Loop 1 CH II. Crew refers to ARP for 2CC2 and OHA G-15. PO checks digital feed water EWS at 2RP7 and reports 21 SG CH II level has failed low. Crew determines failed channel does not impact plant operation. CRS evaluates Tech Specs and enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 Action 6 (6 hour LCO) and 3.3.2.1 Action b.19 (6 hour LCO).
4 21A Condenser tube leak RO reports unexpected Console Alarm for HOTWELL OUTLET CONDUCTIVITY HI. PO refers to ARP for 2CC1 and notifies CRS that entry into S2.OP-AB.CHEM-0001 is required. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CHEM-0001, Abnormal Secondary Chemistry. Crew checks secondary plant chemistry recorders on 2RP5 and determines 21A condenser is affected hotwell. PO reports Attachment 1 CAS Step 1.0 is met for condenser tube failure/leak and Attachment 2 is applicable for Gross Condenser Tube Failure. PO Emergency Trips 21A CW pump. CRS also enters S2.OP-AB.CW-0001, Circulating Water System Malfunction. PO reports no indication of CW system piping rupture. PO reports indication of condenser tube leak in 21A condenser.
5 22 RCP oil level low — manual reactor trip RO reports unexpected OHA D-13 for 22 RCP BRG OIL LVL LO. PO reports alarm is for 22 RCP Upper Radial Bearing Oil Level Low. PO refers to ARP and reports RCP motor bearing temperatures are rising to or exceed 175 F. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 and implements Attachment 2 for stopping 22 RCP. CRS directs RO to trip the reactor, confirm the trip, THEN stop 22 RCP. RO trips the reactor and performs immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1. CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1. RO and CRS review SI parameters and determine no SI is required. PO throttles AFW flow to >22E4 lbm/hr. CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response. PO stops 21 and 22 SGFPs.
6 RHR intersystem RCS leak (LOCA outside Containment) RO reports unexpected console alarms for 24 SI Accumulator Level HI-Lo and Press Hi-Lo with levels and pressures lowering. RO reports OHA A-41 for 23 and 24 RHR Sump Pump starts. RO reports OHAs C-34 22 RHR SUMP OVRFLO and E-36 PZR HTR OFF LVL LO. CRS directs RO to estimate RCS leak rate — greater than Auto Makeup capability. RO recommends initiating SI. CRS directs RO to initiate SI. One train of SI fails to manually actuate. RO actuates other train of SI and reports SI initiated on both trains. (Critical Task #1) CRS returns to EOP-TRIP-1. 22 Charging pump fails to start by 2C SEC — PO blocks and resets 2C SEC, RO starts 22 Charging pump. 2CV116 and 2CV284 fail to close on Phase A — RO manually closes both valves. RO reports 2R41D Plant Vent radiation monitor in alarm, 22 RHR sump overflow alarms. Crew determines RCS leak indicated in 22 RHR pump room — LOCA outside containment. CRS transitions to EOP-LOCA-6.
7 Isolate RHR intersystem leak in EOP-LOCA-6 RO resets SI Phase A and Phase B. RO opens 21 and 22 CA330s. PO resets each SEC and associated 230V control centers. RO reports 2RH1 and 2RH2 (Common Suction) are closed. RO closes 21 and 22 RH19s (RHR discharge cross-connect). RO reports RCS pressure is NOT rising. RO reports 21SJ49 in AUTO — PO removes lockout, RO closes 21SJ49, reports RCS pressure NOT rising, then opens 21SJ49. RO reports 22RH29 is in AUTO — PO removes lockout for 22SJ49, RO closes 22SJ49. (Critical Task #2) RO reports RCS pressure is rising. RO stops 22 RHR pump. CRS transitions to EOP-LOCA-1. Crew determines SI termination requirements are met and transitions to EOP-TRIP-3.
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-2): Manually actuate SI before transition out of EOP-TRIP-1. Safety significance: failure to manually actuate SI when automatic SI has failed results in degraded ECCS capability during a LOCA — crew fails to prevent degradation of a barrier to fission product release and fails to recognize an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system. Cues: lowering PZR pressure and level, SI accumulator levels and pressures lowering, RHR sump pump starts and overflow alarms indicating significant RCS leak. Automatic SI has failed to actuate. Measurable criteria: at least one train of SI successfully actuated from the control room.

CT#2 (CT-32): Isolate LOCA outside containment before transition out of EOP-LOCA-6. Safety significance: failure to isolate the RHR intersystem leak results in continued loss of RCS inventory outside containment, degrading both the RCS fission product barrier and ECCS recirculation capability. Cues: 2R41D Plant Vent radiation monitor in alarm, 22 RHR sump pump starts and overflow, lowering PZR level and pressure, 24 SI accumulator levels/pressures lowering. RCS pressure does not rise until the leaking flow path (22SJ49) is isolated. Measurable criteria: 22SJ49 closed and RCS pressure rising.
EOP Pathway:
AB.PZR-0001 (PZR pressure channel fail) → AB.CHEM-0001 / AB.CW-0001 (condenser tube leak) → AB.RCP-0001 (22 RCP oil leak, manual Rx trip) → EOP-TRIP-1 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) → EOP-TRIP-2 (Reactor Trip Response — no SI required) → RHR intersystem leak develops, SI manually actuated → return to EOP-TRIP-1 → EOP-LOCA-6 (LOCA Outside Containment — isolate 22SJ49) → EOP-LOCA-1 (Loss of Reactor Coolant — SI termination criteria met) → EOP-TRIP-3 (SI Termination)
Source: New | ESG-1 | 17-01 NRC-1 | View Scenario PDF

Connections

Scenario 3 — ATWS / Stuck-Open PORV Simulator | 8 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-258: 89.5% power, MOL; 23 Charging Pump is in service. The following equipment is out of service: 21 Charging pump C/T for oil cooler cleaning, 21A CW pump C/T for waterbox cleaning, 21 BAT pump C/T for pump seal replacement, 22 vacuum pump C/T for pump replacement.

Turnover: Main turbine valve testing was completed last shift. Calorimetric was performed SAT and MSRs are in Auto. The crew is directed to continue power ascension to 100% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 using control rods and turbine load control.
Major Events:
  1. Power ascension to 100% at 10% per hour
  2. Containment Pressure Channel I fails high (TS only)
  3. 22 SI Accumulator gas leak (TS exercised)
  4. Loss of Main Condenser vacuum due to loose tube plug — power reduction to stabilize
  5. Two dropped control rods — reactor fails to trip (ATWS)
  6. Rod speed controller fails at 8 spm in Auto — operator inserts rods in Manual at 48 spm
  7. 2CV175 Rapid Boration valve fails to open — Rapid Borate via RWST
  8. PZR PORV 2PR1 fails open during EOP-TRIP-2
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Power ascension to 100% at 10%/hr Crew discusses reactivity plan for power ascension using control rods and turbine load control. RO withdraws control rods in Manual to maintain Tavg on program IAW S2.OP-SO.RCS-0001, Rod Control System Operation. PO raises turbine load using DEHC HMI panel IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001, Turbine-Generator Startup Operations. Crew monitors proper response for Tavg, reactor power, and rod position.
2 Containment Pressure Channel I fails high (TS only) RO reports unexpected OHA alarms C-6 CNTMT PRESS HI-HI and D-40 SUBCLG CH A MARGIN LO. RO reports Containment Pressure Channel I console indication has failed high. RO may report Subcooling Margin monitor Channel A reading about 0.7 and Adverse button illuminated. Crew refers to OHA ARPs and determines alarm is due to failed instrument channel, not a valid signal. Crew reviews S2.OP-SO.RPS-0005 for placing channel in tripped condition. CRS reviews Tech Spec and enters TSAS 3.3.2.1.b, Action 16 (6 hour LCO).
3 22 SI Accumulator gas leak RO reports unexpected 22 Accumulator low pressure alarm. PO reports ARP directs restoration of accumulator pressure IAW S2.OP-SO.SJ-0002, Accumulator Operations. PO restores 22 Accumulator pressure by opening 2NT32 nitrogen supply valve and 22SJ93 nitrogen supply valve, then closing 22SJ93 and 2NT32 when desired pressure is reached. PO reports 22 accumulator pressure is lowering very slowly. CRS assigns operating band for RO to maintain accumulator pressure. CRS contacts WCC to investigate leak. CRS recognizes TSAS 3.5.1.d Action a (24 hour LCO) was applicable for the time 22 Accumulator gas pressure was <595.5.
4 Loss of Main Condenser vacuum (missing tube plug) PO reports rising condenser backpressure. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum. CRS assigns responsibility for CAS. CRS sends operators to perform local vacuum checks IAW Attachment 2. PO reports NO abnormal vacuum pump indications. PO reports normal CW system operation. PO starts all available vacuum pumps, manually opens AR25 valves as required, reports condenser vacuum stabilizes then continues to degrade. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction. CRS directs a load reduction to stabilize condenser backpressure. RO calculates required boron addition, CRS verifies. RO commences boration. PO initiates load reduction at rate specified by CRS. Field report identifies missing tube plug — backpressure recovers after tube plug reinstalled. RO energizes all PZR heaters. RO inserts control rods to maintain Tavg within prescribed band.
5 Two dropped rods — ATWS RO reports two control rods fully inserted and a demand for reactor trip is present. RO reports reactor failed to auto trip — ATWT has occurred. RO reports Rx trip handles did not trip the Rx. Crew recognizes ATWT. RO reports RTBs will not open. RO reports PZR heater bus breakers will not open. RO trips the Main Turbine. Rod speed controller fails at 8 spm in Auto — RO recognizes failure and inserts rods in Manual at 48 spm. (Critical Task #1 evaluated here.) CRS directs operators to locally open reactor trip breakers and de-energize RD MG sets.
6 EOP-FRSM-1 — Rapid Boration with 2CV175 failure RO reports immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1 are complete. CRS enters EOP-FRSM-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation. PO starts 21 and 22 AFW pumps, reports total AFW flow. RO/PO starts 22 Charging pump (21 CV pump is C/T). PO reports SI has not actuated. PO starts both boric acid pumps in fast speed (21 BAT pump is C/T — only 22 BAT pump available). PO reports 2CV175 Rapid Borate Stop Valve failed to open, NO flow indicated on Rapid Borate flowmeter. Crew establishes Rapid Boration using RWST flow path: PO isolates letdown by closing 2CV3, 2CV4, 2CV5, 2CV2 and 2CV277, and 2CV7. PO opens 2SJ1 and 2SJ2, and 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ13. PO closes 2CV40 and 2CV41, and 2CV68 and 2CV69. Locally dispatched operator opens Rx Trip breakers. RO reports PZR pressure <2335 psig, both PZR PORVs closed and block valves open, 2VC5 and 2VC6 closed, RTBs and Rod Drive MG set breakers open, all turbine stop valves closed, PRNIs <5%, IRNI SUR is negative. CRS directs chemistry to sample RCS for boron and directs performance of SDM.
7 Transition from FRSM-1 to TRIP-1 then TRIP-2 CRS returns to EOP-TRIP-1. RO performs/verifies immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1. CRS verifies TRIP-1 immediate actions are complete. RO reports SI is not actuated and not required by 2RP4 or First Out OHA. CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response. RO makes page announcement. PO reports total AFW >22E4 lbm/hr and stops both SGFPs. PO lowers 23 AFW speed demand to minimum speed. RO reports all RCPs are running, Tavg stable or trending to 547 F, both RTBs are open, all rods have inserted.
8 PZR PORV 2PR1 fails open RO reports PZR level >17%. RO reports unexpected OHA for 2PR1/2 NOT CLSD. RO reports PZR pressure lowering and identifies 2PR1 failed open. RO reports 2PR1 will NOT close in manual. RO closes PORV Block valve 2PR6. (Critical Task #2)
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-52): Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods prior to dispatching operators to locally trip the reactor and/or turbine: de-energize RD MG sets, insert control rods, or establish Emergency Boration flow to the RCS. Safety significance: failure to insert negative reactivity results in the reactor remaining critical or returning to a critical condition, constituting incorrect reactivity control. Cues: two dropped rods with reactor trip demand present but reactor fails to trip by all means from the control room. Measurable criteria: rod position indication shows rods moving inward (manual insertion at 48 spm), and/or emergency boration flow path established with RWST aligned to charging.

CT#2 (CT-10): Close the block valve upstream of the stuck-open PZR PORV (2PR1) by the completion of Step 9 of TRIP-2. Safety significance: failure to close the block valve results in unnecessary continuation of the degraded RCS fission product barrier — crew fails to prevent degradation of a barrier to fission product release. The RCS barrier can be restored to full integrity by closing the block MOV. Cues: OHA 2PR1/2 NOT CLSD, PZR pressure lowering, PORV will not close in manual. Measurable criteria: 2PR6 block valve closed.
EOP Pathway:
AB.COND-0001 (loss of condenser vacuum) → AB.LOAD-0001 (rapid load reduction to stabilize backpressure) → two dropped rods / ATWS → EOP-TRIP-1 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection — trip fails) → EOP-FRSM-1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation — manual rod insertion, Rapid Boration via RWST, locally trip RTBs) → return to EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor confirmed tripped, no SI required) → EOP-TRIP-2 (Reactor Trip Response — 2PR1 PORV fails open, close block valve 2PR6)
Source: Modified / ESG-3 | 17-01 NRC-3 | View Scenario PDF

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Scenario 4 — SGFP Trip / Loss of Heat Sink Simulator | 6 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: IC-260: 88% power, MOL; 23 Charging Pump is in service. The following equipment is out of service: 21 AFW pump C/T for oil bubbler leak repair, 21 SI pump C/T for coupling inspection and alignment checks.

Turnover: Reactor power was lowered for preparation for main turbine valve testing. Testing will commence next shift.
Major Events:
  1. PZR PORV 2PR2 leaks (TS exercised)
  2. 2N41 Power Range channel fails high (TS exercised)
  3. 21 SGFP trips on turbine thrust bearing oil pressure high — failure of Auto Main Turbine runback
  4. Inadvertent Main Turbine trip — reactor fails to auto trip
  5. Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus (loss of 22 AFW pump)
  6. Loss of all AFW flow — Prompt SGFP Recovery in EOP-FRHS-1
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 PZR PORV 2PR2 leak RO reports lowering PZR pressure, or PORV tailpipe temp has risen, or charging flow rising, or lower spray valve demand, or PRT indications of a 2PR2 leak. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. CRS directs initiation of Attachment 1 CAS. RO reports POPS not in service, PZR Pressure Control channel has NOT failed, Master Pressure Controller has NOT failed, PORV is NOT failed. RO opens 2PR6 — reports tailpipe temps lowering or stable. RO opens 2PR7 — reports tailpipe temp rising. RO closes 2PR7 — reports lowering PORV tailpipe temperature (2PR2 isolated). CRS enters TSAS 3.4.5 Action a (1 hour LCO). IF RCS pressure <2185 psig THEN TSAS 3.2.5.b (2 hour LCO) is applicable.
2 2N41 Power Range channel fails high RO reports rods stepping in and no runback in progress. RO places rod control in Manual. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001, NIS Malfunction. RO reports rod control is in Manual. RO reports 2N41 channel is failed high with OHA alarms E-15 PR HI RNG FLUX HI, E-31 PR OVRPWR ROD STOP, E-39 PR CH DEV, and E-47 PR NEUT FLUX RATE HI. CRS directs PO to remove PR channel from service IAW S2.OP-SO.RPS-0001. PO places DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switches in PRN41 position (upper and lower), places POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to BYPASS PR N41, places ROD STOP BYPASS switch to BYPASS PR N41, places COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to N41. CRS enters TSAS 3.3.1.1 Actions 2 and 6 (6 hour LCO). RO withdraws rods to the ARO position.
3 21 SGFP trip — failure of Auto Main Turbine runback PO reports unexpected console alarm TURB THRUST BEARING OIL PRESSURE HI for 21 SGFP. Crew dispatches NEO to investigate. PO reports 21 SGFP tripped and the Main Turbine auto runback has not occurred. CRS directs operators to perform immediate actions of S2.OP-AB.CN-0001. PO depresses GO PB on Digital EHC and reports turbine load reduction in progress. RO ensures control rods insert or inserts rods in Manual to restore Tavg to Tref. CRS directs PO to initiate Attachment 1 CAS. RO reports power >P-10. RO initiates RCS boration. PO ensures 22 SGFP speed rises. PO ensures 21-23 CN108s are open. PO depresses 21 SGFP TURBINE TRIP bezel pushbutton and verifies AFP AUTO ARMED bezel lit. Crew identifies AFD outside normal band. Crew monitors and maintains AFD within limits. Crew stabilizes the unit and SG NR levels restore to >44%.
4 Main Turbine trip — reactor fails to auto trip RO reports valid demand for Rx trip has occurred with No AUTO Rx trip. RO manually trips the reactor using one of the reactor trip pistol grip switches. (Critical Task #1) RO reports reactor is tripped and performs immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1: confirms Rx trip, reports Main Turbine is tripped, reports all 4KV vital buses energized, reports SI has not been initiated with no demand on 2RP4 or First Out OHA. CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-2.
5 Loss of 2B 4KV Vital Bus — loss of all AFW PO reports 22 AFW pump did not start due to loss of power and 23 AFW pump did not Auto start. PO manually starts 23 AFW pump — pump starts but trips moments later on overspeed. PO reports NO AFW pumps are running and total AFW flow is NOT >22E4 lbm/hr. (21 AFW pump is C/T, 22 AFW pump lost with 2B 4KV bus, 23 AFW pump tripped on overspeed.) PO reports all BF19s and BF40s are closed. PO reports Tavg <554 F and resets FW interlock. PO stops 22 SGFP. RO reports all rods inserted, PZR level >17%. Crew reports valid RED path on Heat Sink when SG NR levels <9% with <22E4 lbm/hr AFW flow.
6 EOP-FRHS-1 — Prompt SGFP Recovery CRS transitions to EOP-FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. PO reports it was not operator action which caused total AFW flow to lower. RO reports RCS pressure >all SGs and RCS Thots >350 F. CRS reads Bleed and Feed transition criteria. PO closes 21-24GB4 and 21-24SS94 valves. CRS dispatches operators to investigate AFW pump failures. RO stops all RCPs. PO reports condensate system is in operation — 22 SGFP is available. PO sets all BF19 and BF40 demands to zero. RO resets FW interlock. PO starts 22 SGFP IAW S2.OP-SO.CN-0007, Prompt Recovery From SGFP Trip. PO verifies prerequisites — dispatches operator to check for alarms locally. PO determines reset from Ovation Controller Station on 2RP7 is NOT required. PO reports all SGFP trip signals clear, suction pressure >350, SPEED CONTROLLERs in MANUAL at 0%. PO selects 22 SGFP SPEED SETTER on MASTER SGFP SPEED CONTROLLER, opens 22TD24, verifies 22CN36 is open, confirms casing DT <40 F. PO depresses MODULATE RECIRC VALVE pushbutton — 22BF32 RECIRC is open. PO depresses TURBINE LATCH pushbutton — 22 SGFP is latched. PO places 22 SGFP SPEED CONTROLLER in AUTO, adjusts speed setpoint to 1100 rpm. PO slowly adjusts to 3960-3980 rpm, verifies differential pressure >50 psid. PO places BF19 or BF40 controllers to MANUAL at 0% demand, then adjusts demand to feed SGs. PO reports indications of main feed flow AND SG WR levels rising. (Critical Task #2) CRS returns to EOP-TRIP-2.
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-1): Trip the reactor prior to a transition to FRSM-1 being required. Safety significance: failure to manually trip the reactor when automatic trip has failed results in the reactor remaining at power with no forced cooling from the Main Turbine — constitutes failure to prevent a challenge to plant safety. Cues: valid reactor trip demand (Main Turbine trip) with reactor failing to auto trip. Measurable criteria: reactor trip breakers open and reactor confirmed shutdown before conditions require entry into EOP-FRSM-1.

CT#2 (CT-43): Establish main feedwater or condensate flow to SG(s) before Bleed and Feed is required. Safety significance: failure to restore feedwater results in a total loss of secondary heat sink requiring bleed and feed (opening PZR PORVs and initiating high-head SI for core heat removal via primary system). This significantly degrades the RCS fission product barrier and reduces safety margin. Cues: total loss of AFW flow with no pumps available, CFST RED path on Heat Sink, SG NR levels <9%, 22 SGFP available for prompt recovery. Measurable criteria: main feed flow established and SG Wide Range level rising in at least one SG before bleed and feed criteria are met.
EOP Pathway:
AB.PZR-0001 (PORV leak, isolate 2PR2) → AB.NIS-0001 (2N41 fails high, remove from service) → AB.CN-0001 (21 SGFP trip, manual turbine runback, load reduction to ~66%) → Main Turbine inadvertent trip, auto Rx trip fails → manual Rx trip → EOP-TRIP-1 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection — no SI required) → EOP-TRIP-2 (Reactor Trip Response) → loss of 2B 4KV vital bus, loss of all AFW → CFST RED path Heat Sink → EOP-FRHS-1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink — Prompt SGFP Recovery using 22 SGFP, feed SGs before bleed and feed) → return to EOP-TRIP-2
Source: Modified / ESG-5 | 17-01 NRC-4 | View Scenario PDF

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