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EOPs > EOP-TRIP-1 — Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

EOP-TRIP-1 — Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

⚠️ DRAFT

EOP-TRIP-1 — Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

Purpose

Entry procedure for reactor trip or safety injection events. Provides immediate operator actions and diagnostic steps following a reactor trip, including verification of safeguard valve alignment and containment spray actuation status.

Key Actions / Information

Exam — 2019 Q49
EOP-TRIP-1 Step 1 Immediate Actions — manual reactor trip sequence (performed from memory, in order): FIRST actuate the Reactor Trip Switches (Pistol Grips), then the Trip Breaker BEZELS. If both fail, open Breakers E 6D and G 6D (MG set supply breakers). Trap: the Pistol Grips are FIRST, not the Bezels. The Bezels are the second option. Step 2.2 (Rod Insertion) is a subsequent immediate action, not the next step after trip failure.
Exam — 2023 Q1
Referenced for entry on manual reactor trip. Step 12 covers Safeguard Valve Alignment.
Exam — 2023 Q21
Used to assess containment spray actuation status.
Exam — 2023 Q83
Per AB.CR-0001, EOPs (including EOP-TRIP-1) are NOT applicable during Control Room Evacuation — they should be used for information only or as directed by the TSC.
Exam — 2023 Q87
EOP-TRIP-4 CAS directs actuate SI and return to EOP-TRIP-1 when PZR level cannot be maintained > 4% or subcooling reaches 0 degrees F. This is the correct transition — TRIP-4 does NOT direct entry into EOP-LOCA-1.
Exam -- 2023 Q93
Entry from CW malfunction: per AB.CW-0001, with 4 or more circulators out of service at ≥P-10 power, trip the reactor and enter EOP-TRIP-1.
Exam — 2020 Q55
Safeguard valve verification — Phase A isolation: CC113 and CC215 (Excess Letdown Component Cooling Valves) receive a Phase A signal to close. When verifying safeguards positions: CV2/CV277 (Letdown) do NOT close on Phase A (low PZR level only); CC131/CC190 (RCP Thermal Barrier) close on Phase B, not Phase A; BF13s close on Feedwater Isolation Signal, not Phase A.
Exam — 2022 Q3
Step 12, Safeguard Valve Alignment: check 2CC1 SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION Bezels — Red light LIT = train actuated, OUT = failed. On 2RP4, lights OUT = component failed to reposition. If any safeguards valve not in required position, place valves in safeguards position manually.
Exam — 2022 Q42
CS pump manual start requires SECs to be blocked/reset first. The SEC load sequencer overrides manual keyswitch control.
JPM — 2022 Sim-f
Step 9 — CNMT Spray/Phase B actuation during LBLOCA: containment pressure NOT < 15 psig → manually initiate Phase B and Spray using safeguards key switches on 2CC1. Alternate path: Phase B valves (2CC131, 2CC190) fail to auto-close and NaOH valves (2CS16, 2CS17) fail to auto-open on CS signal. Per Step 9.e, manually reposition valves to safeguards positions.
Scenario — 2022 #3
Manual reactor trip from AB.RCP-0001 (23 RCP motor bearing temp > 175 degF). During TRIP-1 immediate actions, main turbine fails to auto trip AND fails to manually trip (pistol grip and console pushbutton). MSLI fails to auto actuate. CT#1 (CT-12): RO manually initiates MSLI using Fast Close pushbuttons on 2CC2 before Red path to subcriticality or integrity CFST. Auto SI actuates (trips both SGFPs). 23 AFP fails to auto start — PO manually starts. Subsequently 22 AFP trips on overcurrent, 23 AFP trips on overspeed → loss of all AFW → CFST Heat Sink Red Path → transition to EOP-FRHS-1.

Step 19 — Immediate Actions for RTB Failure

Exam — 2018 Q49
EOP-TRIP-1 Immediate Actions when RTBs fail to open (after Trip Switches AND Bezels actuated): NEXT action is open Breakers E 6D and G 6D (MG set supply breakers), THEN actuate the TURBINE TRIP Switch. Trap: Rod Insertion and Main Steam Isolation are also part of immediate actions but come AFTER opening MG set breakers and turbine trip. The sequence is: Trip Switches → Bezels → MG set breakers → Turbine Trip → Rod Insertion → MSLI.
Exam — 2020 Q100
Step 20 of EOP-TRIP-1 specifically directs implementation of EOP-FRHS-1 when aux feed flow cannot be established. This is a procedure-directed transition that occurs BEFORE CFST monitoring begins at Step 30. Trap: do not wait for CFST monitoring (Step 30) to transition to FRHS-1 — EOP-TRIP-1 has a specific earlier step (Step 20) that directs the transition when all AFW is lost. Similarly, EOP-FRSM-1 has a specific transition before Step 30.
Scenario — 2022 #1
LBLOCA with auto SI failure on both trains (CT#1, CT-2): crew must manually actuate SI on at least one train before transition out of TRIP-1. Also, 22 RHR pump fails to start on SEC signal (CT#2, CT-5) — PO blocks and resets 2B SEC, RO manually starts 22 RHR. CAS actions: stop RCPs at <1350 psig, close charging mini-flows at <1500 psig. Transition to EOP-LOCA-1 based on containment pressure >4 psig.
Scenario — 2022 #4
Entered following manual reactor trip and SI on 23 SG tube rupture (650 gpm exceeding makeup). During TRIP-1 immediate actions: PO throttles AFW to no less than 22E4 lbm/hr. PO identifies 21 CFCU failed to start on SEC — blocks 2A SEC, resets, manually starts 21 CFCU in LOW speed. Feed side of ruptured SG isolated during TRIP-1 (23AF21, 23AF11 closed). Transition to SGTR-1 when 23 SG NR level rising uncontrolled. Note: 2PR7 PORV block valve already closed from earlier PORV leakage event — only 2PR6 block valve open.
Scenario — 2020 #1
Entered on LOOP with automatic reactor trip. Immediate actions completed — all 4KV Vital Buses found de-energized. Crew transitions to EOP-LOPA-1 based on all three vital buses de-energized.
Scenario — 2020 #2
Entered following manual Rx trip on RCS leak. Auto SI fails on both trains — RO manually actuates SI (CT-2). 22 RHR pump fails to start on SEC signal (21 RHR C/T) — PO blocks and resets 2B SEC, RO manually starts 22 RHR pump (CT-5). CAS actions: stop RCPs at <1350 psig, close charging mini-flows at <1500 psig. Containment pressure >15 psig — Phase B and Spray auto-initiate, MSLI auto-initiates. Transition to EOP-LOCA-1 based on containment pressure >4 psig.
Scenario — 2020 #3
ATWS — reactor fails to auto trip on 21 SG LVL LO-LO. RO trips reactor by opening both M-G set breakers 2E6D and 2G6D (CT-1). Auto SI actuates on containment pressure high. 21 SG faulted (large oscillating feed flow, no steam flow). RO manually initiates MSLI. 21BF13 fails to close — PO manually closes. Both RTBs fail to open — CRS directs WCC to locally open. Transition to EOP-LOSC-1 on 21 SG depressurizing in uncontrolled manner.
Exam — 2020 Q76
Step 17, CCW Pump Operation Evaluation: during MODE III (LBLOCA + LOOP), directs implementation of EOP-APPX-1 to start one CCW pump. Also directs S2.OP-SO.CC-0002(Q) for CCW HX operation, but that transition is only valid if ≥2 CCW pumps are in service and HXs are not in Auto. During MODE III SEC loading, no CCW pumps are running — so EOP-APPX-1 is the correct implementation, not SO.CC-0001 or SO.CC-0002.
Exam — 2018 Q98
ATWS at 4% power (reactor fails to trip on 21 SG LO-LO Level): IAW EOP-TRIP-1, the crew will MANUALLY insert control rods because at 4% power (turbine not online), automatic rod insertion will NOT exceed 48 steps/minute — the threshold in the basis document for allowing automatic insertion. Since the reactor is NOT tripped (all CR attempts failed), the crew will go to EOP-FRSM-1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation). Trap: reactor power being less than 5% does NOT mean the reactor trip is confirmed — the TRIP-1 Step 2 criteria (power range NI <5%, IR dropping, IR startup rate negative) must ALL be met AT THE TIME the step is read by the NSS.
Scenario — 2018 #1
EOP-TRIP-1 entered after reactor trip from 22 RCP seal failure (seal leakoff >6 gpm). No SI required initially — crew transitions to EOP-TRIP-2. After 24 SG tube rupture develops, crew manually initiates SI and re-enters EOP-TRIP-1. During re-entry, 24BF13 (FW isolation valve) failed to close on SI/Phase A — PO manually closes from console. Then transitions to EOP-SGTR-1 when 24 SG NR level rising uncontrolled.
Scenario — 2018 #2
EOP-TRIP-1 entered after LBLOCA during orderly unit shutdown. Both trains of SI fail to auto-actuate; one keyswitch also fails to manually actuate. RO must use the other train keyswitch to initiate SI on both trains (CT#1: CT-2). During TRIP-1, 2B SEC fails to actuate — crew blocks, resets, and manually starts safeguards loads using Table A. Containment pressure >15 psig triggers Phase B and Spray actuation. Transitions to EOP-LOCA-1.

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