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Tech Specs > TS 3/4.8 — Electrical

TS 3/4.8 — Electrical

⚠️ DRAFT

TS 3/4.8 — Electrical Power Systems

3/4.8.1 — AC Sources

AC Sources — Operating (3.8.1.1)

LCO 3.8.1.1
The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system
b. Three separate and independent diesel generators, each with a separate fuel supply and day tank

Applicability: Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4

Key Actions:

ConditionRequired ActionCompletion Time
1 offsite circuit inoperableRestore72 hrs
1 diesel generator inoperableDemonstrate OPERABILITY of remaining DGs; restore72 hrs
2 offsite circuits inoperableRestore at least one24 hrs
1 offsite circuit AND 1 DG inoperableRestore offsite OR DG12 hrs
Cross-Train Check
When one DG is inoperable, the OPERABILITY of the remaining DGs must be demonstrated within 24 hours. This is to ensure the redundant DGs are not affected by a common-cause failure.
▶ Bases — 3/4.8.1.1 AC Sources (Operating)
Bases — 3/4.8.1.1

OPERABILITY Basis

OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources ensures sufficient power is available for: (1) safe shutdown of the facility, and (2) mitigation and control of accident conditions. The minimum independent and redundant AC and DC power sources satisfy the requirements of GDC 17 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A.

The sources are consistent with initial condition assumptions in the accident analyses — at least two independent sets of onsite AC and DC sources must be OPERABLE during an accident with an assumed loss of all offsite power and a single failure of one onsite AC source.

Action Statement Logic

ACTION requirements specify different completion times commensurate with the level of degradation:

  • Action a.2 (one train without offsite power): assurance that a coincident single failure of the associated DG will not cause a complete loss of all critical redundant required systems.
  • Action b.2 (one DG inoperable): assurance that a loss of offsite power will not cause a complete loss of safety function of critical systems.
  • Action d.2 (two offsite circuits inoperable): assurance that an event plus a coincident single failure will not cause complete loss of redundant required safety functions.

These systems are powered from an independent AC electrical power train. Redundant required systems are not necessarily powered from AC electrical sources (e.g., the turbine-driven AFW pump is redundant to the motor-driven pumps).

When a system or component is determined inoperable solely because its normal power source OR its emergency power source is inoperable, it may still be considered OPERABLE provided the applicable cross-train action (a.2, b.2, or d.2) is satisfied.

LCO 3.0.4.b is NOT applicable to an inoperable DG — a risk assessment cannot be used to enter a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable DG.

Completion Time Rationale

The completion time allows the operator time to evaluate and repair. An exception to the normal “time zero” for the allowed outage clock exists: the clock starts only upon discovery that BOTH (a) one train has no offsite power, the DG is inoperable, or two offsite circuits are inoperable, AND (b) a required system on the other train is inoperable.

The remaining OPERABLE AC supplies are adequate on a component basis — single failure protection may have been lost, but the safety function itself has not been lost.

The completion time for Condition d (loss of both offsite circuits) is reduced to 12 hours, shorter than the time allowed for one train without offsite power (Action a.2). Reg Guide 1.93 allows 24 hours for two required offsite circuits inoperable, but that assumes two complete safety trains OPERABLE. The shorter 12-hour time applies because a concurrent redundant required system failure cannot be ruled out.

14-Day EDG Allowed Outage Time Extension

LCO 3.8.1.1, Action b.4.a.2 allows the EDG AOT to be extended from 72 hours to 14 days with the following commitments (when utilizing extended EDG AOT > 72 hours and < 14 days):

  1. When a DG is removed from service, the TDAFW pump and its supporting systems must be OPERABLE
  2. Voluntary entry is not permitted during adverse weather conditions
  3. The system load dispatcher is contacted once per day regarding grid perturbations
  4. Licensed operators are trained on the SPS (supplemental power supply) purpose and use
  5. Operating crews are briefed on the EDG work plan and LOOP/SBO procedures
  6. If any commitment is not met, enter the corrective action program
▶ Bases — EDG Surveillance Requirements
Bases — EDG Surveillance

DG surveillance is per Reg Guide 1.9 (DG set capacity for standby power), Reg Guide 1.108 (periodic testing of DGs), and Reg Guide 1.137 (fuel oil testing). Surveillance frequency is based on operating experience, reliability, and plant risk, controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Voltage and Frequency

The minimum voltage and frequency values in the SR ensure the EDG can accept DBA loading while maintaining acceptable voltage and frequency. Stable operation at normal voltage and frequency is also essential for OPERABILITY — no time constraint is imposed on voltage/frequency oscillations to dampen.

The narrower band for steady-state frequency ensures the EDG is not in an overloaded (isochronous steady state) condition during accident conditions. Steady state is achieved after 1 minute with all loads sequenced. The narrower band for steady-state voltage ensures the voltage regulator protects against over-voltages during an accident. A wider voltage band is appropriate when the EDG is paralleled to the grid (governor droop mode).

All voltages and frequencies in SR 4.8.1.1.2 are representative values — instrument inaccuracies for EDG voltage and frequency are administratively controlled.

Start Time and Standby Condition

The 13-second start time requirement is based on the Westinghouse assumption of 15 seconds from occurrence to electrical power to the first sequenced safeguards pump (BURL-3011 dated Nov 13, 1974; BURL-1531 dated July 27, 1970). Supporting times are in UFSAR Section 15.4.

“Standby condition” means the engine state immediately prior to starting for the surveillance. Lube oil temperature must be between 100 °F and 170 °F; the minimum lube oil temperature for an OPERABLE diesel is 100 °F.

Exam — 2019 Q58
LCO 3.8.1.1 Action A — one independent AC circuit inoperable (Modes 1-4): with Orchard (5021) and New Freedom (5024) 500KV lines unavailable but Salem-Hope Creek Tie-Line (5037) still available, one independent AC circuit is inoperable. The only 1 hour or less required action is Action a.1: demonstrate OPERABILITY of the remaining independent A.C. circuit by performing SR 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour. Trap: Action 2 (demonstrate OPERABILITY of three DGs per SR 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 1 hour) is NOT required — that would apply to Action D (two offsite circuits inoperable) within 8 hours. Action 3 (suspend positive reactivity changes) applies in Modes 5/6 per LCO 3.8.1.2, NOT Modes 1-4.
Exam — 2019 Q83
SR 4.8.1.1.1.a (verify independent AC circuits) timing when one EDG is inoperable: first performance within 1 hour of entering LCO 3.8.1.1 action b, then second performance within 8 additional hours (9 hours total from entering the LCO). Trap: the second performance interval is 8 hours after the first, not 24 hours. Total maximum time from LCO entry to second completion = 9 hours.

AC Sources — Shutdown (3.8.1.2)

LCO 3.8.1.2
As a minimum, the following AC sources shall be OPERABLE:
a. One circuit between offsite network and onsite distribution
b. Two separate and independent diesel generators with fuel supply

Applicability: Modes 5 and 6

Action:

  • REQUIRED ACTION A: With one or more required DGs inoperable, declare affected required features inoperable OR suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel, and operations with positive reactivity changes
  • REQUIRED ACTION B: With ALL REQUIRED EDGs inoperable, IMMEDIATELY suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes
Exam — 2018 Q21
LCO 3.8.1.2 requires a minimum of TWO separate and independent diesel generators to be OPERABLE in Modes 5 and 6. Trap: LCO 3.8.1.1 (Operating) requires THREE DGs — LCO 3.8.1.2 (Shutdown) requires only TWO. REQUIRED ACTION A provides an option to only declare affected features inoperable, but REQUIRED ACTION B requires IMMEDIATELY suspending all operations involving positive reactivity changes when ALL REQUIRED EDGs are inoperable.
▶ Bases — 3/4.8.1.2 AC Sources (Shutdown)
Bases — 3/4.8.1.2

The minimum specified AC and DC sources during shutdown and refueling ensure: (1) the facility can be maintained in a shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods, and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring.

Specs 3.8.2.2, 3.8.2.4, and 3.8.2.6 include movement of irradiated fuel assemblies — these requirements ensure adequate electrical power for Fuel Handling Building ventilation.

An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to all required trains — the option exists to declare all required features associated with that circuit inoperable instead.

With both required DGs inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power is not available — suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, irradiated fuel movement, and positive reactivity additions.


3/4.8.2 — DC Sources

DC Sources — Operating (3.8.2.1)

LCO 3.8.2.1
The following DC power sources shall be OPERABLE:
a. Three 125-volt battery banks with associated chargers
b. Three 28-volt battery supplies for reactor trip breaker UV coils

Applicability: Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4

Key Actions:

ConditionRequired ActionCompletion Time
1 battery bank or charger inoperableRestore2 hrs (battery) or 24 hrs (charger with spare)
1 of 3 28V supplies inoperableRestore48 hrs
▶ Bases — 3/4.8.2.1 DC Sources (Operating)
Bases — 3/4.8.2.1

The 125V DC batteries provide control power for switchgear operation, diesel generator starting, reactor trip breaker control, and emergency instrumentation. OPERABILITY of the DC sources ensures sufficient power for safe shutdown and accident mitigation, consistent with GDC 17. The 2-hour completion time for a battery reflects the critical importance of DC power for safety functions.

The three 28V battery supplies power the reactor trip breaker undervoltage (UV) coils — loss of these supplies causes a reactor trip (fail-safe design). The 48-hour completion time for one inoperable 28V supply reflects that the remaining two supplies maintain trip capability.

DC Sources — Shutdown (3.8.2.2)

LCO 3.8.2.2
As a minimum, the following DC source shall be OPERABLE:
One 125-volt battery bank with associated charger

Applicability: Modes 5 and 6

▶ Bases — 3/4.8.2.2 DC Sources (Shutdown)
Bases — 3/4.8.2.2

The minimum specified DC source during shutdown and refueling ensures sufficient instrumentation and control capability for monitoring and maintaining the facility in a safe shutdown condition for extended periods. Requirements in Specs 3.8.2.2, 3.8.2.4, and 3.8.2.6 that address movement of irradiated fuel assemblies ensure adequate electrical power for Fuel Handling Building ventilation.


3/4.8.3 — Onsite Power Distribution

LCO 3.8.3.1
The following electrical busses shall be energized and OPERABLE:
- Three 4160V vital busses
- Three 460V vital busses
- Three 115V AC vital instrument busses
- Three 125V DC busses

Applicability: Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4

Action: With one bus inoperable, restore within 8 hours or be in Hot Standby within 6 hours and Hot Shutdown within 6 hours.

▶ Bases — 3/4.8.3 Onsite Power Distribution
Bases — 3/4.8.3

Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation, or by demonstrating OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.

Surveillance frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk, controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.


View TS PDF (AC Sources) | View TS PDF (DC Sources) | View TS PDF (Distribution) | View Bases PDF

Exam — 2019 Q79
LCO 3.8.1.1 ACTION h: LCO 3.0.4.b is NOT applicable to DGs. With one DG inoperable (and offsite power restored), a risk assessment CANNOT be used to justify a MODE change. Unit 2 can NOT go from MODE 4 to MODE 3 until the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status. Trap: LCO 3.0.4.b normally allows MODE changes with a risk assessment, but TS 3.8.1.1 specifically prohibits this exception for DGs.
Exam — 2019 Q89
LCO 3.8.2.1 with 2 inverters inoperable: LCO 3.8.2.1 only addresses one inverter inoperable. With 2 inverters inoperable, no specific REQUIRED ACTION exists → LCO 3.0.3 applies. LCO 3.0.3 clock starts at 1200 (when 2nd inverter declared inoperable): 1 hour to begin + 6 hours to Hot Standby = 7 hours maximum → 1900. Trap: do not use the LCO 3.8.2.1 REQUIRED ACTION B restoration time (30 hours) — with 2 inverters inoperable, there is no applicable REQUIRED ACTION so LCO 3.0.3 is the default.
Exam — 2019 Q90
LCO 3.8.2.3 battery cell voltage: with 3 connected cells at 0 Volts, battery does not meet Category B and C limits. REQUIRED ACTIONS C, D, and F apply — D and F are most limiting: 2 hours to restore + 6 hours to Hot Standby = 8 hours maximum. Trap: REQUIRED ACTION C allows 24 hours to restore, but D and F are more limiting at only 2 hours. Using the 24-hour restoration time incorrectly adds a full day.

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