✓ A. Correct. Two out of three channels less than or equal to 90% of design loop flow indicates degraded RCP. Since reactor power is above P-7 (10%) and below P-8 (36%), no automatic reactor trip will occur with a loss of only one RC loop low flows. However, per S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0004 for OHA D-28, RCP BKR OPEN/FLO LO, with a degraded RCP flow, the RCP must be stopped, the reactor manually tripped, and enter 2-EOP-TRIP-1 since Tech Specs does not allow for three loop operation in Mode 1.

✗ B. Incorrect. While RC flows are degraded, the Alarm Response Procedure requires the RCP to be stopped and the reactor manually tripped. Power operation may not continue with degraded RCP flow since Tech Specs does not allow three loop operation in Mode 1.

✗ C. Incorrect. An automatic reactor trip on low flow requires 2/3 low flow channels, but P-8 (36%) must be exceeded for an automatic trip on loss of a single loop. Power is only 25%, which is below P-8. No automatic trip occurs; instead a manual trip is required per the ARP.

✗ D. Incorrect. The low flow trip logic requires 2/3 channels, not 1/3. Additionally, power is below P-8, so no automatic trip on loss of a single loop would occur regardless of the coincidence logic.

Ref: Logic drawing 221054, simplified ESF-2, S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0004 (R29) | LO: NOS05RXPROT-15, Obj 12.a | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✗ A. Incorrect. Forced cooling requires RCPs running, which are unavailable due to Loss of All Offsite Power.

✓ B. Correct. Natural circulation conditions are met based on the following parameters: (1) subcooling > 0°F — RCS pressure at 1600 psig has a saturation temperature of approx. 606°F, hottest CET is 590°F, therefore subcooling is approx. 606 - 590 = 16°F of subcooling, (2) SG pressures are stable and lowering, (3) RCS T-Hots are stable or dropping, (4) CETs are lowering, and (5) RCS T-colds are at saturation temp for SG pressure. SG pressure is 1015 psig (pre-set pressure for MS110s) which is a saturated temp from the outlet of the SGs of approx. 548°F. Therefore per 2-EOP-LOCA-2 step 19.1 conditions for Natural Circulation are met and will be the RCS heat removal method.

✗ C. Incorrect. Reflux boiling occurs when natural circulation has been lost and steam is condensed on SG tubes. Current conditions show T-hot > T-cold with stable/lowering parameters, indicating natural circulation is still established.

✗ D. Incorrect. Only one Charging Pump is running and no SI pumps based on RCS pressure above the shutoff head (1540 psig), therefore ECCS injection flow and break flow are insufficient for RCS heat removal.

Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-2 (R42), ASME Steam Tables (year 2000) | LO: NOS05LOCA02-06, Obj 5 | Source: Modified - Callaway 2017 NRC RO8 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✗ A. Incorrect. Throttling CV71 open would lower backpressure to the seal injection lines, resulting in lower seal injection flow and higher charging flow — the opposite of what this choice states.

✗ B. Incorrect. Throttling CV71 open would lower backpressure, but seal injection flow would lower and charging flow would rise, not both lower.

✓ C. Correct. When the 1CV71 is closed, then backpressure to the seal injection lines will rise resulting in rising RCP seal injection flows and allowing less charging flow to the non-regen HX, thereby lowering charging flow to the RCS. 1CV71 acts as a backpressure control valve that affects both charging and seal injection flows.

✗ D. Incorrect. Throttling CV71 closed raises backpressure, which raises seal injection flow — it does not lower it. Additionally, charging flow would lower, not rise.

Ref: S1.OP-AB.RC-0001 (R18), CVCS one-line dwg | LO: NOS05CVCS00-18, Obj 4 | Source: Bank - Byron 2017 NRC RO4 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✗ A. Incorrect. While indications 1 and 3 are correct, this choice is missing indication 5 (2CC131 goes closed on high CCW flow to the Thermal Barrier).

✗ B. Incorrect. PZR level would NOT rise — RCS is leaking OUT to the CCW system. Charging flow would NOT lower as a direct indication of thermal barrier rupture.

✗ C. Incorrect. PZR level would NOT rise and charging flow would NOT lower. While 2CC131 closing is correct, indications 2 and 4 are not valid corroborating evidence for a thermal barrier rupture.

✓ D. Correct. A Thermal Barrier leak will cause CCW surge tank to rise as RCS will be leaking into the CCW system, RCS in-leakage will also be identified as a rise in the 2R17 A or B radiation monitors that monitors activity in the CCW system, and the 2CC131 valve will also close on high CCW flow to the Thermal Barrier due to a thermal barrier leak. Choices 1, 3, and 5 are the correct indications. PZR level would NOT rise (RCS is leaking OUT to CCW). Charging flow would NOT lower.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 (R20) | LO: NOS05CCW000-16, Obj 4.c | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. The failed PZR pressure controlling channel will result in PZR pressure lowering. The lowering PZR pressure is one input into OT Delta-T to determine its trip setpoint. As RCS pressure lowers, the OT Delta-T setpoint will lower. With no operator action, the PZR pressure will continue to rapidly lower until the OT Delta-T reactor trip setpoint is reached first (per S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 bases section for Attachment 1). Note: OP Delta-T does NOT have a pressure input.

✗ B. Incorrect. While OT Delta-T is the correct trip function (it does have a pressure input), the setpoint would lower, not rise. As PZR pressure lowers due to the controlling channel failing high, the OT Delta-T setpoint decreases.

✗ C. Incorrect. OP Delta-T does NOT have a pressure input. Changes in PZR pressure do not affect the OP Delta-T trip setpoint.

✗ D. Incorrect. OP Delta-T does NOT have a pressure input. Changes in PZR pressure do not affect the OP Delta-T trip setpoint.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 (R20) | LO: NOS05ABPZR1-05, Obj 2 | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✗ A. Incorrect. The requirement is that at least one RO remains in the ATC area, not that a specific relief must occur by a non-BOP licensed operator.

✓ B. Correct. Per OP-AA-101-111, at least one RO must be in the "At The Controls" (ATC) area (or inner-horseshoe) at all times during Modes 1-6, except for the time period required to acknowledge the receipt of an alarm outside this area or to perform actions required for safe plant operation. The BOP operator remaining in the ATC area satisfies this requirement.

✗ C. Incorrect. CRS permission alone is not sufficient — the requirement is that at least one licensed RO must remain in the ATC area. The BOP remaining in the ATC area satisfies this requirement regardless of CRS permission.

✗ D. Incorrect. A full turnover is not required for a brief departure from the ATC area. The requirement is simply that at least one licensed RO remains at the controls.

Ref: OP-AA-101-111 (R11) | LO: NOS05CONDOP-15, Obj 2.f and 2.g | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ A. Correct. The preferred or normal power source for the PZR Heater Backup Groups is: Group 1 (21) - 2G and Group 2 (22) - 2E 4KV Group Buses. The PZR Heaters can be manually transferred to the emergency backup source: Group 1 (21) from 2C and Group 2 (22) from 2A 460V vital bus. With 2H and 2E unavailable, only PZR Heater Group 1 (21) remains available from 2G Group Bus. Group 2 (22) is unavailable but can be locally transferred to the emergency backup power. Transfer is manual, not automatic.

✗ B. Incorrect. Group 2 (22) is powered from 2E, which is de-energized. Group 1 (21) is powered from 2G, which is still available. This choice reverses the availability.

✗ C. Incorrect. Group 1 (21) is still available from 2G Group Bus, which has not failed. Only 2H and 2E are de-energized.

✗ D. Incorrect. Group 2 (22) is not available since 2E is de-energized. Additionally, the transfer to emergency backup source is manual (local), not automatic.

Ref: 2-EOP-LOSC-2 (R41) | LO: NOS05PZRPL-12, Obj 5.b | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✗ A. Incorrect. High level in only the 21A LP FW heater will close only the associated 21CN22, not all three strings. The power effect is correct (higher) but the valve closure scope is wrong.

✗ B. Incorrect. Not all CN22 valves close, and actual reactor thermal power will be higher (not lower) due to cooler feedwater entering the reactor causing a positive MTC effect.

✗ C. Incorrect. Only the 21CN22 valve closing is correct, but actual reactor thermal power will be higher, not lower. Cooler feedwater from the bypassed heater string raises reactor power due to positive MTC.

✓ D. Correct. High water level in 21A Low Pressure feedwater heater will only close the associated 21CN22 inlet valve (not all three strings). Based on one LP FW heater string out of service, colder feedwater will enter the reactor. The cooler FW will have the effect of raising reactor thermal power (positive MTC effect from cooler moderator) and also provide some shielding to the PR NIS, resulting in the actual NI reactor power indication being lower than actual. Reactor power should be determined based on RCS delta-Ts and turbine load should be reduced to prevent exceeding reactor thermal power limits.

Ref: S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0007 (R67) | LO: NOS05ABCN01-07, Obj 3 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✗ A. Incorrect. With load shedding per EOP-LOPA-1, battery life extends to 4 hours, not 2 hours. The 2-hour capacity is without load shedding.

✓ B. Correct. The 125 VDC vital batteries are designed to have adequate capacity to supply its Station Blackout (SBO) coping and restoration loads during the four (4) hour SBO coping duration with manual stripping of some non-essential loads (ref. section 7.2.2.3 in VTD 314204). The batteries are rated for two (2) hours of operation following a Loss of All AC Power without load shed. With load shedding per EOP-LOPA-1, battery life extends to 4 hours. Loss of All AC Power is not a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

✗ C. Incorrect. Battery capacity during worst case loading (no load shed) is 2 hours, not 6 hours.

✗ D. Incorrect. With load shedding, battery life extends to 4 hours, not 6 hours.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0001 (R32), PSBP 314204 (SBO calculation), FSAR Sect 8.1.4.1 | LO: NOS05DC ELEC-11, Obj 2 | Source: Bank - Beaver Valley 2017 NRC RO11 | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✗ A. Incorrect. While seal injection is NOT permitted (correct for part 1), the reason is to prevent damage to the #1 seal from thermal shock, not to prevent actuation of the Safe Shutdown seal. Safe Shutdown Seal actuation is monitored by seal OUTLET temperature (limit 190°F), not seal inlet temperature.

✗ B. Incorrect. Seal injection is NOT permitted (part 1 is wrong). Also, the reason for checking seal inlet temperature is to prevent #1 seal damage, not Safe Shutdown seal actuation.

✗ C. Incorrect. While preventing damage to #1 seal is the correct reason (part 2), seal injection is NOT permitted since 21 RCP seal inlet temperature is 227°F, which exceeds the 225°F limit.

✓ D. Correct. Per S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0001, Attachment 10, if ANY one of the RCP seal inlet temperatures is ≥ 225°F, then restoring seal injection flow to the RCPs is NOT permitted. Based on 21 RCP seal inlet temperature of 227°F (≥ 225°F), seal injection must be isolated prior to starting 13 charging pump. The reason is to prevent thermal shock from restoring cold seal injection water and damage to the RCP #1 seal. Note: Safe Shutdown Seal actuation is monitored by seal OUTLET temperature (limit 190°F), not seal inlet temperature.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0001 (R34) | LO: NOS05ABLOP1-09, Obj 2 | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. When 1B vital instrument bus de-energizes, 2N32 (SR), 2N36 (IR), 2N42 (PR) lose power, monitors fail low. Bi-stables trip to SSPS. Above P-6 but below P-10, reactor trips on 1/2 IR channel high flux bi-stables tripped. SR blocked above P-6, PR needs 2/4 (only 1 affected).

✗ A. NI channels do fail low, but bi-stables also trip sending signal to SSPS. A reactor trip will occur.

✗ B. IR high flux is blocked at P-10, not P-6. Below P-10 the IR trip is active, so 1/2 IR bi-stables tripped will cause a reactor trip.

✗ D. SR channels are blocked above P-6. At 8% power the unit is above P-6, so SR trip function is blocked.

Ref: 221052, 221053 | LO: NOS05EXCORE-14, Obj 12.b | Source: Modified Bank - Byron Oct 2019 NRC RO55 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. EDG starting circuits are supplied from 125 VDC power. With no DC power, EDG cannot start automatically from SI/SEC or remotely.

✗ B. SEC relays are supplied by vital instrument power, not DC. But the EDG start circuit itself needs DC power, so the conclusion (EDG will not start) is correct but the reason is wrong.

✗ C. SSPS sends SI to SECs, SECs send start to EDG start circuitry which is DC powered. No redundant DC supply for the 2A EDG start circuit.

✗ D. EDG start circuit requires DC power, not vital instrument power.

Ref: NOS05EDG000-15 | LO: NOS05EDG000-15, Obj 14.c | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ A. Correct. R13s monitor CFCU SW discharge for radioactivity from containment into SW. CFCUs SW flow discharges into the OPPOSITE unit's Circulating Water system. Unit 2 CFCUs discharge to Unit 1 CW.

✗ B. CFCUs discharge to the opposite unit's CW, not the same unit. Unit 2 CFCU SW discharges to Unit 1 CW, not Unit 2 CW.

✗ C. R13s monitor CFCUs, not CCW HXs.

✗ D. R13s monitor CFCUs, not CCW HXs.

Ref: S2.OP-SO.RM-0001, ODCM 3.3.8 | LO: NOS05RMS000-20, Obj 3.i | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. PORV air accumulators automatically isolate and realign to normal containment control air when pressure restored (>90 psig normal, <85 psig accumulator). Master Pressure Controller will have demand to open spray valves, so both spray valves reopen when air restored.

✗ A. Spray valves will reopen when air restored due to Master Pressure Controller demand. Accumulator realignment is correct but spray valve effect is wrong.

✗ B. Accumulators automatically realign when air pressure is restored, no manual action required. Spray valves will also reopen.

✗ C. Accumulators automatically realign when containment air pressure is restored. Spray valve effect is correct but accumulator effect is wrong.

Ref: NOS05CONAIR-13 | LO: NOS05CONAIR-13, Obj 4.b | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. Loss of a Salem unit causes 500KV switchyard voltage to lower (below 493 KV or by 2%). As grid voltage lowers, generating units share reactive load, Unit 2 MVARs rise to compensate for the lost reactive support.

✗ A. Grid voltage lowers on loss of a large generating unit, it does not rise.

✗ B. Grid voltage lowers, not rises. MVARs rise, not lower.

✗ C. Grid voltage correctly lowers, but MVARs rise not lower — remaining units compensate for lost reactive support.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 (R23) | LO: NOS05ABGRID-13, Obj 3.b | Source: Modified - Salem 2022 NRC RO17 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. RCS at 1700 psig is above SI pump shutoff head (1520 psig). Flow indicated on SI pumps means a leak exists on cold leg(s). Per EOP-LOCA-6 step 2, 2SJ135 Cold Leg Discharge Valve is closed to isolate SI pump cold leg leak.

✗ B. SJ49s are used to isolate RHR cold legs, not SI cold legs. Flow is the correct indicator but the isolation valve is wrong.

✗ C. SJ49s isolate RHR cold legs, not SI cold legs. SI pump discharge pressure alone does not confirm a leak — flow is the indicator since RCS pressure is above shutoff head.

✗ D. SI pump discharge pressure alone does not confirm a leak — flow is the indicator since RCS pressure is above shutoff head. 2SJ135 is the correct valve but the wrong confirming indication.

Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-6 (R41) & bases | LO: NOS05LOCA06-05, Obj 5 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. Per EOP-LOCA-5 step 23, during RCS depressurization upper head voiding CAN be expected. Hotter liquid in upper head flashes to steam, displaces water into PZR causing rapidly rising PZR level. Monitor PZR level to stop depressurization before going solid.

✗ A. CETs may increase but EOP-LOCA-5 specifically directs monitoring PZR level for this condition, not CETs.

✗ C. Upper head voiding IS expected during RCS depressurization with no RCPs running. The monitoring parameter (PZR level) is correct but the voiding expectation is wrong.

✗ D. Upper head voiding IS expected during RCS depressurization with no RCPs running.

Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-5 (R43) | LO: NOS05LOCA05-06, Obj 6 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. 100% steam dump causes high steam flows and Lo-Lo Tavg (P-12). P-12 closes steam dumps AND high steam flow with P-12 actuates MSLI closing all MSIVs. No steam dumps available. Continue depressurization via MS10s (atmospheric dumps). MSLI signals for high steam flow CANNOT be blocked.

✗ A. Manually actuating and resetting SI does NOT block MSLI signals. MSLI for high steam flow cannot be blocked.

✗ B. High steamline differential pressure causes SI, not MSLI. The correct MSLI signal is high steam flow coincident with Lo-Lo Tavg.

✗ D. P-12 does close steam dumps, but MSLI also actuates on high steam flow with Lo-Lo Tavg. MSLI signals cannot be blocked or bypassed with pushbuttons.

Ref: 2-EOP-FRHS-1 (R41) | LO: NOS05FRHS00-05, Obj 6.a | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. Per EOP-TRIP-2 step 4, adequate rapid boration flow through 2CV175 is 36 gpm. Indicated 20 gpm is inadequate. EOP-TRIP-2 directs: stop BAT pump, realign charging suction from RWST, and maintain charging flow greater than 87 gpm.

✗ A. Rapid boration flow should be 36 gpm; 20 gpm is inadequate. Continuing with inadequate flow does not meet the procedure requirements.

✗ C. This action is from EOP-FRSM-1 (subcriticality response), not EOP-TRIP-2.

✗ D. This action is for emergency borating from the field during control room evacuation, not EOP-TRIP-2.

Ref: 2-EOP-TRIP-2 (R41) | LO: NOS05TRP002-08, Obj 5 | Source: Bank - Byron 2019 NRC RO21 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. Rising backpressure makes LP turbines less efficient, resulting in lowering generator MWe output. Operational concern is overpressurization and damage to the main condenser/LP turbine.

✗ A. Condenser diff temp is not the best confirming indication — lowering MWe is the primary indicator of reduced LP turbine efficiency.

✗ B. Rising diff temp is the wrong indication. Concern is LP turbine damage, not condensate pump cavitation.

✗ C. Lowering MWe is the correct indication, but the concern is LP turbine damage not condensate pump cavitation.

Ref: NOS05MNTURB-14 | LO: NOS05MNTURB-14, Obj 13.c | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ A. Correct. With Ch III removed from service (bypassed), logic goes from 2/4 to 2/3. Only Channel I is above 15 psig. 1/3 does not meet 2/3 coincidence — CS and Phase B NOT actuated. CS pump discharge valves (CS2s) open on CS actuation signal only, not Phase B.

✗ B. Phase B and CS actuate at the same pressure, but CS2s open on CS signal specifically, not Phase B signal.

✗ C. Only 1/3 channels above 15 psig, 2/3 coincidence not met. CS and Phase B are NOT actuated.

✗ D. Only 1/3 channels above 15 psig, 2/3 coincidence not met. CS and Phase B are NOT actuated.

Ref: 2-EOP-TRIP-1 (R42), NOS05CSPRAY-07 | LO: NOS05CSPRAY-07, Obj 15.a | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. Per S2.OP-AB.RC-0002, following confirmation of elevated activity below TS limits, maximize letdown flow to accelerate RCS cleanup through the demineralizers.

✗ A. Procedure directs increasing letdown flow, not reducing it. Maximizing letdown accelerates cleanup through demineralizers.

✗ B. Step 3.20 does direct hourly sampling, but maximizing letdown is the NEXT action and is the primary response to reduce activity.

✗ D. This is the basis for TS 3.4.9 Specific Activity, but activity is below TS limit so shutdown is not required.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.RC-0002 (R12) | LO: NOS05ABRC02-07, Obj 2 | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. Per OP-SA-108-101-2000 Figure 2, the symbol is a Concurrent Step symbol — enter designated procedure while continuing in existing flow path.

✗ A. This describes a Sequential Branching symbol, where the action must be completed before proceeding to the next step.

✗ C. This describes a Conditional Step symbol, where the action is performed only if/when specified conditions occur.

✗ D. This describes a Wait Step symbol, where the crew waits for conditions to be met before proceeding.

Ref: OP-SA-108-101-2000 (R12) | LO: NOS05CONDOP-15, Obj 5 | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ B. Correct. Service Water from CFCUs does NOT get isolated by Phase A or B signals. Therefore SW is the only source of water into containment following Phase A and B actuation that could contribute to containment flooding.

✗ A. Fire Protection is isolated on Phase A signal.

✗ C. CCW is isolated on Phase B signal (containment pressure exceeded 15 psig).

✗ D. Primary Water is isolated on Phase A signal.

Ref: 1-EOP-FRCE-2 (R41) | LO: NOS05FRCE00-08, Obj 1.2 | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ C. Correct. Per EOP-FRCE-3 step 2, place all CFCUs in LOW speed. In LOW speed, dampers realign flow through HEPA filters (bypassing roughing filters) to reduce radioactivity inside containment.

✗ A. High speed is normal operation with roughing filters. LOW speed is required for HEPA filtration to reduce containment radioactivity.

✗ B. CFCUs can run high speed but dampers only realign to route flow through HEPA filters when in low speed.

✗ D. LOW speed is the correct speed, but flow goes through HEPA filters not roughing filters. The damper realignment in low speed bypasses roughing filters.

Ref: 2-EOP-FRCE-3 (R41) | LO: NOS05FRCE00-08, Obj 3 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. Per EOP-TRIP-4 bases Note N1-3: RCPs are started whenever possible. Forced convection permits faster cooldown with less potential for upper head voiding. RCP priority order: 23, 21+22 or 21+24, 21 (to provide normal PZR spray). Single pump operation is preferred in the loop providing best spray.

✗ A. Incorrect. "Prevents two phase flow" is the reason for stopping an RCP during a SBLOCA, not the reason for starting one during natural circulation cooldown. The correct reason is faster cooldown with less potential for upper head voiding.

✗ B. Incorrect. Two RCPs would only be started if 23 RCP is unavailable (to provide spray using 21+22 or 21+24). The "prevents two phase flow" reasoning is the basis for stopping RCPs during a SBLOCA, not for starting them during natural circulation.

✗ C. Incorrect. While the reason (faster cooldown, less head voiding) is correct, only one RCP is preferred. Two RCPs are only started if 23 is unavailable for spray. Note N1-1 allows two RCPs for better spray if 23 unavailable.

Ref: 2-EOP-TRIP-4 (R41) | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ D. Correct. Per AB.RCP-0001 Attachment 1: 5 minutes to restore CCW or trip reactor and stop affected RCP. Anytime motor bearing temperature exceeds 175°F, trip reactor and stop affected RCP. Additional trip criteria: motor winding temp >302°F, seal water outlet >190°F, shaft vibration >20 mils, #1 seal leakoff <0.8 gpm or ≥6 gpm.

✗ A. Incorrect. 2 minutes is the time limit for loss of seal injection AND thermal barrier CCW concurrently, not for loss of CCW to motor bearings alone. 175°F is the correct motor bearing temperature limit.

✗ B. Incorrect. 2 minutes is the concurrent seal injection/thermal barrier CCW loss time limit, not the CCW loss time limit. 165°F is the ARP limit that directs transition to AB.RCP-0001, not the AB trip limit.

✗ C. Incorrect. 5 minutes is the correct CCW restoration time limit, but 165°F is the ARP limit directing entry into AB.RCP-0001. The AB.RCP-0001 trip limit for motor bearing temperature is 175°F.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 (R28) | Source: Bank - Beaver Valley 2018 NRC RO29 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. 2TE-130 fails low, causing the controller to see a low temperature signal. 2CC71 goes closed (reduces CCW cooling flow through the letdown HX). With less cooling, letdown HX outlet temperature rises. Hotter letdown water flowing through the mixed bed demineralizers causes boron release into the RCS (boration effect), which lowers Tavg.

✗ B. Incorrect. Letdown temperature does rise (correct part), but higher temperature through the demineralizers releases boron into the RCS, which is a boration effect. Boration inserts negative reactivity, lowering Tavg, not raising it.

✗ C. Incorrect. 2CC71 goes closed (not open) when 2TE-130 fails low, so letdown temperature rises, not lowers. With boron release from higher demineralizer temperatures, Tavg would lower, not rise.

✗ D. Incorrect. 2CC71 goes closed when the temperature detector fails low, so letdown temperature rises, not lowers. The Tavg direction (lowers) is correct due to boration from demineralizer boron release.

Ref: INPO 191007 Demineralizers | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. LT-112 fails high, causing CV35 high level divert valve to open, which drains the VCT. Automatic make-up will not actuate because only LT-112 actuates automatic make-up, and it is failed high. Automatic swapover to RWST requires 2/2 VCT levels low-low (LT-112 AND LT-114); with LT-112 failed high, the 2/2 coincidence is not met. The charging pump loses suction as VCT empties and runs dry, resulting in pump damage.

✗ A. Incorrect. VCT level does lower and auto make-up will not actuate, but automatic swapover to RWST requires 2/2 VCT levels low-low (both LT-112 AND LT-114). With LT-112 failed high, the coincidence logic is not satisfied and no auto swapover occurs.

✗ C. Incorrect. Only LT-112 actuates automatic make-up. Since LT-112 is failed high, the controller sees a high VCT level and will not initiate make-up. VCT level will lower uncontrolled.

✗ D. Incorrect. Automatic make-up does not initiate at all. Only LT-112 actuates the auto make-up function, and it is failed high, so the controller sees no need for make-up.

Ref: NOS05CVCS00-18 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. Lower demand on RH18s closes them, reducing flow through the RHR heat exchanger. Raise demand on RH20 opens the bypass valve, routing more flow around the heat exchanger. Total RHR flow stays constant, but less flow passes through the heat exchanger, reducing the cooldown rate.

✗ B. Incorrect. Raising RH18 demand opens the HX flow path more, and lowering RH20 demand closes the bypass. This increases flow through the heat exchanger and raises the cooldown rate — the opposite of what is needed.

✗ C. Incorrect. Lowering both RH18 and RH20 demand closes both the HX flow path and the bypass path. This would lower cooldown rate but also lower total RHR flow, which is not desired.

✗ D. Incorrect. Raising both demands opens both paths. This may not significantly change the cooldown rate (flow split stays similar) and would increase total RHR flow rather than maintaining it constant.

Ref: NOS05RHR000-19 | Source: Modified - Salem 2020 NRC RO31 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. A cold leg break results in the highest peak clad temperature during a SBLOCA. This is due to thermodynamics and the fact that ECCS pumps inject into the cold legs. With a cold leg break, injected ECCS water can be lost directly out the break before reaching the core, reducing the effectiveness of core cooling and resulting in the highest PCT.

✗ B. Incorrect. A hot leg break results in the highest loss of flow but does not produce the highest peak clad temperature. ECCS injection into cold legs is more effective at reaching the core with a hot leg break since the break is downstream of the core.

✗ C. Incorrect. A CRDM housing break on the reactor head is an analyzed SBLOCA scenario but does not produce the worst PCT. The break size is limited and flow paths still allow effective ECCS delivery to the core.

✗ D. Incorrect. A pressurizer steam space break is an analyzed SBLOCA scenario but does not produce the worst PCT. The steam space break depressurizes the PZR but ECCS can still effectively deliver coolant to the core.

Ref: NOS05ECCS00-18 | Source: Bank - Braidwood 2018 RO41 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. Per S2.OP-SO.PZR-0003: open 2PR14 to drain PRT to RCDT, which automatically opens 2WL12 and starts the RCDT pump (defeats low level cutoff). RCDT pumps discharge to: RWST, CVCS Hold-Up Tanks, or Waste Hold-Up Tanks.

✗ A. Incorrect. The PRT does drain via the RCDT pump, but the RCDT pump discharges to the RWST, CVCS Hold-Up Tanks, or Waste Hold-Up Tanks — not to the Aux Building Sump.

✗ C. Incorrect. The PRT does not gravity drain to the CVCS Hold-Up Tank. The drain path requires the RCDT pump to transfer the PRT contents.

✗ D. Incorrect. The PRT does not gravity drain, and the destination is not the Aux Building Sump. The RCDT pump is required, and it discharges to RWST, CVCS HUTs, or WHUTs.

Ref: S2.OP-SO.PZR-0003 (R17) | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. SEC Mode 3 (SI + Blackout): all CCW pumps are tripped. SW to CCW HXs is auto-isolated to prevent SW pump runout with only 3 SW pumps available on emergency power. CCW pumps are not sequenced onto the EDGs due to loading concerns. CCW pumps are started later per EOP-APPX-1 when needed for cold leg recirculation.

✗ A. Incorrect. This describes SEC Mode 1 (SI only, no blackout). In a concurrent LOCA + LOOP (SEC Mode 3), CCW pumps are tripped and not sequenced onto EDGs.

✗ C. Incorrect. No CCW pumps running is correct, but SW to CCW HXs is auto-isolated in SEC Mode 3, not manually isolated. The auto-isolation prevents SW pump runout.

✗ D. Incorrect. This describes SEC Mode 2 (blackout only, no SI). In a concurrent LOCA + LOOP (SEC Mode 3), CCW pumps are tripped, not running.

Ref: NOS05CCW000-15 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. MPC fails low (0%): spray valves close (MPC controls spray), both backup heater groups energize (0% demand energizes backup heaters). RCS pressure rises with heaters on and no spray. PZR sprays will not open since MPC controls them and MPC output is at 0%. PORVs open when pressure exceeds 2335 psig — PORVs are interlocked directly from PZR pressure channels, NOT from MPC. Both PORVs will open.

✗ A. Incorrect. MPC output at 0% energizes backup heaters (not de-energizes them) and closes spray valves. With heaters on and no spray, pressure rises, not lowers.

✗ B. Incorrect. Both backup heater groups do energize (correct part), but the result is pressure rising, not lowering. With heaters on and spray valves closed, RCS pressure increases.

✗ C. Incorrect. Pressure does rise (correct part), but PORVs WILL open. PORVs are NOT controlled by MPC; they are interlocked directly from PZR pressure channels and open independently when pressure exceeds 2335 psig.

Ref: NOS05PZRPL-12, S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 (R20) | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. PZR Pressure High trip: 2/4 channels exceeding 2385 psig causes a reactor trip. This trip has NO permissive — it is active in all conditions regardless of power level. At 7% power, this trip is fully active and will directly cause a reactor trip.

✗ A. Incorrect. The RCS Low Flow trip on a single loop (2/3 channels) is enabled above P-8 (36% power). The plant is at 7% power, which is below P-8, so this trip is blocked. The low flow trip on two loops is enabled above P-7 (10%), but the plant is also below P-7.

✗ B. Incorrect. The PZR Pressure Low trip is blocked below P-7 (10% power). The plant is at 7% power, which is below P-7, so this trip is blocked and will not directly cause a reactor trip.

✗ D. Incorrect. The SG Low Level trip requires 2/3 levels low on any 1 of 4 SGs. One level low on two SGs does not satisfy the coincidence logic (need 2/3 on the same SG), so this would not cause a trip.

Ref: Fluency List | Source: Bank - Point Beach 2017 RO1 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. RCP underfrequency trip logic is 1/2 on (H or E) AND 1/2 on (F or G) above P-7. Underfrequency exists on H and E buses (56.0 Hz) but NOT on F and G buses (59.7 Hz). Since the logic requires both bus groups to have underfrequency, the coincidence is NOT satisfied and no reactor trip occurs. Individual 4KV RCP breakers trip on undervoltage, NOT underfrequency. All buses have adequate voltage (4100V and 4200V), so no individual RCP breakers trip. All RCPs remain running.

✗ B. Incorrect. Trip breakers remaining closed is correct, but individual RCP breakers trip on undervoltage, NOT underfrequency. H and E buses have adequate voltage (4100V), so no individual RCP breakers trip.

✗ C. Incorrect. The underfrequency trip logic is not satisfied. The logic requires 1/2 on (H or E) AND 1/2 on (F or G). Only H and E have low frequency; F and G are normal. Trip breakers do not open.

✗ D. Incorrect. Underfrequency trip logic is not satisfied (needs both bus groups). Additionally, individual RCP breakers trip on undervoltage, not underfrequency. Neither condition is met.

Ref: Fluency List | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ D. Correct. After SI and SEC reset, a subsequent LOOP causes EDGs to auto-start on blackout signal (SEC Mode 2). SECs sequence for blackout only — only charging pumps are auto-started by the SEC in Mode 2. Other safeguard loads (SI pumps, RHR pumps, CFCUs) must be manually started since SI and SECs were reset prior to the LOOP.

✗ A. Incorrect. EDGs auto-start on the blackout signal regardless of whether they were previously stopped or SI/SECs were reset. The auto-start on loss of voltage is an independent function.

✗ B. Incorrect. EDGs auto-start on blackout (not manual start required). SECs sequence for Mode 2 (blackout only) since SI was previously reset — only charging pumps are auto-started, not all safeguard loads.

✗ C. Incorrect. EDGs do auto-start, but SECs do NOT sequence all safeguard loads. With SI previously reset, the SECs operate in Mode 2 (blackout only), which only auto-starts charging pumps. SI pumps, RHR pumps, and CFCUs require manual start.

Ref: NOS05SEC000-09 | Source: Bank - Comanche Peak 2020 RO20 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. SEC Mode 1 (SI only): running CFCUs are tripped, then all five start 20 seconds later in low speed. The 20-second time delay allows for motor coastdown before restart. To regain manual control for high speed operation: must reset BOTH trains of SI AND reset all SECs. EOP-TRIP-3 step 1 accomplishes this.

✗ A. Incorrect. The 20-second delay is correct, but resetting SI alone is not sufficient. Both SI trains AND all SECs must be reset to regain manual control of the CFCUs for high speed operation.

✗ C. Incorrect. CFCUs do not restart immediately. The 20-second time delay is required to allow motor coastdown before restarting in low speed. The SI and SEC reset requirement is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect. CFCUs do not restart immediately (20-second delay required for coastdown), and resetting SI only is not sufficient — all SECs must also be reset to regain manual control.

Ref: NOS05SEC000-09, 2-EOP-TRIP-3 (R41) | Source: Modified - Braidwood 2016 NRC RO20 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. With 2B 4KV Vital Bus de-energized: 22 CFCU (B bus) and 24 CFCU (B bus) cannot run. With 23 CFCU CIT for maintenance: 23 cannot run. Only 21 CFCU (A bus) and 25 CFCU (C bus) remain available and running.

✗ A. Incorrect. 22 CFCU is powered from the B bus, which is de-energized. 22 cannot run. 25 (C bus) is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect. Both 22 and 24 CFCUs are powered from the B bus, which is de-energized. Neither can run.

✗ C. Incorrect. 24 CFCU is powered from the B bus, which is de-energized. 24 cannot run. 21 (A bus) is correct.

Ref: NOS05CONTMT-17 | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ C. Correct. Both CS pumps are powered from A and C 4KV vital buses. The 2B SEC failure does not affect CS pumps since neither is powered from the B bus. A and C SECs actuated in Mode 1. With the sequence complete and SECs NOT reset, the CS pump start contact is re-closed — CS pumps WILL auto-start when the Hi-Hi containment pressure signal is received.

✗ A. Incorrect. Both CS pumps are available, not just one. 21 CS pump is on the A bus (A SEC) and 22 CS pump is on the C bus (C SEC). The failed B SEC does not power either CS pump.

✗ B. Incorrect. Both CS pumps are available (not just one), and they will auto-start. With SECs not reset, the CS start contact remains active for auto-start on Hi-Hi containment pressure.

✗ D. Incorrect. Both CS pumps being available is correct, but they WILL auto-start. Since SECs have NOT been reset, the CS pump start contact remains re-closed after the initial sequence, allowing auto-start on Hi-Hi containment pressure.

Ref: NOS05SEC000-09 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. 23 AFW Turbine Driven Pump is designed to operate with SG pressures at 100 psig. As SG pressures lower, the 23 AFW governor will throttle to maintain relative speed of the turbine constant. However, as SG pressure lowers, the D/P across the feedpump discharge and the SG will increase resulting in more AFW flow to the SGs.

✗ A. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that as SG pressure lowers so will the turbine speed and feedflow.

✗ C. Incorrect. Plausible because turbine speed will be maintain relatively constant and the operator may believe that feedflow will also remain constant. Incorrect in that feedflow will rise due to the lowering SG pressure.

✗ D. Incorrect. Plausible because feedflow will rise as SG pressure lowers.

Ref: NOS05AFW000-18 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis
K/A: 039 K3.03 — Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Main and Reheat Steam System will have on the following systems or system parameters: AFW system

✓ A. Correct. Failed open BF19 will result in a Main Turbine Trip on high SG level followed by a reactor trip. The SG High Level setpoint is 2 out of 3 SG NR levels ≥ 67% on any one SG (P-14). P-14 will trip the main turbine that will cause an auto reactor trip and actuate a FW Isolation to close all BF13s, BF19s, BF40s, trip both SGFPs, and trips Main Turbine. FW interlock only closes the BF19s and BF40s.

✗ B. Incorrect. Plausible because a reactor trip will actuate a FW Interlock. Incorrect in that the SG high level (P-14) signal actuate a FW Isolation.

✗ C. Incorrect. Plausible because this is the reactor trip setpoint for PZR high level.

✗ D. Incorrect. Plausible because this is the reactor trip setpoint for PZR high level. Incorrect in that the P-14 setpoint is 67% and a FW Isolation occurs.

Ref: Drawing ESF-1 | Source: Bank — Salem | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory
K/A: 059 G2.4.2 — Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with emergency and abnormal operating procedure entry conditions

✓ A. Correct. Air supply line rupturing on the 2MS132 will cause the AFW steam inlet valve to fail open. This will result in 23 AFW running and injecting cold feedwater into the SGs. As a result, reactor power will increase above the 100% RTP and the operator should reduce reactor power per S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation. Per S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, the maximum power level is 3459 MWt (100% RTP).

✗ B. Incorrect. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because with 23 AFW running additional feedwater is being supplied to all the SGs. Incorrect in that with digital feedwater system in Automatic, the MFW Regulating Valves will automatically adjust demand to maintain SG NR levels within program band.

✗ C. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall how the valve fails on loss of air and believe the 2MS132 fails closed thereby preventing the start of 23 AFW pump. Entering TS LCO 3.7.1.2 is plausible because this LCO is applicable for the 23 AFW pump condition.

✗ D. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall how the valve fails on loss of air and believe the 2MS132 fails closed thereby preventing the start of 23 AFW pump. Failing open the 2MS132 is plausible because many AOVs can be locally operated.

Ref: NOS05AFW000-18, S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 (R88) | Source: Bank — Salem | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis
K/A: 061 A2.07 — Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Auxiliary Emergency Feedwater System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Air operated valve, solenoid-operated valve, or motor-operated valve

✓ B. Correct. The 2DR6 will fail to the open position on loss of air. This will result in the AFWST level rising and potentially overflowing the tank. Per S2.OP-AB.CA-0001, Attachment 2, the 2DR6 can be manually operated from the field to control tank level.

✗ A. Incorrect. Plausible because not all air operated valves can be manually operated in the field.

✗ C. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the 2DR6 failing open would result in tank overflow, thus its failure position would be closed to prevent this (air to open actuator).

✗ D. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the 2DR6 failing open would result in tank overflow, thus its failure position would be closed to prevent this (air to open actuator).

Ref: NOS05AFW000-18, S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 (R22) | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis
K/A: 191001 K1.04 — The failed-valve positions for different operators (open, closed, and as-is positions spring loaded valves; hydraulic, pneumatically controlled valves; electric motor-driven valves)

✓ B. Correct. 23 charging pump is supplied from the 2A 460V bus. An overcurrent condition on the 2A 460V MCC/bus will cause the breakers associated on the 2A 460 and 230V MCCs to trip open on overcurrent and de-energize the 2A 460V bus. This will result in loss of 23 charging pump and letdown isolation when the 23 charging pump breaker opens. Per S2.OP-AB.460-0001, Loss of 2A 460/230V Vital Bus, the operator will start a centrifugal charging pump and then re-establish letdown.

✗ A. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall which 230V bus supplies the normal and backup battery chargers and believe that the 281 125VDC is supplied from 2A 230V bus. Incorrect in the 281 125VDC Battery Charger is supplied from the 2B 230V bus and the 282 125VDC battery charger is supplied from the 2A 230V bus.

✗ C. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall which 230V bus supplies the normal and emergency power to the IRPI indications and believe that the 2A 230V bus is the normal supply resulting in a loss of IRPI indications. Incorrect in that the normal power supply is from 2B 460V and the 2A 230V bus supplies the emergency power.

✗ D. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall which 460V bus supplies the normal and emergency power to the Pressurizer backup heaters and believe that the 2A 460V bus is the normal supply resulting in a loss of PZR backup heaters Group 22. Incorrect in that the normal power supply is from the EP 460V bus and the 2A 460V bus supplies the emergency backup.

Ref: 203061 (R39), 601390 (R25), S2.OP-AB.460-0001 (R9) | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis
K/A: 062 A2.25 — Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the AC Electrical Distribution System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Fault on a motor control center.

✓ C. Correct. Per S2.OP-SO.125-0004, a resistance reading of 50K ohms or less indicates a ground is detected. A resistance of greater than 50K ohms is normal indicating no grounds are present. Therefore, a ground reading of 0 ohms indicates a hard ground is present. Per S2.OP-SO.125-0004, breakers on the bus will be opened one at a time until the resistance indicates greater than 50K ohms.

✗ A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. Plausible because the operator can incorrectly recall and confuse which resistance reading indicates a ground present and believe that the 0 ohms indicates no grounds. Incorrect in that resistance reading less than 50K ohms is a ground. Second part is incorrect. Plausible again if the operator confuses how to interpret resistance readings and believes a lower resistance is good.

✗ B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect. Plausible because the operator can incorrectly recall and confuse which resistance reading indicates a ground present and believe that the 0 ohms indicates no grounds. Incorrect in that resistance reading less than 50K ohms is a ground. Second part is correct.

✗ D. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part is incorrect. Plausible because the operator can incorrectly recall and confuse which resistance reading indicates a ground present and believe that the 0 ohms indicates no grounds. Incorrect in that resistance reading less than 50K ohms is a ground.

Ref: NOS05DCELECT-11 | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory
K/A: 063 K1.01 — Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the DC Electrical Distribution System and the following systems: Ground detection system.

✓ D. Correct. The 125 VDC system does include a design feature that prevents paralleling the normal and backup busses. A mechanical interlock located in the distribution panel requires the normal supply breaker to be open and then the mechanical device is allowed to move allowing the closing of the backup or emergency power. Per procedure, transferring to the backup DC bus is only allowed during Modes 5, 6, or defueled.

✗ A. Incorrect. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall that the DC busses do not have a mechanical interlock. Incorrect in that a mechanical interlock is part of the design. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may misinterpret the questions and believe that the DC bus can be transferred during any modes. Incorrect in that paralleling DC bus will make the DC busses Inoperable during Modes 1-4.

✗ B. Incorrect. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall that the DC busses do not have a mechanical interlock. Incorrect in that a mechanical interlock is part of the design. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Incorrect. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may misinterpret the questions and believe that the DC bus can be transferred during any modes. Incorrect in that paralleling DC bus will make the DC busses Inoperable during Modes 1-4.

Ref: NOS05DCELECT-11 | Source: Bank — Salem | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory
K/A: 063 K4.01 — Knowledge of DC Electrical Distribution System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Manual/automatic transfers of control.

✓ A. Correct. Each EDG two starting air compressors are supplied from its associated bus 230V vital bus. The 21A and 21B starting air compressors are both powered from 2A 230V Vital Bus.

✗ B. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the 21B starting air compressor is powered from the other EDG 230V vital bus. Incorrect in that both starting air compressors are powered from the same 2A 230V vital power.

✗ C. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall and believe that the starting air compressors are powered from 2A 460V vital bus. Incorrect in that both starting air compressors are powered from the same 2A 230V vital power.

✗ D. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the 21B starting air compressor is powered from the other EDG 460V vital bus. Incorrect in that both starting air compressors are powered from the same 2A 230V vital power.

Ref: NOS05EDG000-15 | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory
K/A: 064 K2.01 — Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following Emergency Diesel Generator System: Starting air compressor

✓ C. Correct. When a check source is performed on this radiation monitor, the counts will rise then return to its previous reading. During check source it is not expected for interlocks to actuate.

✗ A. Incorrect. Plausible because other radiation monitors do perform like this. Incorrect in that this radiation monitor check source the counts rise then fall and interlocks are not expected during check source.

✗ B. Incorrect. Plausible because other radiation monitors do perform like this. Incorrect in that this radiation monitor check source the counts rise then fall and interlocks are not expected during check source.

✗ D. Incorrect. Plausible because some other radiation monitors interlocks could occur during check source.

Ref: NOS05RMS000-20, S1.OP-ST.RM-0001 (R10) | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory
K/A: 073 A4.02 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the Process Radiation Monitor in the control room: RMS control panel.

✓ C. Correct. The SW flow rates through the CFCUs in High and Low speed are the same, therefore, the SW header pressure will also be the same when operating in High and Low speed.

✗ A. Incorrect. Plausible because the SW flow through the CFCUs is the same for high or low speed operation. Correct in that the SW header will be relatively the same.

✗ B. Incorrect. Plausible because prior operation of the CFCUs in low speed use to have a higher flow rate. Incorrect in that orifices have been installed to maintain constant flow rates in either speed.

✗ D. Incorrect. Plausible because prior operation of the CFCUs in low speed use to have a higher flow rate. Incorrect in that orifices have been installed to maintain constant flow rates in either speed.

Ref: NOS05CONTMT-17 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis
K/A: 076 A1.03 — Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Service Water System: SWS header pressure

✓ B. Correct. 21SW122 fails open on loss of air (fails closed on loss of 125VDC power). When the 21SW122 opens, SW flow will rise through the CCW HX causing CCW temperature to lower and therefore the outlet temperature of 21 RHR HX to lower raising the cooldown rate. Per S2.OP-AB.CA-0001, the 21/22SW122 can be manually operated.

✗ A. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall if this valve can be manually operated from the field since not all AOVs can be manually operated in the field.

✗ C. Incorrect. Plausible because the question is asking about the cooldown rate and the operator may confuse the concept that a lower temperature means a higher cooldown rate.

✗ D. Incorrect. Plausible because the question is asking about the cooldown rate and the operator may confuse the concept that a lower temperature means a higher cooldown rate.

Ref: NOS05SW0NUC-13, S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 (R22) | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis
K/A: 076 K3.05 — Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Service Water System will have on the following systems or system parameters: RHRS

✓ D. Correct. CA330s are closed by a Phase A isolation signal. Although SI actuated, with both trains of Phase A not actuated, then the 21 and 22 CA330s will remain open. Both 21 and 22 CA330s are required to be closed to fully isolate air to containment. 21 CA330s supplies 2A control air header and 22CA330s supplies 2B control air header to containment. Each instrument air supply line to containment is isolated by its respective CA330 and a check valve. It is for this reason that both CA330s need to be closed to ensure a failure of one of the two components will still isolate a pathway from containment. Backup air receivers inside containment ensure that the PZR PORVs have sufficient air to allow the PZR PORV to stroke during steps in the EOP Network (Inadvertent SI, SGTR, etc.)

✗ A. Incorrect. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the CA330s close on an SI signal. Incorrect in that each CA330s will close on a Phase A signal only. Part 2 is correct. Plausible because the operator may believe that the CA330s are in series and need both to close.

✗ B. Incorrect. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the CA330s close on an SI signal. Incorrect in that each CA330s will close on a Phase A signal only. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the CA330s are in series and only need one of the two to isolate containment as a minimum.

✗ C. Incorrect. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the CA330s are in series and only need one of the two to isolate containment as a minimum.

Ref: NOS05CONAIR-13 | Source: Modified Bank — Farley 2019 NRC RO14 | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory
K/A: 078 A3.05 — Ability to monitor automatic features of the Instrument Air System, including: Isolation of instrument air to containment

✓ B. Correct. The Containment Vacuum Relief System filter unit uses only roughing filters. Since air is being drawn into containment there is no need to filter the air for radioactive contaminants. The dampers (VC5 and VC6) will automatically close on an automatic Safety Injection or CVI signal. The CVI signal will be actuated from a Safety Injection. CVI signal can also be generated manually using either (1) CS/Phase B keyswitches, or (2) Containment Vent Operate pushbutton on the safeguards console. Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitors 2R11A, 2R12A, and 2R12B either one in alarm will cause a CVI.

✗ A. Incorrect. Plausible because Phase A signals do close penetrations through containment. Incorrect in that the Phase A signal does not actuate a CVI signal.

✗ C. Incorrect. Plausible because manually actuating CS/Phase B will actuate a CVI signal. Incorrect in that the stem is asking about automatically generated signals only.

✗ D. Incorrect. Plausible because Phase A and B do isolate containment penetrations. Incorrect in that these signals does not actuate a CVI.

Ref: NOS05CONTMT-17, 221057 (RPS logic) | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory
K/A: 103 K4.01 — Knowledge of Containment System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Vacuum breaker protection

✓ D. Correct. Based on TS bases for TS 3.6.1.4, Internal Pressure must be maintained between -1.5 and +0.3 psig during Modes 1-4. Limitation on containment internal pressure ensure that (1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere of 3.5 psig, and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 47 psig during the limiting pipe break condition. The pipe breaks considered are LOCA and steam line break. Containment Pressure must be restored within limits within 1 hour.

✗ A. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may confuse this value with the TS value of (-) 1.5 psig.

✗ B. Incorrect. Plausible because the operator may confuse this value with the TS value of (-) 1.5 psig.

✗ C. Incorrect. Plausible because there are other TS LCO with less than one hour limits.

Ref: TS 3.6.1.4 and Bases | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory
K/A: 103 K6.15 — Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the Containment System: MRSS

✓ D. Correct. Per console ARP S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0012, Urgent Failure alarm will prevent all rod motion in Manual or Automatic. In this condition the rods are held in position by the stationary gripper coil being energized at a reduced current. The moveable gripper coil is de-energized at this time.

✗ A. Incorrect. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator could believe that even with an Urgent Failure present, the operator will always be able to insert rods. Incorrect in that all rod motion is inhibited in Manual and Automatic. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Incorrect. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator could believe that even with an Urgent Failure present, the operator will always be able to insert rods. Incorrect in that all rod motion is inhibited in Manual and Automatic. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the moveable gripper coil is used to hold the rods in position until the lift coil is energized/de-energized to withdraw or insert rods. Incorrect in that the stationary coil is energized at a reduced current to hold rods in position.

✗ C. Incorrect. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the moveable gripper coil is used to hold the rods in position until the lift coil is energized/de-energized to withdraw or insert rods. Incorrect in that the stationary coil is energized at a reduced current to hold rods in position.

Ref: NOS05RODS00-14, S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0012 (R40) | Source: Modified Bank — Diablo Canyon 2019 NRC RO29 | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory
K/A: 001 K1.03 — Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the Control Rod Drive System and the following systems: CRDM

✓ A. Correct. Only the Group 1 Demand Steps input into the Plant Computer. Per S2.OP-DL.ZZ-0003 for Control Rod Counter channel checks, either the Group Demand Counter or Plant Computer will satisfy the surveillance for Group 1 only. Only the Group 1 Demand Steps input into the Plant Computer. TS 3.1.3.2.1.b, bases states in part, "...either the control console group 1 demand step counter or the plant computer 'bank step' display is sufficient to comply with this specification for group 1 rod position."

✗ B. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that both groups are also displayed on the plant computer. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the Plant Computer cannot satisfy the surveillance requirement. Incorrect in that per S2.OP-DL.ZZ-0003, the Plant Computer Group Demand for Group 1 only will satisfy the surveillance and also that only group 1 demand is displayed on the plant computer.

✗ C. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that both groups are also displayed on the plant computer. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the failed step counter will generate E-24. Incorrect in that E-24 does not use input directly from the console step counters. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the Plant Computer cannot satisfy the surveillance requirement. Incorrect in that per S2.OP-DL.ZZ-0003, the Plant Computer Group Demand for Group 1 only will satisfy the surveillance.

Ref: S2.OP-DL.ZZ-0003 (R126), TS 3.1.3.2.1 bases | LO: NOS05RODS00-14, Objective 6 — Describe the function of the following components and how their normal and abnormal operations affects the Rod Control and Position Indication Systems: Rod Insertion Limit Comparator | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. The reference junction box is located outside of containment. Ambient temperature changes in the room will affect the reference junction box, however the system uses a temperature compensator to adjust for the changes in temperatures where the reference junction box is located. A rise in ambient room temperature will raise temperature, but the temperature compensating circuit will adjust for these reference junction box temperature changes. In-Core system design upper range is 2300 degrees F.

✗ A. Plausible because higher temperatures in the room where the reference junction box is located will cause the in temperature indicated to rise. Incorrect in that the system has a temperature compensator circuit such that the reference junction box temperature changes are adjusted to the true thermocouple reading. In-core system has a design range to 2300 degrees F.

✗ B. Plausible because higher temperatures in the room where the reference junction box is located will cause the in temperature indicated to rise. Incorrect in that the system has a temperature compensator circuit such that the reference junction box temperature changes are adjusted to the true thermocouple reading. In-core system has a design range to 2300 degrees F.

✗ D. In-Core system design upper range is 2300 degrees F.

Ref: INPO Sensors and Detectors (R3) | LO: NOS0SINCORE-09, Objective 7 — Describe how the following components affect the Core Exit Thermocouple System during Normal and Abnormal conditions: Reference Junction Boxes | Source: Bank — Indian Point 2 2021 NRC ROSS | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. Per 2-EOP-LOCA-1 step 17, only one Hydrogen Recombiner is allowed to be placed in service when the Hydrogen concentration is between > 0.5% and < 4%. The bases for running a Hydrogen Recombiner is to reduce the hydrogen concentration to prevent the formation of a flammable mixture that could ignite and cause an explosion and pressure excursion that could challenge containment integrity.

✗ A. Plausible because gas intrusion into the ECCS system can adversely affect the operation of ECCS pumps.

✗ C. Plausible because the operator may believe that both hydrogen combiners can be operated to maximize the reduction of hydrogen when hydrogen concentration is at the upper end (4%). Incorrect in that operation of both hydrogen recombiners is not permitted.

✗ D. Plausible because gas intrusion into the ECCS system can adversely affect the operation of ECCS pumps. Plausible because the operator may believe that both hydrogen combiners can be operated to maximize the reduction of hydrogen when hydrogen concentration is at the upper end (4%). Incorrect in that operation of both hydrogen recombiners is not permitted.

Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-1 (R41) | LO: NOS0SLOCA01-07, Objective 6.j — Describe the plant response to actions taken in the following EOP step sequence(s): Containment Hydrogen Concentration | Source: Bank — Salem | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. Per S2.OP-AB.CC-0001, a leak in the SFP HX will result in the out leakage of CCW into the SFP system resulting in the CCW Surge Tank level lowering and the SFP level rising. The non-borated CCW water will reduce the boron concentration of the SFP. If boron concentration lowers below TS then the crew will need to add borated water into the SFP to raise the boron concentration. Note: SFP low and high level alarms 128' 2" and 129' 2".

✗ A. Plausible because the SFP level will rise. Incorrect in that CCW is a non-borated water source and will reduce the boron concentration.

✗ C. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall that the SFP HX will leak into the CCW system. Incorrect per S1.OP-AB.CC-0001, SFP HX will be out leakage from CCW.

✗ D. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall that the SFP HX will leak into the CCW system. Incorrect per S1.OP-AB.CC-0001, SFP HX will be out leakage from CCW and that the boron concentration will reduce requiring addition from a borated source.

Ref: S1.OP-IO.ZZ-0010 (R30), TS 3.9.11 | LO: NOS05SFP000-12, Objective 5.e — Describe the function of the following components and how their abnormal operation affects the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System: Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger | Source: Bank — Turkey Point 2016 NRC RO61 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. Based on a severed tube in a waterbox, these alarms would confirm a tube leak in a CW waterbox.

✗ A. Plausible because these two alarms would confirm a waterbox tube leak. Incorrect in that the answer is incomplete and missing Hotwell Outlet Conductivity Hi.

✗ B. Plausible because Dissolved Oxygen alarm would be expected and Hydrazine Lo alarm is an alarm for the feedwater system. Incorrect in that it's not expected for river water into the condensate system to impact the concentration of Hydrazine.

✗ D. Plausible because these alarms would confirm a tube leak. Incorrect in that it's not expected for river water into the condensate system to impact the concentration of Hydrazine.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CHEM-0001 (R30) | LO: NOS05CONTMT-17, Objective 3.g | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. Per S1.OP-SO.WL-0001 only one circulator is required to be in service to allow the release to continue. The 1R18 does not isolate or close the 1WL51 on loss of flow.

✗ B. Plausible because the operator may believe that you need both circulators in service to continue the discharge.

✗ C. Plausible because the operator may believe that the 1R18 radiation monitor will trip the 1WL51 closed when loss of flow is detected or may believe the operator may believe that you need both circulators in service to continue the discharge.

✗ D. Plausible because the operator may believe that the 1R18 radiation monitor will trip the 1WL51 closed when loss of flow is detected.

Ref: S1.OP-SO.WL-0001 (R29) | LO: NOS05WASLIQ-11, Objective 12 — Discuss the procedural requirements associated with the Radioactive Liquid Waste System, including an explanation of major precaution and limitations in the Radioactive Liquid Waste System procedures | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. Per the ARP for 1R1A radiation monitor in alarm, the control room crew will be required to place the Control Room Ventilation (CAV) System into Accident Pressurized (AP) Mode. Since the area radiation monitor is alarm sensing radiation on Salem Unit 1 side, the crew will actuate CAV in AP Mode from Unit 1 which will actuate both units CAV into AP Mode and open the emergency intake dampers on the unaffected unit, in this case unit 2.

✗ A. Plausible because the operator may confuse the 1R1A with the 1R1B radiation monitors and believe that it will actuate CAV in AP Mode only on the affected unit. Incorrect in that 1R1A area radiation monitors will not actuate CAV in AP Mode.

✗ B. Plausible because the operator may confuse the 1R1A with the 1R1B radiation monitors and believe that it will actuate CAV in AP Mode only on the affected unit. Incorrect in that 1R1A area radiation monitors will not actuate CAV in AP Mode.

✗ D. Plausible because the operator may confuse which unit to actuate CAV in AP Mode to align the emergency intake dampers on the unaffected unit, in this case unit 2.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001 (R30), S2.OP-SO.CAV-0001 (R43) | LO: NOS05REFUEL-13 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. The 2FP147 requires to be manually opened at the 2RP5 panel when a valid fire is detected inside containment. The 2FP147 will close on a Phase A signal.

✗ A. Plausible because fire protection systems will actuate if the fire detector sensor is triggered. Incorrect in that even though the fire zone fire water header is triggered, the 2FP147 still needs to be manually opened from the control room.

✗ B. Plausible because fire protection systems will actuate if the fire detector sensor is triggered. Incorrect in that even though the fire zone fire water header is triggered, the 2FP147 still needs to be manually opened from the control room.

✗ D. Plausible because the operator may believe that fire water inside containment is the priority and will not auto isolate.

Ref: NOS05FIRPRO-12 | LO: NOS05FIRPRO-12, Objective 13. Given plant conditions, relate the Fire Protection System with the following: Containment and Containment Press Relief | Source: Modified - Salem 2019 NRC RO75 | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ C. Correct. A SGFP will automatically initiate a turbine runback at 200% per minute to 66% power. When a SGFP trips the 2CN47 will open and the polisher will be bypassed.

✗ A. Plausible because this is the ramp rate when manually initiating a turbine runback at the DEHC panel. Plausible because on a condensate pump trip, the 2CN47 will only open if SGFP suction pressure lowers to less than 320 psig. Incorrect in that the 2CN47 will open following a SGFP trip regardless of suction pressure.

✗ B. Plausible because this is the ramp rate when manually initiating a turbine runback at the DEHC panel.

✗ D. Plausible because on a condensate pump trip, the 2CN47 will only open if SGFP suction pressure lowers to less than 320 psig. Incorrect in that the 2CN47 will open following a SGFP trip regardless of suction pressure.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 (R32) | LO: NOS05ABCN01-07, Objective 1.d. Describe the operation of the following system as applied to AB.CN-0001: SGFP Trip | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ A. Correct. The "SI & FW ISOL" Red lamp on 2RP4 would be flashing indicating SSPS train disagreement and that one Train of SI has failed to actuate. Also, the "SI RESET" Green light on the train that failed to actuate will be LIT.

✗ B. Plausible because the "SI & FW ISOL" Red lamp on 2RP4 would be flashing indicating SSPS train disagreement and that one Train of SI has failed to actuate. The SI RESET light would be extinguished but for the Train that did actuate.

✗ C. Plausible because "SI & FW ISOL" Red lamp on 2RP4 would be LIT solid if both trains of SI did actuate and the SI RESET light would also be extinguished for the train that SI actuated on.

✗ D. Plausible because "SI & FW ISOL" Red lamp on 2RP4 would be LIT solid if both trains of SI did actuate and the SI RESET light would be LIT for the train that SI did not actuated on.

Ref: NOS05RXPROT-15, 218489 | LO: NOS05RXPROT-15, Objectives 19a & b. Identify and describe the Control Room controls, indications, and alarms associated with the Reactor Protection System | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ B. Correct. Salem Unit 2 is the only unit that has an automatic turbine runback when any of the following conditions exist; low flow, low pressure, and high temperature.

✗ A. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may confuse which unit has this design feature. Part 2 is correct.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because this condition is used on both units, but unit 2 uses it for the turbine runback whereas unit 1 uses it for a turbine trip feature only.

✗ D. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may confuse which unit has this design feature. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because this condition is used on both units, but unit 2 uses it for the turbine runback whereas unit 1 uses it for a turbine trip feature only.

Ref: NOS05SWCU02-09 | LO: NOS05SWCU02-09, Objective 11. Identify the differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 Stator Cooling Water System components, parameters, and operation | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ C. Correct. Per OP-AA-108-101-1001 and OP-AA-1008-101-1002, when a throttled valve position requires verification, then the valve is fully closed, then reopened to the required number of turns. The independent verification is performed by a second operator by either; independently counting the number of turns, verification of process variable, or verification of valve position for valves with incremental indicators against the tagout footnote or procedure.

✗ A. Plausible because typical independent verification of valve positions is performed after the first operator performs the valve manipulation and the second operator goes out alone to independently verify its position.

✗ B. Plausible because typical independent verification of valve positions is performed after the first operator performs the valve manipulation and the second operator goes out alone to independently verify its position.

✗ D. Plausible because the operator may confuse the direction of how the throttled valve must be positioned prior to returning to its throttled position. Fully closed vs. fully open.

Ref: OP-AA-108-101-1001 (R2), OP-AA-101-1002 (R11) | LO: NOS05CONDOP-14, Objective 5. Describe requirements for the following Control Room or Field Activities in accordance with applicable Conduct of Operations Manual Administrative Procedures: Shift Relief and Turnover | Source: Bank - Millstone U2 NRC RO69 | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ D. Correct. Loss of discharge flow is not a design feature associated with the 2R18 process radiation monitor. Some process radiation monitors do have a feature that when programmed will isolate the process on low of flow. Per ODCM bases for liquid effluent (3.3.8), the controls and monitoring are determined to ensure that the 10 CFR 20 limits are not exceeded. Per Action 29 of the ODCM for an inoperable liquid radwaste effluent line monitor, the release may continue provided effluent flow is estimated once per 4 hours.

✗ A. Plausible because the operator may believe that a low flow condition will automatically close the 2WL51. Incorrect in that loss of flow is not an enabled design feature with the radiation monitor.

✗ B. Plausible because the operator may believe that the procedure requires both 2R18 and 2FR1064 operable in order to recommence the release and satisfy the requirements of the ODCM.

✗ C. Plausible because the operator may believe that a low flow condition will automatically close the 2WL51. Plausible because the operator may believe that the procedure requires both 2R18 and 2FR1064 operable in order to recommence the release and satisfy the requirements of the ODCM.

Ref: ODCM (R29), S2.OP-SO.WL-0001 (R32) | LO: NOS05CONDOP-14, Objective 5. Describe requirements for the following Control Room or Field Activities in accordance with applicable Conduct of Operations Manual Administrative Procedures | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ D. Correct. The 15 minute notification time to the States and Local agencies starts when the Shift Manager classifies or declares the emergency classification for the event.

✗ A. Plausible because the operator may believe that the notification time includes the 15 minutes to classify and 15 minutes for the notification to the States. Incorrect in that the classification time can be less than 15 minutes, therefore 30 minutes for notifications is not always correct.

✗ B. Plausible because the operator as the primary communicator usually waits until the ICMF is completed by the Shift Manager and is read to the communicator before notifying the States. Incorrect in that the notification time of 15 minutes starts when the Shift Manager declares the emergency classification.

✗ C. Plausible because the operator as the primary communicator usually waits until the ICMF is completed by the Shift Manager and is read to the communicator before notifying the States. Incorrect in that the notification time of 15 minutes starts when the Shift Manager declares the emergency classification.

Ref: EP-SA-325-F6 (R16) | LO: None | Source: Bank - Beaver Valley 2017 RO75 | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ B. Correct. Directly following a reactor trip, the neutron flux is reduced essentially to zero. Therefore, Xe-135 is no longer produced directly from fission, but is no longer removed by burnup. The only remaining production mechanism is beta-decay of the iodine-135; the only removal mechanism for xenon-135 is beta-decay. Because the decay rate of iodine-135 is faster than the decay rate of xenon-135, the concentration builds to a peak (about -4700 pcm if tripped at 100% power). The time to peak is slightly less than the square root of the power from the trip (8-9 hours from 100%). Following the peak, the Xe-135 concentration will decrease at a rate controlled by the decay of Xe-135. Therefore, an additional twelve (12) hours after the power change, Xe-135 concentration will be decreasing due to the decay of I-135 and Xe-135. Additionally, returning to 5% power will result in a small amount of the burnout term removing Xe-135. A reduction in Xe-135 inserts positive reactivity (Xe-135 is a fission product poison). Therefore, to maintain stable reactor coolant temperature, the operator must insert negative reactivity because xenon-135 concentration is decreasing.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible if the operator confuses the concept on how the fission product poison (xenon-135) effects reactivity and believes that a higher xenon concentration will require negative reactivity. Incorrect in that after 12 hours xenon has already peaked and xenon concentration will be decreasing adding positive reactivity, and therefore, require adding negative reactivity.

✗ C. Part 1 is incorrect. Part 2 is correct. Plausible if the operator confuses the concept on how the fission product poison (xenon-135) effects reactivity and believes that a lower xenon concentration will require adding positive reactivity. Incorrect in that after 12 hours xenon has already peaked and xenon concentration will be decreasing adding positive reactivity, and therefore, require adding negative reactivity.

✗ D. Part 1 is incorrect. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible if the operator confuses the concept on how the fission product poison (xenon-135) effects reactivity and believes that a higher xenon concentration will require positive reactivity. Incorrect in that after 12 hours xenon has already peaked and xenon concentration will be decreasing adding positive reactivity, and therefore, require adding negative reactivity.

Ref: INPO GFES Fission Product Poisons (R3) | LO: NOS05POISON-02. INPO GFES Fission Product Poisons Rev. 3, ELO 1.4 Xenon Terms | Source: Bank - NRC GFES Bank P3563 | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ D. Correct. Due to loss of offsite power, no RCPs will be running resulting in a significantly lower RCS flowrate (NC conditions). Therefore, more time will be required to achieve complete mixing in the RCS for a given boron concentration change. Once the RCS mixing is complete, a 1 ppm increase (or decrease) in RCS boron concentration during NC operation will cause the same change in core reactivity that it would during forced circulation operation.

✗ A. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible if the operator misreads the question and therefore believes the question is asking about time to mix when forced circulation. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible if the operator believes that reactivity effects will be smaller due to the lower RCS flowrates. Incorrect in that the change in reactivity will be the same when the boron is thoroughly mixed.

✗ B. Part 1 is incorrect. Part 2 is correct. Plausible if the operator misreads the question and therefore believes the question is asking about time to mix when forced circulation.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible if the operator believes that reactivity effects will be smaller due to the lower RCS flowrates. Incorrect in that the change in reactivity will be the same when the boron is thoroughly mixed.

Ref: INPO GFES Fuel Depletion and Burnable Poisons (R3) | LO: NOS05POISON-02, ELO 1.6 Boron and Natural Circulation | Source: Bank - NRC GFES Reactor Theory P3364 | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ B. Correct. The reactor will have a stable count rate in the SR while subcritical (keff < 1.0). When the operator stops rod motion in a subcritical reactor, the source range count rate will achieve a new higher equilibrium level due to the insertion of positive reactivity (keff increases, but still not critical). With each rod pull positive reactivity is inserted and the startup rate will increase then decay to zero indicating subcritical multiplication has reached equilibrium.

✗ A. First part is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that the SR counts will continue to increase sometime after the rod pull has stopped. Incorrect in that this describes the SR count rate when the reactor is near critical conditions. Second part is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe that a stable positive SUR is necessary to achieve a higher equilibrium SR count rate. Incorrect in that in subcritical multiplication, SUR will initially rise then decay to zero with a new stable SR count rate.

✗ C. Plausible because the operator may believe that if the SUR is not constant, then the SR count rate will not achieve a higher value.

✗ D. Plausible if the operator believes that the SR startup rate will not change until the reactor is critical.

Ref: INPO Reactor Operational Physics (R3) | LO: NOS05RXOPER-02, ELO 1.2 Reactor Startup Nuclear Instrumentation Response | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ B. Correct. At 1805 psig or 1820 psia the RCS saturation temperature is 623 degrees F. Therefore, to obtain a 100 degrees F subcooling margin in the RCS loop cold legs, temperature must be 100 degrees F lower than 623 degrees F (which is equal to 523 degrees F). Because a negligible temperature difference exist across the steam generator tubes, steam generator temperature must also be approximately 523 degrees F. Because core heat is being removed by the SGs, the SGs are a saturated system. Therefore, to determine correct SG pressure to obtain 100 degrees F subcooling margin, one must determine the saturation pressure at 523 degrees F, which is approximately 820 psia (which is equal to approximately 805 psig).

✗ A. Plausible if the operator incorrectly calculates the required subcooling temperature or incorrectly reads the Steam Table value.

✗ C. Plausible if the operator fails to convert 820 psia to psig.

✗ D. Plausible if the operator incorrectly calculates the required subcooling temperature or incorrectly reads the Steam Table value.

Ref: ASME Steam Tables | LO: NOS05STEAM0-02 | Source: Modified Bank - INPO GFES Bank P575 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. Changing the condensate depression from 5 degrees F to 2 degrees F will decrease the condensate depression. If condensate depression decreases, then the condensate will be closer to saturation temperature. This produces less NPSH at the suction of the condensate pump, raising the probability of cavitation. However, because the condensate is now at a higher temperature, the steam generators must add less sensible heat to the feedwater to reach saturated conditions, increasing plant efficiency.

✗ A. First part is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe with a lower condensate depression, the feedwater temperature will lower causing a rise in reactor power, and therefore, increase in plant efficiency. Second part is correct.

✗ B. First part is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may believe with a lower condensate depression, the feedwater temperature will lower causing a rise in reactor power, and therefore, increase in plant efficiency. Second part is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall how a lower condensate depression will affect suction pressure at the condensate pump and the likelihood of pump cavitation. Incorrect in that a lower condensate depression will increase the likelihood of pump cavitation.

✗ D. First Part is correct. Second Part is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may incorrectly recall how a lower condensate depression will affect suction pressure at the condensate pump and the likelihood of pump cavitation. Incorrect in that a lower condensate depression will increase the likelihood of pump cavitation.

Ref: INPO GFES Thermodynamic Process (R3) | LO: NOS05THRMPR-03, ELO 2.2 Condenser Design and Characteristics | Source: Bank - INPO GFES P2576 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. Reducing boron concentration (diluting) by 15 ppm will insert positive reactivity in the core, resulting on both heat balance (calorimetric) reactor power and average coolant temperature increasing. Also, diluting raises hot leg temperature, making the water in the upper regions of the core less dense (less neutron moderation), thereby shifting the flux to the already flux-dense portion below midplane. Another way to think about this is that the water is colder in the bottom of the core resulting in a greater change in the atoms per cubic centimeter being removed in the bottom of the core. This again adds positive reactivity in the bottom of the core and will shift the flux downward.

✗ A. Plausible because the operator may believe that the load reduction will lower hot leg temperatures causing the flux in this portion to increase and resulting in an increase in the axial peaking factor. Incorrect in that the lower hot leg temperature will result in a higher density causing the neutron flux to shift higher in the core due to the increased neutron moderation in these regions (delta-T gets smaller as power is reduced). This will reduce the axial peaking factor as the flux in the lower portions of the core lowers relative to the average core flux.

✗ B. Plausible because the operator may believe that withdrawing control rods 4 steps will increase the hot leg temperature resulting in a higher flux in this portion and higher peaking factors. Incorrect in that withdrawing one bank of control rods 4 steps will cause the flux to be depressed less (with no change in average flux). This results in a decrease in axial peaking factor.

✗ D. Plausible because the operator may believe that one control rod dropped in the core will increase the flux in that portion of the core adjacent to the dropped rod resulting in a higher axial peaking factor. Incorrect in that one control rod inserting will affect radial flux peaking, but will have no effect on axial flux peaking because the overall axial flux profile does not shift significantly since it is an axially uniform poison.

Ref: INPO GFES Core Thermal Limits (R3) | LO: NOS05CORTHR-02, ELO 1.3 Reactor Operation Effects on Peaking Factors | Source: Bank - INPO GFES P7650 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. Basically the conditions in the stem describes a small break LOCA and the conditions will meet SI Termination criteria in EOP-LOCA-1 and the SRO will transition to EOP-TRIP-3 (SI Termination). In EOP-TRIP-3, the crew will reduce ECCS injection flow, which with the unisolable PZR vapor space leak (SBLOCA), RCS pressure will lower when ECCS injection flow is reduced. EOP-TRIP-3 will then transition the crew to EOP-LOCA-2. RCS pressure at 1450 psig, will be above the shutoff head for the SI and Charging Pumps and will both be injection flow into the RCS.

✗ A. First part is correct. Second part is incorrect. Plausible because you would ultimately end up on 2-EOP-LOCA-2. Incorrect in that it would not be the next procedure path to transition to.

✗ B. First part is incorrect. Plausible if the operator incorrectly recalls the shutoff head for an SI pump. Second part is correct.

✗ D. First part is incorrect. Second part is incorrect.

Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-1 (R42), 2-EOP-LOCA-2 (R41), 2-EOP-TRIP-3 (R41) | LO: NOS05LOCA01-07, Objective 3 | Source: Modified Bank - Callaway 2021 NRC SRO76 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. Per OP-SA-108-101-2002 step 2.16.2, a continuous action step should not be performed when a Red or Purple path FRP is in progress. Therefore, even though conditions of LOCA-1 step 7.4 are met, the crew should not stop CS pumps.

✗ A. Plausible because the operator may believe that if a conflict arises between actions of an EOP and FRP that the CRS will always have the option to determine the best path to take, for example "Thinking Compliance".

✗ B. Plausible because EOP-LOCA-3 has a Note (N1-1) that does state to NOT implement FRPs while performing actions to establish cold leg recirculation.

✗ C. Plausible because step 7.4 is a continuous action step and would be performed when conditions are met. Incorrect in that continuous actions are not performed when transitions are made to a Red or Purple path FRP.

Ref: OP-SA-108-101-2002 (R0), 2-EOP-CFST-1 (R41) | LO: NOS05TRP001-09, Objective 10 | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ B. Correct. The RCP vibration levels are below the requirements in Attachment 1 of AB.RCP-1 that require stopping the affected RCP per Attachment 2. The OHA ARP for D-36 directs entry into S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001. Per S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 Step 3.10 allows the CRS/SM to determine if a Unit shutdown is required.

✗ A. Plausible because motor and flange vibrations are parameters on Attachment 1 of S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 that may require stopping RCPs per Attachment 2. Incorrect in that the Attachment 1 RCP vibration levels have not been exceeded as of yet.

✗ C. Plausible if the applicant believes that since RCP trip criteria has not been reached per Attachment 1 of S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001, then take the action of TS 3.4.1.1 for a loss of an RCP. Incorrect in that the TS action is to place the unit in MODE 3 within one hour on a loss of RCS flow.

✗ D. Plausible if the applicant believes that the ARP will direct stopping and tripping the reactor which it does not, only directs entry into S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 (R28), TS 3.4.1.1 | LO: NOS05ABRCP0-08, Objective 4b | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. Per OP-SA-108-106-1001 step 4.2.2, if an emergency condition exists, as determined by the SM/CRS, and a breaker fails to close, one attempt at reclosure may be made without conducting an investigation, if that piece of equipment is essential for maintaining plant stability.

✗ B. Plausible because the conditions in the stem are severe and the SRO may believe that the Plant Manager level of management is required to accept responsibility if the RHR motor is damaged.

✗ C. Plausible because the SRO may think that before reclosing the breaker to an important safety equipment that the on-shift Shift Technical Advisor should be involved in the decision process.

✗ D. Plausible because the SRO may think that before reclosing the breaker to an important safety equipment that the on-shift Shift Technical Advisor should be involved in the decision process.

Ref: OP-SA-108-106-1001 (R1) | LO: NOS05CONDOP-15, Objective 5 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. Per 2-EOP-FRSM-1 Step 6, the turbine is tripped when all stop valves are closed. This can be verified by observing the bi-stables on 2RP4. If the turbine fails to trip at Step 6, then the CRS will dispatch an operator to the turbine deck to locally trip the turbine at the front standard.

✗ B. First part is correct. Second part is incorrect. Plausible because stopping EHC pumps is possible from the control room. Incorrect in that FRSM-1 step 6 directs locally tripping the turbine at the front standard.

✗ C. First part is incorrect. Plausible because 2 out of 3 ASO bi-stables tripped is a demand for a turbine trip. Incorrect in that ASO indications is not a direct indication of a turbine trip. Second part is incorrect. Plausible because stopping EHC pumps is possible from the control room. Incorrect in that FRSM-1 step 6 directs locally tripping the turbine at the front standard.

✗ D. First part is incorrect. Plausible because 2 out of 3 ASO bi-stables tripped is a demand for a turbine trip. Incorrect in that ASO indications is not a direct indication of a turbine trip. Second part is correct.

Ref: 2-EOP-FRSM-1 (R43) | LO: NOS05FRSM00-05, Objective 4.iii | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. Per S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 Attachment 1 step 1.B (Action Level 3) with leak rate at greater than or equal to 75 gpd and a rate of change greater than or equal to 30 gpd/hr, then reduce power less than or equal to 50% in 1 hour and place the unit in MODE 3 in the following 2 hours.

✗ A. Plausible because this is an action per Attachment 1 for Action Level 1.

✗ B. Plausible because this is an action per Attachment 1 for Action Level 3 if leakrate is >= 150 gpd.

✗ D. Plausible because this is an action directed in Attachment 1.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 (R34) | LO: NOS05ABSGTL-06, Obj 3 — Given a set of initial plant conditions: Describe the plant response to actions taken in the abnormal procedure | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. When P-6 is LIT, the IR NIS would indicate 1E-5% power. Therefore, 2N36 IR channel is not indicating for the expected overlap between the SR channels. Per TS 3.3.1.1 bases, the IR NIS channel high flux trip ensures that protection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. The trip function provides redundant protection to the Power Range High Flux - Low Setpoint trip function. The 24 hour action times for one inoperable IR channel allow for a slow and controlled adjustment above P-10 or below P-6 and take into account the redundant capability afforded by the operable IR channel and its low probability of failure during this period.

✗ A. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator can incorrectly recall the point where the SR and IR overlap when P-6 is present. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator can incorrectly recall the point where the SR and IR overlap when P-6 is present. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the IR channel does provide redundant trip function to the PR NIS low setting trip, but this is not the bases for the 24 hour action limit.

✗ C. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the IR channel does provide redundant trip function to the PR NIS low setting trip, but this is not the bases for the 24 hour action limit.

Ref: TS 3.3.1.1 bases | LO: NOS05ABNIS1-04, Obj 2 — Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001(Q) and their Bases | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. Per the Note in section 2.0 Immediate Actions in S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, EOPs are NOT applicable during Control Room Evacuation. EOPs should be used for information only or as directed by the TSC while performing this procedure. The CRS will monitor SG pressures at the Hot Shutdown Panel IAW Attachment 3 step 5.0. A Caution statement in step 5.0 cautions the CRS that a steam line differential pressure SI may occur if DP exceeds 100 psi differential pressure.

✗ A. Plausible because the SRO may believe that TS limit of 100 degrees F per hour still applies in this procedure. Incorrect in that the RCS cooldown limit is 25 degrees F per hour IAW Attachment 3 step 24.0.

✗ C. Plausible because EOP-TRIP-1 is the typical procedure to enter following a reactor trip. Plausible because the SRO may believe that TS limit of 100 degrees F per hour still applies in this procedure. Incorrect in that the RCS cooldown limit is 25 degrees F per hour IAW Attachment 3 step 24.0.

✗ D. Plausible because EOP-TRIP-1 is the typical procedure to enter following a reactor trip.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CR-0001 (R24) | LO: NOS05ABCR01-06, Obj 2 — Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S1/S2.OP-AB.CR-0001 and the bases for the actions | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is correct. Per 2-EOP-FRCC-1 step 11, the crew will depressurize the intact SGs by using the steam dumps or MS10s at a maximum rate. At step 18 with CETs above 1200 degrees F, then the crew will determine how many RCPs can be started to reduce CETs. With containment at adverse conditions, the required NR level to start RCPs will be 15%, therefore, after performing step 18, only one RCP meets the requirements in step 18 to be started.

✗ B. Plausible because if use normal containment conditions, the required NR level is 9% and then three RCPs would be started.

✗ C. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because this RCS cooldown rate is used on other EOPs to avoid violating tech spec limits. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because if use normal containment conditions, the required NR level is 9% and then three RCPs would be started.

✗ D. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because this RCS cooldown rate is used on other EOPs to avoid violating tech spec limits. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: 2-EOP-FRCC-1 (R41) | LO: NOS05FRCC00-06, Obj 2.a — Describe the EOP mitigation strategy for the following: Response to Inadequate Core Cooling | Source: Modified Bank - Diablo Canyon 2019 NRC SRO84 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. Redacted due to security-related information.

✗ B. Redacted.

✗ C. Redacted.

✗ D. Redacted.

Ref: 2-EOP-FRHS-2 (R41) | LO: NOS05ABCR04-03, Obj 1 — Describe, in general terms, the actions taken and the bases for the actions | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. The conditions in the stem describes a #3 seal leak. Standpipe level low is a primary indicator that the #3 seal is leaking only since the #1 seal leakoff flow is steady at 1.5 gpm which is normal conditions for an intact #2 seal. The crew will take action per the console ARP and perform a makeup to clear the low standpipe level alarm and initiate S2.OP-ST.RC-0008 for RCS leak rate. The CRS could enter S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 based on the console alarm, but the AB will not provide any direction for a leaking #3 seal.

✗ A. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because this is an action in S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 for a leaking or degraded #2 seal.

✗ C. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may confuse the standpipe level indications in the stem as signs of a #2 seal leak. Part 2 is correct.

✗ D. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the operator may confuse the standpipe level indications in the stem as signs of a #2 seal leak. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because this is an action in S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 for a leaking or degraded #2 seal.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 (R28) | LO: NOS05ABRCPUMP-18, Obj 17.b — Given appropriate control room reference material, evaluate and determine the effect on the Reactor Coolant Pump: Degraded Reactor Coolant Pump seals and seal water | Source: Modified Bank - Diablo Canyon 2019 NRC SRO86 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. Per the foldout page (CAS) of 2-EOP-TRIP-4, if subcooling is 0 degrees F or PZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 4%, then Actuate SI and go to 2-EOP-TRIP-1. In this case subcooling is greater than 0 degrees F, but PZR level is lowering and cannot be maintained based on the 2CV55 and 2CV71 fully open. Letdown is isolated.

✗ A. Plausible because operator may believe that the reason for the PZR level lowering is due to excessive cooldown of the RCS.

✗ B. Plausible because this is similar to CAS step 6.1 in EOP-TRIP-4. Incorrect in that TRIP-4 does not direct entry into EOP-LOCA-1.

✗ C. Plausible because this is similar to CAS step 3 in EOP-TRIP-4. Incorrect in that PZR heaters will not energize with level less than 17%.

Ref: 2-EOP-TRIP-4 (R41) | LO: NOS05TRP004-08, Obj 4 — Determine the basis for each step, caution, note or continuous action step relative to a NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN | Source: Bank - DC Cook 2008 NRC SRO86 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. Per S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001, conditions for SMD are met in step 1.3, the CRS will direct the crew perform Attachment 2, Solar Magnetic Disturbance, and initiate a load reduction to less than or equal to 77.6% (942 MWe) at 15% per min using S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction.

✗ A. Plausible because tripping the reactor and going to 2-EOP-TRIP-1 is directed per Attachment 1 if frequency is less than or equal to 57.55 Hz. Incorrect in that performing S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 is not required to be performed concurrently with 2-EOP-TRIP-1.

✗ B. Plausible because the SRO may believe that the grid conditions in the stem require the generator to be immediately isolated from the grid for asset protection and therefore an immediate reactor trip is required.

✗ D. Plausible because S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 does direct initiating a load reduction to 77.6%. Incorrect in that S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 Attachment 2 also directs initiating the rapid load reduction per S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 (R23) | LO: NOS05ABGRID-13, Obj 2 — Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001(Q) and the bases for the actions | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. Per S2.OP-ST.DG-0001/2/3 P&L 2.1.6, only one DG per Unit may be synchronized to the grid at a time. This prohibition minimizes any potential common failure resulting from undetected interdependence among diesel generator units (Reg Guide 1.108, Section C.2.b). Therefore, the most expeditious manner to complete the surveillance runs is to perform one EDG at a time simultaneously on each unit (i.e. 1B and 2B simultaneously).

✗ B. Plausible because this method would not violate station procedures or commitments, but would not be the most expeditious method.

✗ C. Plausible because the SRO may not recall the station procedure P&L or commitment on running EDGs and believe that you can run multiple EDGs on a unit.

✗ D. Plausible because the SRO may not recall the station procedure P&L or commitment on running EDGs and believe that you can run multiple EDGs on a unit.

Ref: S2.OP-ST.DG-0001 (R57) | LO: NOS05EDG000-15, Obj 12 — Discuss the procedural requirements associated with the Emergency Diesel Generator, including an explanation of major precaution and limitations in the Emergency Diesel Generator procedures | Source: Bank - Braidwood 2020 NRC SRO89 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. Per Table 3.3-13 (Item 3.a) in 3.3.9 of Salem's ODCM, either 2R12A OR 2R41A & D channels is required. Since 2R41 channels are operable (assumption in stem) then ODCM 3.3.9 is MET and no additional action is required to recommence the containment pressure relief.

✗ B. Plausible because this would be the required action (Action 37) if both 2R12A and 2R41A & D channels are INOPERABLE.

✗ C. Plausible because this would be the required action (Action 33) if the SRO incorrectly selects Item 4.a as the affected ODCM instrument. Incorrect in that this is for the Plant Vent Radiation Monitor (R41).

✗ D. Plausible because this is a required action (Action 34) for a containment purge. Incorrect in that this is for a containment pressure relief.

Ref: Salem ODCM 3.3.9 (R29) | LO: NOS05TECHSPEC-12, Obj 14 — Describe the general component and parameter categories that are addressed by Technical Specification Sections 3/4.1 through 3/4.12 | Source: Modified Bank - DC Cook 2018 NRC SRO90 | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ C. Correct. The surveillance data for total RCP seal injection flows is Unsat due to exceeding the Tech Spec 3.5.4 limit of ≤ 40 gpm. Tech Spec 3.5.4 is not met and the required action is to make adjustments to restore seal injection flows to within limits within 4 hours.

✗ A. Plausible because the SRO may incorrectly determine that the unsat seal injection flows is a result of a degraded Charging Pump and therefore declare 21 Charging Pump Inoperable and enter TS 3.5.2 Action a.

✗ B. Plausible if the SRO misinterprets the surveillance data and thinks the test data results meet the Tech Spec surveillance requirements for total seal flows.

✗ D. Plausible if the SRO misinterprets the note in Tech Spec 3.5.4 about TS 4.0.4 exemption is allowed for up to 4 hours.

Ref: TS 3.5.4 and bases | LO: NOS05TECHSPEC-12, Objective 14. Describe the general component and parameter categories that are addressed by Technical Specification Sections 3/4.1 through 3/4.12 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. Following the second PZR pressure failing low, a Safety Injection and Rx Trip will occur on low PZR pressure. Since the RCS pressure was not actually low to meet SI actuation, the SI is NOT valid and NOT reportable. However, actuation of RPS is still reportable under RAL 11.3.2 as a 4 hour report based on actuation of the RPS system only, but SI is NOT. Although RPS is a system listed in Technical Bases 11.3.3, it is not reported under this RAL since it will be reported under RAL 11.3.2.

✗ A. Plausible because the SRO may believe that this was a valid SI actuation and reportable under RAL 11.3.1 as 4 hour report.

✗ C. Plausible because the SRO may incorrectly interpret that with the SI actuating ECCS, that this is reportable under RAL 11.3.3 as 8 hour report.

✗ D. Plausible because the SRO may believe that the RPS and SI actuations are both INVALID, and since it's a system listed in Technical Bases 11.3.3, then only a 60 day report under RAL 11.3.4 is required.

Ref: Salem RAL 11.3 (R4) | LO: NOS05SENSOR-03 | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. When the infeed breaker (24CW9AD) fails open, the 24 CW bus will de-energize, when the bus voltage is < 70% the bus will transfer automatically to the 23 CW bus. However, all the 'B' Circulator (21B, 22B, and 23B) breakers will trip open on undervoltage and must be manually started following the bus transfer. The traveling screen power will be supplied from the 23 CW bus providing power to the 'A' Circulators. Per S2.OP-AB.CW-0001 Attachment 1, with 4 or more circulators out of service with power greater than or equal to P-10 (10%), then trip the reactor and enter 2-EOP-TRIP-1.

✗ A. Plausible because the SRO may believe that the CW Bus Auto Transfer scheme will transfer the 24 CW bus to 23 CW bus without losing power to the 'B' Circulators and therefore, no impact to the current power level.

✗ B. Plausible because the SRO may believe that removing the main turbine from service is allowed using S2.OP-AB.TRB-0001.

✗ C. Plausible because a loss of both 21A and 22A circulators requires a load reduction to less than or equal to 83% power.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.CW-0001 (R41) | LO: NOS05ABCW01-13, Objective 4. Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S2.OP-AB.CW-0001 and the bases for the actions in accordance with the Technical Bases Document. | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ D. Correct. Per OP-AA-101-111, Attachment 2 Note 1, the Salem Shift complement may be one less than the minimum requirements for a period not to exceed 2 hours to accommodate the unexpected absence of on duty shift members provided that immediate action is taken to restore the Shift Complement to within the minimum requirements. Also, this provision does not permit any shift position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift member being late or absent. The preferred action is to hold the off-going shift personnel until a relief is available.

✗ A. Plausible because the SRO may misinterpret the requirements in OP-AA-101-111 and believe that since 2 hours is allowed to fill the unexpected absence that the on duty RO can leave at the end of the shift.

✗ B. Plausible because the SRO may misinterpret the requirements in OP-AA-101-111 and believe that since 2 hours is allowed to fill the unexpected absence that the on duty RO can leave at the end of the shift.

✗ C. Plausible because 1 hour requirements are used in Tech Specs and the SRO may believe that this 1 hour action is warranted.

Ref: OP-AA-101-111 (R11), TS 6.2.2 | LO: NOS05CONDOP-14, Objective 5.g. Describe requirements for the following Control Room or Field Activities in accordance with applicable Conduct of Operations Manual Administrative Procedures: Shift Relief and Turnovers | Source: New | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ B. Correct. Per S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 for BLDG AIR D/P LO, if movement of irradiated fuel assemblies are in progress, then suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the FHB. The next action is to validate the alarm by checking the local indicator. If the alarm is considered invalid, then compensatory actions are required. Per S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0010, if the BLDG AIR D/P LO is not clear, then the local indicator may be used to continuously monitor FHB D/P.

✗ A. Plausible because validating the console alarm is an action performed. Incorrect in that the first action is to suspend fuel moves in the FHB and then validate the alarm.

✗ C. Plausible because the SRO may believe that without the console alarm operable, then fuel moves inside the FHB cannot continue until the alarm function is restored. Incorrect in that procedures allow the use of the local indicator so long as it's continuously monitored.

✗ D. Plausible because validating the console alarm is an action performed. Incorrect in that the first action is to suspend fuel moves in the FHB and then validate the alarm.

Ref: S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0010 (R38), S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 (R64) | LO: NOS05IOP010-05, Objective 7. Evaluate the actions required by TSs or TRM during performance of S1/S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0010, Spent Fuel Pool Manipulations if any of the following limits are exceeded: FHB DP greater than -0.125 (less negative). | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ B. Correct. Per WC-AA-101, step 3.6, the Shift Manager responsibilities include the following: 3.6.1 Ensures shift operations reassesses risk if an emergent condition results in a plant configuration that has not been previously assessed, 3.6.2 Ensures shift operations apply Protected Equipment barriers IAW OP-AA-108-116, 3.6.3 Ensures fire in a(4) Risk Management Actions are implemented as applicable IAW the appropriate site specific procedure, 3.6.4 Ensures the site FLEX capability is maintained.

✗ A. Plausible because the SRO may believe that the SM has this responsibility based on the complex project. Incorrect in that per WC-AA-101, the responsibility belongs to the Online Maintenance Project Coordinator.

✗ C. Plausible because these are responsibilities of the SM. Incorrect in that choice 1 is also a responsibility of the SM.

✗ D. Plausible because choice 1 is a responsibility of the SM. Incorrect in that per WC-AA-101, the responsibility belongs to the Online Maintenance Project Coordinator.

Ref: WC-AA-101 (R30) | LO: NOS05WORK00-07, Objective 4. Describe the conditions under which the SM/CRS permission must be obtained prior to starting work, in accordance with WC-AA-10, Work Management Process Description, and WC-AA-101, On-Line Work Management Process. | Source: Modified - Byron 2017 NRC SRO96 | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ D. Correct. Per the bases of S2.OP-AB.RC-0001, a RCS leak on the CVCS system that can be isolated does not require entry into TS 3.4.7.2 or requires an Emergency Notification (UE EAL SU5.1).

✗ A. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the SRO may believe that the CVCS system is part of the RCS system. Incorrect in that the CVCS system is considered an auxiliary system and not part of the RCS system. Part 2 is correct.

✗ B. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the SRO may believe that the CVCS system is part of the RCS system. Incorrect in that the CVCS system is considered an auxiliary system and not part of the RCS system. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the SRO may incorrectly determine that the RCS leakage exceeded the criteria EAL SU5.1.

✗ C. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the SRO may believe that the CVCS system is part of the RCS system. Incorrect in that the CVCS system is considered an auxiliary system and not part of the RCS system. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because the SRO may incorrectly determine that the RCS leakage exceeded the criteria EAL SU5.1.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.RC-0001 (R18), EP-SA-325-218 (RO) | LO: NOS05ABRC01-04, Objective 2. Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S1/S2.OP-AB.RC-0001 and the bases for the actions in accordance with the Technical Bases Document | Source: New | Cognitive: Comprehension/Analysis

✓ A. Correct. Per the ODCM 3.3.8 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation, with 2R18 inoperable action 26 applies which requires at least two independent samples are analyzed and at least two technically qualified members of the Facility Staff independently verify the release rate calculations and discharge line valving. Per S2.OP-SO.WL-0001, step 2.5 the SM/CRS authorizes the release.

✗ B. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because surveys of piping are performed but for different reason. Incorrect in that the ODCM requires two independent samples analyzed prior to the release which is verified by Chemistry.

✗ C. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the SRO may confuse the responsibility of a radioactive liquid release with a Rad Pro function. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because surveys of piping are performed but for different reason. Incorrect in that the ODCM requires two independent samples analyzed prior to the release which is verified by Chemistry.

✗ D. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the SRO may confuse the responsibility of a radioactive liquid release with a Rad Pro function. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: S2.OP-SO.WL-0001 (R32), ODCM 3.3.8 (R29) | LO: NOS05TECHSPEC-12, Objective 14. Describe the general component and parameter categories that are addressed by Technical Specification Sections 3/4.1 through 3/4.12 | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ C. Correct. Per 2-EOP-CFST-1, for containment environment, the R44A and R44B radiation monitors are used to determine whether entry into 2-EOP-FRCE-3 is required if radiation levels are above 2R/HR. FRCE-3 is a yellow path procedure, not RO knowledge, and the SRO must apply the rules of usage for FRPs to determine how the procedure is performed. Yellow path procedures are optional.

✗ A. Part 1 and 2 are incorrect.

✗ B. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because if the SRO believes a Red or Purple path exists, then entry into the FRP is required. Incorrect in that a yellow path exists and entry is optional.

✗ D. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because the R10A/B radiation monitors are located inside containment. Incorrect in that the R44A/B are the high range radiation monitors used in the CFSTs. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: 2-EOP-CFST-1 (R41), OP-SA-108-101-2002 (RO) | LO: NOS05TRP001-09, Objective 10, Given EOP-CFST-1 and a set of plant conditions, determine whether Functional Restoration Procedures (FRPs) should be implemented and/or terminated, in accordance with OP-SA-108-101-2002 and EOP-CFST-1. | Source: Bank - Diablo Canyon 2018 NRC SRO85 | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory

✓ A. Correct. Per S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0002, step 3.4 if at least one fire pump and one fire pump water supply is NOT available, then step 3.5 will direct opening the backup fire suppression water supply cross-tie valves from Hope Creek. If this cannot be established within 24 hours (step 3.6) then a unit shutdown is required and Hot Standby within the next 6 hours, Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours, and Cold Shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours.

✗ B. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because Hot Shutdown is a required MODE, but in the next 6 hours after reaching Hot Standby in 6 hours.

✗ C. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible but not directed by procedure. Part 2 is incorrect. Plausible because Hot Shutdown is a required MODE, but in the next 6 hours after reaching Hot Standby in 6 hours.

✗ D. Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible but not directed by procedure. Part 2 is correct.

Ref: S2.OP-AB.FIRE-0002 (R2) | LO: NOS05ABFP01-06, Objective 2. Describe, in general terms, the actions taken in S2.OP-AB.FP-0001 and the bases for the actions. | Source: Bank - Salem | Cognitive: Fundamental/Memory