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EOPs > EOP-FRSM-1 — Response to Nuclear Power Generation

EOP-FRSM-1 — Response to Nuclear Power Generation

⚠️ DRAFT

EOP-FRSM-1 — Response to Nuclear Power Generation

Purpose

Functional Restoration Procedure for responding to an ATWS (Anticipated Transient Without Scram) condition where the reactor has failed to trip and nuclear power generation continues. Entered from the Critical Safety Function Status Trees when subcriticality is not achieved.

Key Actions / Information

Exam — 2022 Q10
Step 1 (Immediate Actions) reactor trip sequence: 1) Reactor Trip Switches, 2) Trip Breaker Bezel, 3) Insert control rods at maximum rate using MANUAL and AUTO rod control, 4) Open breakers 2E6D and 2G6D (Rod Drive M-G Set), 5) Send operators to locally open reactor trip breakers. Tripping Main Turbine comes AFTER all step 1 attempts — it is NOT part of the immediate reactor trip sequence. Emergency boration is step 4 of the procedure.
Exam — 2023 Q80
Step 6 checks turbine trip status by verifying ALL turbine stop valve closed bi-stables are LIT on 2RP4. This confirms the turbine is tripped (stop valves closed). 2/3 Auto Stop Oil low pressure bi-stables LIT is a demand for a turbine trip, NOT confirmation of a turbine trip. If the turbine trip is NOT confirmed at Step 6, the CRS directs dispatching an operator to locally trip the turbine at the front standard (not stopping EHC pumps from the control room).
Exam — 2022 Q76
Caution C1-1: RCPs should NOT be tripped with reactor power greater than 5%. During an ATWS, RCP operation could temporarily cool the core under voided RCS conditions. Even if RCP trip criteria are met (e.g., motor flange vibration > 5 mils), do NOT trip the RCP while power is > 5%. Manually tripping an RCP during some ATWS events could result in reduced heat removal and a challenge to fuel integrity.
Exam — 2019 Q56
Step 8 — Local reactor trip: when directed from the Control Room to locally trip the reactor, the NEO will open ALL THREE sets of breakers: (1) Reactor Trip Breakers, (2) Rod Drive MG Set Motor Breakers, and (3) Rod Drive MG Set Generator Breakers. Any ONE set of breakers being opened will trip the reactor, but the procedure directs opening ALL three to ensure the trip is achieved. Candidates may select only a subset.
Scenario — 2019 #3
ATWS following two dropped rods at ~89% power. Rod speed controller fails at 8 spm in Auto; operator must recognize failure and insert rods in Manual at 48 spm. 2CV175 Rapid Boration valve fails to open — crew establishes Rapid Boration via RWST flow path: isolate letdown (2CV3/4/5, 2CV2, 2CV277, 2CV7), open RWST outlets (2SJ1/2SJ2), open BIT valves (2SJ4/5, 2SJ12/13), close charging discharge (2CV40/41, 2CV68/69). CT-52: Insert negative reactivity (rod insertion or emergency boration) prior to dispatching operators to locally trip reactor.
Exam — 2018 Q56
EOP-FRSM-1 Step 3: ensure at least two charging pumps are running (not all three). Step 3.1: the crew is NOT required to manually actuate Safety Injection after starting the required charging pumps. FRSM-1 has a provision for aligning charging pumps to take suction from the RWST, but manual SI actuation is not directed. Trap: candidates may assume all 3 charging pumps are required during an ATWS for maximum boron injection, or that manual SI is required since the automatic SI did not actuate.
Exam — 2018 Q98
ATWS at 4% power: reactor fails to trip on 21 SG LO-LO Level, all CR trip attempts fail. IAW EOP-TRIP-1, since the reactor is NOT tripped, the crew transitions to EOP-FRSM-1. At 4% power with turbine not online, automatic rod insertion will NOT achieve > 48 steps/minute — the EOP-TRIP-1 basis document threshold. Therefore rods must be inserted MANUALLY. Trap: even though power is < 5%, the reactor trip is NOT confirmed because all trip attempts have failed — the reactor is still critical. Power range NI less than 5% alone does NOT confirm a trip.

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