SALEM
SALEM STUDY SYSTEM
Abnormals > AB.CR-0001 — Control Room Evacuation

AB.CR-0001 — Control Room Evacuation

⚠️ DRAFT

AB.CR-0001 — Control Room Evacuation

Purpose

Provides operator actions for evacuating the main control room and establishing plant control from the Hot Shutdown Panel when the control room becomes uninhabitable (e.g., toxic gas, fire, security event).

Entry Conditions

  • Control room determined to be uninhabitable
  • Toxic gas, smoke, or other hazard requiring evacuation of both Salem Unit control rooms
  • Security event — AB.CR-0001 is specifically for security-event-driven evacuations
Exam — 2019 Q48
S2.OP-AB.CR-0001 (Control Room Evacuation) is implemented when the Control Room is evacuated as the result of a security event. Trap: a separate Abnormal Procedure deals with control room evacuation due to fire — do not confuse the two. As an immediate action per AB.CR-0001, the crew WILL initiate a Main Steam Isolation prior to evacuating (if conditions permit). This differs from EOP-TRIP-1, which only requires MSLI if the turbine cannot be tripped. AB.CR-0001 directs MSLI as an immediate action regardless of turbine trip success.

Key Actions

Immediate Actions

  • Trip the reactor (if not already tripped)
  • Evacuate control room personnel to designated assembly area

Important Notes/Cautions

  • EOPs are NOT applicable during Control Room Evacuation — EOPs should be used for information only or as directed by the TSC
  • RCS cooldown limit under this procedure is 25 degrees F per hour (Attachment 3 step 24.0), NOT the normal TS limit of 100 degrees F per hour

Attachment 3 — Hot Shutdown Panel Actions

  • CRS monitors SG pressures at the Hot Shutdown Panel
  • Caution: Monitor SG pressures to avoid steam line differential pressure SI (DP exceeding 100 psi)
Exam — 2023 Q83
Per S2.OP-AB.CR-0001, EOPs are NOT applicable during Control Room Evacuation (information only or as directed by TSC). The Caution in Attachment 3 warns the CRS to monitor SG pressures to avoid Safety Injection on steam line differential pressure (DP > 100 psi). Trap: the RCS cooldown limit during CR evacuation is 25 degrees F/hr, NOT the TS limit of 100 degrees F/hr.

Seal Injection Control During CR Evacuation

Exam — 2020 Q86
Per AB.CR-0001, local control of RCP seal injection during CR evacuation: isolate CV-71 (by closing CV-70), open CV-73 (seal injection pressure control bypass valve), and manually adjust the bypass valve. Total charging flow is then controlled locally at CV-55 (Charging Flow Control Valve) local controller in Panel 216 using a centrifugal charging pump. 23 Charging Pump (PD pump) is tripped by the procedure once a centrifugal pump is verified running. Trap: fire protection procedures direct controlling CV-71 with a hand sender — AB.CR-0001 does NOT (it isolates CV-71 and uses the CV-73 bypass instead).

Immediate Actions — AFW Flow Reduction

Exam — 2019 Q71
Per S2.OP-AB.CR-0001 Immediate Actions, if Control Room conditions permit, the crew will LOWER 23 AFW Pump speed until total flow drops to 22E04 LB/HR. Trap: the crew lowers 23 AFW (turbine-driven) pump speed — they do NOT throttle 21/22 AFW (motor-driven) pump SG inlet valves.

Attachment 6 — Plant Operator RCS Pressure Control

Exam — 2019 Q71
Per Attachment 6 (Plant Operator), after the Control Room has been evacuated, RCS pressure will be maintained by cycling PZR Heaters ONLY. Trap: PZR Spray Valves are NOT used for RCS pressure control after CR evacuation — heaters only.

Attachment 5 — Local Control of Charging Flow

JPM — 2020 IP-i
Unit 2 Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 5 Step 8.0: locally control charging flow at Panel 216-1 (Chg Pmps FL & PR Inst Pnl) in the Unit 2 RCA. Place local E/P Bypass Line Selector Valve in MAN, read charging flow on 2FI-128A, then use the MANUAL hand air operator to adjust flow to 70 gpm. 2CV55 (Cent Chg Pmp Flow Cont Valve) is air-to-close (fails open) — rotating the hand air operator CLOCKWISE raises air pressure and LOWERS flow. Rotating counter-clockwise raises flow.

Attachment 5 — Local Trip of Reactor and Boration Isolation

JPM — 2022 IP-j
Unit 1 Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 5 (locally open reactor trip breakers): proceed to Rod Drive MG Set Control Panel (460V Vital Bus Room - El 84 ft.) and open all four breakers — Reactor Trip Breaker A, Reactor Trip Breaker B, Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker A, Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker B. Confirm with Hot Shutdown Panel Operator that 11 or 12 Charging Pump is operating. Then open 1AX1AX7X (#13 Charging Pump breaker) and 1CY2AX4I (1CV175 Rapid Borate Stop Valve breaker) at 1C West Valve & Misc 230V Control Center - El 84 ft.

Defeating Safety Injection After CR Evacuation

Exam — 2019 Q99
Per AB.CR-0001, after CR evacuation with no damage to the plant: the SM directs SI to be defeated by opening vital instrument bus breakers to de-energize SSPS and the SEC cabinets per Attachment 7 (#1 NEO). This is a local action performed by the #1 NEO, not from the control room. Trap: inserting a P-11 jumper or placing SEC Block switches in Block are control room actions — these would not be performed after evacuation. The SEC Block switches and P-11 jumper are Attachment 5 (Reactor Operator) actions, but de-energizing SSPS and SECs via vital instrument bus breakers is Attachment 7 (#1 NEO) and is the method for defeating SI after evacuation.

Attachment 6 — Emergency Boration Duration and CV55 Location

Exam — 2018 Q67
Per AB.CR-0001 Attachment 6 (Plant Operator), Emergency Boration duration = 35 minutes per stuck rod. With 2 stuck rods: 35 x 2 = 70 minutes total. The RO throttles 2CV55 (Cent Chg Pmp Flow Cont Valve) by adjusting the 2CV55 Manual HAND/AIR Regulator Controller at Panel 216-2 (Unit 2 Chg Pmps FL & PR Inst Panel), NOT Panel 213-2 (Hot Shutdown Panel). Trap: EOP-TRIP-2 uses 120 minutes per stuck rod when RWST is the boration source — do not confuse with AB.CR-0001 which uses 35 minutes per stuck rod (BAST source). Also, CV55 controller is at Panel 216-2 (charging pump alley), not the Hot Shutdown Panel.

Attachment 5 — Emergency Boration for Stuck Rods

JPM — 2019 IP-i
Unit 1 Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 5 Step 10.0 — Emergency Boration for stuck control rods: close 11CV160 and 12CV160 air supply isolation valves (Cont Air Redundant Air Supply Wall Mntd Pnl 701-1A and 701-1B, El 122 ft near Boric Acid Storage Tanks) and open draincocks to bleed control air. This causes both CV160 recirc valves to fail closed on loss of air, eliminating the recirculation path back to the BASTs and forcing all boric acid through charging pump suction. Then open 1CV175 (Rapid Borate Stop Valve) by disengaging clutch and rotating handwheel counterclockwise. Adjust charging flow at Panel 216-1 to 99 gpm (75 gpm boration + 24 gpm for 4 RCP seals at 6 gpm each). 1CV55 is air-to-close — lowering the air signal (counter-clockwise on hand sender) opens the valve and raises flow.
JPM — 2018 IP-j
Unit 1 Control Room Evacuation, Attachment 5 Steps 1-9 — locally trip reactor and control charging flow. Reactor failed to trip from control room at 100% power. Step 2: open Reactor Trip Breaker A and B at Rod Drive MG Set Control Panel (460V Vital Bus Room, El 84). Step 4: trip #13 Charging Pump breaker (1AX1AX7X) at 1A 460V MCC. Step 5: open 1CV175 Rapid Borate Stop Valve breaker (1CY2AX41) at 1C West 230V Control Center. Step 7: confirm 1CV71 isolated (1CV70) and bypassed (1CV73), RCP seal flow 6-10 gpm per seal. Step 8: at Panel 216-1 (Charging Valve Alley), record charging flow from 1FI-128A, place E/P Bypass to Manual, control 1CV55 (fail-open, air-to-close) — lower air pressure = open valve = raise flow. Key learning: air pressure indicator at 8 psig.

Connections