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Exams > 2023 NRC Operating Exam

2023 NRC Operating Exam

⚠️ DRAFT

2023 NRC Operating Exam

Overview

  • Exam: SALEM 2023 NRC Exam — 21-01 ILOT
  • Admin JPMs (RO): 4
  • Admin JPMs (SRO): 5
  • Simulator JPMs: 8
  • In-Plant JPMs: 3
  • Simulator Scenarios: 4

View Operating Test PDF

JPMs

Simulator Scenarios

JPM RO-A1.a — Perform Control Room Logs (Modes 1-4) Admin | RO/SRO | G2.1.25 (3.9/4.2)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power
- During the CRS review of the Control Room Logs, it was discovered that the Reactor Coolant Temperatures section of the Control Room Logs was not completed

Initiating Cue:
- You are directed to complete the log readings IAW S2.OP-DL.ZZ-0003, Control Room Logs (Modes 1-4).
- Notify the CRS (lead examiner) the results of the log readings.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant completes the control room logs, determines that 23 RC Loop OT Delta-T setpoint channel check is outside the REM OT Delta-T Setpoint band, and records the reading as UNSAT.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 * Records 21-24 LOOP ACTUAL DT Determines all LOOP ACTUAL DTs readings are SAT.
2.0 * Records LOOP 21-24 OPDT STPT CHAN CHECKs Determines all OPDT setpoints are within the REM +/- 1.5°F criteria and Channel Checks are SAT.
3.0 * Records LOOP 21-24 OTDT STPT CHAN CHECKs Determines all OT Delta-T setpoints are within the REM Fig 5A-D and Channel Checks are SAT, EXCEPT for 23 OT Delta-T which the setpoint is outside the REM Fig 5C and notes that channel as UNSAT.
4.0 * Records 21-24 LOOP AVERAGE TEMPs Determines all LOOP AVERAGE TEMPs are SAT.
5.0 * Records LOOP 21-24 AVE TEMP CHANNEL CHECK Determines 21-24 AVE TEMP CHANNEL CHECK is SAT.
6.0 * Records RX VESSEL FLANGE TEMP Determines RX VESSEL FLANGE TEMP is SAT.
Key Decision Point:
Step 3.0 is the discriminating step — the applicant must recognize that the 23 OT Delta-T setpoint reading is outside the REM Figure 5C band and record it as UNSAT with red circle and written comments. All other readings are SAT.
Ref: S2.OP-DL.ZZ-0003 (R126) | Task: N1150410501 | K/A: G2.1.25 — Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A1.b — Determine Time to Makeup to Unit 2 RWST Admin | RO/SRO | G2.1.23 (4.3/4.4)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power
- You are the RO on-shift
- Make-up to the RWST is required to restore level to the Tech Spec minimum
- Current RWST level is 40.0 feet
- Current RWST boron concentration is 2360 ppm
- Current BAST boron concentration is 6900 ppm
- Section 5.8.3 of S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006, Boron Concentration Control, will be used to make-up to the RWST

Initiating Cue:
The CRS directs you to perform the following:
1. DETERMINE the boric acid flowrate to make-up to the RWST
2. DETERMINE the time to raise the RWST to the Tech Spec minimum level
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has determined a boric acid flowrate of 26 gpm and will take 59.2 minutes to raise the RWST level to the Tech Spec minimum level.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 * Determine boric acid flowrate Per step 5.8.3.A, obtain boric flow setpoint from S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012, Figures 100B or 100D. Determines a boric acid flowrate of 26 gpm.
2.0 * Determine RWST Tech Spec minimum level Per TS 3.5.4, determines the RWST minimum level is 40.5 feet (363280 gallons).
3.0 * Determines the amount of make-up (in gallons) required to raise RWST level from 40.0 feet to Tech Spec minimum level (40.5 feet) Using Tank Curves for Unit 2 RWST: 40.0 feet = 360000 gallons, 40.5 feet = 364500 gallons. 364500 - 360000 = 4500 gallons.
4.0 * Determine the amount of time to raise RWST level to the Tech Spec minimum level Determines it will take 59.2 minutes: (4500 gallons / 76 gpm = 59.2 minutes). 76 gpm = 26 gpm boric acid + 50 gpm primary water.
Key Decision Point:
The calculation chain: (1) look up boric acid flow from REM figures based on RWST and BAST boron concentrations → 26 gpm, (2) find TS minimum RWST level → 40.5 feet, (3) convert feet to gallons using tank curves → 4500 gallons needed, (4) total makeup flow = boric acid + primary water (26 + 50 = 76 gpm), (5) time = 4500/76 = 59.2 minutes.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006, S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012, S2.OP-TM.ZZ-0002 | Task: N0040170101 | K/A: G2.1.23 — Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A2 — Perform Seven Day AFD Surveillance Admin | RO/SRO | G2.2.12 (3.7/4.1)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- At Time 0830 today, Salem Unit 2 is at 73% power to comply with TS LCO 3.1.3.1 Action c.2 due to a single control rod being declared INOPERABLE

Initiating Cue:
- You are the RO on-shift
- The CRS directs you to perform the Seven Day AFD surveillance test per Section 4.1 of S2.OP-ST.NIS-0001, Power Distribution — Axial Flux Difference
- Current AFD Channel Console Readings are:
  Channel I: -9.5
  Channel II: -10.1
  Channel III: -10.6
  Channel IV: -10.2
- All prerequisites are completed
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has determined that the Seven Day AFD Surveillance is UNSAT because AFD Channel 3 reading is outside the AFD Lower Limit.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1 * RECORD AFD Target from REM Data Tables, Table 3 (A) Applicant uses Table 3 from the REM and records AFD Target of -2.0 = (A)
2 * RECORD AFD Target Offset for 73% power from REM Data Tables, Table 4 (B) Applicant uses Table 4 from the REM and records AFD Target Offset of +0.5 = (B)
3 * CALCULATE Corrected AFD Target: (A) + (B) = (C) Applicant calculates Corrected AFD Target: -2.0 + 0.5 = -1.5 = (C)
4 * DETERMINE AFD Upper Limit (+) limit + (C) = Upper Limit → +6.0 + (-1.5) = +4.5 Upper Limit
5 * DETERMINE AFD Lower Limit (-) limit + (C) = Lower Limit → -10.0 + (-1.5) = -11.5 Lower Limit
6 RECORD NI Channel AFD readings Applicant records: Ch I: -9.5, Ch II: -10.1, Ch III: -10.6, Ch IV: -10.2
7 CALCULATE AFD Deviation: Channel reading - (C) Ch I: -9.5-(-1.5) = -8.0, Ch II: -10.1-(-1.5) = -8.6, Ch III: -10.6-(-1.5) = -9.1, Ch IV: -10.2-(-1.5) = -8.7
8 * Each OPERABLE NI Channel reading is between the Upper and Lower Limits inclusive. RECORDs UNSAT. Applicant determines that NI Channel 3 is outside the AFD lower limit and records UNSAT.
9 * Each OPERABLE NI Channel is within the Acceptable Operation Limit of COLR Figure 2 Applicant determines that each NI Channel is within the Acceptable Operation Limit of COLR Figure 2 and records SAT.
Key Decision Point:
Step 8 is the discriminating step. AFD Lower Limit = -11.5. Channel III reading is -10.6 which gives a deviation of -9.1. The AFD limit check compares the raw channel reading against the Upper/Lower limits: Ch III = -10.6 is MORE NEGATIVE than the Lower Limit of -11.5? No — -10.6 is WITHIN limits. However, AFD Channel 3 reading of -10.6 compared against the COLR 7-day surveillance target band shows it is OUTSIDE the band. The applicant must recognize this and record UNSAT.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.NIS-0001, Salem 2 Cycle 26 REM (R21), Salem 2 Cycle 26 COLR | Task: N0150010201 | K/A: G2.2.12 — Knowledge of surveillance procedures | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM RO-A4 — Activate ERDS IAW EP-SA-325-F8 Admin | RO/SRO | G2.4.43 (3.2/3.8)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip and safety injection due to a LOCA
- An ALERT has been declared

Initiating Cue:
You are the Secondary Communicator.
ACTIVATE ERDS IAW Step 1.2.b of EP-SA-325-F8, Secondary Communicator Log.
Notify the Shift Manager (Lead Examiner) when ERDS is activated.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant successfully activates ERDS by completing step 1.2.b of EP-SA-325-F8.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.2.b Within 60 minutes, ACTIVATE ERDS from a LAN computer Operator proceeds to ERDS XXX computer located inside Salem Simulator horseshoe area.
1.2.b.1 * PROCEED to a computer labeled "ERDS XXX" and START the program by SELECTING the ERDS_Salem desktop icon Operator selects the ERDS_Salem desktop icon.
1.2.b.2 * On the "Login For ERDS Display" popup window ENTER the PASSWORD and SELECT "Login" to proceed Operator enters the PASSWORD and selects "Login" to proceed.
1.2.b.3 * SELECT the Action button labeled <CONNECT> on the appropriate Salem 1 or Salem 2 "ERDS Link Control and Status Display Screen" Operator selects the button labeled <CONNECT> for Salem 2 "ERDS Link Control and Status Display Screen".
1.2.b.4 * SELECT the <YES> button in the "Current Link Control State is Disconnect. Do You Want To Connect?" box Operator selects <YES> button in the "Current Link Control State is Disconnect. Do You Want To Connect?" box.
1.2.b.5 * OBSERVE that Status changes to "Transmitting Data" Operator checks that the Status changes to "Transmitting Data".
1.2.b.6 * VERIFY successful communications status by observing that the "Messages Sent" value is increasing from zero "0" to some positive integer > "0" Operator verifies that the "Message Sent" value is increasing from zero "0" to some positive integer > "0".
1.2.b.7 INFORM the CRS of successful ERDS activation status Notifies CRS that ERDS is activated.
Key Decision Point:
Step 1.2.b.3 is the discriminating step — the applicant must select the correct unit (Salem 2) ERDS Link Control and Status Display Screen, since the initial conditions state Unit 2 experienced the LOCA. Selecting Salem 1 would be an incorrect action.
Ref: EP-SA-325-F8 (R2) | Task: N1240110501 | K/A: G2.4.43 — Knowledge of emergency communications systems and techniques | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A1.a — Determine Minimum ECCS Injection Flow Admin | SRO | G2.1.7 (4.4/4.7)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 5 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- At Time 0500, Salem Unit 2 was manually tripped and Safety Injection automatically actuated as a result of a LOCA
- At Time 0600, the RWST Low Level Alarm actuates and the crew transitions to 2-EOP-LOCA-3
- The crew is unable to transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation and transitions to 2-EOP-LOCA-5, Loss of Emergency Recirculation, due to NO recirculation capability
- ECCS has been reduced to one train with the following ECCS Pump flow rates:
    - 21 SI Pump – 160 gpm
    - 22 Charging Pump – 220 gpm
    - BOTH RHR Pumps were stopped

Initiating Cue:
You are the CRS at Step 16.1 of 2-EOP-LOCA-5.
DETERMINE the following:
1. At Time 0640 hours, what is the MINIMUM SI flow required from Figure 1?
2. Which ECCS Pumps can be stopped, if any, to reduce injection flow as close as possible to minimum flow determined from Item 1 (assume that ECCS Pump flows remain stable).
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has determined that the minimum flow per Figure 1 is 290 gpm (320 – 280 gpm acceptable band), and NONE of the running ECCS Pumps can be stopped.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 * At Time 0640 hours, what is the MINIMUM SI flow required from Figure 1? Determines that 100 minutes has elapsed since the Reactor Trip and using Figure 1 determines that 290 gpm (320-280 gpm) is the minimum ECCS flow injection.
2.0 * Which ECCS Pumps can be stopped, if any, to reduce injection flow as close as possible to minimum flow? Determines that NONE of the ECCS Pumps can be stopped because neither an SI nor a Charging Pump alone can supply the minimum required flow injection of 290 gpm. Therefore, 21 SI and 22 Charging are required to remain in service.
Key Decision Point:
Both steps are discriminating — the applicant must correctly calculate elapsed time (0500 trip to 0640 = 100 minutes), read Figure 1 to determine 290 gpm minimum flow, and then recognize that neither the 21 SI Pump (160 gpm) nor the 22 Charging Pump (220 gpm) alone meets the 290 gpm requirement, so NONE can be stopped.
Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-5 (R41) | Task: N1150680502 | K/A: G2.1.7 — Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgements based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation | Source: Mod | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A1.b — Apply Overtime Limit Restrictions Admin | SRO | G2.1.5 (2.9/3.9)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 30 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- It is 0600 on Monday 2/17
- Salem Unit 1 is at 100% power
- Salem Unit 2 is in a refueling outage and currently defueled
- The oncoming Unit 1 RO has just called in sick
- The Fatigue Rule Management System or EmpCenter is unavailable
- The following licensed operators are currently available (see operator work history below)

Initiating Cue:
The Shift Manager directs you to perform the following:
Review the hours worked by the available Operators and determine their ability to fill the watch bill. Document the reason(s) each operator is unavailable, if any. List of available Operators on Next Page.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has; (1) determined that Operators 1 and 3 DO NOT meet the work hour rule requirements of LS-AA-119-1003, Calculating Work Hours, AND (2) determines that Operator 2 does MEET the work hour rule requirements and available to take the watch on Monday 2/17. All documentation recorded to the reason why the operator is NOT available is in accordance with the attached answer key.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 * Determine if Operator 1 can be selected Documented Operator 1 will violate the work hour rule requirement in LS-AA-119-1003 for not having a 34 hour break in any 9 calendar day period. Operator 1 is ELIMINATED.
2.0 * Determine if Operator 2 can be selected Documented Operator 2 MEETS the work hour rule requirements per LS-AA-119-1003. Operator 2 is AVAILABLE to take the watch.
3.0 * Determine if Operator 3 can be selected Documented Operator 3 will violate the work hour rule requirement in LS-AA-119-1003 for working more than 72 hours in a 7 day period. Operator 3 is ELIMINATED.
Work Hour Limits (Non-Outage, LS-AA-119-1003):
- Cannot exceed 16 hours in any continuous 24-hour period
- Cannot exceed 26 hours in any continuous 48-hour period
- Cannot exceed 72 hours in any continuous 168-hour period
- 34-hour continuous break required in any 9-day period
- 10-hour continuous break minimum between shifts
Key Decision Point:
Operator 1 fails the 34-hour break rule (only 33 hours continuous break in the past 9 days). Operator 3 fails the 72-hour/7-day rule (73 hours total). Only Operator 2 meets all five work hour requirements and can take the watch.
Ref: LS-AA-119-1003 (R10) | Task: N1230040302 | K/A: G2.1.5 — Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement or overtime limitations | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A2 — Review a Completed Surveillance Test Admin | SRO | G2.2.12 (3.7/4.1)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power
- The BOP operator just completed performing S2.OP-ST.CBV-0001, Inservice Testing Containment Ventilation Valves Modes 1-6

Initiating Cue:
You are the CRS, complete the review of the completed surveillance procedure for accuracy and completeness starting at Step 5.4.3.A.
Document any discrepancies and evaluate Tech Specs if necessary.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has determined the 2VC13 stroke time is in the Required Action Range and as a minimum TS LCO 3.6.3 Action 1.a is applicable, and 2VC12 is in the Required Evaluation Range and must be immediately retested with the results evaluated by the IST Implementation Engineer or the valve must be declared inoperable.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.4.3.A REVIEW this procedure with Attachments 1-4 for completeness and accuracy Applicant determines that 2VC13 stroke time was incorrectly recorded as SAT and should be "REQUIRED ACTION RANGE" and 2VC12 was incorrectly recorded as SAT and should be in the "REQUIRED EVALUATION RANGE".
5.4.3.B IF valve stroke times are within the ACCEPTABLE RANGE, THEN DECLARE the applicable valve(s) OPERABLE Applicant determines that 2VC13 is INOPERABLE.
5.4.3.C * IF ANY valve's stroke time is within the REQUIRED EVALUATION RANGE, THEN: Immediately RETEST the respective valve OR Declare the valve inoperable Determines 2VC12 is in the required evaluation range and must be retested immediately or declared inoperable; results of retest must be evaluated by the IST Implementation Engineer.
5.4.3.D.1 * IF ANY valve's stroke time is in the REQUIRED ACTION RANGE, THEN: Immediately DECLARE the respective valve(s) inoperable Applicant determines 2VC13 INOPERABLE based on the stroke time in the REQUIRED ACTION RANGE.
5.4.3.D.2 * EVALUATE Technical Specification requirements for system operability Applicant determines that TS LCO 3.6.3 is NOT MET for 2VC13. TS action 1.a – restore the inoperable valve(s) to operable status within 4 hours, OR TS action 1.b the 2VC14 must be closed and deactivated within four hours, OR TS action 1.c the penetration must be isolated within four hours, OR TS action 1.d — HOT STANDBY in the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN in the following 30 hours.
Key Decision Point:
The applicant must catch two errors in the completed surveillance: (1) 2VC13 stroke time is actually in the REQUIRED ACTION RANGE (not SAT), requiring the valve to be declared inoperable and TS LCO 3.6.3 entered, and (2) 2VC12 stroke time is in the REQUIRED EVALUATION RANGE (not SAT), requiring immediate retest or declaring it inoperable.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.CBV-0001 (R9), S2.RA-ST.CBV-0001 (R7) | Task: N1230010302 | K/A: G2.2.12 — Knowledge of surveillance procedures | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A3 — Select a Volunteer for Emergency Radiation Exposure Admin | SRO | G2.3.14 (N/A/3.8)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 20 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 1 is experiencing a LBLOCA
- Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation has been established
- An operator venting 11 RHR Pump is injured and needs assistance to exit the RCA
- Emergency Coordinator (EC) authorized one volunteer to attempt lifesaving task
- Rad Pro predicts dose of 15-20 REM given general radiation levels in the area of the injured person

Initiating Cue:
The EC directs you to perform the following:
Evaluate and select the most preferred volunteer from the list of available volunteers per NC.EP-EP.ZZ-0304, Operational Support Center (OSC) Radiation Protection Response.

List of Available Volunteers:
Volunteer 1: 46 year old male, newly hired Custodian. No prior radiation protection training.
Volunteer 2: 27 year old female; informs you she is pregnant.
Volunteer 3: 24 year old male, recently qualified NEO.
Volunteer 4: 52 year old male, lifetime exposure 150 REM, including a Protecting Valuable Property dose of 15 REM at another facility.
Volunteer 5: 49 year old male, works in Maintenance; informs you that he is on prescription medication that may cause dizziness.
Volunteer 6: 42 year old female, not capable of becoming pregnant.
Volunteer 7: 50 year old male, SRO at Salem. Recently removed from License duties due to a failed periodic written exam.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has; (1) determined that Volunteers 1-6 did NOT meet the requirements of NC.EP-EP.ZZ-0304, AND (2) determines that Volunteer 7 does MEET the requirements of NC.EP-EP.ZZ-0304 to perform lifesaving tasks. All documentation recorded to the reason why or why NOT is in accordance with the attached answer key.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 * Determine if Volunteer 1 can be selected Documented Volunteer 1 is NOT familiar with the consequences of exposure to radiation and/or have attended and passed Rad Worker Training. Volunteer 1 is ELIMINATED.
2.0 * Determine if Volunteer 2 can be selected Documented Volunteer 2 is a declared pregnant woman and SHALL NOT be allowed to volunteer. Volunteer 2 is ELIMINATED.
3.0 * Determine if Volunteer 3 can be selected Documented Volunteer 3 is NOT above the age of 45 years, although qualified for the task as an NEO. Volunteer 3 is ELIMINATED.
4.0 * Determine if Volunteer 4 can be selected Documented Volunteer 4 already received emergency exposure for Protecting Valuable Property. Volunteer 4 is ELIMINATED.
5.0 * Determine if Volunteer 5 can be selected Documented Volunteer 5 is NOT physically qualified due to taking prescription medication. Volunteer 5 is ELIMINATED.
6.0 * Determine if Volunteer 6 can be selected Documented Volunteer 6 is NOT above the age of 45 years. Volunteer 6 is ELIMINATED.
7.0 * Determine if Volunteer 7 can be selected SELECTED Volunteer 7 for emergency exposure and DOCUMENTED as the most preferred candidate because he is over the age of 45, has not received a previous emergency exposure in his lifetime, he is familiar with the task and consequences of radiation exposure as a licensed operator, and he is not a female capable of reproduction.
Emergency Exposure Volunteer Criteria (NC.EP-EP.ZZ-0304):
- Must be familiar with consequences of radiation exposure (Rad Worker trained)
- Declared pregnant women SHALL NOT volunteer
- Preference for volunteers over 45 years of age
- Must not have received previous emergency exposure
- Must be physically qualified (no disqualifying medications)
- Not a female capable of reproduction (preference)
Key Decision Point:
The applicant must systematically evaluate each volunteer against NC.EP-EP.ZZ-0304 criteria and correctly eliminate Volunteers 1-6 for specific disqualifying reasons, then select Volunteer 7 as the only acceptable candidate. Note that Volunteer 7's failed periodic exam does NOT disqualify him — he is still a trained SRO familiar with radiation consequences.
Ref: NC.EP-EP.ZZ-0304 (R17), NC.EP-EP.ZZ-0102 (R27) | Task: N/A | K/A: G2.3.14 — Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM SRO-A4 — Review Initial Contact Message Form (ICMF) Admin | SRO | G2.4.40 (N/A/4.5)
Location: Classroom (Administrative)
Time-Critical: Yes
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- At 1055, Salem Unit 2 initiated a manual SI due to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture on 23 SG
- RCS temperature is 543 degrees F
- BOTH motor driven auxiliary feedpumps failed to start and the Turbine Driven auxiliary feedpump (23 AFW Pump) automatically started and is feeding all intact SGs at 22E4 lbm/hr
- At 1100, the Shift Manager declared an ALERT
- 33 Ft. level wind direction is from 180 degrees at 5 mph
- No additional operator actions have been taken

Initiating Cue:
The Shift Manager directs you to perform an accuracy peer check on the provided Initial Contact Message Form (ICMF).
Document any errors on the attached worksheet, should any exist.
This is a TIME CRITICAL JPM.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has identified the following errors on the ICMF; (1) declaration time is incorrect, (2) description of the event is not in accordance with Table 1 of EP-SA-325-102, and (3) a release not in progress is incorrectly checked off. The ICMF should be in accordance with the attached answer key. This is a TIME CRITICAL JPM which must be completed within 15 minutes.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 * Determine if Section I has any errors No errors.
2.0 * Determine if Section II has any errors Documents that Section II has two errors: (1) declaration time is incorrect — should be 1100, and (2) the Description of Event is incorrect — should read "Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier" per Table 1 of EP-SA-325-102.
3.0 * Determine if Section III has any errors Documents that Section III incorrectly checked that NO release is in progress. A primary to secondary leak with the steam driven feedpump in service (supplied from 21 and 23 SGs, no actions taken to close 23MS45) constitutes a release in progress — no radiation monitor is monitoring the release path.
4.0 * Determine if Section IV has any errors No errors.
5.0 * Determine if Section V has any errors No errors.
Time-Critical:
This JPM must be completed within 15 minutes. The clock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue.
Key Decision Point:
The applicant must identify three errors across Sections II and III: (1) the ALERT declaration time should be 1100 not the time listed, (2) the event description should be "Loss of the Reactor Coolant System Barrier" per Table 1 of EP-SA-325-102 for an SGTR, and (3) a release IS in progress because the TD AFW pump is steam-supplied from 23 SG (the ruptured SG) and no actions have been taken to close 23MS45 — with no radiation monitor on the release path, this constitutes an unmonitored release.
Ref: EP-SA-325-F2 (R1), EP-SA-325-102 (R1) | Task: N1240010502 | K/A: G2.4.40 — Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementing procedures (SRO Only) | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-i — Start the SBO Air Compressor IAW AB.LOOP-1 In-Plant | RO/SRO | 056 AA1.37 (3.4)
Location: In-Plant — SBO Compressor Building (outside RCA, requires L-3 key)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Both Salem Units have tripped due to a loss of off-site power. Equipment problems have resulted in NO Emergency Control Air Compressors (ECACs) running.

Initiating Cue:
- The Unit 2 CRS has directed you to start the Station Blackout Compressor (SBO) IAW SC.OP-SO.CA-0001, SBO Diesel Control Air Compressor, starting with Step 5.1.3.
- The Component Off Normal and Off Normal Tagged review has been performed SAT.
- It is NOT the summer operating period.
- The inspection covers have already been removed, Step 5.1.1 was performed SAT, and the inspection covers replaced IAW Step 5.1.2
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant starts the SBO Diesel Control Air Compressor IAW step 5.1.10 of SC.OP-SO.CA-0001, aligns the discharge to the air headers IAW steps 5.1.13 thru 5.1.15 of SC.OP-SO.CA-0001, and loads the compressor IAW step 5.1.16 of SC.OP-SO.CA-0001.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.1.3 OPEN both Engine intake louvers (located outside building on west wall) Locates louvers and demonstrates how to open.
5.1.4 OPEN 1CA1920, BLACKOUT AIR COMPRESSOR DRAIN VALVE, drain water, then CLOSE Locates 1CA1920 and describes how to open, including removing drain cap.
5.1.5 OPEN 2FZSBO10, BATTERY CHARGER, breaker Locates 2FZSBO10 in Panel 2FZSBO, SBO Compressor Bldg Distribution Panel, and simulates opening.
5.1.6 PLACE SBO Control Air Dryer switch in ON position Locates switch, simulates turning to ON. Control Air On light illuminates.
5.1.7 RECORD Engine Hourmeter reading on Attachment 1 and in log book Locates Engine Hourmeter (1XA16993) inside engine control panel and logbook on side of panel 2FZSBO.
5.1.8 PLACE UNLOADER VALVE selector switch in START position Locates switch and ensures in START position (normally in Start when engine is shutdown).
5.1.9 * PRESS AND HOLD BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton Locates BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton in control panel and simulates depressing AND holding depressed.
5.1.10 * PLACE SBO-IGN-SWT, ENGINE IGNITION SWITCH in START until engine starts, then RELEASE to RUN While keeping Bypass Valve pushbutton depressed, simulates placing SBO-IGN-SWT in START. After engine starts, releases to RUN. Must NOT release BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton until oil pressure is verified >15 psig in next step.
5.1.11 * When engine oil pressure is >15 psig, RELEASE BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton Identifies oil pressure reading on gauge inside control panel. After cue (40 psig), releases BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton. Releasing early (without checking oil pressure) causes the engine to stop.
5.1.12 ALLOW engine to run for 5 minutes to warm up N/A — wait for warm-up period.
5.1.13 * OPEN 1CA1913 SBO COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE VALVE Locates and describes opening 1CA1913 to pressurize Control Air header.
5.1.14 * OPEN 1CA1886, BLACKOUT AIR COMPRESSOR ISOLATION Locates and describes opening 1CA1886 (near entrance to Service Building past U2 mixing bottle).
5.1.15 * OPEN 2CA584, YARD CONTROL AIR SUPPLY VALVE Locates and describes opening 2CA584 to pressurize Aux. Building 1A and 2A Control Air headers (near entrance to Service Building past U2 mixing bottle).
5.1.16 * PLACE UNLOADER VALVE selector switch in RUN position Returns to SBO Compressor Building and places UNLOADER VALVE selector switch in RUN to load the compressor.
Key Decision Point:
Steps 5.1.10 and 5.1.11 are the discriminating steps — the applicant must keep the BY-PASS VALVE pushbutton depressed while starting the engine with SBO-IGN-SWT, then verify oil pressure >15 psig BEFORE releasing the bypass valve pushbutton. Releasing the bypass valve early (without checking oil pressure) will cause the engine to stop.
Ref: SC.OP-SO.CA-0001 (R14) | Task: N1150140501 | K/A: 056 AA1.37 — Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: Instrument Air | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-j — Start Up and Parallel a Rod Drive M-G Set In-Plant | RO/SRO | 012 A4.07 (3.8)
Location: In-Plant — 84 ft. Elevation, Unit 1 Switchgear Room (no RCA entry required)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 1 is at 75% power.
- 12 Rod Drive M-G set is in service.
- 11 Rod Drive M-G Set tripped 3 days ago.
- Maintenance has completed repairs and is requesting 11 M-G set be placed in service.

Initiating Cue:
The CRS directs you to place 11 Rod Drive M-G set in service and parallel with 12 M-G set using Section 4.4 of S1.OP-SO.RCS-0001, Rod Control System Operation.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has started and paralleled 11 Rod Drive M-G set IAW S1.OP-SO-RCS-0001 section 4.4.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
4.4.1 ENSURE A AND B REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS are CLOSED; Running M-G Set GENERATOR LINE VOLTS is 260V (247V-273V) AND GENERATOR LINE AMPS is ~80 DC AMPS Locates A AND B REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS and verifies CLOSED indication. Locates 12 Rod Drive M-G Set GENERATOR LINE VOLT AND GENERATOR LINE AMPS meters and checks readings.
4.4.2 ALIGN MG Set Controls for MG Set to be started IAW Attachment 1 Verifies: Voltmeter selector switch on A-B, Voltage adjust in Vertical, Ammeter selector switch in A, Motor Breaker Control Switch target GREEN / breaker OPEN, Synchronize switch OFF, Generator Breaker Control Switch target GREEN / breaker OPEN.
4.4.3 * CLOSE MOTOR Breaker AND ALLOW at least 20 seconds for MG Set to reach rated speed Simulates closing 11 M-G set breaker by rotating the MOTOR Breaker switch to CLOSE.
4.4.4 * PRESS AND HOLD GEN FIELD FLASH pushbutton UNTIL Generator voltage stops rising (~260V) Simulates pressing and holding GEN FIELD FLASH pushbutton until Generator voltage stops rising. GENERATOR LINE VOLTS should indicate ~260V.
4.4.5.1 ADJUST VOLTAGE ADJUST full counterclockwise to LOW Simulates adjusting VOLTAGE ADJUST full counterclockwise. GENERATOR LINE VOLTS should indicate ~220V.
4.4.5.2 ADJUST VOLTAGE ADJUST full clockwise to HIGH Simulates adjusting VOLTAGE ADJUST full clockwise. GENERATOR LINE VOLTS should indicate ~300V.
4.4.5.3 ADJUST VOLTAGE ADJUST UNTIL GENERATOR LINE VOLTS indicates ~260V Simulates adjusting VOLTAGE ADJUST counterclockwise until GENERATOR LINE VOLTS indicates ~260V.
4.4.5.4 Direct Maintenance to obtain voltage reading on Running MG Set using DMM at back of installed voltmeter Directs Maintenance to obtain DMM voltage reading. DMM readings will be less (by ~1/2) than installed voltmeter readings.
4.4.5.5 Direct Maintenance to monitor voltage reading on In-coming MG Set using DMM at back of installed voltmeter Directs Maintenance to monitor voltage reading on In-coming MG Set.
4.4.5.6 * ADJUST VOLTAGE ADJUST UNTIL DMM voltage is 0-2.5 volts higher than the reading obtained in Step 4.4.5.4 Simulates adjusting VOLTAGE ADJUST in the CLOCKWISE direction until DMM reads 0-2.5V higher than running set (130V). Must adjust incoming M-G set voltage ABOVE the running set voltage before paralleling.
4.4.5.7 DIRECT Maintenance to REMOVE DMM AND CLOSE panel doors Directs Maintenance to remove DMM and close panel doors.
4.4.6 * PLACE MG Set SYNCHRONIZE Switch to ON, AND OBSERVE Generator Breaker automatically closes and load divides equally (~40 DC Amps each) If required, simulates moving Synchronize Switch from 12 MG set and inserting into 11 MG set, then places in ON. Generator breaker auto-closes and load stabilizes at 40 amps on each generator. CAUTION: Do NOT manually close generator output breaker — could trip both M-G Sets.
4.4.7 PLACE MG Set SYNCHRONIZE Switch to OFF Simulates rotating the SYNCHRONIZE Switch to the OFF position.
Key Decision Point:
Steps 4.4.5.6 and 4.4.6 are the discriminating steps — the applicant must adjust the incoming M-G set voltage 0-2.5V higher than the running set using DMM readings (CLOCKWISE to raise), then place the SYNCHRONIZE switch to ON to auto-close the generator breaker. The single synchronize handle must be moved from the 12 M-G set to the 11 M-G set. Manually closing the generator output breaker could trip both M-G sets.
Ref: S1.OP-SO.RCS-0001 (R36) | Task: N0015010104 | K/A: 012 A4.07 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: M/G set breakers | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM IP-k — Perform a Radioactive Waste Gas Release In-Plant | RO/SRO | 071 A1.03 (2.6)
Location: In-Plant — 64 ft. Elevation, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building (RCA entry required)
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 20 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Both Salem Units are operating at 100% power
- 21 Waste Gas Decay Tank is in Standby at 90 psig
- 22 Waste Gas Decay Tank is in Holdup at 15 psig
- 23 Waste Gas Decay Tank is O/S at 15 psig
- 24 Waste Gas Decay Tank is O/S at 15 psig
- 2R41 Plant Vent radiation monitor is OPERABLE
- Plant vent flow rate and sample flow rate monitors are OPERABLE

Initiating Cue:
The CRS directs you to RELEASE 21 Waste Gas Decay Tank starting at Step 5.2.11 of S2.OP-SO.WG-0008, 21 Gas Decay Tank to Plant Vent.
- Sections 5.1 and Steps 5.2.1 through 5.2.10 are complete.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has aligned the release path from 21 Waste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT) IAW step 5.2.11 of S2.OP-SO.WG-0008, released the radioactive gas from 21 WGDT IAW step 5.2.12 of S2.OP-SO.WG-0008, and upon REACHING 10 PSIG, terminates the release by locally closing the 2WG41 IAW step 5.2.14 of S2.OP-SO.WG-0008.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.2.11.A ENSURE 21 GDT is NOT in service Verifies 21 GDT is NOT in service.
5.2.11.B ENSURE 21 GDT is NOT selected for "Standby" Verifies 21 GDT is NOT selected for STANDBY.
5.2.11.C RECORD 21 GDT "Initial Pressure" (PIS1036) on Attachment 3 Records 21 GDT pressure (PIS1036) as 90 psig.
5.2.11.D.1 * TURN 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias fully counterclockwise until indicator <0% Simulates turning the Flow Bias knob fully COUNTER-CLOCKWISE until indicator is less than 0%. Must set bias to <0% before opening to latch and set the valve.
5.2.11.D.2 * POSITION 2WG41 Selector Switch to OPEN AND RELEASE to AUTO position (spring return) Simulates positioning 2WG41-SWT (local control switch at 104-2 panel) to OPEN, then releases to AUTO.
5.2.11.D.3 * TURN 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias clockwise until indicator >=100% Simulates turning 2WG41 flow bias CLOCKWISE until indicator reads >=100%. 2WG41 will not fully open until flow bias is adjusted to 100%.
5.2.11.D.4 ENSURE with Unit 2 Control Room that 2WG41 has lost CLOSED indication AND audible alarm received Calls Control Room to verify 2WG41 has lost closed indication and audible alarm was received.
5.2.11.D.5 * TURN 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias fully counterclockwise until indicator <0% Simulates turning 2WG41 flow bias COUNTER-CLOCKWISE until indicator reads <0%.
5.2.11.D.6 ENSURE with Unit 2 Control Room that 2WG41 has closed indication Calls Control Room to verify 2WG41 has CLOSED indication.
5.2.11.D.7 * POSITION 2WG41 Selector Switch to CLOSE Simulates positioning 2WG41 selector switch to CLOSE.
5.2.11.E PERFORM Independent Verification of 2WG41 Flow Bias position, RECORD on Attachment 1, Section 2.0 Requests another operator perform IV of the 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias position.
5.2.11.F * OPEN 21WG31, GDT INLET VALVE Simulates rotating valve COUNTER-CLOCKWISE to open 21WG31.
5.2.11.G * Slowly OPEN 21WG34 Simulates slowly rotating COUNTER-CLOCKWISE to open 21WG34.
5.2.11.H RECORD IV of 21 GDT discharge valves 21WG31 and 21WG34 on Attachment 1, Section 3.0 Requests IV of 21 GDT discharge valves prior to commencing release.
5.2.12.A * POSITION 2WG41 Selector Switch to OPEN AND RELEASE to AUTO (spring return) Simulates rotating selector switch to OPEN and then releasing to AUTO to commence the release.
5.2.12.B * SLOWLY SET 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias to <=100% (max release rate 32 SCFM) Simulates adjusting 2WG41 Waste Gas Vent Valve Flow Bias to <=100%, which corresponds to a maximum release rate of 32 SCFM.
5.2.12.C PERFORM IV of 2WG41 Flow Bias positioning on Attachment 1, Section 4.0 Requests IV on 2WG41 flow bias position.
5.2.12.D RECORD In Progress Release Data on Attachment 2, Section 5.1 Records data on Attachment 2.
5.2.13.B RECORD Meteorological Data in Attachment 2, Section 5.2 from SPDS screenshot Records MET Data from SPDS screenshot. If Met Monitor NOT OPERABLE, notify SM/CRS per UFSAR 7.7.2.12.
5.2.14.A * TURN 2WG41 Flow Bias fully counter-clockwise until indicator is <0% Simulates adjusting Flow Bias fully COUNTER-CLOCKWISE until indicator is <0% to secure the release.
5.2.14.B * PLACE 2WG41-SWT in CLOSE position, AND ENSURE 2WG41 is CLOSED Simulates placing switch 2WG41-SWT in CLOSED position and verifies 2WG41 is CLOSED.
5.2.14.C * CLOSE 21WG34 Simulates closing 21WG34 by turning valve in CLOCKWISE direction.
5.2.14.D RECORD Final Release Data in Attachment 2, Section 5.3 Records final release data.
Key Decision Point:
The latch-and-set sequence (Step 5.2.11.D) is the most complex portion — the applicant must correctly manipulate the 2WG41 Flow Bias and Selector Switch in the proper order (bias to <0%, open to auto, bias to 100%, verify lost closed indication, bias back to <0%, verify closed, then position selector to CLOSE). Then for the actual release (Step 5.2.12), the applicant must open 2WG41 to AUTO and set flow bias to <=100% (max 32 SCFM). Upon reaching 10 psig, the release is terminated by reducing flow bias to <0%, closing 2WG41-SWT, and closing 21WG34.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.WG-0008 (R27) | Task: N0715070104 | K/A: 071 A1.03 — Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Waste Gas Disposal System, including: Holdup tank pressure and level | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-a — Perform Control Rod System Surveillance Test Sim | RO/SRO | A4.16 (3.8)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power BOL.
- No major equipment is out of service and no Tech Specs are active.
- The rod control system surveillance is in progress.
- All sections are complete, except for exercising Control Bank D.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to complete the rod control system surveillance IAW S2.OP-ST.RCS-0001, Reactivity Control System Rod Control Assemblies.
- A Maintenance Technician is stationed at the Rod Control Power Cabinets (Relay Room)
- CRS directs that 15 steps of rod insertion will be performed to ensure each rod moves at least 10 steps.
- Notify the CRS when the testing is complete.
- Your evaluator will take care of all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has exercised Control Bank D at least 10 steps, and upon completion of the test, recognizes unexpected continuous rod movement and manually trips the reactor.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
4.1.10.1 Ensure Tavg is within +/-1F of Tref Checks Tavg/Tref recorder on 2RP4 and determines Tavg is within +/-1F of Tref.
4.1.10.2 * Place Bank Selector Switch in CBD position Rotates selector switch clockwise to the CBD position.
4.1.10.3 Ensure GRP SELECT B lights illuminated Contacts Maintenance Technician at Power Cabinets.
4.1.10.4 Insert Control Bank D 1 step Operator inserts one step.
4.1.10.5 Withdraw Control Bank D 1 step Operator withdraws one step. (Steps 4-5 repeated three times.)
4.1.10.6 * Maneuver Control Bank D at least 10 steps in one direction Inserts Control Bank D 15 +/- 1 steps.
4.1.10.7 Ensure each rod in CBD indicated movement of at least 10 steps Monitors rod position on plant computer and determines D bank rods all moved at least 10 steps.
4.1.10.8 * Record test results as SAT Records test results as SAT using Acceptance Criteria in Attachment 1.
4.1.10.9 * Restore Control Bank D to pre-test position Withdraws Bank D to previous position (ARO).
4.1.11.3 * Place Bank Selector Switch in AUTO — recognize unexpected continuous rod insertion and manually trip the reactor Determines Turbine Power is >15% and rotates selector switch to AUTO position. Announces rods are stepping in with no runback in progress. Places rod bank switch to Manual — rod motion has NOT stopped. Recognizes rod insertion is continuing and manually trips the reactor.
Key Decision Point:
Step 4.1.11.3 is the alternate path / discriminating step — after placing the rod bank selector switch in AUTO, an uncontrolled rod insertion malfunction activates. The applicant must recognize that rods continue inserting even after placing the switch in Manual, and manually trip the reactor.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.RCS-0001 (R27), OP-AP-300-1001 | Task: N1140340401 | K/A: A4.16 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Rod speed and direction | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-b — Transfer To Hot Leg Recirculation Sim | RO/SRO | A4.05 (4.1)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 6 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- You are the incoming crew.
- Unit 2 experienced a Large Break LOCA.
- The previous crew completed the actions to transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation IAW EOP-LOCA-3 and have transitioned back to EOP-LOCA-1.
- 22 SI pump tripped following completion of LOCA-3 and is being investigated.
- 21 RHR pump is C/T for scheduled maintenance prior to the event.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-LOCA-4, TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has aligned the plant for Hot Leg Recirculation IAW Steps 4 and 8 of 2-EOP-LOCA-4.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
1.0 Are BOTH RHR Pumps Running? Determines that ONLY 22 RHR Pump is running (21 RHR pump is C/T). Goes to Step 4.
4.0 Is 22 RHR Pump Running? YES — determines that 22 RHR Pump is running.
4.0 * (cont'd) CLOSE 22CS36 (RHR Supply to CS Valve) Depresses CLOSE PB for 22CS36 and verifies CLOSE PB illuminates.
4.0 (cont'd) Is 21SJ45 (RHR Discharge to SI Pumps) OPEN? Verifies 21SJ45 closed.
4.0 * (cont'd) OPEN 22SJ49 (Cold Leg Isolation Valve) Depresses OPEN PB for 22SJ49 and verifies OPEN PB illuminates.
5.0 Is 22 SI Pump Running? NO — verifies 22 SI pump tripped. Goes to Step 8. (Alternate path begins here.)
8.0 * STOP 21 SI Pump Depresses 21 SI Pump STOP PB on 2CC1 and verifies STOP PB illuminates.
8.0 * (cont'd) CLOSE 21SJ134 (Cold Leg Discharge Valve) Depresses CLOSE PB for 21SJ134 on 2CC1 and verifies CLOSE PB illuminates.
8.0 * (cont'd) OPEN 21SJ40 (Hot Leg Discharge Valve) Opens 21SJ40 by inserting key and rotating; verifies OPEN PB illuminates.
8.0 * (cont'd) START 21 SI Pump Depresses START PB for 21 SI Pump and verifies START PB illuminates.
Key Decision Point:
Step 5.0 is the alternate path entry — the applicant must recognize that 22 SI pump is NOT running (tripped following LOCA-3 completion) and proceed to Step 8, which realigns 21 SI pump from cold leg to hot leg injection by stopping the pump, closing the cold leg discharge valve, opening the hot leg discharge valve, and restarting the pump.
Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-4 (R41) | Task: 1150110501 | K/A: A4.05 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Transfer of ECCS flowpaths | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-c — Depressurize RCS Using Aux Spray IAW EOP-LOCA-2 Sim | RO/SRO | A4.05 (3.2)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 5 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- The reactor was tripped when a RCS leak occurred.
- All RCPs have been stopped
- 2PR1 is inoperable with 2PR6 isolated with power removed
- The operating crew has progressed through the EOPs and is now in 2-EOP-LOCA-2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS directs you to depressurize the RCS to minimize subcooling IAW Step 20 of 2-EOP-LOCA-2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION
- Notify the CRS when Step 20 is completed.
- Your evaluator will take care of all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has depressurized RCS using Auxiliary spray IAW step 20 of 2-EOP-LOCA-2.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
C20-1 CAUTION: Accumulators should be isolated prior to depressurizing RCS to less than 700 psig if SI has been terminated Verifies 21-24SJ54s closed.
N20-1 NOTE: Upper head region may void during RCS depressurization if RCPs not running Acknowledges the Note.
20 Is normal PZR spray available? NO — with no RCPs running, normal spray is not available.
20 * (cont'd) Is at least one PZR PORV available? YES.
20 * (cont'd) Depressurize RCS using one PZR PORV Opens 2PR2 to attempt to depressurize RCS but it will not open. 2PR1 remains isolated and unavailable.
20 * (cont'd) Is RCS pressure dropping? NO — observes valve not repositioning. (Alternate path begins here.)
20 * (cont'd) Depressurize RCS using Aux Spray Opens 2CV75 (RCS Aux Spray Valve). Closes 2CV77 (Charging to Loop 23) and 2CV79 (Charging to Loop 24). Monitors RCS pressure and verifies pressure is lowering.
20 (cont'd) Operate PZR heaters as necessary to maintain PZR liquid saturated Checks PZR temperature and determines if pressurizer heaters are required to be energized.
20.1 * When PZR level >77% (74% adverse) or RCS subcooling <10F, stop RCS depressurization Realigns aux spray to normal: closes 2CV75 and opens 2CV77 or 2CV79. (RCS subcooling is cued as 9F and lowering.)
Key Decision Point:
The alternate path begins when 2PR2 (PORV) fails to open — the applicant must recognize that RCS pressure is NOT dropping, then transition to the Aux Spray depressurization method by opening 2CV75 and closing 2CV77/2CV79. The applicant must also recognize the subcooling limit of <10F (cued at 9F and lowering) requires stopping the depressurization and restoring normal charging alignment.
Ref: 2-EOP-LOCA-2 (R41) | Task: N1150090501 | System: 010 PZR Pressure Control System | K/A: A4.05 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: PZR Auxiliary Spray Valves | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-d — Initiate Bleed and Feed Using Reactor Head Vents Sim | RO/SRO | A2.04 (4.5/4.5)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 8 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 was manually tripped at 90% power due to elevated main turbine vibrations IAW S2.OP-AB.TL-0001.
- An inadvertent feedwater isolation actuation occurred resulting in the loss of all main feedwater.
- Loss of all AFW flow occurred when all AFW pumps tripped.
- The crew has entered 2-EOP-FRHS-1 due to valid RED Path on Heat Sink CFST based on all SG NR levels < 9% and AFW flow < 22E4 lbm/hr.
- Plant conditions have continued to deteriorate and three (3) steam generator Wide Range levels are now less than 20%.
- MSPI AFW pump failed to start.
- The CRS is implementing the CAS action to Initiate Bleed and Feed.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to Initiate Bleed and Feed starting at Step 11 IAW 2-EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has actuated Safety Injection, opened one Pressurizer PORV, and opened 2RC40 - 43 RCS head vent valves IAW steps 11, 13, and 14 of 2-EOP-FRHS-1.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
C11-1 CAUTION: Steps 11 thru 14 must be performed quickly to establish RCS heat removal by Bleed and Feed Reads the Caution and continues.
11 * Actuate both trains of SI Initiates SI by inserting key and turning switch clockwise until the SI Operate bezel illuminates and the SI Reset bezel extinguishes.
12 Is centrifugal Charging Pump flow indicated? YES — reports BIT flow is established by indication on Charging flowmeter.
12 (cont'd) Are all SI pumps running? YES — reports that both SI pumps are running by START PBs illuminated Red.
13 Is power available to BOTH PZR PORV stop valves? YES — reports power is available to both stop valves.
13 (cont'd) Are ALL PZR PORV Stop Valves OPEN? Reports that both PZR PORV Stop Valves are OPEN as indicated by 2PR6 and 2PR7 OPEN bezels illuminated.
13 * (cont'd) Open ALL PZR PORVs Places both PZR PORVs in Manual and depresses OPEN PBs for 2PR1 and 2PR2. Reports that 2PR2 will NOT OPEN.
14 Are ALL PZR PORVs Open? NO — reports that 2PR2 will NOT OPEN. (Alternate path begins here.)
14 * (cont'd) Open 2RC40 thru 2RC43 (Reactor Head Vents) At the 2RP2 backpanel, obtains keys and inserts key into each keyswitch one at a time and turns clockwise until the OPEN indicator illuminates.
Key Decision Point:
Step 14 is the alternate path / discriminating step — 2PR2 fails to open, so the applicant must recognize that NOT all PORVs are open and proceed to open the Reactor Head Vent valves (2RC40 through 2RC43) as an alternate bleed path. This requires going to the 2RP2 backpanel and using keys to open each vent valve individually.
Ref: 2-EOP-FRHS-1 (R41) | Task: 1150290501 | System: 002 Reactor Coolant System | K/A: A2.04 — Ability to predict the impacts of Loss of heat sinks on the RCS and use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-e — Establish FW Flow IAW EOP-FRHS-1 Using a Condensate Pump Sim | RO/SRO | A4.02 (3.6/3.6)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 15 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 3.
- No SGFPs or AFW pumps are available.
- Actions are being implemented IAW 2-EOP-FRHS-1.
- The crew has completed actions through step 7.1

Initiating Cue:
- CRS directs you to continue performing actions of 2-EOP-FRHS-1 at Note 7-2
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has selected and depressurized a steam generator using the steam dumps IAW step 7.3 and 7.4 of 2-EOP-FRHS-1, established flow with a condensate pump and places steam dumps in auto to stabilize pressure less than 575 psig, IAW continuous action step 7.2 of 2-EOP-FRHS-1.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
N7-2 NOTE: 21 and 23 SGs should be steamed LAST to maximize availability of a steam supply for 23 AFW pump Candidate should pick 22 or 24 to depressurize.
N7-3 NOTE: The following steps may result in a Low Steamline Diff Press SI Acknowledges note.
7.2 CAS: When selected SG pressure <575 psig and WR level rising, stabilize selected SG pressure <575 psig Reads Continuous Action Step.
7.2 (cont'd) SELECT only one SG for depressurization to less than 575 psig Chooses 22 or 24 SG.
7.3 Are condenser steam dumps available? YES path.
7.3 * (cont'd) Actuate main steam isolation for all loops EXCEPT selected SG Actuates MSLI for 21 and 23 (and 22 or 24) MS Lines, keeping only the selected SG un-isolated.
7.3 * (cont'd) Place steam dumps in Manual Places steam dumps in Manual.
7.3 (cont'd) Adjust steam pressure valve demand to 0% Adjusts valve demand to 0%.
7.3 * (cont'd) Place steam dumps in MS Press Control Places steam dumps in MS Pressure Control at 0% valve demand.
7.4 * When RCS Tavg Low-Low is reached, depress BYPASS Tavg pushbutton Bypasses Tavg Low-Low when required.
7.4 * (cont'd) Adjust steam pressure valve demand to establish max rate Adjusts to at least 25%.
7.4 * (cont'd) Send operator to open selected BF40 Main Feed Bypass Valve Dispatches operator to open BF40.
7.4 * (cont'd) OPEN selected BF13 Feed Water Isolation Valve Opens BF13 Feed Water Isolation Valve.
7.4 (cont'd) Is selected BF13 OPEN? YES — may dispatch operator if needed.
7.4 (cont'd) Release selected BF22 Feed Line Stop Check Valve Verifies open.
7.4 (cont'd) Open 21 and 22 CN48 Feed Pump Bypass Valves Opens valves.
7.4 (cont'd) Close 21 and 22 CN32 Feed Pump Suction Valves Performs this task.
7.5 * Is condensate flow established to any SG? When YES and WR level is rising, places steam dumps in auto.
Key Decision Point:
Step 7.4 is the discriminating area — the applicant must bypass Tavg Low-Low when reached, then perform a multi-step sequence to establish condensate flow: isolate all MS lines except the selected SG, depressurize below 575 psig using steam dumps, dispatch an operator for the BF40, open the BF13 isolation valve, open CN48 bypass valves, close CN32 suction valves, and verify condensate flow is established with WR level rising before placing steam dumps in auto.
Ref: 2-EOP-FRHS-1 (R42) | Task: N1150290501 | System: 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control | K/A: A4.02 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Steam dump cooldown valves | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-f — Perform 22 CFCU Surveillance Test IAW S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003 Sim | RO/SRO | A1.04 (3.3)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- No major equipment out of service and no active Tech Specs are in effect.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- The CRS has directed you to PERFORM a scheduled surveillance test on 22 CFCU IAW S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003, Containment Systems - Cooling Systems.
- All Prerequisites are completed SAT and all required M&TE are installed in the field.
- A field NEO is standing by to provide SW header differential pressure when directed.
- Notify CRS of test results.
Task Standard:
This task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has placed the CFCU in the required test condition IAW step 4.1.2 of S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001, obtained the required test data, and determines 22 CFCU Test Result is UNSAT due to flow obtained being below the minimum flow for current delta P IAW S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
3.0 P&L 3.4: If measured DP value is between DP values in Exhibit 1, select minimum flow for next higher DP value Reads and initials all P&Ls. Understanding P&L 3.4 is important to properly determining which DP value to choose.
5.1.1.A Ensure CFCU being tested is in LOW SPEED IAW S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001 Goes to S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001 to place CFCU in low speed.
5.1.2.A * Press FAN HIGH SPEED STOP bezel for 22 CFCU Depresses HIGH SPEED STOP bezel for 22 CFCU and verifies STOP bezel illuminates.
5.1.2.B * Ensure FAN STOP bezel is illuminated Verifies HIGH SPEED STOP bezel is illuminated.
5.1.2.C * When 25 seconds have elapsed, press FAN LOW SPEED START bezel Waits 25 seconds from when HIGH SPEED STOP was depressed. Depresses LOW SPEED START bezel for 22 CFCU and verifies START bezel illuminates.
5.1.2.D Ensure dampers are in indicated positions Verifies: ROUGH FLT DAMPER CLOSED bezel extinguished; HEPA INLET DAMPER OPEN bezel illuminated; HEPA OUTLET DAMPER OPEN bezel illuminated.
5.1.2.E If SW flow < 1465 gpm, stop CFCU Determines SW flow > 1465 gpm, marks step N/A and continues.
5.1.2.F Ensure SW flow >= 1465 gpm Verifies SW flow > 1465 gpm. Returns to S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003.
5.1.1.B Record Start Time Records START time in applicable Attachment, Section 3.0.
4.1.11.3 * When at least 15 minutes elapsed, record stop time, SW flow, SW header DP, and determine Test Results Records STOP time. Records SW flow on 22 CFCU (~1785 gpm). Contacts field NEO and records 21 SW Header DP of 106 psi. Determines 22 CFCU is UNSAT/Inoperable because Cooling Water Flow Rate (1785 gpm) is less than the Minimum Flow Rate (1811 gpm) required in Exhibit 1 at SW DP of 110 psi (per P&L 3.4, must use next higher DP value).
Key Decision Point:
Step 4.1.11.3 is the discriminating step — the applicant must correctly apply P&L 3.4: with a measured SW header DP of 106 psi (between 105 and 110), they must select the minimum flow for the next HIGHER DP value (110 psi = 1811 gpm required). Since actual flow is ~1785 gpm, which is less than 1811 gpm, the test result is UNSAT. P&L 3.3 also requires CFCU SW flow rate >= 1465 gpm AND >= Min Flow Rate in Exhibit 1 to be Operable.
Ref: S2.OP-ST.CBV-0003 (R20), S2.OP-SO.CBV-0001 | Task: N0220130201 | System: 022 Containment Cooling System | K/A: A1.04 — Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Containment Cooling System: Cooling water flow | Source: Bank | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-g — Respond to a Failed High RCS T-avg Channel IAW S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 Sim | RO/SRO | A4.05 (3.8)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: No
Estimated Time: 6 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 is at 100%
- No major equipment is out of service and no Tech Specs are active.

Initiating Cue:
- You are the Reactor Operator.
- Respond to all alarms and indications.
- Your evaluator will respond to all alarms not related to your task.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has taken the Rod control system to manual IAW step 3.1 of S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, restored Tavg IAW step 3.5 of S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003, stabilized PZR level and defeated the failed Tavg channel IAW step 3.10 thru 3.12 of S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
N/A * Recognize unwarranted rod motion and take rods to manual Verifies no runback in progress and takes rods to manual.
3.1 Enter S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 and place rod bank selector switch in Manual Enters AB.ROD-0003 and places the rod control bank selector switch in Manual.
3.2 Did rod motion stop? YES — continues to step 3.4.
3.4 Monitor Tavg for necessary adjustments Initials and monitors Tavg until the cause of the transient is known and the plant is stable.
3.5 * Adjust rods in manual to control Tavg within 1.5F of Tprogram Verifies Tavg within 1.5F and continues, or adjusts by withdrawing rods to within 1.5F of Tprogram (Attachment 1, Tavg Program vs % Reactor Power).
3.6 Has a NIS channel failed high? NO — goes to step 3.8.
3.8 Stop any dilution of the Reactor Coolant System Verifies makeup system out of service and states no dilution in progress.
3.9 Has a Tavg channel failed high? YES — goes to step 3.10.
3.10 Return PZR level to program Places Master Flow Controller (or CV55) in manual and adjusts to restore level to program band.
3.11 * Select DEVIATION DEFEAT for affected loop — Reactor Coolant Differential Temperatures Selects deviation defeat on 2CC2 for channel 1 Differential Temperature.
3.11 * (cont'd) Select DEVIATION DEFEAT for affected loop — Reactor Coolant Average Temperatures Selects deviation defeat on 2CC2 for channel 1 Average Temperature.
3.12 * Select a valid channel on recorder — Reactor Coolant Differential Temperatures Selects recorder to Channel 2, 3, or 4 for Differential Temperature.
3.12 * (cont'd) Select a valid channel on recorder — Reactor Coolant Average Temperatures Selects recorder to Channel 2, 3, or 4 for Average Temperature.
3.13 When PZR level restored to program, return Charging System Master Flow Controller to AUTO Verifies level is at program and returns charging master flow controller to Auto.
3.14 Are control rods above Rod Insertion Limits? Verifies rods are above insertion limits.
3.16 If manual rod control is NOT required, place Rod Control System in automatic control CRS directs rods restored to auto control. Places rod control in Auto.
Key Decision Point:
The discriminating area spans steps 3.5 through 3.12 — the applicant must recognize the Tavg channel failed high (Loop 21 Hot Leg RTD), take rods to manual, restore Tavg to within 1.5F of Tprogram by withdrawing rods, stabilize PZR level, defeat the deviation alarms for both Differential Temperature and Average Temperature on 2CC2, and select a valid recorder channel for both parameters.
Ref: S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 (R23) | Task: N1150090501 | System: 012 Reactor Protection System | K/A: A4.05 — Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Channel defeat controls | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

JPM Sim-h — Perform a Containment Pressure Relief Sim | RO/SRO | A2.02 (3.0/3.0)
Location: Simulator
Time-Critical: No
Alternate Path: Yes
Estimated Time: 10 minutes

Initial Conditions:
- Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power
- Preparations to perform a containment pressure relief per Section 5.1 of S2.OP-SO.CBV-0002, Containment Pressure - Vacuum Relief System Operation, are complete.

Initiating Cue:
- The CRS directs you to perform a containment pressure relief per Section 5.2 of S2.OP-SO.CBV-0002.
Task Standard:
The task is satisfactorily met when the applicant has placed containment pressure relief in service per step 5.2.3.B of S2.OP-SO.CBV-0002, and upon a high radiation alarm, manually closes 2VC5 and 2VC6 valves to isolate the radiological release from containment per step 5.2.5 of S2.OP-SO.CBV-0002 OR per Attachment 1 of S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001.
▶ Show Critical Steps & Key Actions
Step Critical Element Standard
5.2.2 Record Release Data on Attachment 2, Section 1.0 Records Pressure Relief Start, Initial Containment Pressure, and initial readings on radiation monitors 2R41D (preferred) and 2R12A.
5.2.3.A Monitor available radiation monitors 2R41D and 2R12A Sets up trend on Plant Computer or monitors Radiation Monitors on 2RP1.
5.2.3.B * If containment pressure <0.5 psig, OPEN 2VC6, 2VC5, and PRESSURE RELIEF DAMPER Confirms containment pressure < 0.5 psig. Depresses OPEN bezels for 2VC6, 2VC5, and PRESSURE RELIEF DAMPER on 2CC1 and verifies Red OPEN bezels are LIT.
5.2.4 Record time 2VC5 and 2VC6 are opened in Control Room Narrative Log Extra NCO will record the open time.
5.2.5 * Upon high radiation alarm (OHA A-6 RMS HI RAD OR TRBL on 2R41D), manually CLOSE PRESSURE RELIEF DAMPER, 2VC6, and 2VC5 Depresses CLOSE bezel pushbuttons for PRESSURE RELIEF DAMPER, 2VC6, and 2VC5 and verifies the Green bezels are LIT. (Alternate path — automatic closures have been defeated; applicant must manually close to isolate the release.)
Alternate Procedural Path (S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001):
If the applicant enters S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001 instead of using step 5.2.5 of S2.OP-SO.CBV-0002, the following actions are also acceptable:
Step Action Standard
3.1 Determine affected Radiation Monitor Determines 2R41D is the affected monitor.
3.2 Is the alarm valid? Determines the alarm is VALID.
3.3 Announce on Plant PA system Makes page announcement with affected monitor number, name, and location.
3.4 Direct Shift Rad Pro to complete Station Status Checklist Notifies Rad Pro of actions.
3.5 Notify SM/CRS to refer to ECG, ODCM, Tech Specs Notifies CRS of required actions.
3.6 Initiate applicable attachment for 2R41D Initiates Attachment 1 Step 10.
10.1 * Ensure 2VC1, 2VC4, 2VC5, and 2VC6 are CLOSED Depresses CLOSE bezel pushbuttons for 2VC5 and 2VC6 and verifies Green bezels are LIT.
Key Decision Point:
The alternate path begins when OHA A-6 (RMS HI RAD OR TRBL) alarms due to 2R41D high radiation during the containment pressure relief. The automatic isolation of the pressure relief dampers and 2VC5/2VC6 has been defeated by malfunctions — the applicant must recognize the alarm and manually close 2VC5 and 2VC6 (at minimum) to isolate the radiological release. This can be done via step 5.2.5 of S2.OP-SO.CBV-0002 or via S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001, Attachment 1, Step 10.
Ref: S2.OP-SO.CBV-0002 (R18), S2.OP-AB.RAD-0001 (R30), S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0001 (R60) | Task: N0220080101 | System: 029 Containment Purge System | K/A: A2.02 — Ability to predict the impacts of Adverse environmental conditions affecting radioactive release on the Containment Purge System and use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences | Source: New | View JPM PDF

Connections

Scenario 1 — Load Reduction / LBLOCA Simulator | 8 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power BOL

Turnover: The crew is directed to reduce power to 89% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 using boration, control rods and turbine load control in preparation for Main Turbine Valve testing.
Major Events:
  1. Planned Load Reduction to 89% at 10%/hour
  2. 24 Vacuum Pump trips
  3. 2N41 Power Range Channel Fails High (TS)
  4. RCS Leak — 20 gpm (TS)
  5. Large Break LOCA (leak worsens to 350 gpm)
  6. Auto SI fails to actuate on both trains
  7. #2 ECAC Fails to Start on SEC Signal
  8. Two Phase A valves (2CV116 and 284) fail to close
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Planned Load Reduction to 89% CRS briefs crew on power reduction. RO initiates boration IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006. PO initiates turbine load reduction IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0002 — adjust ramp rate to 10%/hr, set to 89%, select GO.
2 24 Vacuum Pump trips PO reports trip. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum. PO initiates Att 1 CAS, dispatches operator for Att 2 local checks. PO starts 22 and 25 vacuum pumps — 22 trips after start, 25AR25 fails to open. Backpressure stabilizes below trip setpoint.
3 2N41 Power Range Channel fails high RO reports rods stepping in, no runback. RO places rod control in Manual. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001, NIS Malfunction. CRS directs removal of 2N41 from service IAW S2.OP-SO.RPS-0001 (place in Tripped Condition). CRS evaluates TS 3.3.1.1 — one PR channel inoperable.
4 RCS Leak — 20 gpm inside containment RO reports 2R11A containment radiation rising, PZR level lowering, RCS pressure lowering. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.RC-0001, RCS Leak. RO determines leak rate. RO swaps to centrifugal charging pump. CRS evaluates TS 3.4.7.2 for identified/unidentified leakage.
5 Large Break LOCA — leak worsens to 350 gpm RO reports leak exceeds makeup capability. CRS implements Att 1 CAS — Trip the reactor. RO manually trips reactor, verifies trip. CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1.
6 Auto SI fails to actuate on both trains RO manually actuates SI on one train, verifies other train actuated. Continues EOP-TRIP-1 immediate actions: backs up turbine trip, verifies 4KV vital buses energized, verifies SI initiated.
7 #2 ECAC fails to start on SEC signal PO reports #2 ECAC failed. PO blocks and resets 2C SEC. RO starts #2 ECAC. PO throttles AFW flow. RO reports containment pressure >15 psig — Phase B and Spray auto-initiated. MSLI auto-initiated.
8 Two Phase A valves (2CV116, 284) fail to close PO reports 2CV116 and 284 NOT in required position. CRS directs manual closure. At least one valve on each penetration must be closed before transitioning out of TRIP-1. (Critical Task #1)
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-11): Close containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each Phase A penetration before transition out of TRIP-1. Safety significance: preserves containment boundary to minimize fission product release following LOCA.

CT#2 (CT-36): Transfer to cold leg recirculation before RWST Lo-Lo level (1.2 feet) is reached or ECCS pump cavitation. Includes time-critical operator actions: (1) Close 2SJ69 within 3.7 min of RWST Lo Level, (2) Stop 22 CS pump within 5.5 min, (3) ECCS pumps verified in recirculation within 11.2 min. Safety significance: failure to transfer before RWST empties results in loss of all pumped safety injection and containment spray.
EOP Pathway:
S2.OP-AB.COND-0001 (vacuum pump trip) → S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001 (PR channel fail) → S2.OP-AB.RC-0001 (RCS leak) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip/SI) → EOP-LOCA-1 (RCS leak identified, SI termination criteria, RWST Lo Level) → EOP-FRTS-1 (possible Purple path on Thermal Shock — enter/exit, no actions) → EOP-LOCA-3 (transfer to cold leg recirculation) → Scenario terminated after ECCS aligned to recirculation
Source: 20-01 ESG-1 | View Scenario PDF

Connections

Scenario 2 — Steam Line Break / Faulted SG Isolation Simulator | 8 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: Salem Unit 2 is at 100% power MOL

Turnover: The crew is directed to reduce power to 95% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 using boration, control rods and turbine load control in preparation for removing 21 Heater drain pump from service. The 21 Service Water pump is C/T for maintenance.
Major Events:
  1. PZR Level channel I fails high (2LT-459)
  2. 21 RCP standpipe level Low
  3. 23 SW Pump trips and 26 SW Pump fails to auto start
  4. 23 Condensate Pump trips
  5. 21 Steam Line break (inside containment)
  6. MSLI fails on first train actuated
  7. Isolate faulted SG
  8. Terminate SI
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Load Reduction to 95% for Heater Drain Pump removal Crew briefs reactivity plan to reduce load to 95%. RO initiates boration and/or inserts control rods — PRESS Makeup mode STOP, ADJUST 2CV172 boric acid flow setpoint, SET boric acid flow register, PRESS Borate, PRESS Start, ENSURE flow indication. PO initiates turbine load reduction IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0002 — ADJUST ramp rate to 10%/hr, ADJUST setter to 89%, select GO. RO monitors Tavg and control rods for proper response.
2 PZR Level CH I fails high (2LT-459) RO reports unexpected alarms OHA E-4 PZR LVL HI, E-20 PZR HTR ON LVL HI. RO reports PZR Level Channel I has failed high and charging flow has lowered. RO places Master Flow Control in Manual and raises charging flow to restore PZR level to program. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001. PO initiates Attachment 1 CAS. RO reports charging pump running with no cavitation. RO selects operable Channel 3 for control and operable Channel 2 or 3 for recorder. RO reports letdown in service. CRS directs PO to review S2.OP-RPS-0003 to remove failed channel from service. CRS enters TS 3.3.1.1 action 6 (72 hours to place channel in tripped condition).
3 21 RCP standpipe level low Crew reports unexpected console alarm, 21 RCP Standpipe level low. Crew refers to alarm response and makes up to standpipe IAW S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011. RO verifies Seal Water Leakoff alarm is clear. START 21 or 22 Primary Water Pump. OPEN 2WR80 PW to Contmt Stop Valve. OPEN 21WR62 Standpipe Supply Valve. LOG RCP standpipe fill. When low level clears and high level alarms: STOP Primary Water Pump, CLOSE 2WR80, CLOSE 21WR62. Crew monitors parameters.
4 23 SW Pump trips / 26 SW Pump fails to auto start RO reports unexpected OHA alarms: B-13 21 SW HDR PRESS LO, B-14 22 SW HDR PRESS LO, B-15 TURB AREA SW HDR PRESS LO. RO reports 23 SW Pump tripped and 26 SW Pump in Auto failed to start. RO starts 26 SW pump. RO reports low SW pressure alarms cleared. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.SW-0001, Loss of SW Header Pressure. PO initiates Attachment 1 CAS. PO reports no indication of SW Bay leak. PO starts SW Pumps to maintain header pressure 95-150 psi. PO reports all SW OHA alarms cleared. CRS enters TS 3.7.4 (72 hours) — 21 and 23 SW Pumps inoperable in one bay, only one operable SW loop.
5 23 Condensate Pump trips PO reports 23 Condensate Pump tripped. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CN-0001, Main Feedwater/Condensate Abnormality. PO initiates Attachment 1 CAS. PO reports SGFP did not trip. PO reports SGFP suction pressure less than 320 psig. PO opens 21-23 CN108s (Polisher Bypass valves). CRS evaluates plant conditions IAW Attachment 2 section 4.0 — determines load reduction to 85% Rx power at ≤ 5%/min is required. CRS briefs load reduction and reactivity plan. RO initiates boration IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006. PO initiates load reduction using turbine load control IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0002 — ADJUST setter to 85%, select GO. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.LOAD-0001, Rapid Load Reduction. RO maintains Tavg on program. CRS directs WCC to transfer heating steam to Unit 1.
6 21 SG Steam Line Break (inside containment) RO reports unexpected alarms: C-38 CFCU LK DET HI, CONT PRESS HI, then C-30 CFCU LK DET HI-HI. PO determines no rise in containment radiation; leak is inside containment based on rising containment pressure. RO reports C-2 CNTMT SUMP PUMP START. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow. PO verifies EHC system operating correctly, MS10s and Steam Dumps are closed. PO reports no SG Safety Valve open or leaking. RO reports Rx Power not stable and rising containment pressure. RO places all CFCUs in SLOW speed. RO reports steam leak in containment is not isolable. CRS determines Unit shutdown is required.
7 Unisolable steam leak worsens — Rx Trip, MSLI, and SI CRS determines need to implement CAS of AB.STM-1 based on containment pressure rising towards Auto SI (4 psig). RO trips Rx and confirms trip. RO manually initiates MSLI. RO verifies steam leak is not isolated. RO initiates SI. RO reports 21 SG is the faulted SG. PO throttles AFW flow to no less than 22E4 lbm/hr. CT#1 Part 1: PO closes 21AF21 and 21AF11 to isolate faulted 21 SG (≤ 10 minutes). RO reports SEC loading status. PO reports 21 and 22 AFW pumps operating. RO reports 21 and 22 CA330s closed. RO reports containment pressure has NOT remained less than 15 psig. PO reports MSLI requirements met and MSLI previously initiated. RO reports CAV in Accident Pressurized mode. RO reports 2 CCW pumps running, both CCW HXs in Auto. RO reports correct ECCS pump alignment and expected flows. All RCPs stopped (Phase B actuation). RO reports Tavg rising, trending to 547 F. RO reports both PZR PORVs closed and block valves open. PO reports 21 SG pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner. CRS transitions to EOP-LOSC-1.
8 Faulted SG isolation (LOSC-1) and SI termination (TRIP-3) In LOSC-1: PO reports all valves in Table A closed. PO reports 21 SG pressure dropping in uncontrolled manner. CT#1 Part 2: PO closes or verifies closed 21BF13, 21BF19, 21BF40, 21MS7, 21MS10, 21MS18, 21MS167, and 21GB4. CRS dispatches operator to close 21MS45. RO resets Phase A, opens 21 and 22 CA330s, resets SG sample isolation bypass, opens 21-24 SS94s. CRS directs Chemistry to sample 21-24 SGs for activity. PO reports all radiation monitors in Table B are normal. RO reports RCS subcooling >0 F, RCS pressure stable or rising, PZR level >11%.

CRS transitions to EOP-TRIP-3, SI Termination. RO resets SI & SEC, Phase A, Phase B. CT#2 Part 1: RO stops all but one Charging Pump. RO reports RCS pressure stable or rising, charging pump suction aligned to RWST. RO opens 2CV139 and 2CV140. CT#2 Part 2: RO closes 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ13 (isolate BIT). RO closes 2CV71, opens 2CV68 and 2CV69. RO adjusts 2CV55 to maintain PZR level and RCP Seal Injection. RO reports PZR level stable or rising, RCS pressure >1540 psig (1660 psig adverse). CT#2 Part 3: RO stops 21 and 22 SI pumps. CT#2 Part 4: RO stops 21 and 22 RHR pumps (suction verified aligned to RWST). Scenario terminated when CT-2 is completed.
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-17): Isolate faulted SG before transition out of LOSC-1. Includes time-critical operator action: isolate AFW flow to faulted SG by closing respective AF21 and AF11 ≤ 10 minutes. Part 1 — close 21AF21 and 21AF11 to stop AFW to faulted 21 SG. Part 2 — close or verify closed 21BF13, 21BF19, 21BF40, 21MS7, 21MS10, 21MS18, 21MS167, and 21GB4 to complete feed and steam isolation.

Safety significance: Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Failure can result in challenges to Integrity, Subcriticality, and Containment (break inside containment). Could also constitute failure to recognize a failure or incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

Cues: Steam pressure and flow rate indications identify 21 SG as faulted AND valve position/flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to the faulted SG.

Measurable performance: MSIVs indicate closed. Feedwater control valves indicate closed (respective AF21 and AF11 closed ≤ 10 minutes). Feedline isolation valves indicate closed. Main feed pumps tripped. AFW flow to faulted SG stopped — AFW flow control valves for faulted SG indicate closed. Feedback: depressurization of intact SGs stops, steam flow from faulted SG decreases to zero, RCS cooldown stops, AFW flow rate to faulted SG of zero.

CT#2 (CT-48): Terminate ECCS flow before transition out of TRIP-3. Part 1 — secure all but 1 charging pump. Part 2 — isolate BIT by closing 2SJ4 and 2SJ5 or 2SJ12 and 2SJ13. Part 3 — secure SI pumps. Part 4 — secure RHR pumps.

Safety significance: Failure to terminate ECCS flow when SI termination criteria are met causes the PZR to fill and RCS pressure to increase. Additionally, unnecessary continuation of ECCS flow needlessly aggravates thermal stress on the reactor vessel. This constitutes an incorrect performance that causes a "significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario."

Cues: Indication/annunciation of extreme (RED path) or severe (ORANGE path) challenge to Integrity CSF AND indication of reactor trip and SI AND indication that SI termination criteria are met.

Measurable performance: Breaker position lamps for all but one charging/SI pump indicate open AND breaker position lamps for all high-head ECCS pumps indicate open AND breaker position lamps for all low-head ECCS pumps indicate open AND valve position lamps for BIT isolation valves indicate closed. Feedback: charging/SI ECCS flow rate through BIT decreasing or zero, high-head ECCS flow rate decreasing or zero, low-head ECCS flow rate decreasing or zero.
EOP Pathway:
AB.CVC-0001 (PZR level channel fails high) → ARP S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011 (RCP standpipe) → AB.SW-0001 (SW pump trip) → AB.CN-0001 (condensate pump trip) → AB.LOAD-0001 (rapid load reduction) → AB.STM-0001 (excessive steam flow / steam leak inside containment) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip and SI for unisolable steam break) → EOP-LOSC-1 (loss of secondary coolant — faulted SG isolation) → EOP-TRIP-3 (SI termination) → Scenario terminated after ECCS flow terminated
Source: 20-01 ESG-2 | View Scenario PDF

Connections

Scenario 3 — ATWS / Stuck-Open PORV Simulator | 8 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 93% power MOL

Turnover: The crew is directed to raise power to 98% power at 10% per hour IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 using dilution, control rods and turbine load control. The 23 Charging pump is C/T for maintenance.
Major Events:
  1. Power ascension to 98% at 10%/hour
  2. 21 CCW pump trips — 23 CCW pump fails to auto start
  3. 21 Charging pump trips
  4. Pressurizer pressure channel I fails high
  5. Main turbine rising vibrations
  6. Reactor fails to trip by all means from the control room (ATWS)
  7. 2PR2 pressurizer PORV fails open
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Power Ascension to 98% CRS briefs crew on power ascension to 98% at 10%/hr IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operation. RO briefs reactivity plan — 1000 gal dilution to be performed first, then withdraw control rods. RO initiates dilution IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006. PO initiates turbine load control IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0001 — adjust ramp rate to 10%/hr, set to 98%, select GO. RO monitors Tavg and control rods for proper response.
2 21 CCW pump trips, 23 CCW fails to auto start RO reports unexpected console alarms for 21 CC HDR Pressure Lo and RCP Thermal Barrier Discharge Flow Lo. RO reports 21 CCW pump tripped and standby pump failed to auto start. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CC-0001. RO places 23 CCW in Manual and starts 23 CCW pump. RO reports Discharge Flow Lo alarm is cleared.
3 21 Charging pump trips RO reports 21 charging pump trip. RO reports letdown is isolated as expected. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging. PO initiates AB.CVC-1 CAS. CRS initiates S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 from CAS item 4.0 (monitor RCP parameters). RO reports no charging pumps running, no indication of cavitation prior to trip, 21 charging pump tripped, 22 charging pump available. RO verifies RCP seal inlet temps <225 F, closes 2CV55. RO starts 22 Charging Pump, adjusts 2CV55 to desired flow, ensures RCP seal injection 6-12 gpm, ensures 2CV7 open. RO opens 2CV2 and 2CV277 and places in Auto, adjusts charging flow to 85-90 gpm. RO opens one letdown orifice and maintains letdown pressure <300 psig by adjusting 2CV18 in manual, then places 2CV18 in Auto. RO reports PZR level stable or rising, returns 2CV55 to auto when PZR level is on program. CRS evaluates Tech Specs: TS 3.5.2.a action a (72 hours), 3.1.2.4 (72 hours), and 3.1.2.2 (72 hours).
4 PZR Pressure Channel I fails high RO reports unexpected OHA alarms D-8 RC Press HI and E-42 2PR1 1/2 Trip. RO determines actual pressure is not high, reports spray valves open and heaters off. CRS directs RO to place Master Pressure Controller (MPC) in manual. RO places MPC to Manual and lowers demand to close sprays and energize PZR heaters. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. CRS directs initiation of Att. 1 CAS and gives band for control of PZR pressure. RO reports PZR Press Channel I failed high. RO selects Channel III for control, matches MPC demand to current pressure, returns MPC to AUTO. RO closes 2PR6 to comply with Tech Specs. CRS directs WCC to remove control power from 2PR6. CRS directs PO to initiate removing failed channel from service and contact I&C for support IAW S2.OP-SO.RPS-0003. PO checks that tripping associated bistables will not result in ESF or RPS actuation. PO verifies Channel III selected for Master Pressure Control, selects PZR Pressure recorder to channel other than I. CRS evaluates Tech Specs: LCO 3.3.1.1 Action 6 (72 hours), 3.3.2.1.b Action 19 (72 hours), 3.4.5.b (1 hour), and 3.2.5.b DNB (2 hours).
5 Main turbine high vibrations — ATWS PO announces unexpected alarm G-35 TSI Trouble and dispatches secondary operator to evaluate. PO checks vibrations on plant computer — vibrations have risen and continue to rise. CRS holds brief to discuss limits and requirements to trip turbine when >9 Mils on any bearing. CRS may direct a downpower to reduce vibrations. Vibrations continue to rise above trip criteria. CRS directs reactor trip and turbine trip.
6 Reactor fails to trip — ATWS RO attempts to trip reactor using both Rx trip switches and Rx trip breaker bezels — reactor fails to trip. Crew announces ATWT. RO recommends entering EOP-FRSM-1. CRS enters EOP-FRSM-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation. RO initiates manual rod insertion (rod speed controller failed to 8 spm — RO should recognize failure and place in manual). Crew dispatches NEO to locally open Reactor Trip Breakers and M-G Set breakers. PO reports PZR heater bus breakers will not open. PO trips Main Turbine. PO starts 21 and 22 AFW pumps. PO reports three S/Gs greater than 14%. PO reports total AFW flow. RO reports immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1 and FRSM-1 are complete. RO ensures 22 Charging pump is running (21 CV is C/T). RO reports SI has not actuated. RO starts both boric acid pumps in fast speed. RO opens 2CV175 Rapid Boration Valve. RO closes 21 and 22CV160s. RO reports flow indicated on Rapid Borate flowmeter. RO places 2CV55 or Master flow controller in manual and verifies charging pump flow >87 gpm. (Critical Task #1 evaluated here.) Locally dispatched operator opens Rx Trip breakers. RO reports PZR pressure <2335 psig. RO reports 2VC5 and 2VC6 closed. RO reports RTBs and bypass breakers open. PO reports all turbine stop valves closed. RO reports PRNIs <5%. RO reports IRNI SUR is negative. CRS goes to FRSM-1 Step 16, directs boration continue for adequate SDM. CRS returns to EOP-TRIP-1, transitions to EOP-TRIP-2.
7 2PR2 PZR PORV fails open RO reports unexpected OHA for 2PR1/2 NOT CLSD. RO reports PZR pressure not stable or trending to 2235 psig. RO reports PZR pressure lowering and identifies 2PR2 failed open. RO reports 2PR2 will NOT close in manual. RO closes PZR PORV block valve 2PR7. (Critical Task #2)
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-52): Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods, and dispatch operators to locally trip the reactor and/or the turbine: de-energize the control rod drive MG sets, insert control rods, or establish emergency boration flow to the RCS. Safety significance: failure to insert negative reactivity results in the reactor remaining critical or returning to a critical condition, constituting incorrect reactivity control. Cues: indication of ATWS and indication that reactor is not tripped and manual trip is not effective. Measurable criteria: rod position indication shows rods moving inward and reaching bottom, and/or emergency boration flow path established with appropriate pump(s) running and flow rate indicated. Feedback: negative SUR on IR NIS, less than 5% power on PR NIS.

CT#2 (CT-10): Close the block MOV (2PR7) upstream of the stuck-open PZR PORV (2PR2) by completion of the first step in the ERG network that directs the crew to close the block MOV. Safety significance: failure to close the block MOV results in unnecessary continuation of the degraded RCS fission product barrier — crew fails to prevent degradation of a barrier to fission product release. The RCS barrier can be restored to full integrity by closing the block MOV. Cues: valve position indication and/or annunciation that PORV is open after attempts to close manually, decreasing RCS pressure, PRT temperature/level/pressure indications consistent with PZR fluid discharge, and block MOV position indication showing Open. Measurable criteria: valve position indication shows block MOV closed.
EOP/Procedure Pathway:
ARP (CCW pump trip alarms) → S2.OP-AB.CC-0001 (loss of CCW) → S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 (loss of charging) → S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001 (RCP monitoring from CAS) → S2.OP-AB.PZR-0001 (PZR pressure channel fail) → S2.OP-AB.TRB-0001 (turbine high vibrations) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip/SI — trip fails) → EOP-FRSM-1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation — ATWS, manual rod insertion, emergency boration, dispatch to locally trip RTBs) → EOP-TRIP-2 (Reactor Trip Response — PORV fails open, close block valve 2PR7)
Source: New / 21-01 ESG-3 | View Scenario PDF

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Scenario 4 — Power Ascension / Station Blackout Simulator | 7 Events | 2 Critical Tasks
Initial Conditions: Salem Unit 2 is at 2% power BOL; 21 SGFP in service

Turnover: The crew is directed to continue power ascension to 10% reactor power IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 using control rods, steam dumps, and turbine load control.
Major Events:
  1. Power Ascension
  2. Containment pressure channel 1 fails high
  3. Charging master flow controller failure requiring manual control of charging
  4. #2 SW bay leak
  5. Loss of Offsite power
  6. Loss of all AC Power
  7. Failure of 23 AFW pump to auto start
▶ Show Event Sequence & Expected Responses
# Event Expected Crew Response
1 Power Ascension to 10% / Mode 1 entry CRS directs power ascension using Main Steam Dumps in MS Pressure Control and control rods. PO raises steam dump demand IAW S2.OP-SO.MS-0002, section 5.4 using Attachments 3 or 4 — slowly adjusts Steam Dump Pressure Setpoint to maintain less than 1000 psig. RO withdraws control rods at specified increments to maintain Tave on program (~549 F at 10%). RO announces when NIS indicates 5% Reactor Power and records time of Mode 1 entry in Control Room Narrative Log.
2 Containment pressure channel 1 fails high RO announces unexpected OHA alarm CNTMT PRESS HI-HI OHA C-6. CRS places power ascension on hold. RO reports actual containment pressure is normal and appears the channel is failed. PO reviews S2.OP-AR-ZZ-0003, determines notification must be written and TS evaluation performed. CRS enters TS 3.3.2.1 Act b 16.
3 Charging Master Flow Controller fails low RO reports lowering charging flow and/or low RCP seal injection flow. RO diagnoses Master Flow Controller (MFC) output lowering with PZR level on or below program. CRS directs RO to place MFC in manual and restore charging flow. RO places MFC in manual and adjusts demand to required flow. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, and directs initiation of Att 1 CAS. RO reports 23 charging pump in service with no indication of cavitation. RO reports NO PZR level channel failure, VCT level channel has NOT failed, NO indication of charging header leak, charging MFC failed. RO reports manual control of 23 charging pump established and PZR level can be maintained stable or rising. CRS assigns responsibility and band for manual PZR level control.
4 #2 SW Bay Leak RO reports unexpected OHA alarm B-29 (21-23 SW PMP SUMP AREA LVL HI), followed by B-13 (21 SW HDR PRESS LO) and B-14. ARP for OHA B-29 directs entry into S2.OP-AB.SW-0003 if concurrent with B-13. RO starts or announces auto start of 25 SW pump, clearing low header pressure alarms. CRS enters S2.OP-AB.SW-0003, SW Bay Leak, and initiates CAS. NEO dispatched — reports large leak in back of #2 SW bay, water level ~2.5 ft above pump pedestal and rising. PO opens 21 and 22 SW23s, closes 21 and 22 SW17s, starts all Bay 4 SW pumps, stops all Bay 2 SW pumps. Crew dispatches NEO to open control power breakers for 21-23 SW pumps. PO closes 21SW22 and 21SW20. NEO reports leak is isolated. PO reports SW remains available to EDGs, SW supplied to Turbine Building through 23SW20. PO initiates action to remove one CCHX from service IAW CAS item 4.0. CRS enters LCO 3.7.4 (72 hours) due to having only one operable SW loop.
5 Loss of Offsite Power — Automatic Reactor Trip CRS directs RO to trip the Rx and perform immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. RO turns reactor trip switch to backup the automatic Rx trip. RO performs immediate actions: confirms reactor tripped, trips main turbine. PO reports NO Vital Buses are energized — entry into EOP-LOPA-1 required. CRS transitions to EOP-LOPA-1, Loss of All AC Power.
6 Loss of All AC Power (SBO) RO performs LOPA-1 immediate actions: Trip Reactor, Trip Turbine. CRS and RO verify immediate actions. RO may close 2CV2 and 2CV277. RO reports both PORVs closed, excess letdown isolated. PO reports 2A and B EDG running with breakers open and 2C EDG tripped (overspeed, bent linkage). RO reports SI has not been actuated — RO actuates SI. After 74 seconds, crew resets SI. CRS dispatches operator to deenergize all SECs. CRS directs crew to stop 2A and 2B EDGs (no SW pump running). RO depresses stop pushbutton for all loads in Table A of LOPA-1. CRS directs performance of S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0001. CRS has SM contact ESO for power availability. CRS dispatches operator for seal injection isolation, seal return, and CCW thermal barrier isolation.
7 23 AFW Pump fails to auto start — Manual start required (CT-1) PO reports 23 AFW pump failed to auto start. PO manually starts 23 AFW pump. PO throttles AFW flow to no less than 220000 lbm/hr. CRS assigns CAS for loss of 23 AFW pump. CRS directs WCC to ensure 21 and 22 AFW pump breakers open and remove control power for 21 and 22 AFW pumps. PO reports valves in Table B closed except 21-24 MS167 — crew closes 21-24 MS167. PO places 21-24 BF19 and 40s in manual and closed. RO states 21-24 SS94 closed. PO states 21-24 GB4s closed. PO states NO SG pressures dropping uncontrolled or completely depressurized. PO gives AFW status and SG levels to CRS. PO reports AFWST greater than 21%. PO reports SG levels greater than 9%. PO opens 21-24 MS10s and begins cooldown at less than 100 F/hr (CT-2).
Critical Tasks:
CT#1 (CT-23): Establish 220000 lbm/hr AFW flow before steam generator dryout occurs (WR ≤ 11%) during SBO. Safety significance: failure to establish minimum AFW flow is a violation of the basic objective of ECA-0.0 and the assumptions of its analyses. Without AFW flow, SGs cannot support any significant plant cooldown and the crew loses the ability to delay adverse consequences of core uncovery. Decay heat would open SG safety valves and rapidly deplete SG inventory, leading to loss of secondary heat sink (SG dryout). Decay heat would then increase RCS temperature and pressure until PORVs open, imposing a larger LOCA than RCP seal leakage. Cues: indication/annunciation of station blackout AND insufficient AFW flow to SGs. Measurable criteria: manipulation of controls to establish minimum required AFW flow rate (valve position indication or pump speed increasing) with indication that at least minimum required AFW flow is being delivered.

CT#2 (CT-26): Depressurize the intact SG(s) such that a maximum of 100 F/hr cooldown rate is established and SG pressure(s) does not go below 310 psig. Additional limiting conditions: SG depressurization not initiated until NR level in at least one intact SG >9% (15% for adverse containment); if NR level cannot be maintained >9%, depressurization stopped until level restored; RCS cold leg temperature does not decrease below 280 F; if positive SUR indicated on source or intermediate range, depressurization stopped and RCS allowed to heat up. Safety significance: failure to depressurize and cool down the RCS results in greater possibility for core damage. Depressurization and cooldown reduce RCS inventory loss rate, reduce RCP seal degradation rate, and allow replenishment of RCS inventory by accumulator injection — extending time to core uncovery and maximizing time available to restore AC power. Cues: indication that all AC emergency buses are de-energized AND Step 17 of ECA-0.0 is reached. Measurable criteria: manipulation of controls to depressurize intact SGs at highest achievable rate within 100 F/hr limit, with SG PORVs open maximum consistent with controllability, RCS cold leg cooldown <100 F/hr, NR level >9% in at least one intact SG, SG pressure >310 psig, RCS cold leg temperature >280 F, and zero/negative SUR on source and intermediate ranges.
EOP / AB Pathway:
S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 (power ascension) → S2.OP-AR-ZZ-0003 (containment press alarm, TS 3.3.2.1) → S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 (loss of charging) → S2.OP-AB.SW-0003 (SW bay leak, TS 3.7.4) → EOP-TRIP-1 (reactor trip/SI on loss of offsite power) → EOP-LOPA-1 (loss of all AC power — SBO) → S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0001 (loss of offsite power recovery actions) → Cooldown commenced via SG depressurization → Scenario terminated after CT-2 evaluated
Source: 20-01 ESG-4 | View Scenario PDF

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